A Theologico Political Treatise [Part IV]
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Benedict de Spinoza >> A Theologico Political Treatise [Part IV]
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[16:7] (82) Lastly, treason can only be committed by subjects, who by
compact, either tacit or expressed, have transferred all their rights to the
state: a subject is said to have committed this crime when he has attempted,
for whatever reason, to seize the sovereign power, or to place it in
different hands. (83) I say, has attempted, for if punishment were not to
overtake him till he had succeeded, it would often come too late, the
sovereign rights would have been acquired or transferred already.
(16:84) I also say, has attempted, for whatever reason, to seize the
sovereign power, and I recognize no difference whether such an attempt
should be followed by public loss or public gain. (85) Whatever be his
reason for acting, the crime is treason, and he is rightly condemned: in
war, everyone would admit the justice of his sentence. (86) If a man does
not keep to his post, but approaches the enemy without the knowledge of his
commander, whatever may be his motive, so long as he acts on his own motion,
even if he advances with the design of defeating the enemy, he is rightly
put to death, because he has violated his oath, and infringed the rights of
his commander. (87) That all citizens are equally bound by these rights in
time of peace, is not so generally recognized, but the reasons for obedience
are in both cases identical. (88) The state must be preserved and directed
by the sole authority of the sovereign, and such authority and right have
been accorded by universal consent to him alone: if, therefore, anyone else
attempts, without his consent, to execute any public enterprise, even though
the state might (as we said) reap benefit therefrom, such person has none
the less infringed the sovereigns right, and would be rightly punished for
treason.
(16:89) In order that every scruple may be removed, we may now answer the
inquiry, whether our former assertion that everyone who has not the
practice of reason, may, in the state of nature, live by sovereign natural
right, according to the laws of his desires, is not in direct opposition to
the law and right of God as revealed. (90) For as all men absolutely
(whether they be less endowed with reason or more) are equally bound by the
Divine command to love their neighbour as themselves, it may be said that
they cannot, without wrong, do injury to anyone, or live according to their
desires.
(16:91) This objection, so far as the state of nature is concerned, can be
easily answered, for the state of nature is, both in nature and in time,
prior to religion. (92) No one knows by nature that he owes any obedience to
God [Endnote 28], nor can he attain thereto by any exercise of his reason,
but solely by revelation confirmed by signs. (93) Therefore, previous to
revelation, no one is bound by a Divine law and right of which he is
necessarily in ignorance. (94) The state of nature must by no means be
confounded with a state of religion, but must be conceived as without
either religion or law, and consequently without sin or wrong: this is how
we have described it, and we are confirmed by the authority of Paul. (95) It
is not only in respect of ignorance that we conceive the state of nature as
prior to, and lacking the Divine revealed law and right; but in respect of
freedom also, wherewith all men are born endowed.
(16:96) If men were naturally bound by the Divine law and right, or if the
Divine law and right were a natural necessity, there would have been no need
for God to make a covenant with mankind, and to bind them thereto with an
oath and agreement.
(16:97) We must, then, fully grant that the Divine law and right originated
at the time when men by express covenant agreed to obey God in all things,
and ceded, as it were, their natural freedom, transferring their rights to
God in the manner described in speaking of the formation of a state.
(98) However, I will treat of these matters more at length presently.
[16:8] (99) It may be insisted that sovereigns are as much bound by the
Divine law as subjects: whereas we have asserted that they retain their
natural rights, and may do whatever they like.
(16:100) In order to clear up the whole difficulty, which arises rather
concerning the natural right than the natural state, I maintain that
everyone is bound, in the state of nature, to live according to Divine law,
in the same way as he is bound to live according to the dictates of sound
reason; namely, inasmuch as it is to his advantage, and necessary for his
salvation; but, if he will not so live, he may do otherwise at his own risk.
(101) He is thus bound to live according to his own laws, not according to
anyone else's, and to recognize no man as a judge, or as a superior in
religion. (102) Such, in my opinion, is the position of a sovereign, for he
may take advice from his fellow-men, but he is not bound to recognize any as
a judge, nor anyone besides himself as an arbitrator on any question of
right, unless it be a prophet sent expressly by God and attesting his
mission by indisputable signs. (103) Even then he does not recognize a man,
but God Himself as His judge.
[16:9] (104) If a sovereign refuses to obey God as revealed in His law,
he does so at his own risk and loss, but without violating any civil or
natural right. (105) For the civil right is dependent on his own decree; and
natural right is dependent on the laws of nature, which latter are not
adapted to religion, whose sole aim is the good of humanity, but to the
order of nature - that is, to God's eternal decree unknown to us.
(16:106) This truth seems to be adumbrated in a somewhat obscurer form by
those who maintain that men can sin against God's revelation, but not
against the eternal decree by which He has ordained all things.
(107) We may be asked, what should we do if the sovereign commands anything
contrary to religion, and the obedience which we have expressly vowed to
God? should we obey the Divine law or the human law? (108) I shall treat of
this question at length hereafter, and will therefore merely say now, that
God should be obeyed before all else, when we have a certain and
indisputable revelation of His will: but men are very prone to error on
religious subjects, and, according to the diversity of their dispositions,
are wont with considerable stir to put forward their own inventions, as
experience more than sufficiently attests, so that if no one were bound to
obey the state in matters which, in his own opinion concern religion,
the rights of the state would be dependent on every man's judgment
and passions. (109) No one would consider himself bound to obey laws framed
against his faith or superstition; and on this pretext he might assume
unbounded license. (110) In this way, the rights of the civil authorities
would be utterly set at nought, so that we must conclude that the sovereign
power, which alone is bound both by Divine and natural right to preserve and
guard the laws of the state, should have supreme authority for making any
laws about religion which it thinks fit; all are bound to obey its behests
on the subject in accordance with their promise which God bids them to keep.
(16:111) However, if the sovereign power be heathen, we should either enter
into no engagements therewith, and yield up our lives sooner than transfer
to it any of our rights; or, if the engagement be made, and our rights
transferred, we should (inasmuch as we should have ourselves transferred the
right of defending ourselves and our religion) be bound to obey them, and to
keep our word: we might even rightly be bound so to do, except in those
cases where God, by indisputable revelation, has promised His special aid
against tyranny, or given us special exemption from obedience. (112) Thus we
see that, of all the Jews in Babylon, there were only three youths who were
certain of the help of God, and, therefore, refused to obey Nebuchadnezzar.
(113) All the rest, with the sole exception of Daniel, who was beloved by
the king, were doubtless compelled by right to obey, perhaps thinking that
they had been delivered up by God into the hands of the king, and that the
king had obtained and preserved his dominion by God's design. (114) On the
other hand, Eleazar, before his country had utterly fallen, wished to give a
proof of his constancy to his compatriots, in order that they might follow
in his footsteps, and go to any lengths, rather than allow their right and
power to be transferred to the Greeks, or brave any torture rather than
swear allegiance to the heathen. (115) Instances are occurring every day in
confirmation of what I here advance. (116) The rulers of Christian
kingdoms do not hesitate, with a view to strengthening their dominion, to
make treaties with Turks and heathen, and to give orders to their subjects
who settle among such peoples not to assume more freedom, either in
things secular or religious, than is set down in the treaty, or allowed by
the foreign government. (117) We may see this exemplified in the Dutch
treaty with the Japanese, which I have already mentioned.
[17:0] CHAPTER XVII - IT IS SHOWN THAT NO ONE CAN, OR
NEED, TRANSFER ALL HIS RIGHTS TO THE SOVEREIGN POWER.
OF THE HEBREW REPUBLIC, AS IT WAS DURING THE LIFETIME
OF MOSES, AND AFTER HIS DEATH, TILL THE FOUNDATION
OF THE MONARCHY; AND OF ITS EXCELLENCE. LASTLY, OF
THE CAUSES WHY THE THEOCRATIC REPUBLIC FELL, AND WHY
IT COULD HARDLY HAVE CONTINUED WITHOUT DISSENSION.
[17:1] (1) The theory put forward in the last chapter, of the universal
rights of the sovereign power, and of the natural rights of the individual
transferred thereto, though it corresponds in many respects with actual
practice, and though practice may be so arranged as to conform to it more
and more, must nevertheless always remain in many respects purely ideal. (2)
No one can ever so utterly transfer to another his power and, consequently,
his rights, as to cease to be a man; nor can there ever be a power so
sovereign that it can carry out every possible wish. (3) It will always be
vain to order a subject to hate what he believes brings him advantage, or to
love what brings him loss, or not to be offended at insults, or not to wish
to be free from fear, or a hundred other things of the sort, which
necessarily follow from the laws of human nature. (4) So much, I think, is
abundantly shown by experience: for men have never so far ceded their power
as to cease to be an object of fear to the rulers who received such power
and right; and dominions have always been in as much danger from their own
subjects as from external enemies. (5) If it were really the case, that men
could be deprived of their natural rights so utterly as never to have any
further influence on affairs [Endnote 29], except with the permission of the
holders of sovereign right, it would then be possible to maintain with
impunity the most violent tyranny, which, I suppose, no one would for an
instant admit.
(17:6) We must, therefore, grant that every man retains some part of his
right, in dependence on his own decision, and no one else's.
(7) However, in order correctly to understand the extent of the sovereign's
right and power, we must take notice that it does not cover only those
actions to which it can compel men by fear, but absolutely every action
which it can induce men to perform: for it is the fact of obedience, not the
motive for obedience, which makes a man a subject.
(17:8) Whatever be the cause which leads a man to obey the commands of the
sovereign, whether it be fear or hope, or love of his country, or any other
emotion - the fact remains that the man takes counsel with himself, and
nevertheless acts as his sovereign orders. (9) We must not, therefore,
assert that all actions resulting from a man's deliberation with himself are
done in obedience to the rights of the individual rather than the sovereign:
as a matter of fact, all actions spring from a man's deliberation with
himself, whether the determining motive be love or fear of punishment;
therefore, either dominion does not exist, and has no rights over its
subjects, or else it extends over every instance in which it can prevail on
men to decide to obey it. (10) Consequently, every action which a subject
performs in accordance with the commands of the sovereign, whether such
action springs from love, or fear, or (as is more frequently the case) from
hope and fear together, or from reverence. compounded of fear and
admiration, or, indeed, any motive whatever, is performed in virtue of his
submission to the sovereign, and not in virtue of his own authority.
(17:11) This point is made still more clear by the fact that obedience does
not consist so much in the outward act as in the mental state of the person
obeying; so that he is most under the dominion of another who with his whole
heart determines to obey another's commands; and consequently the firmest
dominion belongs to the sovereign who has most influence over the minds of
his subjects; if those who are most feared possessed the firmest dominion,
the firmest dominion would belong to the subjects of a tyrant, for they are
always greatly feared by their ruler. (12) Furthermore, though it is
impossible to govern the mind as completely as the tongue, nevertheless
minds are, to a certain extent, under the control of the sovereign, for he
can in many ways bring about that the greatest part of his subjects should
follow his wishes in their beliefs, their loves, and their hates. (13)
Though such emotions do not arise at the express command of the sovereign
they often result (as experience shows) from the authority of his power, and
from his direction ; in other words, in virtue of his right; we may,
therefore, without doing violence to our understanding, conceive men who
follow the instigation of their sovereign in their beliefs, their loves,
their hates, their contempt, and all other emotions whatsoever.
(17:14) Though the powers of government, as thus conceived, are sufficiently
ample, they can never become large enough to execute every possible wish of
their possessors. (15) This, I think, I have already shown clearly enough.
(16) The method of forming a dominion which should prove lasting I do not,
as I have said, intend to discuss, but in order to arrive at the object I
have in view, I will touch on the teaching of Divine revelation to Moses in
this respect, and we will consider the history and the success of the Jews,
gathering therefrom what should be the chief concessions made by sovereigns
to their subjects with a view to the security and increase of their
dominion.
[17:2] (17) That the preservation of a state chiefly depends on the
subjects' fidelity and constancy in carrying out the orders they receive, is
most clearly taught both by reason and experience; how subjects ought to be
guided so as best to preserve their fidelity and virtue is not so obvious.
(18) All, both rulers and ruled, are men, and prone to follow after their
lusts. (19) The fickle disposition of the multitude almost reduces those who
have experience of it to despair, for it is governed solely by emotions, not
by reason: it rushes headlong into every enterprise, and is easily corrupted
either by avarice or luxury: everyone thinks himself omniscient and wishes
to fashion all things to his liking, judging a thing to be just or unjust,
lawful or unlawful, according as he thinks it will bring him profit or loss:
vanity leads him to despise his equals, and refuse their guidance: envy of
superior fame or fortune (for such gifts are never equally distributed)
leads him to desire and rejoice in his neighbour's downfall. (20) I need
not go through the whole list, everyone knows already how much crime.
results from disgust at the present - desire for change, headlong anger,
and contempt for poverty - and how men's minds are engrossed and kept
in turmoil thereby.
(17:21) To guard against all these evils, and form a dominion where no room
is left for deceit; to frame our institutions so that every man, whatever
his disposition, may prefer public right to private advantage, this is the
task and this the toil. (22) Necessity is often the mother of invention, but
she has never yet succeeded in framing a dominion that was in less danger
from its own citizens than from open enemies, or whose rulers did not fear
the latter less than the former. (23) Witness the state of Rome, invincible
by her enemies, but many times conquered and sorely oppressed by her own
citizens, especially in the war between Vespasian and Vitellius. (24) (See
Tacitus, Hist. bk. iv. for a description of the pitiable state of the city.)
(17:25) Alexander thought prestige abroad more easy to acquire than prestige
at home, and believed that his greatness could be destroyed by his own
followers. (26) Fearing such a disaster, he thus addressed his friends:
"Keep me safe from internal treachery and domestic plots, and I will front
without fear the dangers of battle and of war. (27) Philip was more secure
in the battle array than in the theatre: he often escaped from the hands of
the enemy, he could not escape from his own subjects. (28) If you think over
the deaths of kings, you will count up more who have died by the assassin
than by the open foe." (Q. Curtius, chap. vi.)
(17:29) For the sake of making themselves secure, kings who seized the
throne in ancient times used to try to spread the idea that they were
descended from the immortal gods, thinking that if their subjects and the
rest of mankind did not look on them as equals, but believed them to be
gods, they would willingly submit to their rule, and obey their commands.
(30) Thus Augustus persuaded the Romans that he was descended from AEneas,
who was the son of Venus, and numbered among the gods. (31) "He wished
himself to be worshipped in temples, like the gods, with flamens and
priests." (Tacitus, Ann. i. 10.)
(17:32) Alexander wished to be saluted as the son of Jupiter, not from
motives of pride but of policy, as he showed by his answer to the invective
of Hermolaus: "It is almost laughable," said he, that Hermolaus asked me to
contradict Jupiter, by whose oracle I am recognized. (33) Am I responsible
for the answers of the gods? (34) It offered me the name of son;
acquiescence was by no means foreign to my present designs. (35) Would that
the Indians also would believe me to be a god! (36) Wars are carried through
by prestige, falsehoods that are believed often gain the force of truth."
(Curtius, viii,. Para, 8.) (37) In these few words he cleverly contrives to
palm off a fiction on the ignorant, and at the same time hints at the motive
for the deception.
(17:38) Cleon, in his speech persuading the Macedonians to obey their king,
adopted a similar device: for after going through the praises of Alexander
with admiration, and recalling his merits, he proceeds, "the Persians are
not only pious, but prudent in worshipping their kings as gods: for kingship
is the shield of public safety," and he ends thus, "I, myself, when the king
enters a banquet hall, should prostrate my body on the ground; other men
should do the like, especially those who are wise " (Curtius, viii.
Para. 66). (39) However, the Macedonians were more prudent - indeed, it is
only complete barbarians who can be so openly cajoled, and can suffer
themselves to be turned from subjects into slaves without interests of their
own. (40) Others, notwithstanding, have been able more easily to spread the
belief that kingship is sacred, and plays the part of God on the earth, that
it has been instituted by God, not by the suffrage and consent of men; and
that it is preserved and guarded by Divine special providence and aid.
(41) Similar fictions have been promulgated by monarchs, with the object of
strengthening their dominion, but these I will pass over, and in order to
arrive at my main purpose, will merely recall and discuss the teaching on
the subject of Divine revelation to Moses in ancient times.
[17:3] (42) We have said in Chap. V. that after the Hebrews came up out of
Egypt they were not bound by the law and right of any other nation, but were
at liberty to institute any new rites at their pleasure, and to occupy
whatever territory they chose. (43) After their liberation from the
intolerable bondage of the Egyptians, they were bound by no covenant to any
man; and, therefore, every man entered into his natural right, and was free
to retain it or to give it up, and transfer it to another. (44) Being, then,
in the state of nature, they followed the advice of Moses, in whom they
chiefly trusted, and decided to transfer their right to no human being, but
only to God; without further delay they all, with one voice, promised to
obey all the commands of the Deity, and to acknowledge no right that He did
not proclaim as such by prophetic revelation. (45) This promise, or
transference of right to God, was effected in the same manner as we have
conceived it to have been in ordinary societies, when men agree to divest
themselves of their natural rights. (46) It is, in fact, in virtue of a set
covenant, and an oath (see Exod. xxxiv:10), that the Jews freely, and not
under compulsion or threats, surrendered their rights and transferred them
to God. (47) Moreover, in order that this covenant might be ratified
and settled, and might be free from all suspicion of deceit, God did not
enter into it till the Jews had had experience of His wonderful power by
which alone they had been, or could be, preserved in a state of prosperity
(Exod. xix:4, 5). (48) It is because they believed that nothing but
God's power could preserve them that they surrendered to God the natural
power of self-preservation, which they formerly, perhaps, thought they
possessed, and consequently they surrendered at the same time all their
natural right.
[17:4] (49) God alone, therefore, held dominion over the Hebrews, whose
state was in virtue of the covenant called God's kingdom, and God was said
to be their king; consequently the enemies of the Jews were said to be the
enemies of God, and the citizens who tried to seize the dominion were guilty
of treason against God; and, lastly, the laws of the state were called the
laws and commandments of God. (50) Thus in the Hebrew state the civil and
religious authority, each consisting solely of obedience to God, were one
and the same. (51) The dogmas of religion were not precepts, but laws and
ordinances; piety was regarded as the same as loyalty, impiety as the same
as disaffection. (52) Everyone who fell away from religion ceased to be a
citizen, and was, on that ground alone, accounted an enemy: those who
died for the sake of religion, were held to have died for their country;
in fact, between civil and religious law and right there was no distinction
whatever. {in Biblical Hebrew, there was no word for what we call Religion."
Modern Hebrew has selected a word whose root is "knowledge."} (53) For this
reason the government could be called a Theocracy, inasmuch as the citizens
were not bound by anything save the revelations of God.
(17:54) However, this state of things existed rather in theory than in
practice, for it will appear from what we are about to say, that the
Hebrews, as a matter of fact, retained absolutely in their own hands the
right of sovereignty: this is shown by the method and plan by which the
government was carried on, as I will now explain.
(17:55) Inasmuch as the Hebrews did not transfer their rights to any other
person but, as in a democracy, all surrendered their rights equally, and
cried out with one voice, "Whatsoever God shall speak (no mediator or
mouthpiece being named) that will we do," it follows that all were equally
bound by the covenant, and that all had an equal right to consult the Deity,
to accept and to interpret His laws, so that all had an exactly equal share
in the government. [17:5] (56) Thus at first they all approached God
together, so that they might learn His commands, but in this first
salutation, they were so thoroughly terrified and so astounded to hear God
speaking, that they thought their last hour was at hand: full of fear,
therefore, they went afresh to Moses, and said, "Lo, we have heard God
speaking in the fire, and there is no cause why we should wish to die:
surely this great fire will consume us: if we hear again the voice of God,
we shall surely die. (57) Thou, therefore, go near, and hear all the words
of our God, and thou (not God) shalt speak with us: all that God shall tell
us, that will we hearken to and perform."
(17:58) They thus clearly abrogated their former covenant, and absolutely
transferred to Moses their right to consult God and interpret His commands:
for they do not here promise obedience to all that God shall tell them, but
to all that God shall tell Moses (see Deut. v:20 after the Decalogue, and
chap. xviii:15, 16). (59) Moses, therefore, remained the sole promulgator
and interpreter of the Divine laws, and consequently also the sovereign
judge, who could not be arraigned himself, and who acted among the Hebrews
the part, of God; in other words, held the sovereign kingship: he alone
had the right to consult God, to give the Divine answers to the
people, and to see that they were carried out. (60) I say he alone, for if
anyone during the life of Moses was desirous of preaching anything in the
name of the Lord, he was, even if a true prophet, considered guilty and a
usurper of the sovereign right (Numb. xi:28) [Endnote 30]. (61) We may here
notice, that though the people had elected Moses, they could not rightfully
elect Moses's successor; for having transferred to Moses their right of
consulting God, and absolutely promised to regard him as a Divine oracle,
they had plainly forfeited the whole of their right, and were bound to
accept as chosen by God anyone proclaimed by Moses as his successor. (62) If
Moses had so chosen his successor, who like him should wield the sole right
of government, possessing the sole right of consulting God, and consequently
of making and abrogating laws, of deciding on peace or war, of sending
ambassadors, appointing judges - in fact, discharging all the functions of a
sovereign, the state would have become simply a monarchy, only differing
from other monarchies in the fact, that the latter are, or should be,
carried on in accordance with God's decree, unknown even to the monarch,
whereas the Hebrew monarch would have been the only person to whom the
decree was revealed. (63) A difference which increases, rather than
diminishes the monarch's authority. (64) As far as the people in both cases
are concerned, each would be equally subject, and equally ignorant of
the Divine decree, for each would be dependent on the monarch's words, and
would learn from him alone, what was lawful or unlawful: nor would the fact
that the people believed that the monarch was only issuing commands in
accordance with God's decree revealed to him, make it less in subjection,
but rather more. [17:6] (65) However, Moses elected no such successor, but
left the dominion to those who came after him in a condition which could not
be called a popular government, nor an aristocracy, nor a monarchy, but a
Theocracy. (66) For the right of interpreting laws was vested in one man,
while the right and power of administering the state according to the
laws thus interpreted, was vested in another man (see Numb. xxvii:21)
[Endnote 31].
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