The Riddle of the Rhine:
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Victor LeFebure >> The Riddle of the Rhine:
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The realisation of the facts in question led to the direct
admission of their importance in the Treaty. Article 172,
the one in question, states: "Within a period of three
months from the coming into force of the present Treaty,
the German Government will disclose . . . the nature and mode
of manufacture of all explosives, toxic substances or other
like chemical preparations used by them in the war, or prepared
by them for the purpose of being so used."
German Information.--This clause should be fulfilled in detail.
In any given period of the stage of intensive chemical warfare and at the end,
the Germans, in addition to those devices in operation, must have had
a large number of more telling and more novel ones in preparation.
It is important to get as much information as possible on this development.
A striking fact emerges. The years 1915, 1916, and the early part
of 1917 witnessed the actual manufacture of the war chemicals which were
used by Germany on the front. All the research and other work which
precedes chemical manufacture must have been completed much earlier.
What surprises, then, had the German laboratories in store for us after 1917?
Have these been revealed under authority of the Treaty?
Probably the most important point in the clause is its interpretation
with regard to the Haber process. Its critical importance in
the manufacture of explosives is so great that our neglect to use
the Treaty to remove the monopoly is a direct menace to peace.
This process undoubtedly saved Germany in 1915 and is largely
responsible for the three years of war agony which followed.
It can only have missed specific reference in the Treaty on account of its
claim to represent the fertiliser rather than the explosives industry.
To yield to such views, however ideal the motives, is to threaten
the greater ideal of world peace.
Limitation of Armament.--This clause, covering only war development,
cannot be regarded as a serious safeguard for the future.
It is rather the fruits of victory, the logical outcome
of Allied success and the German breach of faith.
But the Treaty of Versailles contains an admission of the importance
of chemical warfare for the future. Article 171 states:
"The use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of
analogous liquids, materials, or devices being prohibited,
their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden
in Germany. The same applies to materials specially intended
for the manufacture, storage, and the use of the same products
or devices." What kind of guarantee is this? How far is it
supported by other disarmament? It is very important to answer
these questions. In a sense the full execution of the other
relevant Treaty clauses would provide a partial answer.
We deal with these in the next chapter.
Report of the Hartley Mission.--Chemical warfare is the _point
faible_ in world disarmament. Judging from the above clause
of the Treaty, it is clear that this is not fully recognised.
Once again our trust is invited in mere prohibition. The lesson
of the war is not learnt. The chemical menace is not countered.
Why should this be? There are two main reasons. In the first place,
very few had any conception of the tremendous growth in this branch
of warfare, for facts had rarely been disclosed, and those with no
direct contact with chemical warfare were relying on impressions.
The vivid recollection of the first German cloud attack, and of
the introduction of mustard gas, have, for most people, obscured the
solid facts of the case. The great importance of the projector,
the high percentage of chemical shell used by the enemy artillery,
and the tremendous undertaking involved in protecting an army
of millions with a modern gas mask, have not been grasped.
The Hartley report clearly revealed the importance of the German dye
factories for chemical warfare production. But we have a shrewd
idea that it left many of its official readers much better informed
on production than on the use of the materials concerned, that is,
on the military value of chemical warfare.
New Conceptions in Chemical Disarmament.--The second
difficulty preventing a full understanding of the case lies
in the fact that chemical disarmament involves certain
conceptions which are remote from the normal military outlook.
Let us examine the matter as simply as possible.
During the many discussions on disarmament in Paris, various principles
were suggested as a basis. One which received recognition
in the Treaty was the limitation of the number of projectors
or guns, using the term "projector" in a general way to cover
all projectile-throwing weapons. Thus, in the sense implied,
rifles, machine-guns, field and heavy guns are projectors.
Recent writers have termed gas a projectile, one which,
on account of its fluid nature, ignores the limitations of explosive
shell and multiplies their radius of action indefinitely.
This is true--with one most important qualification.
Gas has never entirely depended upon the usual form of projector,
the gun, and with the limitation of the latter its dependence
will decrease. New forms of chemical weapon will evolve.
Now it is true that almost every form of warfare which one
can conceive depends for success on some sort of projector,
and it is also true that the manufacture of these projectors
can be controlled, because it is usually so complicated.
These remarks apply, for example, to the manufacture of a
field or heavy gun. But there is one serious exception
to the covering power of this method of limitation.
You cannot carry on tank warfare without ordinary projectors,
but you can run a chemical campaign without them.
Facing the difficulties which are before any League of Nations
or international body planning world disarmament, let us assume
armament reduced to a police basis. In other words, the use
of force is not entirely ruled out, but is limited to the minimum
required for reducing local disorder, maintaining the peace,
and contributing to any general scheme for preventing war.
The nations, then, agree to limit their personnel and material
within certain prescribed bounds. The work of the League
of Nations, or central organisation, does not finish here.
We cannot assume that permanent purity of national intentions,
in other words, some check or guarantee must be instituted. This may
take the simple form of systematic reporting by nations and their
inspection by the League. Here we meet with considerable difficulty.
Unless some simple covering principle for inspection can
be determined upon, we shall end up with one-half the world
inspecting the administration and organisation of the other.
The matter becomes an absurdity.
Limitation, Mechanical and Chemical.--Considering the present
trend of war development, we can divide the factors requiring
limitation into three classes--the combatants, and weapons
of a mechanical and chemical nature.
Tank Disarmament.--A little thought will show that the limitation
of the number of projectile-throwing weapons covers the first two types,
and is a matter which is not theoretically beyond the possibility
of inspection. Periodic inspection could reasonably be regarded as a check
against very big scale production beyond the normal scope of industry,
for such weapons as rifles, machine-guns, field and heavy guns.
If we consider the most important new mechanical war appliance, the tank,
we find it no exception to the above remarks. Without projectors, that is,
machine-guns, rifles, etc., it merely becomes a means of conveying troops
and material from one place to another.
Two possibilities then arise. The number of tanks required
might be so small that they could be suitably armed with light
projectors without entering upon large-scale production.
Secondly, the tank might become an offensive weapon
without projectors, by the use of some chemical contrivance.
This merely goes to prove that steps must be taken to limit
the output of the tank itself. Are such steps possible?
We assume that the modern tank is, and will increasingly become,
a weapon practically as specific as a big gun, requiring a number
of special parts which normal industry does not provide,
and that the production concerned can be controlled by inspection
with the same order of difficulty as that of the bigger projectors.
We now come to the third type requiring limitation under
a disarmament scheme.
Chemical Limitation.--Can we limit chemical armament?
Our review of production has shown the impossibility of doing so,
unless we completely wipe out the organic chemical industry
which is essential for world progress by its contribution
of dyes, drugs, and other synthetic commodities. The factories
of the organic chemical industries are more silently converted
into arsenals than any other type. It is true that, under normal
conditions of warfare, the decisive success of a chemical campaign
might be restricted by the use of other weapons, such as artillery.
But, under conditions where the latter are seriously limited,
the chemical weapon becomes, relatively, of much greater importance.
One of the main trends in chemical warfare was the development
of devices which would give long-range chemical effects without
a complicated form of projector, or with none at all. Having thus
shown the independence of the chemical weapon, under conditions
of limitation of armament, we are faced with an important question.
What can be the guarantees for the limitation of chemical warfare?
Research.--In the first place, can any research results accrue under
Treaty or League conditions? The chief poison gases used during
the war owed their discovery, as individuals, to pre-war research
which was not stimulated by the need for an offensive chemical.
Phosgene was discovered in 1811 by J. Davy, while experimenting on
the action of sunlight on a mixture of carbon monoxide and chlorine.
Guthrie, in 1860, trying to throw light on some theoretical aspects
of organic chemistry, examining the nature of certain so-called
radicles or groups of atoms, came across a family of compounds
of which mustard gas, or B:B dichlordiethylsulphide, was a member.
This he found to be a dangerous substance, but the nearest members
of the series were harmless.
These substances will arise as a result of normal chemical research.
We admit they may multiply much more quickly if work is specially
directed towards their discovery, but it is practically
impossible to control such work. The research worker's nearest
confidante and laboratory companion might be unaware that he was
developing some new vitally important chemical for warfare.
No serious person can claim the possibility of a check upon
such research. If, then, the Government of any country desires
to provide its chemical factories with suitable subjects for
chemical warfare production, these can be produced under ANY
international arrangements, however prohibitive.
Production.--But what of production? Here, again, we have an entirely
different problem compared with that of limiting the output of a gun.
Let us assume that the production of some vitally important new
organic compound involves four different steps, and that the last
step produces the toxic substance. This is a fair assumption.
Let us further assume the most favourable condition for detection,
_i.e_. {t}he final product is a liquid or gas with obviously
toxic properties. Given a big organic chemical industry,
there is no possibility of detection by open methods of control.
With regard to the first three steps, in practically every case they
will be related to some new or existing dye, drug, photographic, or other
commercial organic product. The products of these first reactions can
either be stored, ready for the rapid realisation of the last reaction,
in which case there is no possibility of detection, or the reaction
can be completed and the materials passed without exposure through
a standard type of plant to an easily concealed container.
The only type of inspection which could possibly cope with such a
problem would require to probe deeply into the technical and commercial
secrets of the factories and plants, and could even then be misled
owing to the constantly developing nature of the compounds produced.
The inspectors would require to be numerous and as closely in touch
with the plants and processes as the actual factory staffs.
Consider the Leverkusen works for a moment. They cover a very wide
range of products, are admirably planned on a well thought out and
rational scheme, and there is a reason for the position of every unit.
Their methodical arrangement would be of more assistance
to inspection in this than in any other large organic chemical
works with which we are acquainted. Even under such favourable
conditions satisfactory inspection would be most difficult.
Each one of the twenty huge blocks contains many units of plant,
and is devoted to the production of primary, intermediate or
finished materials. For the inspection of suspected poison
gas production, an examination of the first two would be of
no assistance, for the war and peace materials would be identical.
Differentiation would occur in the dye and finished product blocks.
Each one of these blocks may be producing as many as one hundred
different compounds at the same time, and each one of these
compounds may, itself, involve two, three, or four different stages.
The members of one official mission, when asking to be shown
the plant for the manufacture of _p_-amidophenol, an important
dye and photographic chemical, were taken to a large building
filled with assorted plant, and were told by the guides,
"We have no special plant for the product you mention;
we make it in this building with a great many other products,
for it is our principle not to have plant which makes one
product only, but is readily adaptable for making a variety."
In many of the processes the materials do not appear to the naked
eye after their introduction into the first plant unit, being fed
by gravity or pressure from one enclosed apparatus to another.
It would be absolutely essential for any inspection to conduct
chemical tests at the different stages. The difficulty of inspection
is incontestable. It could be done with a large staff, but we
must remember that the Rhine plants are, themselves, but a small
corner of the whole world of industry requiring inspection.
Even under the most favourable conditions for detection,
the chances are exceedingly small. But, in most cases, an enemy
with a strong organic chemical industry need not undertake
manufacture during peace. He could rely on the potentialities
of his chemical industry, which would enable him to commence
production in his existing plant immediately on the outbreak of war.
The question of the use of the chemical then arises.
If of an exceedingly novel and decisive nature, it could take
its share of use in the limited number of guns available;
on the other hand, it might be capable of use in one of the very
simple weapons already devised for chemicals, or to be devised
in the future.
Consider the Livens projector, by no means a favourable case.
The latest German designs have a range well over a mile.
This range maybe increased. Yet the Livens projector can
be made without serious or obvious war modification of plant,
in a tube works, where the bomb can also be produced.
The very nature of chemical warfare is such that great accuracy
is not required, and simplification of production of the gas
projector follows naturally. We conclude from the above that
whatever treaty or international arrangements exist for prohibiting
chemical warfare, we can find no safeguard in practicable methods
of control, and must find safety in some other measure.
Mechanical and Chemical Preparations for War.--There is a fundamental
difference in preparation for the mechanical and chemical methods of war.
This difference necessitates special consideration for the chemical method
from the point of view of disarmament. All the modern mechanical types
of war appliances are characterised by their great structural intricacy,
witness the Lewis gun with its innumerable complicated parts,
the heavy and field guns with their wonderful mechanism, and the future
tank with its anti-gas, anti-water, and general anti devices.
This characteristic of great structural development has certain
concomitants which are of considerable military importance.
It imposes certain conditions on production, involving special factories
for special parts and other factories for the assembly of those parts.
It implies large scale experimentation for the improvement of the appliance.
All this brings control and inspection within the region of the
theoretically possible, and militates against sudden surprise.
The structural characteristic also imposes certain important conditions
in military training. It takes a definite period of time to create
a machine-gunner who will humour the wonderful mechanism which he serves.
He must know the different jambs, and simple repairs. He must be trained.
The same remarks apply to any other structurally intricate appliance,
such as the tank. In other words, this characteristic is a distinct check
on any nation aiming at a sudden expansion from limited to war armament.
But consider the chemical method. The specific property
of the chemical which gives it its military value is ultimately
its influence on the human organism, which causes casualties
or imposes heavy military handicaps on protected troops.
There is, again, a question of structure, the chemical
structure of the substance in question. This, however,
does not involve the same aids to armament limitation as for
the mechanical type, unless it be in a very restricted sense.
In research, the discovery of the most effective chemical
the world will ever see can occur by the use of a few beakers,
pots and pans, and common chemicals, directed by a trained mind.
Being atomic or molecular, the structure imposes no large scale
conditions on the research. Nor is it fair to say that from
the point of view of production there is a parallel between
the complexity of the molecule and the plant required to make it.
The chemically complicated Blue Cross arsenic compounds were
produced by Germany in a plant which was simplicity itself
when compared with the marvellous installation developed
to produce oleum, a concentrated form of the relatively simple
sulphuric acid, a fundamental substance in explosives production.
Instead of manipulating a huge lathe, or forge, or exceedingly
complicated multiple mechanical device, you manipulate
temperatures and pressures and vary the reaction medium.
Naturally, chemical engineering is very important,
but its magnitude and complexity is in no sense parallel
with the intricacy of the chemical molecule, whereas a
distinct parallel exists for the mechanical war appliance.
More than this, we believe that developments in both fields
will exaggerate rather than diminish the difference.
We see thus how, on general grounds, the chemical weapon tends
to evade any normal condition of limitation which might be
perfectly adequate for the mechanical type.
Recent Disarmament Proposals.--A superficial examination of recent
disarmament speeches by prominent League of Nations advocates leaves
one with the glow of inspiration produced by homage to a great ideal.
But later reflection, in the cold light of reason, produces a critical,
but not cynical, frame of mind. Disarmament depends for success on
the way in which we tackle certain critical cases, The carrying out
of the more commonly considered forms of disarmament will give immensely
added importance to other forms of warfare which have already challenged
supremacy in the keen competitive atmosphere of the great world war.
The outstanding example is the chemical arm, whose peculiar requirements
in any scheme of disarmament have been but vaguely understood.
The great case and rapidity with which the German dye
factories mobilised for poison gas production on a
super-industrial scale has already been demonstrated.
It took forty years and more to develop those factories.
Yet forty days saw many of their plants producing huge tonnages
of poison gas, and as many hours were sufficient for others.
In some cases, indeed, they were already producing eventual
munitions long before the outbreak of war. We must not remain
insensible to the double-edged nature of this industrial weapon.
When with one hand Germany withdrew life-giving drugs from America,
with the other she poured upon us an endless stream of deadly poison
made in the same factories. Even when our textile industries
were threatened through lack of indigo, from the very plants on
which we had depended there issued a steady stream of mustard gas,
each ounce of which threatened Allied limb and life.
But how does this touch disarmament? Very simply.
A few quotations from some recently published disarmament utterances
will show that we are not pressing the point without need.
But let us follow the matter through in a logical way.
The Covenant of the League;--Need for Guarantees.--We start from
the sure ground of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 8,
recognising the reduction of armaments to the lowest point
consistent with national safety, refers to the formulation
and revision of plans for such reduction and states:
"The members of the League undertake to interchange full
and frank information as to the scale of their armaments,
their military and naval programmes, and the conditions of such
of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes."
Here is the frank admission of the importance of such industries.
But later exponents of the League express dissatisfaction
with Article 8, claiming the wording to be vague. Thus, from
Major David Davies, M.P.,[1] "The whole wording of Article 8 is vague.
These proposals would not eradicate the old atmosphere of suspicion
which has brought about so many wars. Nations who put their
trust in the League are entitled to an assurance that the League
will be able to enforce its decisions with promptitude.
The proposals concerning armaments in Article 8 and elsewhere
do not give this assurance. Something more definite is required,"
and he proceeds to lay down three aims which must be covered
by an efficient disarmament scheme.
[1] _The Flaw in the Covenant and the Remedy_. Major David Davies, M.P.
"(_a_) Allow each nation an army sufficient to maintain internal
order within its own boundaries, and sufficient also to furnish
its quota for the League of Nations when required.
"(_b_) Ensure that the quota of any nation shall not be rendered useless
by the employment of a new weapon of war by another nation.
"(_c_) Provide the League of Nations with an adequate force
for immediate use.
"All the above essentials are incorporated in a scheme for an
International Police Force. This scheme, which is given in
the merest outline, is based on the assumption that our national
security must always be absolutely safeguarded, and that before
we decide on any relaxation of our armament policy we must
be certain that the alternative offers complete protection."
Other exponents emphasise this last essential. This reference
to an International Police Force raises an important issue.
Such a force must draw its personnel from the different nations.
Without any doubt, one of the most important contributions from
the nations is the fostering of organic chemical research and
technical cadres which can only be maintained under true disarmament
conditions by the redistributed organic chemical industries.
Viscount Grey--"Germany Must Disarm First."--Viscount Grey,
at the public meeting in support of the League of Free Nations
on October 10th, 1918, stated: "Germany must disarm first.
She led the way up the hill in increasing expenditure on armaments.
She must lead the way down the hill. That as a first condition,
from our point of view, goes without saying. There can be no talk
of disarmament until Germany, as the greater armer, is disarmed."
One can only heartily agree with such expressions, but the
_denouement_ brings a sense of disappointment. There is a feeling
that those who should be nearest are but groping for a solution.
The peculiar significance of chemical warfare for the future is freely
admitted in these utterances. Thus Major David Davies states:
"If they had kept their intentions secret until they could utilise
a thoroughly deadly gas in the general attack, it was more than
possible that they would have completely broken the Allied line,"
and Lord Grey, "You cannot limit the amount of merchant
ships or commercial aeroplanes, and the fewer the armaments,
fighting aeroplanes, and ships of war, the more potential as weapons
of war become the things which you use in commerce-ships, aeroplanes,
chemicals of all kinds."
Left in this state the case is true but not complete.
The essential point is that the new and telling types
of armament will develop from these very peace industries.
We are not merely concerned with their relative magnitude
in a state of disarmament, but with the critical types which may
develop from them.
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