The Memoirs of General the Baron de Marbot

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The Russo-Prussians having come to a halt and dug in at Bautzen,
the French emperor ordered Ney to outflank their position, which
resulted in a victory on the 21st of May, which lack of cavalry
once more rendered incomplete though the enemy lost 18,000 men
and fled in disorder.

On the 22nd, the French, in pursuit of the Russians, made contact
with their rear-guard at the pass of Reichenbach. What little
cavalry Napoleon had was commanded by General Latour-Maubourg, a
most distinguished soldier, who led it with such elan that the
enemy were overwhelmed and abandoned the field after heavy
losses. Those suffered by the French, though fewer, were most
painful. The cavalry general, Bruyere, a fine officer, had both
his legs carried away and died of this dreadful injury; but the
saddest event of the day was the result of a cannon-ball which,
after killing General Kirgener (brother-in-law of Marshal
Lannes), mortally wounded Marshal Duroc, the grand marshal of the
palace, a man liked by everyone, and Napoleon's oldest and best
friend. Marshal Duroc survived for a few hours following his
injury, and the Emperor who was at his side showed every sign of
the deepest grief. Those who witnessed this melancholy scene,
noted that the Emperor, who was forced to leave his friend by the
demands of duty, parted from him in tears, having given him a
rendez-vous in "A better world!"

The French army now pressed on into Silesia, whose capital,
Breslau (Wroclaw) it occupied on the 1st of June. The allies, and
in particular the Prussians, much alarmed, realised that in spite
of their boasts, they were unable, without help, to stop the
French, and wanted to gain a respite in the hope that the
Austrians would end their hesitation and join forces with them.
They sent out envoys, given the task of soliciting an armistice
which, subject to the mediation of Austria, would lead, they
said, to a peace treaty. Napoleon thought that he should agree
to this armistice, and so it was signed on the 4th of June, to
last until the 10th of August.

While Napoleon was going from success to success, Marshal Oudinot
was defeated at Luckau, and lost 1100 men. The Emperor hoped that
during the armistice the numerous reinforcements from France
which he was awaiting, particularly the cavalry which had been
sorely missed, would make their appearance, and would take part
in a new campaign if that became unavoidable. There were,
however, several generals who regretted that the Emperor had not
followed up his victory. They argued that if the armistice
permitted us to build up our reserves, it did the same for the
Russo-Prussians, who hoped that they would be joined by the
Austrians, as well as by the Swedes, who were marching to their
aid. The former were not yet ready, but they would have more than
two months to organise and put into motion their numerous troops.

When at Mons I heard of the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen, I
was sorry not to have been there, but my regrets were diminished
when I found that my regiment had not been involved; it was, in
fact, before Magdeburg on the road to Berlin. M. Lacour, a former
aide-de-camp to General Castex, had been posted as squadron
commander to the 23rd, about the end of 1812, and he took command
of the regiment in my absence. He was a brave man, who had
acquired some education by reading, which gave him pretentions
which were out of place in a military milieu; in addition to
which his lack of experience as a commanding officer, resulted in
the regiment suffering losses which should have been avoided, and
of which I shall speak later. While I was at the depot, I gained
as second squadron commander M. Pozac, a very fine officer in all
respects who had been awarded a "sabre of honour" for his conduct
at the battle of Marengo.

Towards the end of June, all the colonels who had been sent to
France to organise the new forces, having completed this task,
were ordered to return to their posts with the army, although
hostilities would be suspended for some time. I was therefore
forced to leave my family, with whom I had passed so many happy
days, but duty called and I had to obey.

I once more took the road to Germany, and went first to Dresden,
to where the Emperor had summoned all the colonels in order to
question them about the composition of the detachments they had
sent to the army. There I learned something which annoyed me
greatly! At the depot I had organised four superb squadrons of
150 men each. The two first of which (happily the smartest and
best) had joined the regiment; the third had been taken, by
Imperial decision, and sent to Hamburg to be incorporated in the
28th Chasseurs, one of the weakest regiments in the army. This
was a lawful order, and I accepted it without complaint: but it
was not the same when I was told that the 4th squadron which I
had sent from Mons, having been noticed as it passed through
Cassel, by Jerome, the King of Westphalia, this prince had found
it so desirable that he had, on his own authority, enrolled it in
his Guard! I knew that the Emperor, very irritated that his
brother had taken it upon himself to make off with some Imperial
troops, had ordered him to send them on their way immediately,
and I had hopes that I would receive them; but King Jerome got
hold of some of the Emperor's aides, who represented to his
Majesty that as the King of Westphalia's Guard was composed
entirely of Germans, who were not by any means to be relied upon,
it was right that he should have a French squadron on whose
loyalty he could count; in the second place the King had, at much
expense, equipped the squadron with the brilliant uniform of
Hussars of his Guard; and finally, that even without this
squadron, the 23rd would still be the strongest regiment in the
French cavalry. Whatever the reason, my squadron remained in the
Westphalian guard, in spite of my loud protests. I could not get
over this loss, and found it supremely unjust that I should be
deprived of the fruits of my trouble and labour.

I rejoined my regiment not far from the Oder in the region of
Zagan, where it was in cantonment in the little town of
Freistadt, as was Exelman's division, of which it was a part.

During our stay in this area, a curious incident occurred. A
trooper by the name of Tantz, the only bad character in the
regiment, having got thoroughly drunk, threatened an officer who
had ordered him to be put in the police cell. Put before a
court-martial he was found guilty, condemned to death and the
sentence confirmed. Now when the guard, commanded by
Warrant-officer Boivin, went to fetch Tantz to take him to the
place where he was to be shot, they found him in the cell
completely naked, on the pretext that it was too hot.

The warrant-officer, a brave fellow, but one whose brains did not
match his courage, instead of making him dress, told him to wrap
himself in a cloak. However, having arrived on the draw-bridge
across the large moat which surrounded the chateau, Tantz threw
the cloak in the faces of the guard, leapt into the moat which he
swam across, and having reached the other side made off to join
the enemy on the opposite bank of the Oder. We never heard
anything more of him!... I broke the warrant-officer for being
so careless, but he soon regained his rank, by an act of bravery
which I shall describe shortly.

The squadrons which I had recently added to the regiment, brought
its strength up to 993 men, of whom almost 700 had fought in the
Russian campaign. The newly arrived soldiers were a well-built
body of men who had nearly all come from the departmental legion
of Jemmapes, which made it easier to train them as cavalrymen; I
incorporated the newcomers in the older squadrons. Both sides
were preparing for the coming struggle but our opponents had made
good use of their time, and had presented us with a powerful
adversary by persuading the Austrians to take up arms against us.

The Emperor Napoleon, whom numerous victories had accustomed to
taking little account of his enemies, believed himself to be once
more invincible, when he saw himself in Germany at the head of
300,000 men, but he did not examine sufficiently closely the
composition of the forces with which he was about to oppose the
whole of Europe, united against him.

The French army had received an intake of fine quality recruits,
and had never looked better; but with the exception of some
regiments, the majority of these new soldiers had never been in
action, and the disasters of the Russian campaign had generated
an uneasy feeling in the corps, the effects of which were still
felt. Our superb army was better suited to being put on show to
obtain terms, than to being engaged, at this moment, in combat.
Nearly all the generals and colonels, who saw the regiments at
close quarters, were of the opinion that they needed some years
of peace. If one were to pass from the French army to an
examination of those of her allies, one would see nothing but
apathy, ill-will and the wish for an opportunity to betray
France! Everything should have led Napoleon to treat with his
enemies, and to do this he should have first settled with his
father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, by giving back to him
Dalmatia, Istria, the Tyrol, and some of the other provinces
which he had seized in 1805 and 1809. Some concessions of this
sort offered to Prussia would have quietened the allies who, it
seems, were willing to return to Napoleon the colonies which had
been taken from France and to guarantee his occupation of all the
provinces this side of the Rhine and the Alps, and also upper
Italy; but in return he would have to give up Spain, Poland,
Naples, and Westphalia. These terms were acceptable; but at a
conference with the diplomats sent to discuss them, Napoleon was
rude to M. Metternich, the principal member of the delegation,
and sent them away without any concessions. It is said that as he
saw them leave the palace of Dresden, he remarked "We'll give
them a sound thrashing!" The Emperor seemed to forget that the
enemy armies were almost three times the size of his own forces.
He had, in fact, no more than 320,000 men in Germany, while the
allies could put in the line almost 800,000 fighting men.

The Emperor's birthday was on the 15th of August, but he ordered
that it should be celebrated in advance, because the armistice
ended on the 10th. The rejoicings of Saint-Napoleon's day then
took place in the cantonments. This was the last time that the
French army celebrated the birthday of its Emperor! There was not
much enthusiasm, for even the least perceptive of officers was
aware that we were on the brink of a catastrophe, and the worries
of the commanders affected the morale of their subalterns.
However each one prepared to do his duty, though with little hope
of success, in view of the great inferiority in numbers of our
army as opposed to the innumerable troops of the enemy. Already,
among our allies of the Confederation of the Rhine, the Saxon
General Thielmann had deserted with his brigade to join the
Prussians, after trying to hand over to them the fortress of
Torgau. Among our troops there was much uneasiness and lack of
confidence.

It was at this time that one heard of the return to Europe of
General Moreau who, condemned to banishment after the conspiracy
of Pichegru and Cadoudal, had retired to America. The hatred
which Moreau had for Napoleon made him forget the duty he owed to
his country. He soiled his reputation by ranging himself with the
enemies of France; however, it was not long before he paid the
price of this infamous conduct.

Now an immense semi-circle was formed around the French army. A
body of 40,000 Russians was in Mecklemberg; Bernadotte, the
Prince Royal of Sweden, occupied Berlin and the surrounding
district with an army of 120,000 men, composed of Swedes,
Russians, and Prussians. Two great Russian and Prussian armies,
220,000 men strong, of whom 35,000 were cavalry, were in Silesia
between Schweidnitz and the Oder; 40,000 Austrians were stationed
at Lintz, and the main Austrian army of about 140,000 men was
concentrated in Prague; finally, a short distance behind this
front line of 560,000 combatants, an enormous body of reserves
was ready to march.

The distribution of his troops made by Napoleon was as follows:
70,000 men were concentrated around Dahmen in Prussia, to oppose
Bernadotte; Marshal Ney with 100,000 occupied part of Silesia. A
corps of 70,000 was in the region of Zittau. Marshal Saint-Cyr
with 16,000 men occupied the camp at Pirna and gave cover to
Dresden. Finally the Imperial Guard, 20 to 25,000 strong was
spread round this capital, ready to go wherever was necessary.
Including the troops left in the garrisons of the forts, the
troops at Napoleon's disposal were infinitely fewer than those of
the enemy. This enumeration did not include the forces left in
Spain and Italy.

Chap. 24.

The French Emperor had divided his army into 14 Corps, called
infantry, although they each contained at least a brigade of
light cavalry. The commanding generals were as follows:--

1 Corps. Gen. Vandamme.

2 Corps. Marshal Victor.

3 Corps. Marshal Ney.

4 Corps. Gen. Bertrand.

5 Corps. Gen. Lauriston.

6 Corps. Marshal Marmont.

7 Corps. Gen. Reynier.

8 Corps. Prince Poniatowski.

9 Corps. Marshal Augereau.

10 Corps. (confined in Danzig) Gen. Rapp.

11 Corps. Marshal Macdonald.

12 Corps. Marshal Oudinot.

13 Corps. Marshal Davout.

14 Corps. Marshal Saint-Cyr.

Finally came the Guard, under the direct orders of the Emperor.

The cavalry was divided into 5 Corps, commanded by 1. Gen.
Latour-Mauberg, 2. Gen. Sebastiani, 3. Gen. Arrighi, 4. Gen.
Kellermann. 5. Gen. Milhau. The cavalry of the Guard was
commanded by general Nansouty.

The army, as a whole, approved of some of these appointments but
disapproved of others. They disliked such important posts being
given to Oudinot, who had made more than one mistake during the
Russian campaign, to Marmont, whose rashness had lost the battle
of Arpiles, to Sebastiani, who did not seem equal to the task,
and finally it was regretted that for a campaign which was to
decide the destiny of France, the Emperor had seen fit to try out
the strategic talents of Lauriston and Bertrand. The first was a
good artillery officer, and the second an excellent engineer, but
neither had directed troops in the field, and so lacked the
experience needed to command an army Corps.

Napoleon, recalling that when he was named as commander-in-chief
of the army of Italy, he had hitherto commanded only some
battalions, which had not prevented him from successfully filling
the post, probably believed that Lauriston and Bertrand could do
the same thing. But men of such universal talent as Napoleon are
rare, and he could not hope that his new corps commanders could
follow his example. It is thus that the personal affection which
he felt for these generals led him to commit once more the error
which he had previously made in giving command of an army to the
artilleryman Marmont.

The history of past wars shows quite clearly that to be
commander-in-chief, theoretical knowledge will not suffice, and
with a very, very few exceptions, it is necessary to have served
in an infantry or cavalry unit and to have commanded one in the
rank of colonel, to be competent to direct masses of men in the
field. This is a basic training which very few men can acquire as
generals or as commanders of an army. Louis XIV never confided
the command of troops in the open country to Marshal de Vauban,
who was, however, one of the most able men of his century, and
one presumes that if he had been offered the post, Vauban would
have turned it down in order to concentrate on his own specialty,
which was the attack and defence of fortresses. Marmont and
Bertrand, lacked this modesty, and the affection which Napoleon
had for them prevented him from listening to any observations on
the subject.

King Murat, who had gone to Naples after the Russian campaign,
rejoined the Emperor at Dresden. The coalition, that is to say
the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians, opened the campaign with
an act of bad faith, unworthy of civilised nations. Although
under the terms of the previous convention, hostilities should
not have begun until the 16th of August, they attacked our
outposts on the 14th, and put the greater part of their forces in
motion after the defection of Jomini.

Until this time, only the two Saxon generals, Thielmann and
Langueneau, had, shamefully, changed sides, but no general
wearing French uniform had sullied it in such a manner. It was a
Swiss, General Jomini, who was the first to do so. Jomini was a
simple clerk, on a salary of 1200 francs, in the ministerial
offices of the Republic of Helvetia, when, in 1800, General Ney
was sent to Berne by the First Consul to discuss with the Swiss
government the defence of their state, which was then our ally.
The duties of the clerk Jomini, which involved dealing with
confidential government documents, put him in contact with
General Ney, who was thus in a position to appreciate his
outstanding ability, and, yielding to his urgent requests, he
arranged for him to admitted as lieutenant, and shortly captain,
in the Swiss regiment which was being formed to serve with the
French army. General Ney took an increasing interest in his
protege. He had him enrolled as a French officer, took him as an
aide-de-camp and gave him the means to publish works which he had
written on the art of war, works which, although over-valued, are
not without some merit.

Thanks to protection of this kind, Jomini advanced rapidly to the
rank of colonel and brigadier-general, and at the resumption of
hostilities in 1813 was chief-of-staff to Marshal Ney. Seduced,
however, by the extravagant promises made by the Russians, he
deserted, in possession of much information about Napoleon's
plans of campaign. It was fear that, on hearing of this
defection, Napoleon would change these plans that induced the
allies to commence hostilities two days before the date agreed
for the ending of the armistice. To the surprise of everyone, the
Emperor Alexander rewarded the treacherous Jomini by taking him
as an aide-de-camp, which is said to have outraged the delicate
susceptibilities of the Austrian Emperor.

The information which Jomini was able to give the allies was a
serious blow to Napoleon, for several of his corps were attacked
in the course of moving into position and had to give up a number
of important points for lack of time to prepare their defence.
However, the Emperor, whose plan it was to move into Bohemia,
finding that his opponents were forewarned and on their guard
against this, resolved to attack the Prussian army in Silesia,
and re-engage in the offensive those troops which had been
compelled to retreat before Blucher. In consequence Napoleon
arrived at L”wenberg on the 20th of August, where he attacked a
considerable force of the allies consisting of Prussians,
Austrians, and Russians. Various actions took place on the 21st,
22nd, and 23r, in the areas of Goldberg, Graditzberg, and
Bunzlau. The enemy lost 7000 men killed or taken prisoner, and
retired behind the Katzbach.

During one of the numerous engagements which took place during
these three days, Wathiez's brigade, which was pursuing the
enemy, was held up by a wide and swift-flowing stream, a
tributary of the Bobr. There was no way of crossing except by two
wooden bridges about a quarter of a mile apart, which were
covered by Russian artillery fire. The 24th Chasseurs, who had
passed into the command of the gallant Colonel Schneit, having
received the order to attack the left hand bridge, advanced to
the assault with their usual courage, but it was a different
matter when it came to the 11th (Dutch) Hussars, recently
incorporated into the brigade. Ordered to take the right hand
bridge, their Colonel M. Liegeard, the only Frenchman in the
unit, called in vain on his troops to follow him, they were so
overcome by fear that not one of them moved. As my regiment,
which was in the second line, was being subjected to as much fire
as the 11th Hussars, I hastened to the side of their colonel to
give him some help in urging his men to attack the enemy
artillery, which was the only way of stopping the cannonade, but
when I saw that I would have no success, and that the cowardice
of the Hollanders would result in many casualties in my regiment,
I led my troops to the front of them and was about to move into
the attack when I saw the bridge on the left collapse under the
first section of men from the 24th, throwing them into the river
where several men and horses were drowned. The Russians, during
their withdrawal, had prepared this trap by sawing so cunningly
through the main timbers supporting the bridge that, unless one
were warned, it was impossible to see what had been done.

The sight of this disaster made me fear that the same treatment
had been given to the bridge towards which I was leading my men,
so I called a halt in order to arrange an inspection. This was a
dangerous undertaking, for not only was the bridge within range
of the enemy guns, but it was also within range of the muskets of
an infantry battalion. I was about to call for a volunteer for
this perilous task, when warrant-officer Boivin, whom I had
recently demoted for negligently allowing the Chasseur condemned
to death to escape, got off his horse and coming to me said,
rather than risking the life of one of his comrades, would I
please permit him to carry out the mission, in order to redeem
his mistake. Pleased with this courageous declaration, I said,
"Go then, and you will recover your epaulets at the end of the
bridge!"

Boivin went forward and, ignoring cannon-balls and bullets, he
examined the superstructure of the bridge and its supports and
returned to assure me that it was in order and that the regiment
could cross. I thereupon re-instated him in his rank. He
remounted his horse and placing himself at the head of the
squadron which was about to cross the bridge he led the way
towards the Russians, who did not wait for us to attack, but
withdrew smartly. The month following, when the Emperor reviewed
the regiment and awarded several promotions, I had Boivin made a
sous-lieutenant.

Our new brigade commander, General Wathiez, was able during the
these various actions to win the affection and regard of the
troops. As for the divisional commander, General Exelmans, we
knew only his reputation in army circles which was that of a man
of outstanding bravery; but he was also regarded as being
somewhat unreliable. We had proof of this in an event which
occurred at the re-commencement of hostilities.

At a time when the division was carrying out a withdrawal, to
which my regiment was giving cover, General Exelmans, on the
pretext that he was about to lay a trap for the Prussian advance
guard, ordered me to place at his disposal my elite company and
25 of my best marksmen, whom he put under the command of Major
Lacour; then he put these 150 men in a meadow surrounded by
woodland, and after telling them not to move without his
permission, he went off and completely forgot them!... The enemy
arrived, and seeing the detachment abandoned in this manner, they
halted, fearing that it had been put there to lure them into an
ambush. To reassure themselves, they sent some individual men to
slip into the wood, on the right and left, and when they heard no
sound of gunfire, they gradually built up the number until they
had completely surrounded our troopers. It was in vain that
several officers pointed out to Major Lacour that this movement
was going to cut off his retreat; Lacour, brave but lacking
initiative, stuck rigidly to the order he had been given, without
considering that General Exelmans might have forgotten him and
that it might be as well to send someone to remind him, and at
least to reconnoitre the terrain over which he might be able to
retreat. He had been ordered to stay there, and he would stay
there even if his men were killed or taken prisoner!

While Major Lacour was carrying out his instructions in the
manner of a simple sergeant rather than that of a senior officer,
the division marched into the distance! General Walthiez and I,
when we saw that the detachment did not return, and not knowing
how to contact General Exelmans, who was galloping across
country, had serious misgivings. I then asked permission from
General Walthiez to return to Major Lacour, and on receiving it I
left at the gallop with a squadron and arrived just in time to
see a most distressing sight, particularly for a commanding
officer who cared for his soldiers.

The enemy, having infiltrated both flanks and even the rear of
our detachment, had mounted a frontal attack by a greatly
superior force, so that some 700 to 800 Prussian lancers
surrounded our 150 men, whose only way of retreat was over a
wretched footbridge of wooden planks which joined the two steep
banks of a nearby mill-stream. Our horsemen could cross here only
one by one so that there was congestion, and the elite company
lost several men. A number of riders then noticed a large
farmyard which they thought might lead to the mill-stream, and in
the hope of finding a bridge they entered it, followed by the
rest of the detachment. The stream did, in fact, run past the
farmyard, but it there formed the mill-pool, the banks of which
were lined by slippery flagstones, making access extremely
difficult for horses. This gave the enemy a great advantage, and
in an attempt to capture all the French who had entered this huge
yard, they closed the gates.