The Riddle of the Rhine:
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Victor LeFebure >> The Riddle of the Rhine:
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So far, so good, but what steps are proposed to counter the menace?
In reviewing what has been suggested by different responsible individuals,
we find that the methods intended to cover armament limitation for the newer
weapons fall into two classes.
Suggested Methods.--In the first place, it is suggested "that war's
newest weapons--poison gas, aeroplanes, submarines, heavy artillery,
and tanks, should be ceded to the League to form the _Headquarter's Force_,
and that no state should be allowed to own them or to make use of any
new invention for warlike purposes.
"There should be no delay in handing over the new arms before they can
claim long traditions. Vested interests have not yet been created on
a permanent footing. Great disturbance would not be caused at present
by the suggestion of denationalisation."
This really claims the advisability of verbal prohibition, which is
absolutely useless, unless supported by the second class of safeguard,
periodic "inspection." Major Davies suggests "all arsenals and
munition factories would be open to inspection by the General Staff,
who would use them, when necessary, for arming the quota of a
nation other than that in whose territory they were situated."
We know of no practical method by which inspection could be relied upon
to give satisfactory warning of the conversion of the plants of the I.G.
for war purposes. A distinction must be made between those weapons whose
production can and cannot be practically controlled by inspection.
In attempting such a classification, Major Davies claims, "It is
difficult to prevent the secret manufacture of rifles, but it is easy
to prevent the manufacture of tanks, aeroplanes, gas, or submarines."
No one having witnessed the large scale operations of assembling tanks
and heavy guns, and aware, at the same time, of the German methods
of producing mustard gas or Blue Cross compounds, could make such an
elementary mistake in classification, and any international disarmament
arrangements based on such an error can only produce a false security.
_*Gas is the outstanding case of a weapon whose manufacture it is
difficult to prevent_.
"Vested Interests."--With regard to the vested interests
in the new method of warfare, the most striking example
is again the I.G. We find Ludendorff consulting Krupp and
the I.G. representative when formulating his plans for a vast
munition programme. Few people have realised the existence
of another Krupp in the I.G. It would, indeed, be a revelation
to find Germany sharing in these schemes of disarmament
to the extent of voluntarily abandoning her dye monopoly.
For such a situation is the only one consistent with safety.
While the sole big source of production of these substances
exists in Germany or in any one country for that matter,
no scheme of disarmament is on sure ground.
"Handing Over" Inventions.--Certain disarmament advocates have ingenuous
ideas with regard to new war inventions, and their "handing over"
to the League. How can an invention be handed over? If every country
informed the League of its new scientific war developments, those countries
would still be aware of them. It is possible, commercially, to hand over any
invention by assigning a patent, but this is of no use for war purposes.
What country would regard patent law as a barrier to the use of a
valuable war invention? Secondly, the cession of an invention to
the League depends entirely on the goodwill of the nation concerned.
No country can be sufficiently inspected to root out its new inventions.
Suppose a gas ten times more useful, from a military point of view,
than mustard gas were discovered in the laboratories of the I.G. An inspector,
or "Secret Service" agent, at the next bench in the laboratory might never
know that the research was not aimed at the discovery of a new dye.
World equilibrium may at this moment be threatened by the discoveries
of some absorbed scientist working, say, in a greenhouse in St. John's Wood.
We come back to the same point, that the crux of the situation lies in the
possession of the means of production. There is hope of controlling this
for a weapon like a tank, but it cannot be controlled for chemical warfare.
If the League requires these weapons it cannot rely on obtaining them from
a monopoly source so complete as the I.G. Further, with or without a League
the mere existence of this monopoly is a permanent menace to peace.
Neglect of Chemical Disarmament in the Treaty.--Let us face the facts.
Our treatment of chemical industry during the Treaty negotiations
and in the Treaty itself persistently ignored its chameleon nature.
We knew that the nitrogen plants at Oppau and Merseburg were the most
menacing munition plants in existence. We knew the grave dangers of
leaving Germany, a guilty country, in possession of the poison gas monopoly.
Yet, deaf to such arguments, the Treaty opportunity was ignored.
Even now the lesson is only half learnt by those whom it vitally concerns.
Here is a new weapon whose exploitation demands research and large
scale production. The former cannot be checked, and the latter
cannot be destroyed or suitably controlled to prevent conversion
for war purposes. Yet three distinct features of this weapon make
the disarmament need imperative.
In the first place, everything points to "chemical disarmament"
as a key measure to control the large scale use of all other weapons.
The aggressive agent in war is the chemical. All weapons,
except the bayonet, depend upon it.
In the second place, chemical warfare is itself so overwhelmingly important
that it is farcical to con-template any disarmament scheme which does not,
first and foremost, tackle this question.
Thirdly, no nation ever held a more complete monopoly for any weapon
than did Germany for chemical warfare. Yet the levelling up process
which occurred during the war, tending towards armament equilibrium,
towards removal of enormous disparity, failed to touch the chemical arm.
Germany through her guilty exercise of the new weapon, has still further
increased her enormous manufacturing superiority for war.
This age has witnessed the growth of an industry critical for war
and disarmament. Others will follow as science progresses.
Without them, the possibility of sudden decisions,
and therefore war incentive will be removed. Sir Oliver Lodge
prophesies the war use of the newly controlled atomic energy.
The fulfilment depends on the growth of another critical war
industry whose nature it would be difficult to foretell.
It is these critical industries which rational disarmament must harness.
At present the chemical industry holds the field.
Surely the first and crying need is to effect a redistribution
of these organic chemical forces. This, indeed, is the one solid
chemical disarmament measure which can and must he brought about.
The certain establishment of these industries in the chief
countries outside Germany must be fixed far beyond the hazard
of local politics and the reach of organised German attack.
True, it is essential that no such support should in any way
drug the will, weaken the initiative and impoverish the service
of the fostered industries. This must depend upon wise
organisation and control in the country concerned.
I claim, however, that it is one of the main duties of any League
of Nations or other organisation dealing with disarmament to proceed
two steps beyond the paragraph in Article 8 of the Covenant. This runs
as follows: "The members of the League undertake to interchange
full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments,
their military, naval, and air programmes, and the conditions
of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes."
Such an exchange of information must be used, first, to isolate that
industry which is of a vital or key nature to the armament of the period,
either on account of its value as a universal check, or because it
fosters some particularly deadly new type of weapon or aggressive agent.
The chemical industry at present fulfils both conditions, for without it,
all weapons except the bayonet become silent, and it includes the organic
chemical industry which fosters the deadly weapon of the period.
Secondly, rational disarmament must prevent the existence
of monopoly in this critical industry. It may be objected
that we are interfering with the play of ordinary economic laws.
But we must face the possibility that the war of the future
can never be averted without such interference. Indeed, if we
accept the reports of the American Alien Property Custodian,
this very monopoly which now threatens us was established
by methods open to the same objections. It is indeed an
interesting question whether the German dye monopoly resulted
from forces which directly opposed the play of economic law.
Further, the question is not so simple as it appears, for, in the
industries which disarmament most concerns, governing technical
changes are constantly occurring, and the normal home for
the production of a whole range of chemical products may be
shifted by a change of process which demands new raw materials
or new types of energy and power. We must be ready, in certain
critical cases, to regard disarmament as the paramount need.
International agreement, through the League or otherwise,
must find a suitable method to control the critical industry
and prevent its use against world peace.
To be the ardent possessor of an ideal, to be its official guardian,
does not allow us to ignore the technical aspect of an international
and national issue. After our gigantic praiseworthy, but wasteful,
attempts at chemical armament, let us at least disarm on rational lines.
CONCLUSION
THE TREATY AND THE FUTURE
I have endeavoured to present the facts of chemical warfare
as briefly yet as truly as possible, giving a glimpse of the war
possibilities inherent in this branch of applied chemical science.
Nor have I ignored the hidden forces which inspired, stimulated,
and supported the huge war chemical experiment. The great Rhine
factories of the I.G. still cast their shadow on the outer world,
obscuring the issues of reconstruction. This looming menace,
its share in the past and future of chemical warfare, and the fatal
growth of the latter present questions demanding an imperative answer.
It is the weak point of world disarmament.
The Treaty of Versailles answers the riddle in principle,
but have the actual clauses been unfulfilled?
Article 168 demands the limitation of munitions production to factories
or works approved by the Allied and Associated Governments. "All other
establishments for the manufacture of any war material whatever shall
be closed down."
True, the plants of the I.G., like most other munition plants,
have a dual function for peace and war. But their recent vital
use for the latter brings them without doubt within the scope
of the above clause. Are they still equipped for war purposes?
Very drastic action will have been necessary by the
Inter-Allied Commission of Control to justify a negative answer.
Has that action been taken? If not, the I.G., a second Krupp,
remains in splendid isolation, secure behind our mediaeval
but generous conception of munitions, for fifty per cent.
of the German shell fillings, the message of their guns, were eventually
provided by the I.G. It is true that they were manufactured in
synthetic dye and fertiliser plants, but the explosives were none
the less violent and the poison gases none the less poisonous.
Do we understand that the Allied and Associated Governments
voluntarily leave Germany in unquestioned possession of this vast
source of munitions in the face of the Treaty Article 168?
Article 169 wisely requires that any special plant intended for
the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognised
as necessary for equipping the authorised strength of the German Army,
must be "surrendered to be destroyed or rendered useless."
The most formidable examples of such excess production were,
and remain, the nitrogen fixation and the nitric acid plants
of the I.G. The factories of the latter represent explosives
and poison gas capacity far in excess of the authorised needs
of the German Army. Why, then, should they be left. intact?
What is the authorised equipment of the German Army? In the first
place the manufacture and use of poison gas is specifically forbidden
by the Treaty. The plants in question are therefore all in excess
of authorised production, and should be destroyed or rendered useless.
At present, to the best of our belief, they stand ready to produce at
short notice at the rate of more than 3000 tons of Poison gas per month.
Does this mean that we admit them as authorised equipment?
If so, we are ourselves contravening another clause of the Treaty.
The Treaty tabulates the authorised equipment in stock of shell.
Based on the figures, we find that the actual war explosives production
of the I.G., which, we believe, still largely remains available,
could meet the total stock allowed to Germany by the current production
of little more than one day!
Even if the Treaty provided authority, could these plants evade
their just penalties on the ground of commercial world need?
Consider the question of German poison gas, all produced within
the I.G., and its use and manufacture in Germany forbidden by
the Treaty. It was made in converted or multiplied dye plants,
or in special plants of the same type. Germany's great
advantage was due, unquestionably, to her pre-war dye monopoly.
The 1913 figures for production and home consumption are
given below, under (A) and (B) :
A B C
Country. Dye Production, Home Dye Dye Production,
1913. Consumption. 1918,
Tons Tons Tons
Germany 135,000 20,000 135,000
(probably
more)
Switzerland 10,000 3,000 12,000
France 7,500 9,430 18,000
U.K . 4,500 31,730 25,000
U.S.A 3,000 26,020 27,000
Other Countries 3,000 72,820 4,000
---- ---- ----
Total 163,000 163,000 221,000
The completeness of the German monopoly stands clearly revealed.
If, therefore, any plants capable of making dyes were built for
poison gas or explosives during war, they could find no post-war
_raison d'etre_ unless the feeble production of other countries
had even further diminished.
Do the above figures (C) justify such an assumption? There is an
increase of production outside Germany of nearly 60,000 tons per annum.
Almost all of this, representing development under definitely expressed
national policy, must be maintained unless we wish to revert to the
exceedingly dangerous situation of a German dye and poison gas monopoly.
Much of this 60,000 tons per annum German excess could be covered
by plants used or built specially for poison gas or explosives.
There is every reason, for world peace, to eliminate such excess plants.
There is no important reason, for commerce, to maintain them.
In addition, many of them represent excess capacity which should be destroyed
because they originated solely for the exploitation of a forbidden weapon.
Even if a generous ruling, superimposed on the Treaty, offered these guilty
plants a new lease of life because of their urgent peace-time use,
the claim could not be supported before neutral experts. The Treaty
provides authority for the disarming of certain chemical munition plants.
Nothing but the most drastic economic need can justify departure from this
critical disarmament measure. The need may justify Treaty exemption
for other types of munition production in which the disarmament aspect
is not so overwhelmingly important. The matter demands examination.
We can hardly conceive that this has not been done. Are our missions
equipped to meet the best German commercial minds on such a matter?
In any case, Allied Governments have already wisely adopted a dye industry
policy inconsistent with the special Treaty immunity of the excess I.G.
munition plants. Our figures remove any ground for the economic argument.
The nitrogen fixation plants of the I.G. undoubtedly demand
the same critical examination. These plants were built almost
entirely for war purposes, for the production of ammonia to be
oxidised to nitric acid. Ammonium nitrate also resulted.
These substances are the mainstay of explosives warfare, and, as a
matter of fact, their production in these very plants was the chief
factor which enabled Germany to continue the war beyond 1915.
Under the simple reading of the Treaty clauses, the plants
should "be destroyed or rendered useless." Here, possibly,
strong arguments will be advanced by Germany for the retention
of the plants for the purpose of fertilising her own soil.
The argument is strong, for the impoverishment of German soil
has been such as to demand, theoretically, enormous tonnages
of ammonium sulphate. But it is vital, for the stability
of peace, that this unique capacity for producing explosives
must not remain the monopoly of any one country.
It is the expressed intention of certain governments outside
Germany to foster the nitrogen fixation enterprise. If, then,
we admit the immunity of these German plants from the Treaty,
for strong agricultural reasons, we must not allow Germany
to use this privilege as a military advantage.
In other words, if we yield to such arguments it must be on two conditions.
In the first place, the plants to evade the Treaty clauses must
be proved necessary for German agriculture. Secondly, the products
of the untouched plants must be used for this purpose and no other.
As far as we know, no attempt has been made to apply the Treaty
to the nitrogen fixation plants, and their products, instead of being
mainly used for agriculture on German soil, have served as a deliberate
weapon against the growing chemical industries of other countries.
Indeed, the figures at our disposal would indicate that even if the full
demands of German agriculture were met, the plants built and projected
leave a big margin which can only find outlet by export or military use.
According to the _Frankfurter Zeitung_ of November 23rd, 1919, the total
consumption of nitrogenous material by Germany was, in 1913, as follows:
Tons
Source and Nature Tons Calculated as
Nitrogen
Chili Saltpetre 750,000 116,000
Ammonium Sulphate 460,000, 92,000
Norwegian Nitrate 35,000 4,500
Calcium Cyanamide 30,000 6,000
Haber Ammonium Sulphate
(by Fixation) 20,000 4,000
-------
Total 222,500
The same journal, October 18, 1919, states the capacity of the finished
Haber plants to be equivalent to 300,000 tons of nitrogen per annum,
and the total consumption of the old German Empire was thus less than
the amount available from one source alone, _i.e_. nitrogen fixation
by the Haber process. But other pre-war German sources of nitrogen,
expanded by the war, will easily contribute their pre-war quota.
We can therefore very safely assume German capacity of above 400,000 tons
of nitrogen per annum, approximately twice the pre-war consumption.
It is exceedingly unlikely that Germany will actually consume such
a quantity. In any case, a large excess is now deliberately used
to recapture world chemical markets, and this, as explained above,
should be dealt with under the Treaty even if special immunity be afforded
the capacity required for home purposes. We are indeed entitled to ask,
what is being done on this vital matter?
Article 170 prohibits the importation of munitions of every kind
into Germany. Considered from the point of view of chemical munitions,
this clause shows a complete failure to understand the situation.
Far from importing, possession of the I.G. leaves Germany the greatest
potential exporter of chemical munitions in the whole world.
Further, it is not improbable that countries outside Germany
may encourage her in munitions production for export.
Lord Moulton stated in a speech at Manchester in December, 1914:
"Supposing our War Minister had been in the last few years
buying in the cheapest market for the sake of cheapness,
and that he had had the munitions of war manufactured by Krupp's
of Essen. Gentlemen, I think he would have been lynched about
three months ago."
We have fallen far from the inspired resolution of those days!
Knowing the true war significance of the I.G. as a second Krupp,
if we fail to establish our own organic chemical industries,
that warning may become a prophecy.
Article 171 forbids the manufacture of asphyxiating gases and analogous
materials in Germany.
Has this clause any value unsupported by definite measures of control?
With such an enormous capacity of rapidly convertible production,
need Germany consider the production of these chemicals during peace?
Once engaged in war, what is the value of the prohibition?
True, failure would imply penalties for the specific breach of
the Treaty. But a similar breach of International Convention is
already involved, and admitted in the first phrase of Article 171:
"The use of poison gases being prohibited, etc."
It is difficult to see, therefore, unless penalties be actually
incurred for the existing breach, why Article IV would be a serious
deterrent for the future.
A trenchant comparison is afforded by the motive for this Treaty Article,
and the actual operation of other Articles which should support it.
The Treaty makers thought it necessary to give direct reference
to chemical warfare. They issued a special edict against its use.
This alone should have guided those responsible for the execution of
the Disarmament Clauses of the Treaty, measures of general application
to the means of production of the different types of weapon.
Have the special plants erected for poison gas received drastic
action under the Treaty? It is to be feared that they and other war
chemical plants of the I.G. have received undeserved immunity.
Where lies our help apart from the Treaty? World peace
depends upon disarmament. True peace must come from a
radical change in the outlook and sentiment of individuals.
The forces working through these channels are the real peacemakers.
But a League of Nations can forward the cause by wise measures
of disarmament, and this implies limiting war producing capacity.
The weak point in such a scheme is the organic chemical industry.
There must be a redistribution of capacity, for while Germany retains
a vast world monopoly of potential organic chemical munitions,
which fed the armaments of the past with explosives and poison gas,
and to which the weapons of the future are looking for inspiration
and sustenance, disarmament will be a hollow farce.
The League of Nations may succeed in rooting out the means of production
of certain munitions. But organic chemical factories must survive
for the sake of their material contribution to the welfare of humanity.
They cannot be inspected and controlled, as we have shown,
and there is only one sound solution. The obstacle to peace must
be removed by decentralising the organic chemical factories.
We cannot leave this monopoly in the hands of any country.
It now lies a weapon ready to the hands of those who created
and wielded it with such success. Redistributed, this dangerous
productive grouping will create a source of stability and strength
to a League of Nations, and will invite a national sense of security,
so essential to peace and disarmament under the present regime.
This has only one meaning, the establishment of dye industries
in Allied countries. This may clash with certain political schools
of thought developed before the war without a due realisation of
the organic way in which production links up with national defence.
But let there be no misunderstanding. The refusal to support this
critical industry is a definite sacrifice of vital national issues.
Political principles responsible for such opposition no longer
merit the name; they have become a fetish.
Our armies repelled the German chemical attack.
They stood and fell unprotected before the early German clouds
and unprotected again before the vile contact of mustard gas.
The awful price they paid for our safety demands that we do more
than rest contented with the sacrifice. It is an imperative
and patriotic duty to the fallen, to the future of the race,
and to the Empire, that, faced once again with modern war,
we should be able to say, "every possible precaution was taken."
But the chief precaution will have been neglected unless organic
chemical industries are fostered on Imperial soil.
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