The Riddle of the Rhine:
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Victor LeFebure >> The Riddle of the Rhine:
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The accuracy of this reference to the long range effect of our gas
clouds is borne out in a number of other statements. For example,
we learnt from a prisoner examined by the French: "The men were thrown
into disorder and raised their masks because they were suffocated.
Many fell in running to the rear; a number did not become ill until
the next day. Vegetation was burnt up to a depth of 8 kilometres."
Again, prisoners taken at Maurepas stated that one of the English
gas attacks was effective 10 kilometres back.
There are also marked references to the surprise nature of our
gas attacks, which are an unconscious tribute to the successful
tactical developments which have already been referred to, and also
numerous other references to the "delayed" action of phosgene.
The prisoner mentioned above, taken at Maurepas, gave testimony
that some were only taken ill after several days, and one died
suddenly two days after, whilst writing a letter. One prisoner,
pointing to Les Ayettes on the map, stated that about the beginning
of September when gas came over suddenly in the late evening,
they thought it was from artillery fire because it was so sudden.
No one was expecting gas and very few were carrying their masks.
Another one stated: "The attack was a surprise and the cloud
came over and passed fairly quickly. The whole thing did not
occupy more than ten minutes." More than thirty per cent.
of the battalion was put out of action.
Finally, to show what a serious imposition this constant
cloud gas attack was upon the German Army, we will quote from
the Special Correspondent of the _Vossiches Zeitung_. He said:
"I devote a special chapter to this plague of our Somme warriors.
It is not only when systematic gas attacks are made that they
have to struggle with this devilish and intangible foe."
He refers to the use of gas shell, and says: "This invisible
and perilous spectre of the air threatens and lies in wait
on all roads leading to the front."
In a despatch dated December 23rd, 1916, from Field-Marshal
Sir Douglas Haig, G.C.B., the situation is ably summarised:
"The employment by the enemy of gas and of liquid flame
as weapons of offence compelled us not only to discover ways
to protect our troops from their effects but also to devise
means to make use of the same instruments of destruction.
Great fertility of invention has been shown, and very great credit
is due to the special personnel employed for the rapidity and success
with which these new arms have been developed and perfected,
and for the very great devotion to duty they have displayed
in a difficult and dangerous service. The army owes its thanks
to the chemists, physiologists, and physicists of the highest
rank who devoted their energies to enable us to surpass the enemy
in the use of a means of warfare which took the civilised world
by surprise. Our own experience of the numerous experiments
and trials necessary before gas and flame could be used,
of the preparations which had to be made for their manufacture,
and of the special training required for the personnel employed,
shows that the employment of such methods by the Germans
was not the result of a desperate decision, but had been
prepared for deliberately.
"Since we have been compelled, in self-defence, to use similar methods,
it is satisfactory to be able to record, on the evidence of prisoners,
of documents captured, and of our own observation, that the enemy
has suffered heavy casualties from our gas attacks, while the means
of protection adopted by us have proved thoroughly effective."
One of the causes which leads to a lack of understanding of the chemical
weapon is the fact that the results of chemical attack are not,
like those of a huge assault, obvious to the mere visual observer.
A period of months often elapsed during the war before the immediate
effect of a gas attack was known. It was inspiring to witness
the assault of the 18th Division near Montauban on July 1st, 1916.
But few realised the part played by the preparatory gas
attacks in that and other sectors of the line, in weakening
the numerical strength and battle morale of effective reserves.
It is, therefore, of great interest to follow up a particular case
and to obtain a connected idea of the series of events associated
with some particular attack.
The early stages of the Somme battle were characterised by a
number of cloud gas attacks which served the double purpose
of a feint, and reducing the strength of available reserves.
These attacks occurred chiefly along the part of the line north
of the Somme battle zone, and they extended as far as the sea.
One of them occurred on the 30th August, 1916, at Monchy, between Arras
and Bapaume. About one thousand cylinders were discharged during
the night. The usual careful organisation preceded the attack and it
is quite likely that it shared the advantage of surprise common
to a large number of these attacks. Three German regiments were
holding the line directly in front of the British sector concerned.
Before December, 1916, the following reliable information was collected
from prisoners and confirmed by cross-examination. One Company
of the 23rd regiment, was in training and had no gas masks with it.
The gas came along quickly and about half the Company were killed.
After that there were more stringent rules about carrying masks.
They had no recollection of a gas alarm being sounded.
Another man said that in his Company no special drill or training
was being done, and a large number of men were put out of action
through not being able to adjust their respirators in time.
There was no warning, although after this gas alarms were given
by ringing church bells. Other prisoners, from the 63rd, regiment,
had such vivid recollections of the attack that they said:
"The effects of the English gas are said to be appalling."
Collecting information from prisoners belonging to this or that Company,
and carefully checking by cross-examination, it is clear that this
attack must have been responsible for many hundreds of casualties.
Reasons for British Cloud Gas Success.--The fact that the British persisted
with cloud gas attack and attained so much more success than the Germans,
after the first surprise, was due to a curious combination of causes,
quite apart from the prevailing favourable wind.
Our Casualties.--In the first place, we knew from bitter experience
the deadly effect of a successfully operated cloud gas attack.
We knew, for example, that in the first attack at Ypres there were
more than 5000 dead with many more times that number of casualties.
On the other hand, the Germans, left to speculate on our casualties,
retained the conviction, from apparent non-success, that cloud gas
was not a suitable form of preparation behind which to develop big
infantry attacks. Quoting from Schwarte: "Large gains of ground
could hardly be attained by means of an attack which followed the use
of gas clouds, therefore such clouds were soon merely employed as a
means of injuring the enemy, and were not followed up by an attack."
This represented German policy, and it lacked vision. They did not
realise that their difficulty was the method of forming the cloud,
and that if a more mobile and long range method of cloud formation
materialised, with correspondingly less dependence on wind direction,
the object which they once sought and failed to attain would again
be within their reach.
Exhausting Preparations for Cloud Attack.--The second reason
accounting for the relatively early cessation of German cloud
attacks is one constantly referred to in the German war memoirs.
It was the enormous mechanical and muscular effort required in preparing
for such an attack. Few people realise what hours of agonised
effort were involved in preparing and executing a cloud gas attack.
The cylinders had to be in position in specially chosen emplacements
in the front line within certain time limits. The "carrying in"
could not be spread over an indefinite period and usually took
from two to six nights, according to the magnitude of the attack and
the local difficulties. Naturally, all the work occurred in the dark.
Picture the amount of organisation and labour required to install
2000 cylinders on, say, a two mile front. These cylinders would have
to be assembled at a number of points in the rear of the given line
where the roads met the communication trenches. No horse or lorry
transport could assemble at such points before dark, nor be left
standing there after dawn. To carry this number of cylinders more than
fifty lorries would be required or, say, perhaps, go G.S. wagons.
All the points of assembly would be under possible enemy shell fire.
These points would be normally in use for the unloading of rations
and trench engineering materials, etc., with which cylinder transport
would have to be co-ordinated. Once arrived at the unloading points,
parties had to be provided for unloading the lorries and for
conveying the cylinders up to the front line trench. In a normally
difficult trench system, for a carry of a mile to a mile and a half
of communication trench, at least four men per cylinder are required
to give the necessary margin for casualties and reliefs, etc.
This implies the organisation of more than 8000 officers and men
for the installation, with a fundamental condition that only small
groups of these men be assembled at any one point at any given time.
The installation of gas for an attack on this scale would have been
a matter of vast and complicated organisation if there were no other
activities in the trench system, and no enemy to harass the work.
But to co-ordinate such an enterprise with the busy night life of
the trench system and to leave the enemy unaware of your activities
was a task which tried the patience, not only of the Special Companies,
who organised, guided, and controlled these operations, but much
more so of the Infantry Brigades and Divisions whose dispositions
were interfered with, and who had to provide the men for the work.
Add to this even more acute difficulties. The front line
trench is nothing but a series of traverses, thus to avoid
the enfilade effect of shell and machine-gun fire.
A straight trench is a death-trap. But to carry hundreds of
pole-slung cylinders, already weighing as lead, round traverses
on a dark night, is a feat requiring superhuman endurance.
Therefore many "carries" finished with a hundred yards "over the top"
through the parados wire, to the near locality of the appropriate
emplacement in the front line. This last carry was critical;
a false step, the clatter of falling metal, meant drawing
the fire of some curious and alert German machine gunner.
The sudden turning of darkness into day by enemy Very lights
imposed instantaneous immobility. Yet all the time tired men
were straining at their heavy burden and any moment a cylinder
might be pierced by intentional or unaimed rifle fire.
But the spirit of the infantry in this work, as in all they undertook,
is to their everlasting credit. These tasks were an enemy challenge
and they accepted it successfully, albeit with much cursing.
The work was indeed beyond description and the country, colonial,
and London troops expressed their opinion equally emphatically
in their own peculiar way. Think again of the need of systematic
wind observation along the whole front of attack, the disorganisation
and "gas alert" conditions imposed on the favourable night,
the possibility of postponement, and we can only draw one conclusion.
There must have been some imperative need or justification of cloud gas
attack for the army to have encouraged or even tolerated its continuance.
There is no difficulty in understanding why gas attack was so
exceedingly unpopular among the staffs in the early stages of the war.
Later, however, when they realised the enemy casualties that were being
created by the gas, and what a large part it was taking in the war
of attrition, the opposition and lack of appreciation vanished.
Further, when the projector arrived to produce similar effects
with less demand upon infantry personnel, and less dependence
on the wind, the whole tone of the army towards gas was changed,
and it became almost popular.
The peculiarity of cloud gas attack was the concentration of all this
effort of preparation within a few days. In terms of military efficiency,
the amount of energy expended was fully justified by the casualties produced.
We know that some of our cloud attacks were responsible on one night
for many thousands of casualties, and the amount of artillery effort
to give such a result would probably have been considerably larger.
But under normal conditions of warfare, such artillery effort would
have been expended over a much longer period of time.
The Livens Projector.--The Somme offensive witnessed the use
of a new British gas weapon which became of the utmost importance.
This was the mortar known as the Livens Projector. Its origin
dates back many months, however, and is of considerable interest.
A British engineer, Lt. Livens (afterwards Major, D.S.O., M.C.)
of the Signal Corps, was inspired to constructive and aggressive
thought on the gas question by a double motive. He quickly
realised the tactical weakness of the German method at Ypres,
once shorn of its vast initial possibilities of surprise.
He saw the advantage of being able to command the point or
locality of incidence of the cloud, instead of being limited
to the actual trench front. Prompted by a direct personal
interest in the huge loss sustained by the _Lusitania_ outrage,
he determined to find a practical outlet for his feelings by
developing his views on the future of gas clouds. In a few months
the general principles of the projector were defined and a crude
specimen resulted. Caught up, however, in the gas organisation,
preparations for the cloud attack at Loos absorbed all his
attention and energies and the consequent reorganisation found him
developing a flammenwerfer and training a company for its use.
It was really the Somme battle which gave him the first
opportunity to carry his idea into offensive practice.
This arose in front of High Wood, which was a veritable nest of German
machine gunners in such a critical tactical position as to hold
up our advance in that region. The huge stationary flammenwerfer
had recently been used by Major Livens and his company against
a strong point in front of Carnoy in the assault of July 1st.
Here again the effect of flame was limited even more than
that of cloud gas by dependence on a fixed emplacement.
It was quickly grasped that the solution was to be found
in the application of the projector principle to the use of oil
for flame and a crude projector was devised for the emergency,
using oil cans as mortars, burying them in the earth for two-thirds
of their length and employing water cans as bombs.
As soon as the possibilities of the weapon were seen its
development was pressed. The usual Livens Projector consisted
of a simple tube mortar or projector closed at one end,
and fitted with a charge box on which rested the projectile.
By an electrical arrangement and suitable communications,
large numbers, sometimes thousands, of these projectors could
be discharged at a given moment. In this way quantities of gas,
comparable with the huge tonnages employed in the normal stationary
cloud attack, could be used to produce a cloud which would originate,
as cloud, as far as a mile away from the point of discharge.
In other words, the advantages of cloud attack could
be used with a much smaller dependence on wind direction,
and with a much greater factor of local surprise.
Thus when the partially perfected and efficient weapon was used
in large quantities during the British Arras offensive in April,
1917, the German Army was thrown into great consternation.
But for the fact that protection had developed so strongly
on both sides, the use of the Livens Projector would have gone
far towards a decision.
The simplest way to illustrate the peculiar value of the projector will
be to quote from one or two of the many Intelligence reports collected.
Thus from a captured document dated July, 1917, belonging to the 111th
German Division, signed Von Busse, we have: "The enemy has combined
in this new process the advantages of gas clouds and gas shells.
The density is equal to that of gas clouds, and the surprise effect
of shell fire is also obtained. For the bombardment the latter part
of the night is generally chosen, in a calm or light wind (the direction
of the latter is immaterial). The enemy aims essentially at surprise.
Our losses have been serious up to now, as he has succeeded, in the majority
of cases, in surprising us, and masks have often been put on too late. . . .
As soon as a loud report like a mine is heard 1000-1500 metres away,
give the gas alarm. It does not matter if several false alarms are given.
Masks must not be taken off without orders from an officer. Men affected,
even if apparently only slightly, must be treated as serious cases, laid flat,
kept still, and taken back as soon as possible for medical treatment.
Anti-gas officers and Company Commanders will go through a fresh course
of training on the above principles." The influence of gas discipline
is borne out by another captured statement that they could only attempt
to "reduce their losses to a minimum by the strictest gas discipline."
Again, from a prisoner we learn that "every time a battalion goes into rest,
masks are inspected and a lecture is delivered by the gas officer
on British gas projectors, which are stated to be the most deadly form
of warfare." So great was the impression formed by the introduction
of the projector that uneasiness at the front was reflected later on
in the Press. Thus, quoting from reference to the military discussion
before the main committee of the Reichstag. "Casualties from enemy poison
gas admit on the whole of a favourable judgment, as the harm involved
is only temporary, and in most cases no ill after-effects persist"
(_Tagliche Rundschau_, 24.4.18). "Cases of gas poisoning are not as a rule
accompanied by harmful consequences, even though the treatment extends
sometimes over a long period" (_Vorwarts_, 25.4.18), Based on the later
mustard gas casualties these statements would have been more truthful.
As it was, they afforded poor consolation to the German people.
British Gas Shell.--The British first used shell gas as lachrymators,
in trench mortar bombs, in small quantities, during the battle of the Somme,
but for the first time, during the battle of Arras, 1917, our supplies
of gas for shell were sufficient for extensive and effective use.
Our success can be measured by the report dated April 11th, 1917, from the
General Commanding the first German Army, on "Experiences in the Battle
of Arras," in which he says: "The enemy made extensive use of gas
ammunition against our front positions as well as against batteries."
"The fighting resistance of the men suffered considerably from wearing
the mask for many hours." Artillery activity seems to have been paralysed
by the effects of the gas.
In a general comparison of British and German methods of gas warfare,[1]
General Hartley tells us "our methods improved rapidly during 1917.
At first we neglected, almost entirely, the question of rate of firing,
but we soon arrived at the method of crashes of lethal shell.
These got the surprise concentrations of gas which proved
so effective, and we realised that the number of shells required
to produce an effect was much bigger than we thought originally.
At Messines gas was used in much the same way as at Arras."
[1] Journal of the Royal Artillery, February, 1920.
German Gas Shell Development, 1916.--The main evidence of Allied reaction
was to be found in the intensive development of cloud gas attacks,
but during the same period the Germans, who appeared to be abandoning
the use of cloud gas, were making steady efforts to regain their initiative
by the comprehensive development of shell gas. Thus, to quote from
General Hartley's report to the British Association, "In the Summer
of 1916 chlor-methyl-chloroformate with toxic properties similar
to those of phosgene was used against us in large quantities
during the battle of the Somme. Later this was replaced by
trichlor-methyl-chloro-formate, a similar liquid, which was used until
the end of the war as the well-known Green Cross shell filling.
The use of phosgene in trench mortar bombs also began in 1916."
Many of those on the front in 1916 will remember the surprise gas shell
attack of December of that year, on the Baudimont gate at Arras. We were
fortunately let off lightly with little over 100 casualties,
but the effect was to tighten up gas discipline all along the line.
The appearance of the new substances represented definite German
progress and had definite military results, but they lost decisive
value owing to the relative inefficiency of German gas shell tactics.
Consideration of the Allied reaction must include some
reference to the appearance of the American Army in the field.
The Americans during their more or less educational period gave
serious attention to the gas question, and showed almost immediately,
by their preparations, that they attached enormous importance
to the new weapon.
Main Features of the Period.--It is difficult to generalise. But the
following features appear to characterise the period under discussion.
In the first place we see German policy tending towards the use of gas
projectiles containing a variety of organic substances. Secondly, we have
the British exploitation of cloud gas attack both in magnitude and method.
The Livens Projector provides the third important feature. Fourthly, we note
the somewhat tardy development of the British use of gas shell.
A number of causes, no doubt, unite in responsibility for the above.
But whether due to definitely framed policy on our part, or merely to
the hard facts of the case, one important factor seems largely responsible.
It is the relative ease of production by Germany as compared with ourselves.
When German military opinion tended towards the development of gas shell,
a variety of substances came quickly to hand, not only from German
research sources, but in quantity from the dye factories. No such quick
response could have met, or actually did meet, the demands of Allied
military policy. Whatever ideas emanated from our research organisations,
there was no quick means of converting them into German casualties.
It is true that we could obtain chlorine and later phosgene in bulk and devote
them to the exploitation of the older gas appliances in cloud methods.
But British chemical supply was weak, owing to the absence of a strong
organic chemical industry. In other words, German flexibility of supply
meant flexibility in meeting the requirements of military policy, and,
given sound military policy, this flexibility meant surprise, the essence
of successful war.
CHAPTER IV
INTENSIVE CHEMICAL WARFARE
The chemical struggle became very intense in the Summer and Autumn of 1917.
Projector attacks multiplied, the use of chemical shell increased
on both sides, allied and enemy gas discipline was tightened up,
officers and men acquired a kind of gas sense, a peculiar alertness
towards gas. The home front was strengthened in England and France
by reinforced and sounder organisations, and by the vigorous steps taken
by America. The Germans began to reap the benefit of their gas shell policy.
At the end of 1916, as a result of a review of the production situation,
they had arrived at the so-called Hindenburg Programme. This included
a large output of gas for shell, and from its realisation the Germans
acquired a momentum which kept them ahead well into 1918.
It is a very clear indication of the progress made by Germany in research,
that the sudden expansion in manufacture required by the Hindenburg Programme
found a number of new efficient war chemicals ready for production.
The Mustard Gas Surprise.--The next big surprise came
from Germany. Units in the line at Nieuport and Ypres
in July, 1917, were the first to experience it. Some were
sprinkled and some deluged with a new type of German shell
chemical which, in many cases, evaded the British gas discipline,
and mustard gas, unrecognised, caused many serious casualties.
Even those who wore the mask were attacked by the vesicant
or blistering influence of the gas. The matter is vividly
expressed in a letter, given below, which I received from
an officer wounded in the Nieuport attack:
"I was gassed by dichlor-diethyl sulphide, commonly known as mustard stuff,
on July 22nd. I was digging in (Livens Projectors), to fire
on Lambartzyde. Going up we met a terrible strafe of H.E. and gas
shells in Nieuport. When things quietened a little I went up with
the three G.S. wagons, all that were left, and the carrying parties.
I must say that the gas was clearly visible and had exactly the same smell
as horseradish. It had no immediate effect on the eyes or throat.
I suspected a delayed action and my party all put their masks on.
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