The Riddle of the Rhine:

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"On arriving at the emplacement we met a very thick cloud
of the same stuff drifting from the front line system.
As it seemed to have no effect on the eyes I gave orders for all
to put on their mouthpieces and noseclips so as to breathe none
of the stuff, and we carried on.

"Coming back we met another terrific gas shell attack
on Nieuport. Next morning, myself, and all the eighty men
we had up there were absolutely blind. The horrid stuff
had a delayed action on the eyes, causing temporary blindness
about seven hours afterwards. About 3000 were affected.
One or two of our party never recovered their sight and died.
The casualty clearing stations were crowded. On August 3rd,
with my eyes still very bloodshot and weak and wearing blue glasses,
I came home, and went into Millbank Hospital on August 15th."

These early mustard gas attacks caused serious gaps amongst
the troops assembling for the Northern offensives. The gas was
distinctly a new departure. Effective in low concentrations,
with very little odour, and no immediate sign of discomfort
or danger, very persistent, remaining on the ground for days,
it caused huge casualties. Fortunately, its most fatal effects
could be prevented by wearing a respirator, and only a very small
proportion of mustard gas casualties were fatal.

The insidious nature of the gas and the way in which it evaded the gas
discipline is shown in the following example from an official report:
"A battery was bombarded by the new gas shell from 10 p.m. to 12
midnight and from 1.30 to 3.30 on the night of 23rd-24th July.
The shelling then ceased and at 6 a.m., when the battery had
to carry out a shoot, the Battery Commander considered the air
free from gas, and Box Respirators were accordingly removed.
Shortly afterwards several men went sick from gas poisoning,
including the Battery Commander. On previous nights they
had been fired at with gas shell in the same way, but found
it safe to remove Box Respirators after a couple of hours.
On the occasion in question the air was very still and damp."
In another case an officer in the Boesinghe sector,
during the gas bombardment on the night of the 22-23 July,
adjusted the mouthpiece and nose-clip, but left the eyes uncovered.
His eyes were seriously affected, but he had no lung symptoms
on the morning of the 24th.

Mustard gas (or Yellow Cross, as it was called officially by the Germans)
was the war gas _par excellence_ for the purpose of causing casualties.
Indeed, it produced nearly eight times more Allied casualties than all
the various other kinds of German gas. It was used for preparation
a considerable time before the attack, or during the attack, on localities
and objects with which the attackers would have no contact.

Blue Cross.--Another new type, the German Blue Cross, was introduced
about the same time. This represented at different times
diphenylchlorarsine, diphenylcyanarsine and other arsenic compounds.
The Blue Cross compound was contained in a shell with high explosive.
The enemy expected that the shell burst would create such a fine diffusion
of the compound that it would penetrate our respirator mechanically,
and then exercise its effects. These, violent irritation of the nose
and throat, nausea and intense pain, would cause the removal
of the respirator and allow other lethal gases to have full play.
Fortunately, the German hopes of penetration were not realised,
but they were, no doubt, continuing to develop the vast possibilities
of the new method.

German Emphasis on Gas Shell.--The Green Cross or lethal filling
was another type of German gas shell. Green Cross covered
such compounds as phosgene and chlor-methyl chloroformate.
Although these caused fewer casualties than mustard gas,
they were relatively more fatal. Schwarte's book tells us that,
"After the introduction of the Green Cross shell in the summer
of 1916, at Verdun over 100,000 gas shell were used to
a single bombardment."

From the time of the first use of mustard gas until the terrific
gas shell attack of March, 1918, the Germans persistently
used their new types against us with considerable effect.
Even when the period of surprise effect with mustard gas was over,
the number of casualties caused by it was considerably
greater than during the months when the Germans were firing
only non-persistent lethal shell of the Green Cross type.
The Germans regarded these shell gas developments as largely
responsible for our failure to break through in the Autumn of 1917.

The German Projector.--During this period they also developed a projector.
Their first use of it was again co-ordinated with an attempt at surprise.
Fortunately, protection and gas discipline had reached such an efficient
state that normal "alert" conditions of the front line system were largely
able to counter the use of this new device by Germany. The first attack
was against the French at Rechicourt on the night of December 5th-6th.

On the night of December 10th-11th, 1917, they fired several hundred
projectiles on the Cambrai and Givenchy sectors of the British line.
In both cases the gas bombs were fired almost simultaneously
into a small area including our front and support lines.
The bombs appeared to have been fired from the enemy support line,
as observers state that they saw a sheet of flame run along this line,
followed by a loud explosion. The bombs, which emitted a trail of sparks,
were seen in the air in large numbers and made a loud whirring noise.
They burst with a large detonation, producing a thick, white cloud.
The discharge was followed immediately by a bombardment with H.E. shrapnel
and gas shell, and a raid was attempted south of Givenchy. We learn
that so strong was the gas discipline that in many cases respirators were
adjusted before the arrival of the bombs, the resemblance to our projector
attacks having been established at once. When this was done practically
no casualties occurred. Again, to show the efficiency of British
protection against projector gas, we learn from official reports that,
"At one point five bombs burst in a trench without harming the occupants.
It should be remembered that the British box respirator protects against
very high concentrations of gas which pass at once through the German mask."
Similar discharges were made against the French on two occasions in December,
and against the Lens sector on December 30th. The compounds used
in the bombs were phosgene and a mixture of phosgene and chlorpicrin.
These attacks increased in number during the ensuing months.

German Projector Improvements.--The Germans developed a longer
range modification and would undoubtedly have exploited this
weapon very considerably but for the trend of the campaign.
The Allied advance in 1918 uncovered a number of enemy dumps.
Amongst the most interesting was one which contained a number
of a new type of projector.

A prisoner of the 37th pioneer gas battalion, captured on
August 26th, had said that they were to practise with a new
type of projector with a range of 3 kilometres, the increased
range being obtained by rifling the bore of the projector.
He stated that the intention was to use the longer range
weapons in conjunction with the old short range projector,
using the new type to deal with the reserve positions.
The capture of the dumps referred to above revealed the truth
of his statement. Two kinds of bombs were used, one containing H.E.
and the other small pumice granules impregnated with phosgene.
This was an ingenious attempt to produce a persistent but highly
lethal gas by physical means, for hitherto the highly lethal
gases had only been slightly persistent. The new projector
had a calibre of 158 mm. and was termed the "Gaswerfer, 1918."
The importance of this new projector cannot be overestimated.
Its large scale use would, undoubtedly, have resulted in
imposing stringent gas alert conditions at greater distances
from the front line.

Dyes in Gas Shell.--Another interesting German development of this
period was the use of certain dyes or stains in gas shell.
After gas bombardments in the winter of 1916-17, the snow
was seen to be covered with coloured patches. These coincided
with the bursts of the shell. Analysis of the earth showed
that the colour was due to the presence of an actual dyestuff.
A number of explanations were advanced to account for the use
of the colour, of which the most probable claimed its employment
for the identification of affected localities several hours
or even days after the bombardment. This was especially the case
with persistent types. As the explosive charge of chemical shell
was feeble, some such means of identification was necessary.
It may be that the Germans expected that troops advancing after
such bombardments would be helped by the splashes of colour,
and that these earlier attempts were purely experimental.

German Flame Projectors.--We have already referred to the use of flame
projectors by the enemy, and a picturesque account of their development
and use in the later stages of the campaign is found in an extract
from the _Hamburger Nachrichten_ of the 9th of June, 1918:

Their Origin.--"Our Flammenwerfer troops owe their origin to a mere incident.
Their present commander, Major R., when an officer of the Reserve, received
the order, during peace manoeuvres, to hold a certain fort at all costs.
During the sham fight, having employed all means at his disposal,
he finally alarmed the fire brigade unit, which was under his orders as
commander of the fort, and directed the water jets on the attacking force.
Afterwards, during the criticism of operations in the presence of the Kaiser,
he claimed that he had subjected the attackers to streams of burning oil.
The Kaiser thereupon inquired whether such a thing would be possible,
and he received an answer in the affirmative.

"Long series of experiments were necessary before Engineer L. succeeded
in producing a combination of various oils, which mixture is projected
as a flame on the enemy by means of present day Flammenwerfer.

"Major R. occupied himself in peace time with fighting fire
as commander of the Munich Fire Brigade. The `Prince of Hades,'
as he is called by his `fire spouters,' enjoys great popularity among his
men as well as among the troops to whose assistance he may be called.
He can look back on an important development of his units.
Whereas in January, 1915, Flammenwerfer troops consisted of a group
of 36 men, to-day they constitute a formation with special assault
and bombing detachments, and are furnished with all requisites
for independent action. In reading Army Communiques, we often
find mention of these troops. If difficulty is experienced
in clearing up an English or French Infantry nest, the `Prince
of Hades' appears with his hosts and smokes the enemy out.
That conditions of membership of this unit hardly constitute
a life insurance policy is obvious; nor is every man suitable.
Special men who are physically adapted and who have given proof
of keenness in assault are necessary for such work."

Further Flame Development.--Specimens of a very neat portable
German Flammenwerfer were captured in August, 1917. It contained
three essential parts: a ring-shaped oil container surrounding
a spherical vessel containing compressed nitrogen, which was used
to expel the oil, and a flexible tube of rubber and canvas carrying
the jet. The whole was arranged to be carried on the back.
At about this time prisoners stated that men were transferred
to the Flammenwerfer companies as a form of punishment.

The Germans were fond of using the Flammenwerfer during counter-attacks
and raids in which the morale factor is so important. Thus in September,
1915, in a raid against the British during our great offensive,
the German raiding party was heralded by a shower of stick bombs and
the Flammenwerfer men followed. The bombing party advanced under cover
of these men, the smoke from the flame throwers acting as a screen.
British experience was that the calm use of machine-gun fire soon put
German flame throwers out of action, and it is clear that the Germans
themselves realised this weakness of isolated flame attacks for, in one
of their documents issued by German G.H.Q. in April, 1918, they said:
"Flammenwerfer have been usefully employed in combats against villages.
They must be engaged in great numbers and must fight in close liaison
with the infantry, which helps them with the fire of its machine-guns
and its grenades."

The 1918 Offensive.--Some idea of the importance of these developments
and of the scale on which they were exploited in the later campaigns
of the war can be obtained by briefly examining the German plans
for the use of gas in their 1918 offensive, and their execution:
_Die Technik im Weltkriege_ tells us: "During the big German attacks
in 1918, gas was used against artillery and infantry in quantities
which had never been seen before, and even in open warfare the troops
were soon asking for gas."

The Yellow and Blue Cross shells first introduced into operation in July,
1917, were not incorporated into comprehensive offensives until March, 1918.
Owing to the exigencies of the campaign, the initial surprise value of these
gases was subordinated to the later large scale use in the great offensive.
In December, 1917, the German Army was instructed anew regarding
the use of the new gas shell types for different military purposes,
laying great stress on the use of non-persistent gas for the attack.
Fortunately for us, the gas shells destined for this purpose were not
relatively so efficient as the German persistent types, which were devoted
to the more remote preparation for attack and to defensive purposes.
Their penetrating Blue Cross types were a comparative failure.
Although plans emphasised the importance of this gas for the attack,
facts later gave greater prominence to the use of the persistent Yellow Cross
shell for defensive purposes in the great German retreat.

Ludendorffs Testimony.--Ludendorff, himself, emphasised the great
importance which was attached to gas in this offensive.
He says[1]: "And yet our artillery relied on gas for its effect,
and that was dependent on the direction and strength of the wind.
I had to rely on the forecast submitted to me at 11 a.m, by
my meteorologist, Lieutenant Dr. Schmaus. Up till the morning
of the 20th strength and direction were by no means very favourable;
indeed, it seemed almost necessary to put off the attack.
It would have been very hard to do. So I was very anxious to see
what sort of report I should get. It was not strikingly favourable,
but it did indicate that the attack was possible. At 12 noon
the Army Groups were told that the programme would be carried out.
Now it could no longer be stopped. Everything must run its course.
G.H.Q. higher commanders and troops had all done their duty.
The rest was in the hands of fate, unfavourable wind diminished
the effectiveness of the gas, fog retarded our movements
and prevented our superior training and leadership from reaping
its full reward."

[1] _My War Memories_. Hutchinson & Co., 1919.

Preparations for Assault;--Gas Defensive at Armentieres.--For twelve
days prior to their March assault the Germans used mustard gas over,
certain areas, and the non-persistent types for other localities.
As an example of the first method, we can state that nearly
200,000 rounds of Yellow Cross shell were used on the 9th March,
and caused us heavy casualties. The actual attack at once
confirmed our suspicions of enemy intention to break through on
the territories which were not infected by the persistent mustard gas.
In the second case, of the non-persistent types of Blue and Green Cross,
bombardments of tremendous intensity occurred for several hours
before the assault, on all defensive positions and organisations
for several miles behind the front line. Millions of rounds must
have been used. Although not without serious effect on the campaign,
this furious gas attack did not fully justify expectations.
The failure of mask penetration by the Blue Cross shell prevented
the full possibilities of Green Cross coming into play.
To illustrate the specific use of gas in this great offensive,
and the organic way in which it was co-ordinated in the plan of attack,
we quote from a recent statement by General Hartley.[1] Referring
to the gas shelling immediately before the extension of the attack
to the north of Lens on 9th April, he explains, "Between the 7th April
and 9th April there was no gas shelling between the La Bassee Canal
and Armentieres, while there was heavy Yellow Cross shelling
immediately south of the Canal, and Armentieres had such a heavy
bombardment that the gutters were running with mustard gas.
This indicated the probability of an attack on the front held
by the Portuguese, which occurred on 9th April, Blue and Green Cross
being used in the preliminary bombardment." The Portuguese front
lay between the two Yellow Cross regions.

[1] _Journal of the Royal Artillery_, February, 1920.

Fixed Gas Barrage at Kemmel.--Another most interesting example
is also quoted, dealing with the shelling preceding the attack
on Kemmel on 25th April. "This is an interesting case,
as non-persistent Blue Cross shell were used within the objective
and Yellow Cross just behind it, indicating that on 25th April
the enemy did not intend to go beyond the line they gained."

Percentage of Chemical Shell.--Some idea of the importance
which the Germans attached to their chemical ammunition,
as distinct from explosives, can be gathered from the following
extract from a captured order of the Seventh German Army,
dated May 8th, 1918, giving the proportion of chemical shell
to be used in the artillery preparation for the attack on
the Aisne on 27th May, 1918.

"(_a_) Counter-battery and long range bombardments.
For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m and 15 c/m,
howitzers and 10 c/m guns; Blue Cross 70%,
Green Cross, 10%; H.E. 20%, long 15
c/m guns fire only H.E.
(_b_) Bombardment of infantry positions.
(i) Creeping Barrage.
For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m and 15
c/m howitzers; Blue Cross 30%, Green
Cross 10%, H.E. 60%, 21 c/m howitzers
fire only H.E.
(ii) Box Barrage.
For 7.7 c/m field guns, 10.5 c/m howitzers
and 10 c/m guns; Blue Cross 60%, Green
Cross 10%, H.E. 30%."

What more striking demonstration is needed than these
extraordinarily high percentages?

Gas Retreat Tactics;--General Hartley's Analysis.--No Yellow Cross
shell were to be used in the bombardment, but, as mentioned above,
there was a complete change of tactics in their retreat, during which they
attempted to create a series of barriers by literally flooding areas
with mustard gas. This defensive use of mustard gas was most important.
Again, quoting General Hartley, "Yellow Cross shell were used much
farther forward than previously, bombardments of the front line
system and of forward posts were frequent, and possible assembly
positions were also shelled with this gas. On more than one occasion
when an attack was expected the enemy attempted to create an impassable
zone in front of our forward positions by means of mustard gas.
Their gas bombardments usually occurred on fronts where they had reason
to fear an attack, with the idea of inflicting casualties in areas
where troops might be massing. It was instructive to note how supplies
of Yellow Cross shell were switched from the Third to the First Army
front late in August when they became nervous about the latter sector.
In Yellow Cross they had an extremely fine defensive weapon, which they
did not use to the best advantage, for instance, they neglected its use
on roads and did not hamper our communications nearly as much as they
might have done. As our offensive progressed their gas shelling
became less organised, and one saw very clearly the superior value
of a big gas bombardment as compared with a number of small ones.
In the latter case it was usually possible to evacuate the contaminated
ground and take up alternative positions, while in the case of a bombardment
of a large area such as the Cambrai salient, the difficulty of doing
so was greatly increased, and consequently casualties were higher.
During our offensive it was not possible to exercise the same precautions
against gas as during stationary warfare, and the casualties were
increased on this account."

Percentage of German Gas Shell in Enemy Dumps.--A test of the
importance attached by any army to the different types of ammunition
which it uses can be made by examining the percentage of such
types of shell in a number of ammunition dumps assembled behind
the front line for some specific operation, or part of a campaign.
An examination of German production from this point of view
is very interesting, and also brings out a significant point.
The normal establishment of a German divisional ammunition dump
in July, 1918, contained about 50 per cent. of gas shell.
The dumps captured later in the year contained from 30 per cent.
to 40 per cent. These figures are significant, for they show
how much importance the German Army attached to gas shell.
When we think of the millions of shell and of the huge quantities
of explosives turned out by our own factories to fill them,
and when we realise that for a large number of gun calibres
the Germans used as many shell filled with gas as with explosive,
some idea of the importance of gas in the recent war and of its
future possibilities can be obtained. Further, when we realise
that the production of explosives can be controlled and inspected
during peace, but that no such control can exist for chemical
warfare products, the significance for the future stands revealed.

Forced Exhaustion of Stocks.--It might be thought that the lower percentages
found later on in the year were an indication of the decreasing importance
of chemical shell. Examining the case less superficially, however, we soon
see that this lower percentage has an entirely different meaning.
In the first place, we know that the German factories were still pressing
on to their maximum output at the time of the Armistice. New units were
being brought into operation. Secondly, we have seen how huge quantities
of mustard gas were diverted to those particular German armies which were
most threatened by the final Allied offensive, indicating that certain
portions of the German front were being starved for chemical shell.
The truth of the matter is that the Germans had accumulated enormous
stocks for their great offensive and that they had expended these
stocks at a greater rate than their factories could replace them.
We learn from Schwarte's book that, "Although the production of Yellow Cross
almost reached 1000 tons a month, yet finally the possibilities of use
and the amount required were so great that only a much increased monthly
output would have been sufficient."

Yperite, French Mustard Gas.--During this period the volume
of allied gas activities also increased considerably.
But until June, 1918, our success was due to the development
of more successful tactical methods rather than to any
specific chemical surprise.

Very great credit is due to the French for having produced large quantities
of mustard gas by the above date.

Judging from the German Intelligence Reports the surprise effect of the French
production was almost as great as that obtained by the earlier German use.
It again evaded the gas discipline of the troops, and we find the German staff
laying enormous emphasis on this question, which was already very prominent
in their general and operation orders. The occasion provided a very striking
example of German belief in their absolute predominance in production.
They were largely justified in this belief, but it carried them too far.
They explained the use of mustard gas by the French as due to the use
of German mustard gas obtained from "blind" German shell!

Effect on German Gas Discipline.--British mustard gas was not in use
in the field until September, 1918, but the French was a great success,
and probably contributed to no small extent to the final allied
success in the 1918 campaign. The French termed mustard gas
"Yperite" after Ypres, the place where it was first used.
As far as such terms can be applied to any weapon, Yperite arrived
to spread panic, and terror amongst the German formations.
A document captured by the Sixth French Army shows that Yperite used
on the 13th June against the 11th Bavarian Division was the chief cause
of the precipitate retreat of this Division. The Seventh German Army
refers to another bombardment on the 9th of June, in which the casualties
exceeded five hundred.

It is curious to note that although the Germans had so preached
the superiority of their gases and gas methods, serious blows
by the Allies found the German gas discipline unequal to them.
It is no exaggeration to say that the use of mustard gas by the French,
and later by the British, and the British projector, produced,
on each occasion, in the German ranks feelings allied to panic.
This is reflected in the many orders which have been captured from
army and other headquarters enforcing and even appealing for gas
discipline amongst the troops. Thus, almost immediately after
the first French use, Ludendorff, chief of the German General Staff,
issued a special detailed order on the subject, and the German
document captured by the French can be taken as representative.
"Our Yellow Cross has caused much damage to the enemy, formerly less
protected than now. But as a natural sequence he had developed
through it a gas discipline which can certainly be taken as model.
On this account enemy troops have been able to cross, at once
and without loss, areas which their artillery had just bombarded
with gas. We also must train our troops to an excellent
standard of gas discipline if we expect to avoid the grave
dangers which threaten the fighting forces of our army."
By the time of the Armistice France had produced nearly 2000 tons
of mustard gas, British and American production was rapidly increasing,
so that the output was attaining stupendous proportions.
Some idea of the importance of chemical warfare in the campaigns
of 1917-1918 can be obtained from the following figures:

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