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FEDERALIST No. 1

General Introduction
For the Independent Journal.
Saturday, October 27, 1787

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting
federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new
Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its
own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the
existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it
is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting
in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been
reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to
decide the important question, whether societies of men are really
capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and
choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their
political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in
the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be
regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong
election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be
considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of
patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good
men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be
directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and
unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this
is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The
plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests,
innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its
discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views,
passions and prejudices little favorable to the discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution
will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest
of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may
hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the
offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted
ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize
themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter
themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of
the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under
one government.

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature.
I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve
indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their
situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious
views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated
by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the
opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its
appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not
respectable -- the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived
jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes
which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many
occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right
side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance,
if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who
are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any
controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be
drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who
advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their
antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition,
and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate
as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a
question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing
could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all
times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion,
it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword.
Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.

And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have
already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as in all
former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and
malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the
opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually
hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the
number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the
bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and
efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a
temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty.
An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which
is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be
represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity
at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one
hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble
enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and
illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that
the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty; that,
in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their
interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more
often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the
people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and
efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been
found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the
latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of
republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an
obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending
tyrants.

In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my
fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts,
from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the
utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which
may result from the evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same
time, have collected from the general scope of them, that they proceed
from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my
countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an attentive
consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest to adopt it.
I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your
dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel.
I will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have
decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely
lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness
of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply
professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my
own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by
all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace
the cause of truth.

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting
particulars:

THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY
OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF A
GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE
ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO
THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN
STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS
ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT,
TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a
satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made their
appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the
utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts
of the great body of the people in every State, and one, which it may be
imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it
whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new
Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too great extent for any
general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate
confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.[1] This doctrine will,
in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough
to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to
those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the
alternative of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of
the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the
advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers,
to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall
accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.

PUBLIUS

1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held
out in several of the late publications against the new Constitution.

____

FEDERALIST No. 2

Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
For the Independent Journal.
Wednesday, October 31, 1787

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon to
decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of the
most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety of their
taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious, view of it, will
be evident.

Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government,
and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is
instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in
order to vest it with requisite powers. It is well worthy of
consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the interest
of the people of America that they should, to all general purposes, be
one nation, under one federal government, or that they should divide
themselves into separate confederacies, and give to the head of each the
same kind of powers which they are advised to place in one national
government.

It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion that the
prosperity of the people of America depended on their continuing firmly
united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of our best and wisest
citizens have been constantly directed to that object. But politicians
now appear, who insist that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead
of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a
division of the States into distinct confederacies or sovereignties.
However extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it nevertheless has
its advocates; and certain characters who were much opposed to it
formerly, are at present of the number. Whatever may be the arguments or
inducements which have wrought this change in the sentiments and
declarations of these gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the
people at large to adopt these new political tenets without being fully
convinced that they are founded in truth and sound policy.

It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was
not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one
connected, fertile, widespreading country was the portion of our western
sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a
variety of soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable
streams, for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A
succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders,
as if to bind it together; while the most noble rivers in the world,
running at convenient distances, present them with highways for the easy
communication of friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and
exchange of their various commodities.

With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has
been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people --
a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language,
professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of
government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their
joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a
long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and
independence.

This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and
it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so
proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by
the strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial,
jealous, and alien sovereignties.

Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and
denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have uniformly
been one people each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same
national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we have made
peace and war; as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies; as a
nation we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and entered into
various compacts and conventions with foreign states.

A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the people,
at a very early period, to institute a federal government to preserve
and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political
existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in flames, when
many of their citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility
and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and
reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and
wellbalanced government for a free people. It is not to be wondered at,
that a government instituted in times so inauspicious, should on
experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it
was intended to answer.

This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. Still
continuing no less attached to union than enamored of liberty, they
observed the danger which immediately threatened the former and more
remotely the latter; and being pursuaded that ample security for both
could only be found in a national government more wisely framed, they as
with one voice, convened the late convention at Philadelphia, to take
that important subject under consideration.

This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of the
people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by their
patriotism, virtue and wisdom, in times which tried the minds and hearts
of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season of peace, with
minds unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many months in cool,
uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally, without having been
awed by power, or influenced by any passions except love for their
country, they presented and recommended to the people the plan produced
by their joint and very unanimous councils.

Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED, not
imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended to
BLIND approbation, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate and
candid consideration which the magnitude and importance of the subject
demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. But this (as was
remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished
than expected, that it may be so considered and examined. Experience on
a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. It is
not yet forgotten that well-grounded apprehensions of imminent danger
induced the people of America to form the memorable Congress of 1774.
That body recommended certain measures to their constituents, and the
event proved their wisdom; yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the
press began to teem with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very
measures. Not only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the
dictates of personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of
consequences, or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose
ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public good,
were indefatigable in their efforts to pursuade the people to reject the
advice of that patriotic Congress. Many, indeed, were deceived and
deluded, but the great majority of the people reasoned and decided
judiciously; and happy they are in reflecting that they did so.

They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and
experienced men. That, being convened from different parts of the
country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a variety
of useful information. That, in the course of the time they passed
together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests of their
country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that head.
That they were individually interested in the public liberty and
prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination than
their duty to recommend only such measures as, after the most mature
deliberation, they really thought prudent and advisable.

These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely greatly
on the judgment and integrity of the Congress; and they took their
advice, notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors used to deter
them from it. But if the people at large had reason to confide in the
men of that Congress, few of whom had been fully tried or generally
known, still greater reason have they now to respect the judgment and
advice of the convention, for it is well known that some of the most
distinguished members of that Congress, who have been since tried and
justly approved for patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in
acquiring political information, were also members of this convention,
and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and experience.

It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding
Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably joined with
the people in thinking that the prosperity of America depended on its
Union. To preserve and perpetuate it was the great object of the people
in forming that convention, and it is also the great object of the plan
which the convention has advised them to adopt. With what propriety,
therefore, or for what good purposes, are attempts at this particular
period made by some men to depreciate the importance of the Union? Or
why is it suggested that three or four confederacies would be better
than one? I am persuaded in my own mind that the people have always
thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform
attachment to the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons,
which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers.
They who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct
confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem clearly to
foresee that the rejection of it would put the continuance of the Union
in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly would be the case, and I
sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreseen by every good citizen,
that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have
reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL
TO ALL MY GREATNESS."

PUBLIUS

____

FEDERALIST No. 3

The Same Subject Continued
(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
For the Independent Journal.
Saturday, November 3, 1787

JAY

To the People of the State of New York:

IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the
Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily
persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their
interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect
for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and
uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly
united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for
all general and national purposes.

The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear
to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that
they are cogent and conclusive.

Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary
to direct their attention, that of providing for their SAFETY seems to
be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation to a great
variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords
great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and
comprehensively.

At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the
preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from
FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE KIND arising
from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it is
proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to
examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial
Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best
security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from abroad.

The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will
always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the
causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. If this
remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes
of war are likely to be given by UNITED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America;
for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the
fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union tends most to
preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.

The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation
of treaties or from direct violence. America has already formed treaties
with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia,
are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and injure us. She has also
extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect
to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighborhood to
attend to.

It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the
laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident
that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national
government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by
three or four distinct confederacies.

Because when once an efficient national government is established, the
best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will
generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or
other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or
senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more
general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications
will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national
government, -- especially as it will have the widest field for choice,
and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon
in some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration,
the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national
government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of
individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to
other nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to us.

Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of
treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in
one sense and executed in the same manner, -- whereas, adjudications on
the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four
confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as
well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by
different and independent governments, as from the different local laws
and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the
convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and
judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national
government, cannot be too much commended.

Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the
governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and
justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and
consequently having little or no influence on the national government,
the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be
preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great
weight to this reasoning.