Aeroplanes and Dirigibles of War
F >>
Frederick A. Talbot >> Aeroplanes and Dirigibles of War
Pages:
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 |
14 | 15
Germany's aerial fleet was of similar proportions to that of her
Gallic neighbour, but curiously enough, and in strange contrast,
there appeared to be a lack of readiness in this ramification of
the Teuton war machine. The military establishment possessed
about 1,000 machines--active and reserve--of which it is
estimated 700 were available for instant service. During the
period of mobilisation a further 450 machines were added to the
fleet, drawn for the most part from private owners. So far as
the dirigibles were concerned 14 Zeppelins were ready for duty,
while others were under construction or undergoing overhaul and
repair. A few other types were also in commission or acquired
during mobilisation, bringing the dirigible force to 40 machines
all told.
But the greatest surprise was probably offered by Russia. Very
little was known concerning Russian activities in this particular
field, although it was stated that large orders for machines had
been placed with various foreign manufactories. Certain
factories also had been established within the Empire, although
the character of their work and its results and achievements were
concealed from prying eyes. In Russia, however, an appreciable
number of private aeroplanes were in operation, and these, of
course, were placed at the disposal of the authorities the moment
the crisis developed.
The British and French aeroplane manufacturers had been busy upon
Russian orders for many months previous to the outbreak of
hostilities, while heavy shipments of component parts had been
made, the assembling and completion of the machines being carried
out in the country. It is generally believed that upon the
outbreak of war Russia had a fleet of 800 aeroplanes in hand, of
which total 150 were contributed from private sources. Even the
dirigible had not been overlooked, there being nearly 20 of these
craft attached to the Russian Army, although for the most part
they are small vessels.
In comparison with the foregoing large aerial navies, that of
Great Britain appeared to be puny. At the moment Great Britain
possesses about 500 machines, of which about 200 are waterplanes.
In addition, according to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 15
dirigibles should be in service. Private enterprise is supported
by the Government, which maintains a factory for the manufacture
of these craft.
During the two years preceding the outbreak of war the various
Powers grew remarkably reticent concerning the composition and
enlargement of their respective aerial fleets. No official
figures were published. But at the same time it is a well-known
fact that during the year 1913 France augmented her flying force
by no fewer than 544 aeroplanes. Germany was no less energetic,
the military acquisition in this branch, and during the self-same
year, approaching 700 machines according to the semi-official
reports published in that country.
The arrangements concluded for the manufacture of additional
craft during the war are equally remarkable. The principal
factory in Germany, (now devoting its energies to the production
of these craft, although in happier days its normal complement of
4,000 men were responsible for the production of another
commercial article) possesses facilities for turning out 30
complete aeroplanes per week, according to the statement of its
managing director. But it is averred that this statement is
purposely misleading, inasmuch as during the first fortnight of
the campaign it was producing over 50 aeroplanes per week. It
must be remembered that Germany is responsible for the supply of
the majority of such craft for the Austnan armies, that country
purchasing these vessels in large numbers, because in the early
days of the conflict it was notoriously weak in this arm. Since
the declaration of war strenuous efforts have been made to remedy
this state of affairs, particularly upon the unexpected
revelation of Russia's aerial strength.
It is computed that upon the outbreak of war the various Powers
were in the position to show an aggregate of 4,980 aircraft of
all descriptions, both for active service and reserve. This is a
colossal fleet, but it serves to convey in a graphic manner the
importance attached to the adrial vessel by the respective
belligerents. So far as Germany is concerned she is sorely in
need of additional machines. Her fleet of the air has lost its
formidable character, owing to the fact that it has to be divided
between two frontiers, while she has been further weakened by the
enormous lengths of the two battle-fronts.
Russia has been able to concentrate her aerial force, which has
proved of incalculable value to the Grand Duke Nicholas, who has
expressed his appreciation of the services rendered by his
fliers. The French likewise have been favoured by Fortune in
this respect. Their aerial navy is likewise concentrated upon
a single frontier, although a pronounced proportion has been
reserved for service upon the Mediterranean sea-board for
co-operation with the fleet. France suffers, however, to a
certain degree from the length of her battle-line, which is over
200 miles in length. The French aerial fleet has been
particularly active in the Vosges and the Argonne, where the
difficult, mountainous, and densely wooded country has rendered
other systems of observation of the enemy's movements a matter of
extreme difficulty. The Germans have laboured under a similar
handicap in this territory, and have likewise been compelled to
centre a considerable proportion of their aerial fleet upon this
corner of the extended battlefield.
It is in this region that the greatest wastage has been manifest.
I have been informed by one correspondent who is fighting in this
sternly contested area, that at one time a daily loss of ten
German machines was a fair average, while highwater mark was
reached, so far as his own observations and ability to glean
information were concerned by the loss of 19 machines during a
single day. The French wastage, while not so heavy upon the
average, has been considerable at times.
The term wastage is somewhat misleading, if not erroneous. It
does not necessarily imply the total loss of a machine, such as
its descent upon hostile territory, but includes damage to
machines, no matter how slight, landing within their own lines.
In the difficult country of the Vosges many aeroplanes have come
to earth somewhat heavily, and have suffered such damage as to
render them inoperative, compelling their removal from the
effective list until they have undergone complete overhaul or
reconstruction. Upon occasions this wastage has been so
pronounced that the French aviators, including some of the
foremost fliers serving with the forces, have been without a
machine and have been compelled to wait their turn.
I am informed that one day four machines, returning from a
reconnaissance in force, crashed successively to the ground, and
each had to be hauled away to the repair sheds, necessitating
withdrawal from service for several days. Unfortunately the
French, owing to their decision to rule out certain machines as
unsuited to military service, have not yet perfected their
organisation for making good this wastage, although latterly it
has been apprecably reduced by greater care among the aviators in
handling their vessels.
The fast vessels of the French aerial fleet have proved
exceptionally valuable. With these craft speeds of 95 and 100
miles or more per hour have been attained under favourable
conditions, and pace has proved distinctly advantageous, inasmuch
as it gives the French aviators a superiority of about 40 per
cent over the average German machine. It was the activity and
daring of the French fliers upon these high speed machines which
induced the German airmen to change their tactics. Individual
effort and isolated raiding operations were abandoned in favour
of what might be described as combined or squadron attack. Six
or eight machines advancing together towards the French lines
somewhat nonplussed these fleet French mosquito craft, and to
a certain degree nullified their superiority in pace. Speed
was discounted, for the simple reason that the enemy when so
massed evinced a disposition to fight and to follow harassing
tactics when one of the slowest French machines ventured into
the air.
It is interesting to observe that aerial operations, now that
they are being conducted upon what may be termed methodical lines
as distinct from corsair movements, are following the broad
fundamental principles of naval tactics. Homogeneous squadrons,
that is, squadrons composed of vessels of similar type and armament,
put out and follow roughly the "single line ahead" formation.
Upon sighting the enemy there is the manoeuvring for position
advantage which must accrue to the speedier protagonist. One
then, witnesses what might almost be described as an application
of the process of capping the line or "crossing the 'T.'" This
tends to throw the slower squadron into confusion by bending it
back upon itself, meanwhile exposing it to a demoralizing fire.
The analogy is not precisely correct but sufficiently so to
indicate that aerial battles will be fought much upon the same
lines, as engagements between vessels upon the water. If the
manoeuvres accomplish nothing beyond breaking up and scattering
the foe, the result is satisfactory in as much as in this event
it is possible to exert a driving tendency and to force him back
upon the lines of the superior force, when the scattered vessels
may be brought within the zone of spirited fire from the ground.
Attacks in force are more likely to prove successful than
individual raiding tactics, as recent events upon the battlefield
of Europe have demonstrated more or less convincingly. An attack
in force is likely to cause the defenders upon the ground beneath
to lose their heads and to fire wildly and at random, with the
result that the airmen may achieve their object with but little
damage to themselves. This method of attacking in force was
essayed for the first time by the British aerial fleet, which
perhaps is not surprising, seeing that the machines are manned
and the operations supervised by officers who have excelled in
naval training, and who are skilled in such movements.
No doubt this practice, combined with the daring of the British
aviators, contributed very materially to the utter demoralisation
of the German aerial forces, and was responsible for that
hesitancy to attack a position in the vicinity of the British
craft which became so manifest in the course of a few weeks after
the outbreak of hostilities.
One of the foremost military experts of the United States, who
passed some time in the fighting zone, expressed his opinion that
the British aerial force is the most efficient among the
belligerents when considered as a unit, the French flier being
described by the same authority as most effective when acting
individually, owing to personal intrepidity. As a scout the
French aviator is probably unequalled, because he is quick to
perceive and to collect the data required, and when provided with
a fast machine is remarkably nimble and venturesome in the air.
The British aviators, however, work as a whole, and in the
particular phases where such tactics are profitable have
established incontestable superiority. At first the German
aerial force appeared to possess no settled system of operation.
Individual effort was pronounced, but it lacked method. The
Germans have, however, profited from the lessons taught by their
antagonists, and now are emulating their tactics, but owing to
their imperfect training and knowledge the results they achieve
appear to be negligible.
The dirigible still remains an unknown quantity in these
activities, although strange to relate, in the early days of the
war, the work accomplished by the British craft, despite their
comparatively low speed and small dimensions, excelled in value
that achieved by the warplanes. This was particularly noticeable
in matters pertaining to reconnaissance, more especially at
night, when the British vessels often remained for hours together
in the air, manoeuvring over the hostile lines, and gathering
invaluable information as to the disposition and movements
of the opposing forces.
But it is probably in connection with naval operations that the
British aerial fleet excels. The waterplanes have established
their supremacy over the naval dirigible in a striking manner.
British endeavour fostered the waterplane movement and has
carried it to a high degree of perfection. The waterplane is not
primarily designed to perform long flights, although such may be
carried out if the exigencies demand. The practice of deputing
certain vessels to art as "parent ships" to a covey of
waterplanes has proved as successful in practice, as in theory.
Again, the arrangements for conveying these machines by such
means to a rendezvous, and there putting them into the water to
complete a certain duty, have been triumphantly vindicated.
At the time this idea was embraced it met with a certain degree
of hostile criticism: it was argued that the association of the
two fighting, machines would tend towards confusion, and impair
the efficiency of both.
Practice has refuted this theory. The British aerial raids upon
Cuxhaven and other places would have been impossible, and
probably valueless as an effective move, but for the fact that it
was possible to release the machines from a certain point upon
the open sea, within easy reach of the cooperating naval
squadron. True, the latter was exposed to hostile attack from
submarines, but as results proved this was easy to repel. The
aircraft were enabled to return to their base, as represented by
the rendezvous, to be picked up, and to communicate the
intelligence gained from their flight to the authorities in a
shorter period of time than would have been possible under any
other circumstances, while the risk to the airmen was
proportionately reduced.
The fact that the belligerents have built up such huge aerial
navies conclusively proves that the military value of the Fourth
Arm has been fully appreciated. From the results so far achieved
there is every indication that activity in this direction
will be increased rather than diminished.
Pages:
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 |
14 | 15