Aeroplanes and Dirigibles of War

F >> Frederick A. Talbot >> Aeroplanes and Dirigibles of War

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CHAPTER VIII
SCOUTING FROM THE SKIES

From the moment when human flight was lifted from the rut of
experiment to the field of practical application, many theories,
interesting and illuminating, concerning the utility of the
Fourth Arm as a military unit were advanced. The general
consensus of expert opinion was that the flying machine would be
useful to glean information concerning the movements of an enemy,
rather than as a weapon of offence.

The war is substantiating this argument very completely.
Although bomb-dropping is practised somewhat extensively, the
results achieved are rather moral than material in their effects.
Here and there startling successes have been recorded especially
upon the British side, but these triumphs are outnumbered by the
failures in this direction, and merely serve to emphasise the
views of the theorists.

The argument was also advanced that, in this particular work, the
aeroplane would prove more valuable than the dirigible, but
actual campaigning has proved conclusively that the dirigible and
the heavier-than-air machines have their respective fields of
utility in the capacity of scouts. In fact in the very earliest
days of the war, the British airships, though small and slow in
movement, proved more serviceable for this duty than their
dynamic consorts. This result was probably due to the fact that
military strategy and tactics were somewhat nonplussed by the
appearance of this new factor. At the time it was an entirely
unknown quantity. It is true that aircraft had been employed in
the Balkan and the Italo-Ottoman campaigns, but upon such a
limited scale as to afford no comprehensive idea of their
military value and possibilities.

The belligerents, therefore, were caught somewhat at a
disadvantage, and an appreciable period of time elapsed before
the significance of the aerial force could be appreciated, while
means of counter acting or nullifying its influences had to be
evolved simultaneously, and according to the exigencies of the
moment. At all events, the protagonists were somewhat loth to
utilise the dirigible upon an elaborate scale or in an
aggressive manner. It was employed more after the fashion of a
captive balloon, being sent aloft from a point well behind the
front lines of the force to which it was attached, and well out
of the range of hostile guns. Its manoeuvres were somewhat
circumscribed, and were carried out at a safe distance from the
enemy, dependence being placed upon the advantages of an
elevated position for the gathering of information.

But as the campaign progressed, the airships became more daring.
Their ability to soar to a great height offered them complete
protection against gun-fire, and accordingly sallies over the
hostile lines were carried out. But even here a certain
hesitancy became manifest. This was perfectly excusable, for the
simple reason that the dirigible, above all, is a fair-weather
craft, and disasters, which had overtaken these vessels time
after time, rendered prudence imperative. Moreover, but little
was known of the range and destructiveness of anti-aircraft guns.

In the duty of reconnoitring the dirigible possesses one great
advantage over its heavier-than-air rival. It can remain
virtually stationary in the air, the propellers revolving at just
sufficient speed to off-set the wind and tendencies to drift. In
other words, it has the power of hovering over a position,
thereby enabling the observers to complete their task carefully
and with deliberation.

On the other hand, the means of enabling an aeroplane to hover
still remain to be discovered. It must travel at a certain speed
through the air to maintain its dynamic equilibrium, and this
speed is often too high to enable the airman to complete his
reconnaissance with sufficient accuracy to be of value to the
forces below. All that the aeroplane can do is to circle above a
certain position until the observer is satisfied with the data he
has collected.

But hovering on the part of the dirigible is not without
conspicuous drawbacks. The work of observation cannot be
conducted with any degree of accuracy at an excessive altitude.
Experience has proved that the range of the latest types of anti-
aircraft weapons is in excess of anticipations. The result is
that the airship is useless when hovering beyond the zone of
fire. The atmospheric haze, even in the clearest weather,
obstructs the observer's vision. The caprices of this obstacle
are extraordinary, as anyone who has indulged in ballooning
knows fully well. On a clear summer's day I have been able to
see the ground beneath with perfect distinctness from a height of
4,500 feet, yet when the craft had ascended a further two or
three hundred feet, the panorama was blurred. A film of haze
lies between the balloon and the ground beneath. And the
character of this haze is continually changing, so that the
aerial observer's task is rendered additionally difficult. Its
effects are particularly notice able when one attempts to
photograph the view unfolded below. Plate after plate may be
exposed and nothing will be revealed. Yet at a slightly lower
altitude the plates may be exposed and perfectly sharp and
well-defined images will be obtained.

Seeing that the photographic eye is keener and more searching
than the human organ of sight, it is obvious that this haze
constitutes a very formidable obstacle. German military
observers, who have accompanied the Zeppelins and Parsevals on
numerous aerial journeys under varying conditions of weather,
have repeatedly drawn attention to this factor and its caprices,
and have not hesitated to venture the opinion that it would
interfere seriously with military aerial reconnaissances, and
also that it would tend to render such work extremely hazardous
at times.

When these conditions prevail the dirigible must carry out its
work upon the broad lines of the aeroplane. It must descend to
the level where a clear view of the ground may be obtained, and
in the interests of safety it has to keep on the move. To
attempt to hover within 4,000 feet of the ground is to court
certain disaster, inasmuch as the vessel offers a magnificent and
steady target which the average gunner, equipped with the latest
sighting devices and the most recent types of guns, scarcely
could fail to hit.

But the airman in the aeroplane is able to descend to a
comparatively low level in safety. The speed and mobility of his
machine constitute his protection. He can vary his altitude,
perhaps only thirty or forty feet, with ease and rapidity, and
this erratic movement is more than sufficient to perplex the
marksmen below, although the airman is endangered if a rafale is
fired in such a manner as to cover a wide zone.

Although the aeroplane may travel rapidly it is not too fleet for
a keen observer who is skilled in his peculiar task. He may only
gather a rough idea of the disposition of troops, their
movements, the lines of communication, and other details which
are indispensable to his commander, but in the main the
intelligence will be fairly accurate. Undulating flight enables
him to determine speedily the altitude at which he is able to
obtain the clearest views of the country beneath. Moreover,
owing to his speed he is able to complete his task in far less
time than his colleague operating in the dirigible, the result
being that the information placed at the disposal of his superior
officers is more to the moment, and accordingly of greater value.

Reconnoitring by aeroplane may be divided into two broad
categories, which, though correlated to a certain degree, are
distinctive, because each constitutes a specific phase in
military operations. They are known respectively as "tactical"
and "strategical" movements. The first is somewhat limited in
its scope as compared with the latter, and has invariably to be
carried out rapidly, whereas the strategical reconnaissance may
occupy several hours.

The tactical reconnaissance concerns the corps or divisional
commander to which the warplane is attached, and consequently its
task is confined to the observation of the line immediately
facing the particular corps or division. The aviator does not
necessarily penetrate beyond the lines of the enemy, but, as a
rule limits his flight to some distance from his outermost
defences. The airman must possess a quick eye, because
his especial duty is to note the disposition of the troops
immediately facing him, the placing of the artillery, and any
local movements of the forces that may be in progress.
Consequently the aviator engaged on this service may be absent
from his lines for only a few minutes, comparatively speaking;
the intelligence he acquires must be speedily communicated to the
force to which he is attached, because it may influence a local
movement.

The strategical reconnaissance, on the other hand, affects the
whole plan of campaign. The aviators told off for this duty are
attached to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, and the work has
to be carried out upon a far more comprehensive and elaborate
scale, while the airmen are called upon to penetrate well into
the hostile territory to a point thirty, forty, or more miles
beyond the outposts.

The procedure is to instruct the flier either to carry out his
observations of the territory generally, or to report at length
upon a specified stretch of country. In the latter event he may
fly to and fro over the area in question until he has acquired
all the data it is possible to collect. His work not only
comprises the general disposition of troops, defences, placing of
artillery, points where reserves are being held, high-roads,
railways, base camps, and so forth, but he is also instructed to
bring back as correct an idea as possible of what the enemy
proposes to do, so that his Commander-in-Chief may adjust his
moves accordingly. In order to perform this task with the
requisite degree of thoroughness it is often necessary for the
airman to remain in the air for several hours continuously, not
returning, in fact, until he has completed the allotted duty.

The airman engaged in strategical aerial reconnaissance must
possess, above all things, what is known as a "military" eye
concerning the country he traverses. He must form tolerably
correct estimates of the forces beneath and their character. He
must possess the ability to read a map rapidly as he moves
through the air and to note upon it all information which is
likely to be of service to the General Staff. The ability to
prepare military sketches rapidly and intelligibly is a valuable
attribute, and skill in aerial photography is a decidedly useful
acquisition.

Such men must be of considerable stamina, inasmuch as great
demands are made upon their powers of endurance. Being aloft for
several hours imposes a severe tax upon the nervous system, while
it must also be borne in mind that all sorts and conditions of
weather are likely to be encountered, more particularly during
the winter. Hail, rain, and blizzards may be experienced in
turn, while the extreme cold which often prevails in the higher
altitudes during the winter season is a fearful enemy to combat.
Often an airman upon his return from such a reconnaissance has
been discovered to be so numbed and dazed as a result of the
prolonged exposure, that considerable time has elapsed before he
has been sufficiently restored to set forth the results of his
observations in a coherent, intelligible manner for the benefit
of the General Staff. Under these circumstances it is not
surprising that the most skilful and experienced aviators are
generally reserved for this particular work. In addition to the
natural accidents to which the strategical aerial observer is
exposed, the dangers arising from hostile gun-fire must not be
overlooked. He is manoeuvring the whole time over the enemy's
firing zone, where anti-aircraft weapons are disposed
strategically, and where every effort is made by artillery to
bring him down, or compel him to repair to such a height as to
render observation with any degree of accuracy well-nigh
impossible.

The methods practised by the German aerial scout vary widely, and
are governed in no small measure by the intrepidity and skill of
the airman himself. One practice is to proceed alone upon long
flights over the enemy's lines, penetrating just as far into
hostile territory as the pilot considers advisable, and keeping,
of course, within the limits of the radius of action of the
machine, as represented by the fuel supply, the while carefully
taking mental stock of all that he observes below. It is a kind
of roving commission without any definite aim in view beyond the
collection of general intelligence.

This work, while productive and valuable to a certain degree, is
attended with grave danger, as the German airmen have repeatedly
found to their cost. Success is influenced very materially by
the accuracy of the airman's judgment. A slight miscalculation
of the velocity and direction of the wind, or failure to detect
any variations in the climatic conditions, is sufficient to prove
his undoing. German airmen who essayed journeys of discovery in
this manner, often failed to regain their lines because they
ventured too far, misjudged the speed of the wind which was
following them on the outward run, and ultimately were forced to
earth owing to the exhaustion of the fuel supply during the
homeward trip; the increased task imposed upon the motor, which
had to battle hard to make headway, caused the fuel consumption
per mile to exceed calculations.

Then the venturesome airman cannot neglect another factor which
is adverse to his success. Hostile airmen lie in wait, and a
fleet of aeroplanes is kept ready for instant service. They
permit the invader to penetrate well into their territory and
then ascend behind him to cut off his retreat. True, the invader
has the advantage of being on the wing, while the ether is wide
and deep, without any defined channels of communication. But
nine times out of ten the adventurous scout is trapped. His
chances of escape are slender, because his antagonists dispose
themselves strategically in the air. The invader outpaces one,
but in so doing comes within range of another. He is so harassed
that he either has to give fight, or, finding his retreat
hopelessly cut off, he makes a determined dash, trusting to his
high speed to carry him to safety. In these driving tactics the
French and British airmen have proved themselves adepts, more
particularly the latter, as the chase appeals to their sporting
instincts. There is nothing so exhilarating as a quarry who
displays a determination to run the gauntlet.

The roving Teuton scout was considerably in evidence in the early
days of the war, but two or three weeks' experience emphasised
the sad fact that, in aerial strategy, he was hopelessly
outmatched by his opponents. His advantage of speed was
nullified by the superior tactical and strategical acumen of his
antagonists, the result being that the German airman, who has
merely been trained along certain lines, who is in many cases
nothing more than a cog-wheel in a machine, and who is
proverbially slow-witted, has concluded that he is no match for
the airmen of the Allies. He found from bitter experience that
nothing afforded the Anglo-French military aviators such keen
delight as to lie in wait for a "rover," and then to swoop into
the air to round him up.

The proportion of these individual scouts who were either brought
down, or only just succeeded in reaching safety within their own
lines, and who were able to exhibit serious wounds as evidence of
the severity of the aerial tussle, or the narrowness of the
escape, has unnerved the Teuton airmen as a body to a very
considerable extent. Often, even when an aeroplane descended
within the German lines, it was found that the roving airman had
paid the penalty for his rashness with his life, so that his
journey had proved in vain, because all the intelligence he had
gained had died with him, or, if committed to paper, was so
unintelligible as to prove useless.

It was the success of the British airmen in this particular field
of duty which was responsible for the momentous declaration in
Field-Marshal Sir John French's famous despatch:--"The British
Flying Corps has succeeded in establishing an individual
ascendancy, which is as serviceable to us as it is damaging to
the enemy . . . . The enemy have been less enterprising in
their flights. Something in the direction of the mastery of the
air has already been gained."

The methods of the British airmen are in vivid contrast to the
practice of the venturesome Teuton aerial rovers described above.
While individual flights are undertaken they are not of unknown
duration or mileage. The man is given a definite duty to perform
and he ascends merely to fulfil it, returning with the
information at the earliest possible moment. It is aerial
scouting with a method. The intelligence is required and
obtained for a specific purpose, to govern a contemplated move in
the grim game of war.

Even then the flight is often undertaken by two or more airmen
for the purpose of checking and counterchecking information
gained, or to ensure such data being brought back to
headquarters, since it is quite possible that one of the party
may fall a victim to hostile fire. By operating upon these
lines there is very little likelihood of the mission proving
a complete failure. Even when raids upon certain places
such as Dusseldorf, Friedrichshafen or Cuxhaven are planned,
complete dependence is not placed on one individual. The machine
is accompanied, so that the possibility of the appointed task
being consummated is transformed almost into a certainty.

The French flying men work upon broadly similar lines. Their
fleet is divided into small squadrons each numbering four, six,
or more machines, according to the nature of the contemplated
task. Each airman is given an area of territory which is to be
reconnoitred thoroughly. In this way perhaps one hundred or more
miles of the enemy's front are searched for information at one
and the same time. The units of the squadron start out, each
taking the appointed direction according to the preconceived
plan, and each steering by the aid of compass and map. They are
urged to complete the work with all speed and to return to a
secret rendezvous.

Later the air is alive with the whirring of motors. The machines
are coming back and all converging to one point. They vol-plane
to the earth and gracefully settle down within a short distance
of each other at the rendezvous. The pilots collect and each
relates the intelligence he has gained. The data are collated
and in this manner the General Staff is able to learn exactly
what is transpiring over a long stretch of the hostile lines, and
a considerable distance to the rear of his advance works.
Possibly five hundred square miles have been reconnoitred in this
manner. Troops have been massed here, lines of communication
extend somewhere else, while convoys are moving at a third place.
But all has been observed, and the commanding officer is in a
position to re-arrange his forces accordingly. It is a
remarkable example of method in military tactics and strategy,
and conveys a striking idea of the degree to which aerial
operations have been organised.

After due deliberation it is decided that the convoys shall be
raided, or that massed troops shall be thrown into confusion, if
not dispersed. The squadron is ordered to prepare for another
aerial journey. The roads along which the convoys are moving are
indicated upon the map, or the position of the massed troops in
bivouac is similarly shown. The airmen load their machines with
a full charge of bombs. When all is ready the leader ascends,
followed in rapid succession by the other units, and they whirr
through the air in single file. It now becomes a grim game of
follow-my-leader.

The leader detects the convoy, swoops down, suddenly launches his
missiles, and re-ascends. He does not deviate a foot from his
path to observe the effects of his discharge, as the succeeding
aeroplane is close behind him. If the leader has missed then the
next airman may correct his error. One after another the
machines repeat the manoeuvre, in precisely the same manner as
the units of a battleship squadron emulate the leading vessel
when attacking the foe. The tactical evolutions have been laid
down, and there is rigid adherence thereto, because only thereby
may success be achieved. When the last war-plane has completed
its work, the leader swings round and repeats the dash upon the
foe. A hail of bullets may scream around the men in the air, but
one and all follow faithfully in the leader's trail. One or more
machines may fail in the attack, and may even meet with disaster,
but nothing interferes with the movements of the squadron as a
whole. It is the homogeneity of the attacking fleet which tells,
and which undermines the moral of the enemy, even if it does not
wreak decisive material devastation. The work accomplished to
the best of their ability, the airmen speed back to their lines
in the same formation.

At first sight reconnoitring from aloft may appear a simple
operation, but a little reflection will reveal the difficulties
and arduousness of the work. The observer, whether he be
specially deputed, or whether the work be placed in the hand of
the pilot himself--in this event the operation is rendered
additionally trying, as he also has to attend to his machine
must keep his eyes glued to the ground beneath and at the same
time be able to read the configuration of the panorama revealed
to him. He must also keep in touch with his map and compass, so
as to be positive of his position and direction. He must be a
first-class judge of distances and heights.

When flying rapidly at a height of 4,000 feet or more, the
country below appears as a perfect plane, or flat stretch,
although as a matter of fact it may be extremely undulating.
Consequently, it is by no means a simple matter to distinguish
eminences and depressions, or to determine the respective and
relative heights of hills.

If a rough sketch is required, the observer must be rapid in
thought, quick in determination, and facile with his pencil, as
the machine, no matter how it may be slowed down, is moving at a
relatively high speed. He must consult his map and compass
frequently, since an airman who loses his bearings is useless to
his commander-in-chief. He must have an eagle eye, so as to be
able to search the country unfolded below, in order to gather all
the information which is likely to be of value to his superior
officers. He must be able to judge accurately the numbers of
troops arrayed beneath him, the lines of the defensive works, to
distinguish the defended from the dummy lines which are thrown up
to baffle him, and to detect instantly the movement of the troops
and the direction, as well as the roads, along which they are
proceeding. Reserves and their complement, artillery,
railway-lines, roads, and bridges, if any, over streams and
railways must be noted--in short he must obtain an eye photograph
of the country he observes and grasp exactly what is happening
there. In winter, with the thermometer well down, a
blood-freezing wind blowing, wreaths of clouds drifting below and
obscuring vision for minutes at a time, the rain possibly pelting
down as if presaging a second deluge, the plight of the vigilant
human eye aloft is far from enviable.

Upon the return of the machine to its base, the report must be
prepared without delay. The picture recorded by the eye has to
be set down clearly and intelligibly with the utmost speed. The
requisite indications must be made accurately upon the map.
Nothing of importance must be omitted: the most trivial detail is
often of vital importance.

A facile pencil is of inestimable value in such operations.
While aloft the observer does not trust to his memory or his eye
picture, but commits the essential factors to paper in the form
of a code, or what may perhaps be described more accurately as a
shorthand pictorial interpretation of the things he has
witnessed. To the man in the street such a record would be
unintelligible, but it is pregnant with meaning, and when worked
out for the guidance of the superior officers is a mass of
invaluable detail.

At times it so happens that the airman has not been able to
complete his duty within the time anticipated by those below.
But he has gathered certain information which he wishes to
communicate without coming to earth. Such data may be dropped
from the clouds in the form of maps or messages. Although
wireless telegraphy is available for this purpose, it suffers
from certain drawbacks. If the enemy possesses an equipment
which is within range of that of the air-craft and the force to
which it belongs, communications may be nullified by the enemy
throwing out a continuous stream of useless signals which "jamb"
the intelligence of their opponents.

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