The Memoirs of General the Baron de Marbot

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The 24th Chasseurs, with which my regiment was brigaded, was a
first class unit which would have done very well if there had
been a bond of sympathy between the men and their commander.
Unfortunately Colonel A... was very hard on his subordinates who,
for their part, disliked him. This state of affairs led General
Castex to travel and camp with the 23rd, and to unite his field
kitchen with mine, even though he had once served in the 24th.
Colonel A..., big, skillful and always perfectly mounted, showed
up well in engagements featuring the "arme blanche", but was
thought not to be so keen on those in which fire-arms and
artillery were involved. In spite of this, the Emperor recognised
in him qualities which made him undoubtedly the best light
cavalry officer in our European armies. No one had a better eye
for country. Before he set out, he could predict where there
would be obstacles not shown on the map, and where streams, roads
and even paths would lead to, and deduce from enemy movements
forecasts which were almost always correct. In all the aspects of
war, great or small, he was remarkably adept. The Emperor had
often used him for reconnaissance in the past and had recommended
him to Marshal Oudinot, who frequently called him into
consultation; with the result that many of the laborious and
dangerous jobs fell to my regiment.

Chap. 8.

Hardly had the various army corps which had preceded us into
Polotsk left to join the Emperor at Witepsk, when Oudinot,
collecting his troops into a single immense column on the road to
St. Petersburg, marched to attack Wittgenstein's army, which we
believed was positioned ten leagues from us, between two little
towns named Sebej and Newel. At the end of the day we made our
bivouac on the banks of the Drissa. This tributary of the Dvina
is no more than a rivulet at the coaching inn of Siwotschina,
where it is crossed by the main road to St. Petersburg; and
where, as there is no bridge, the Russian government has instead
cut back the steep banks between which the stream runs to make a
gently sloping approach, and has paved its bed to the same width
as the road, thus creating a passable ford. To the right and left
of the ford, however, troops and vehicles cannot cross, because
of the steepness of the banks. I mention this because three days
later this spot was the scene of a brisk engagement.

The next day, the 30th, my regiment being on duty, I took my
place at the head of the advance-guard and, followed by the whole
army corps, I crossed the ford through the Drissa. The heat was
most oppressive, and in the dust-covered corn fields at the side
of the road one could see two large areas where the grain had
been flattened and crushed, as if a roller had been dragged over
it, indicating the passage of a large column of infantry.
Suddenly, near the coaching inn of Kliastitsoui, these signs
disappeared from the main road, and could be seen to the left on
a wide side-road which led to Jacoubovo. It was evident that the
enemy had turned off the road to Sebej at this point and was
preparing to attack our left flank. This seemed to me to be a
serious matter, so I halted our troops and sent a message to warn
my general. The Marshal, however, who usually kept in view of the
advance-guard, had seen that I had halted. He came along at the
gallop and in spite of the opinions of Generals Castex and
Lorencez, he ordered me to continue up the main road. I had
scarcely gone a league when I saw coming towards me a calische
drawn by two post-horses....I stopped it and I saw a Russian
officer who, overcome by the heat, was lying full-length on its
floor. This young man, the son of the nobleman who owned the
coaching inn of Kliastitsoui which I had just passed, was one of
Wittgenstein's aides-de-camp, and was returning from St.
Petersburg with the reply to some despatches which the general
had sent to the government. You may imagine his surprise when,
startled out of his sleep, he found himself surrounded by our
bearded chasseurs, and saw not far away the numerous columns of
French soldiers. He could not understand why he had not
encountered Wittgenstein's army, or at least some of his scouts,
between Sebej and the spot where we were; but his astonishment
confirmed the opinion held by General Castex and me that
Wittgenstein, to lay a trap for Oudinot, had suddenly quitted the
road to St. Petersburg to attack the left flank and the rear of
the French force. In fact, it was not long before we heard the
sound of artillery and gun-fire.

Marshal Oudinot, although taken by surprise by this unexpected
attack, extricated himself quite well from the tight spot in
which he had landed himself. Ordering his columns to left face,
he presented a line to the attacker, who was repulsed so
vigourously that he did not care to renew the attack that day,
and retired to Jakoubovo. Wittgenstein's cavalry had, however,
enjoyed a considerable success, for they had captured, in the
French rear, some thousand men and some of our equipment; amongst
other things, all our mobile forges. This was a serious loss,
which was felt badly by the cavalry of 2nd Corps throughout the
whole of the campaign. After this engagement, Oudinot's troops
having taken up their position, Castex was ordered to return to
Kliastitsoui, to guard the point at which the road branched,
where we were joined by General Maison's infantry. The Russian
officer held prisoner in the house belonging to his father did us
the honours with good grace.

In expectation of a major battle on the following day, the
commanders of both armies had made their dispositions, and, at
daybreak, the Russians attacked the inn at Kliastitsoui, which
constituted the French right wing. Although in these
circumstances both our regiments would be in action, the regiment
on duty would be in the first rank, and it was the turn of the
24th Chasseurs. To avoid any possibility of hesitation, General
Castex placed himself at the head of the regiment, and falling
rapidly on the Russians, he overran them and took 400 prisoners
without suffering many casualties. He was in the forefront of the
attack, and his horse was killed by a bayonet thrust. In the
resultant fall his foot had been trodden on, and he was unable
for several days to lead the brigade. His place was taken by
Colonel A....

The Russian battalions which the 24th had just defeated were
immediately replaced by others which, emerging from Jacoubovo,
marched rapidly towards us. The Marshal ordered A... to attack
them, and we were told to advance, which we did without delay.
Having arrived at the front line, we arranged ourselves in battle
order and advanced toward the Russians, who awaited us
resolutely. As soon as we were within range, I ordered the
charge...! It was carried out with the greatest vigour, for my
troopers, as well as displaying their usual courage, were aware
that their comrades of the 24th were watching their every move.
The Russians made what I consider to be the fatal mistake of
discharging all their weapons at once by firing a volley, which,
badly aimed, killed only a few men and horses: continuous fire
would have been much more devastating. They then needed to
reload, but we did not give them time; our excellent horses,
galloping at full speed, hit them with such force that many of
them were knocked to the ground. A good number got to their feet
and attempted to defend themselves with their bayonets against
the sabres of our Chasseurs, but after suffering a great many
casualties they fell back, then broke ranks, and a good number
were killed or captured as they fled towards a cavalry regiment
which had come to their aid. This was the Grodno Hussars.

I have noticed that when a unit has defeated another, it always
maintains its superiority. I saw here a further proof of this,
for the Chasseurs of the 23rd hurled themselves on the Grodno
Hussars, as if they were easy prey, having previously beaten them
soundly in a night battle at Drouia, and the Hussars, having
recognised their enemy, took to their heels. This regiment,
during the rest of the campaign, invariably faced the 23rd, who
always retained their ascendancy. While these events were taking
place on our right wing, the infantry on the left and in the
centre had attacked the Russians who, defeated everywhere, had
abandoned the field of battle and at nightfall they went to take
up a position about a league away. Our army took possession of
the area which it occupied, between Jakoubovo and the road
junction at Kliastitsoui. There was much celebration that night
in the brigade bivouacs, on account of our victory. My regiment
had captured the flag of the Tamboff infantry, and the 24th had
also taken that of the Russian unit which they had overcome; but
their satisfaction was diminished by the knowledge that two of
their squadron commanders had been wounded, both of whom,
however, made a rapid recovery and served throughout the rest of
the campaign.

When a unit endeavours to outflank an enemy, it risks being
itself outflanked. This is what happened to Wittgenstein, for on
the night of the 29th, having left the St. Petersburg road to
attack the left and rear of the French army, he had compromised
his line of communication, which Oudinot could have cut
completely if he taken full advantage of the victory achieved on
the 30th. The Russian situation was made worse by the fact that
while facing a victorious army which barred its line of retreat,
it learned that Marshal Macdonald, having crossed the Dvina and
taken the fort of Dvinaberg, was advancing on the Russian rear.
To get out of this difficulty, Wittgenstein had, during the night
after the battle, made a cross-country detour which took his army
back on to the St. Petersburg road at a point beyond the inn at
Kliastitsoui. Since, however, he was afraid that the French
troops who were in that area might fall on his force during this
flank move, he decided to prevent them from doing so by himself
attacking them with superior strength, while the bulk of his army
regained the route to St. Petersburg and reopened his
communications with Sebej.

The next day, the 31st of July, my regiment came on duty at dawn,
when it could be seen that part of the army which we had defeated
the day before had avoided our right wing and was in full flight
towards Sebej, while the remainder were about to attack us at
Kliastitsoui. All of Marshal Oudinot's troops were immediately
stood to, but while the generals were arranging them in battle
order, a strong column of Russian Grenadiers attacked our allies,
the Portuguese, and reduced them to complete disorder; they then
turned on the large and solid coaching inn, an important point
which they were about to take, when Marshal Oudinot, always in
the forefront of any action, hurried to my regiment, which was
already at the outposts, and ordered me to try to stop or at
least slow down the enemy advance until the arrival of our
infantry which was approaching rapidly. I took my regiment off at
the gallop, and ordering the trumpeter to sound the charge, I
struck the right of the enemy line obliquely, which greatly
hindered the ability of their infantry and Grenadiers to fire on
us, and they were about to be cut down, for they were already in
disorder, when either spontaneously or under the orders of their
officers, they made an about turn and ran for a large ditch which
they had left behind them. They all scrambled into it and from
its cover they directed a continuous fire at us. Immediately I
had six or seven men killed and some twenty wounded, and was hit
by a stray ball in the left shoulder. My troopers had their blood
up, but they could not attack men whom it was physically
impossible to reach. At this moment General Maison arrived with
his infantry and having ordered me to withdraw behind his
columns, he attacked the ditch from both ends and all its
defenders were either killed or made prisoner.

As for me, with a painful wound, I was taken back to the inn and
removed, with difficulty, from my horse. The good Dr. Parot, the
regimental surgeon, came to dress my injury, but he had scarcely
started this when he was forced to break off. There was a new
Russian assault and a hail of ball fell about us, so that we had
to remove ourselves out of range of the fire. The doctor found
that my injury was serious and could have been fatal if the thick
braiding of my epaulet, through which the ball had passed, had
not deflected it and lessened its force. The blow had been
sufficiently heavy to knock me back almost onto my horse's
crupper, so that the officers and troopers who were following me
thought I had been killed, and I would have fallen if my
orderlies had not supported me. The dressing was very painful,
for the ball was embedded in the bone at the point where the
upper arm joins the collar-bone. To get it out the wound had to
be enlarged and you can still see the big scar.

I can promise you that if I had been already a colonel, I would
have joined the many wounded who were being sent back to Polotsk,
and after crossing the Dvina I would have sought some Lithuanian
town where I might be cared for; but I was only a squadron
commander and at any time the Emperor could arrive at Witepsk and
hold a revue, at which he would award nothing except to those who
were present, bearing arms. This custom which at first may seem
cruel, was based nevertheless on the interest of the service, for
it encouraged the wounded not to remain in hospital any longer
than was necessary, and to rejoin their units as soon as they
were fit enough to do so. In view of the above, my success in
action against the enemy, my recent wound received in combat, and
my devotion to the regiment, all compelled me not to go away; so
I stayed in spite of the severe pain which I was suffering, and
having put my arm in a sling as well as I could, and had myself
hoisted onto horseback, I rejoined my regiment.

Chap. 9.

Since I had been wounded, things had changed considerably; our
troops had defeated those of Wittgenstein and taken a great
number of prisoners, but the Russians had reached the St.
Petersburg road and were continuing their retreat to Sebej.

To get to this town from the inn at Kliastitsoui, one must cross
the enormous marsh of Khodanui, in the middle of which the main
road is raised on an embankment made of huge pine trees laid one
next to another. On each side of this causeway is a ditch, or
rather a wide and deep canal, and there is no other route except
by making an exceedingly long detour. The embankment is almost a
league long, but of considerable width, so that, it being
impossible to put flank guards in the marsh, the Russians marched
in dense columns along this artificial road, beyond which our
maps showed open country. Marshal Oudinot, aiming at further
victory, had decided to follow them, and for this reason he had
already despatched on the road to the marsh General Verdier's
infantry, which was to be followed first by Castex's brigade of
cavalry, then the whole army corps. My regiment had not yet
joined the line when I returned to it.

When, in spite of my injury, I took up my place at their head, I
received a general acclamation from both officers and men, which
showed the affection and esteem in which these brave people held
me; I was deeply touched by this, and even more so by the welcome
I received from Major Fontaine. This officer, although both
courageous and competent, was so unambitious that he had remained
a captain for eighteen years, having refused promotion three
times, which he had finally accepted only on a direct order from
the Emperor.

So I once more took command of the 23rd, and began to cross the
marsh behind General Verdier's division, at which the rear unit
of the enemy column fired only a few long range shots while they
were still on the causeway. When, however, our infantry reached
the open country, they saw the Russian army deployed in battle
formation, and were treated to a devastating barrage of artillery
fire. Nevertheless, in spite of their losses the French
battalions continued to advance. Soon they were all off the
embankment and it was the turn of my regiment, at the head of the
brigade, to reach the open ground. Colonel A..., who was the
temporary brigade commander, was not there to give me orders so I
thought it right to remove my regiment from this dangerous spot
and I led them off at the gallop as soon as the infantry gave me
room; however I had seven or eight men killed and a greater
number wounded. The 24th, who followed me, also suffered many
casualties. The same happened to General Legrand's infantry
division; but as soon as they were formed up on the plain,
Marshal Oudinot attacked the enemy lines, and they directed their
artillery fire at several different points so that the exit from
the marsh would have become less perilous for the remainder of
the army, if Wittgenstein had not at that moment attacked with
all his force the units which we had in the open. His superiority
in numbers compelled us to give ground and we were driven back
towards the causeway of the Khodanui. Fortunately the track was
very wide, which allowed us to proceed by platoons. As soon as we
left the plain, the cavalry became more of a hindrance than a
help. The marshal put us in front of the retreat; we were
followed by Verdier's division, whose general had been very
seriously wounded, and General Legrand's division made the
rear-guard. The last brigade of this division, commanded by
General Albert, had to fight a very sharp action while its last
battalions were getting onto the causeway, but once they were
formed into columns General Albert put eight artillery pieces at
the tail end which kept up a continuous fire during the retreat,
so it was the turn of the enemy to suffer heavy casualties. By
contrast, the Russian artillery rarely discharged a shot because
the guns had to be turned round to fire at us and then turned
back to continue the pursuit, a lengthy and difficult operation
on the causeway, so that they did us little damage.

The day was ending when the French troops, having crossed the
marsh, repassed Kliastitsoui and found themselves once more on
the banks of the Drissa, at the ford of Sivotschina which they
had crossed in the morning to follow the Russians who had been
defeated at Kliastitsoui. The Russians had their revenge for
having caused us seven or eight hundred casualties on the plain
beyond the marsh; they now had a sword at our backs. To put an
end to the fighting and allow the army some rest, Marshal Oudinot
led it across the ford to set up camp at Bieloe.

Night was falling when the outposts which had been left to watch
the Drissa, reported that the enemy were crossing the river. The
Marshal went there at once, and could see that eight Russian
battalions with a battery of fourteen guns were setting up their
bivouac on our side of the river, while the remainder of the army
stayed on the other side, preparing no doubt to cross over and
attack us on the morrow. This advance party was commanded by
General Koulnieff, an enterprising officer but one who, like most
of the Russian officers of the period, drank to excess. It would
seem that on this evening he had drunk more than usual, for it is
otherwise difficult to explain why he made the grave error of
coming, with no more than eight battalions to set up camp a short
distance from an army of forty thousand men, and that in a most
unfavourable position; for he had, some two hundred paces behind
him, the Drissa, which could not be crossed except by the ford;
not because of the depth of the water but because it ran between
very steep banks fifteen to twenty feet high. Koulnieff had
therefore no other line of retreat but the ford. Could it be that
he hoped that his eight battalions and fourteen canons would be
able, if defeated, to withdraw smartly across this one passage,
in the face of an attack which might be launched at any moment by
the French army from nearby Bieloe? The answer must be no, but
general Koulnieff was in no state to consider the matter when he
put his camp on the left bank of the river. It is perhaps
surprising that Wittgenstein should have entrusted the command of
his advance guard to Koulnieff, of whose intemperate habits he
must have been aware.

While the head of the Russian column approached, rashly, to
within such a short distance of us, a great confusion reigned,
not among the troops, but among their leaders. Marshal Oudinot,
although the bravest of men, lacked consistency, and passed
rapidly from a plan of attack to one of a withdrawal. The losses
which he had suffered towards the end of the day on the other
side of the great marsh had thrown him into a state of
perplexity, and he could not think how he was to carry out the
Emperor's orders, which were to push Wittgenstein back at least
as far as Sebej and Newel. He was therefore delighted to receive,
during the night, a despatch informing him of the imminent
arrival of a Bavarian corps, commanded by General Saint-Cyr,
which the Emperor was placing under his orders; but instead of
awaiting this powerful reinforcement in his present sound
position, Oudinot, advised by the general of artillery, Dulauloy,
wished to make contact with the Bavarians by withdrawing his army
as far as Polotsk. This inexplicable notion was warmly opposed by
the group of generals summoned by the Marshal. General Legrand
said that although our success of the morning had been
counter-balanced by the losses of the evening, the army was still
in good heart and ready to advance, and that to retreat to
Polotsk would damage their morale and present them to the
Bavarians as a defeated force coming to seek refuge amongst them;
an idea which would arouse indignation in all French bosoms. This
vigourous speech by Legrand was acclaimed by all the generals and
the Marshal then gave up the project of a retreat.

There remained the question of what to do the next day. General
Legrand, with the authority of his seniority, long service and
experience in warfare, proposed that they should take advantage
of the serious error made by Koulnieff by attacking the
advance-guard so imprudently placed without support on the bank
which we occupied, and drive them back into the Drissa which they
had behind them. This advice having been accepted by the Marshal
and all the group, the execution of it was confided to General
Legrand.

Oudinot's army was encamped in a forest of huge, widely spaced
pines, beyond which there was a very extensive clearing. The
boundaries of the wood took the form of a bow, the two ends of
which reached the Drissa, which formed as it were the bow-string.
The Russians had set up their bivouac very close to the river,
opposite the ford. Their frontage was protected by fourteen
artillery pieces.

General Legrand wanted to take the enemy by surprise, so he
ordered General Albert to send a regiment of infantry to each of
the ends of the wood from where they could attack the camp from
the flank as soon as they heard the approach of the cavalry, who,
emerging from the woods in the centre of the bow would go
bald-headed for the Russian battalions and drive them into the
ravine. The task given to the cavalry was plainly the most
dangerous, for not only had they to make a frontal attack on an
enemy armed with 6000 muskets but would also be exposed to the
fire of fourteen artillery pieces before they could reach their
objective. It was, however, hoped that by a surprise attack, the
Russians might be caught asleep, and put up little resistance.

You have seen that my regiment having come on duty on the morning
of the 31st July at Kliastitsoui, had continued to serve for the
whole of that day, and should, according to the regulations, have
been relieved by the 24th at 1 A.M. on the 1st August, and it was
this regiment whose duty it was to carry out the attack, while
mine remained in reserve; there being only enough space in the
clearing between the woods and the stream for one regiment of
cavalry. However, Colonel A... went to Oudinot and suggested to
him that there was a danger that while we were preparing to
attack the troops in front of us, General Wittgenstein might send
a strong column to our right which could cross the Drissa at
another ford which probably existed some three leagues upstream
from where we were, and gaining our rear could capture our
wounded and our equipment; and that it would be a good idea to
send a regiment of cavalry to keep an eye on this ford. The
Marshal fell in with this suggestion and Colonel A..., whose
regiment had just come on duty, quickly ordered his men into the
saddle and led them off on this expedition which he had thought
up, leaving to the 23rd the dangers of the battle which was about
to take place.

My regiment received with calm the news of the perilous mission
which had been thrust upon them and welcomed the appearance of
the Marshal and General Legrand when they came to supervise the
preparations for this important attack which we were about to
carry out.