The Riddle of the Rhine:

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Allied Gas Statistics.--Between November, 1917, and November, 1918,
France produced more than five millions of her latest type of respirator.
The British figure was probably higher. From April to November, 1918,
the French filled nearly two and a half million shell with mustard gas.
From the 1st of July, 1915, to the latter date more than seventeen million
gas shell were completed by the French. In addition to these huge gas
shell figures we must remember the chemical operations from projectors
and as cloud gas. During the period the British averaged fifty
large scale operations of this type per month, sometimes discharging
monthly three hundred tons of gas. The total French production of
chlorine and poison gas for chemical warfare approached 50,000 tons,
a large proportion of which production occurred during 1917 and 1918.
The British was of the same order, but German production was at least
more than twice as high, showing what great use they made of gas shell.
The huge American programme might have reduced the margin, but no limits
can be placed on German possibilities and elasticity in production.

Critical Importance of Rapid German Production.--These figures are
misleading inasmuch as they give no indication whatever of the relative
difficulties and corresponding rapidity of action on both sides.
As a general rule, where the German lag between the approval
of a substance and its use in the field covered weeks, our lag
covered months. Owing to efficient production, chemical warfare
was an infinitely more flexible weapon in German hands than in ours.
This will be readily understood when we analyse, later,
the methods of production of some of the chief German war gases.
In general, German development of these complicated substances
provided a series of examples of the ease and rapidity of production
of organic substances by the dye industry. On the other hand,
except in very few exceptional cases, British and French production,
although we cast no reflection on the energy or skill of any concerned,
was exceedingly slow and costly by comparison. The Germans used
mustard gas in July, 1917. We identified it a few days afterwards.
But the first fruits of allied production were not in the field for
eleven months. British material was not used until a month or two before
the Armistice. Further, in this case, we were convinced of the value
of the substance almost from the first day of its use by the enemy.
We will endeavour to throw light upon this in our review of production.

The period of intensive chemical warfare may be regarded as the proof
of the German experiment of 1915-1916. Shed of their trial nature,
the chemical weapons played a logical and increasingly dominating part
in the campaign. They were surely destined to play a much more prominent
part had the period of stabilised warfare continued. Projector cloud
gas would have assumed greater importance as a casualty producer.
But we will leave such considerations for a future chapter.

CHAPTER V

CHEMICAL WARFARE ORGANISATIONS

We have no desire nor intention to give a detailed historical
account of the above. The ramifications, of Allied organisations
were so numerous, the number of persons concerned so great,
the sacrifices made so heavy, that only an exceedingly
lengthy account could hope to do justice to individuals.
In addition, such an account would not serve our purpose.
We wish to show, as briefly as possible, how the different Allied
organisations were bound up in an organic way with the campaign,
how they compared with those of the enemy, and what lesson
the comparison may contain for the future.

Two facts stand out in such a comparison. We are struck with
the extreme simplicity of the German organisations, as we know them,
and the great complexity and multiplicity of the Allied departments
as we saw them. We must admit from the beginning that we know
least of the German home organisations for research and production,
but our knowledge is sufficient to reveal their simplicity.
The Inter-Allied Commission of Control may, and certainly should,
obtain full information, but at present the matter stands as follows.

German Research.--The Germans relied upon two main and very strong
centres for research. They have already been indicated as the
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, under the direction of Professor Haber,
and the enormous research organisations of the I.G. There are various
references to internal gas organisation in captured documents.
It appears that they received their final form late in 1917.
A great gas school (Heeres-Gaschule) was instituted in Berlin where
there were also central depots for anti-gas inspection and material.
Rather earlier than this the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute was definitely
appointed as the official research centre. The War Ministry had
a chemical section named A.10, which dealt with gas questions.
It is rumoured, and there is strong reason to believe, that the I.G.
was largely staffed by officers of the Reserve before the war.
Whatever their pre-war associations, if any, with the War Ministry,
hostilities must have found them keenly alive to the possibilities
of their unique research and organic chemical producing facilities.
It is inconceivable that this military personnel should not have
greatly assisted the I.G. in its operations, inventions and general
assistance for the army.

It appears that the subdivision of work left the, direction of
chemical research in Berlin, possibly at the above Institute,
while the bulk of the work of preparing the new compounds,
and developing manufacturing processes for approved substances,
occurred in the laboratories of the I.G.

Leverkusen.--We know, for example, that a very large number
of substances was produced at Leverkusen and samples forwarded
to Berlin, of which only a few were finally approved for production.
The physiological work and field tests were certainly associated
with the Berlin organisation, but it is not clear how much
of this work occurred within the I.G. An Allied mission
to Leverkusen reported as follows:--"It was emphatically
stated that no means of testing the products were resorted
to beyond inhala-tion and testing the effect of the substances
on the staff, but this statement must be accepted with reserve."
This is particularly so as we know that large numbers of
respirator-drums had been made in this factory, and that a gas
school existed at Leverkusen in 1915.

A member of another Allied mission was informed by one of the staff
at Leverkusen that the authorities there were well aware
of the difficulties in chemical warfare, apart from production,
for they had some experience in the designing and testing of
chemical shell. It maybe that the German Government relied upon
the I.G. for such work in the early stages of the chemical war,
pending the development of official organisation.
When we remember, however, that at Leverkusen alone there
was a staff of 1500 technical and commercial specialists,
apart from thousands of workpeople, before the war,
and that the latter were increased by 1500 during the war,
we find it difficult to place a limit on the services which
might have been rendered by this research centre alone.
The opinion of the members of the Hartley Commission[1] was,
that much thought and attention had been given to chemical
warfare by the chemists of the Company.

[1] A post-armistice inter-allied mission of experts, to the Rhine
chemical factories, March, 1919.

Hochst.--A great volume of chemical warfare research occurred
also at Hochst. "The admission was made that the research
department of the factory was continuously employed during the war
on the preparation of substances suitable for chemical warfare,
many hundreds being prepared and sent to Berlin for examination.
The firm employed 300 academically trained chemists in peace time,
but during the war many more were engaged, partly for research
and partly because all shell filling was carried out under
the supervision of trained chemists."

Ludwigshafen.--The most influential branch of the I.G. was,
undoubtedly, the Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik. It might
have been expected, as they shared largely in production,
that a considerable amount of chemical warfare research would occur
at these works, but this was emphatically denied to Allied missions.
It may be, however, that as the nitrogen fixation enterprise
was developed there, requiring a large amount of technical
development and control, this was considered a sufficient
contribution to the general cause.

Early Formulation of Policy.--In examining what signs we have
of the organisation and policy underlying chemical warfare
research and production in Germany, we are struck by the fact
that all the substances used with such dire effect against us
during the war must have been approved for production by the
Government at a relatively early date. The following table,
assembled from information supplied by the German factories,
brings this point out very clearly.

First Use
War Chemical. Factory. Production Began. in the Field,
Diphosgene Hochst Sept., 1916 Summer, 1915
(Green Cross) Leverkusen June, 1915
Mustard Gas Leverkusen Spring, 1917 July, 1917
(Yellow Cross)
Diphenyl- Hochst May, 1917 July, 1917
chlorarsine
(Blue Cross)
Diphenyl- A.G.F.A. ? Feb., 1918 June, 1911
cyanarsine
(Blue Cross)
Ethyl-dichlor- Hochst Aug., 1917 March, 1918
arsine
(Blue Cross)

We have chosen the later products to establish the point, for it
is self-evident for the earlier products, some of which were made
before the war.

Movements of Personnel.--The movements of German chemical personnel give
us a clue as to the main tendencies in their chemical warfare policy.
The factories were called upon to produce, as we have already shown,
towards the end of 1914, but this production largely involved
the use of substances already manufactured on a certain scale.
Large scale production of the more advanced types of war chemical
seems to have been directly stimulated by the Hindenburg programme,
in connection with which the Companies withdrew large numbers of their
skilled workers from the front.

German Simplicity of Organisation.--We can safely conclude
from the above that Germany required no cumbersome government
mechanism for the preparation of new war chemicals,
for the semi-industrial work in developing processes for
approved substances, nor for their production. By relying on
the I.G., the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, and probably some other
organisation for field and physiological tests, Germany escaped
the necessity for comprehensive government organisation,
the development of which was such a handicap to Allied countries.
It is certainly very suggestive that we only met,
in the field, substances approved before the summer of 1917.
It is with great interest and a certain amount of apprehension
that we speculate upon the research developments after that period
with which the war did not make us immediately acquainted.
If this early period produced such effective results as mustard gas,
Blue Cross compounds, and the different cloud substances,
what hidden surprises were matured in the later period?
This feature of simplicity, of linking up a new war with an old peace,
activity was paralleled somewhat in the field organisation.
We have seen how Germany created special formations for
cloud attacks, but for a time practically abandoned them,
throwing most of her chemical warfare production into shell.
In other words, she substituted a normal weapon, the artillery.
We, on the other hand, largely impelled by the enforced
simplicity of our production, tended more towards the development
of special formations and special weapons for cloud production,
but with such success that the German Pioneer formations,
after being practically dropped, found a use in developing
and using our new weapon, the Livens Projector.

German Organisation at the Front;--The Gas Regiment.--It is probable
that the earliest form of German organisation at the front consisted
in the liaison between Professor Haber and the German G.H.Q. It
will be remembered that Ludendorff, discussing cloud and shell gas,
refers to this co-operation, stating:[1] "Geheimrat Haber proved
of valuable service in this connection with the use of gas."
It was also rumoured soon after the first German attack that the
organisation and preparation of the latter were under the scientific
guidance of this renowned Professor. The attack was carried out by
the 35th and 36th Pioneer Regiments, each furnished with chemically
trained officers who were specially detailed for gas warfare.

The importance of protection was realised very early, and a gas
school for officers of all armies was organised at Leverkusen
for training in protection. We cannot but regard it as significant
that Leverkusen is also the site of the enormous Bayer[2] organic
chemical works which played such a large part in poison gas production.
The school dealt mainly with protection.

[1] _My War Memories_, page 338.

[2] A branch of the great German dye combine, the Interessen Gemeinschaft,
known as the I.G.

Early German Gas School.--Apparently, at the end of November, 1916,
special gas staffs were created and attached provisionally to the
headquarters of formations entrusted with large scale gas operations.
In addition, these staffs had the normal routine function of
supervising inspection and instruction in gas warfare at the front.
At about this time each regiment or larger unit was given a gas officer
(gasschutzoffizier) with similar duties to those outlined above.
In other words, the arrangement was generalised throughout the army.
This officer was assisted by non-commissioned officers and men
specially chosen for the purpose in the smaller units. The great need
for these staffs is brought out in German official documents.

New Gas Regiments;--Gas Shell Experts.--In 1917 two new
Pioneer battalions, the 37th and 38th respectively, were created
for the express purpose of carrying out projector attacks.
These developments in organisation, both advisory and combatant,
led, at about this time, to the centralisation of the gas services
at the front under a Kommandeur der Gastruppen at G.H.Q. It
would thus appear that the Germans achieved the centralisation
of their gas services some months later than ourselves.
Further developments in organisation, of which we are aware,
were connected with two main tendencies in German gas warfare.
In the first place, the vast employment of gas shell led the Germans
to create special gas experts on the Divisional artillery staffs.
We have this on the authority of an order by Ludendorff dated
June 16th, 1918. This gas shell expert was not necessarily an
imported specialist, but was usually a specially trained officer
chosen from the staff in question. This was a very important move,
for it gave the artillery a paternal interest in gas shell.
This artillery specialist maintained a very close liaison
with the Divisional Gas Officer.

Inspection of Protective Masks and Method.--The second tendency
was towards stricter protective standards and inspection.
The gas inspection centre at Berlin was given more responsibilities
in the field and the protection of horses, dogs and carrier
pigeons received great emphasis.

British Field Organisation;--"Breach" Organisations.--Our own
field development followed very similar lines. The immediate
need in April, 1915, was for organisations on the front
to advise formations on temporary methods of protection,
to ascertain quickly the nature of any new German chemical attack,
and to provide special means of examining the treatment of
the new kind of casualty. These were "breach organisations,"
so to speak, countering the immediate effects of enemy attacks
while more comprehensive and permanent cadres were created
to absorb them. The personnel of these breach organisations
was largely composed of chemists already at the front who
had in some cases taken part in the first German attacks.
Efforts were soon on foot to mobilise British chemists for
offensive purposes. So remote from the old army standards
and training were the conceptions of the new scientific warfare,
that there was no scientific cadre or outstanding scientific
soldier to take over the direction and organisation of these
matters at the front or at home. Accordingly, in June,
1915, Brigadier-General C. H. Foulkes, C.M.G., D.S.O.
(then Major, R.E.) was given the difficult task of assembling
and training an offensive gas formation, and acting as
Gas Adviser to G.H.Q. The Special Companies thus created
have already been referred to in quotations from despatches.
In addition to this combatant personnel a number of
specialists and advisory organisations came into being.
Additional gas officers were appointed by various divisions,
and chemical advisers by higher formations.

Central Laboratory.--A central laboratory was instituted at G.H.Q. under
the late Colonel W. Watson, C.M.G., F.R.S., which did particularly valuable
work in connection with the rapid identification of new enemy chemicals.
With the development of gas shell, the chemical advisers included this
subject in their province. Reference must also be made to the medical
and physiological side.

New Type of Casualty.--After the introduction of gas warfare
the army was always faced with the possibility that some
entirely new chemical would produce a new type of casualty
which would require special and sometimes unusual treatment.
A new element was thus introduced into army medical work.
The effects of a new gas used in large quantities on the front
was often just as serious a threat to organisation as the sudden
development of a strange epidemic. Reaction to meet these new
conditions took the form of the development of medical research
organisations at home, and of the appointment of a special medical
and physiological advisory staff incorporated later in the Directorate
of Gas Services. It was thus possible, after any enemy gas attack,
and with little delay, to institute inquiries with regard
to treatment of casualties, stimulate special investigations,
and prepare for any reorganisation in personnel and equipment, and,
in general, introduce satisfactory alert conditions throughout
the medical organisation along the whole of the Allied front.
In this connection the effective liaison between the medical
specialists of the British and French armies must be mentioned.

Directorate of Gas Services.--These various services were centralised
in the Directorate of Gas Services, in the Spring of 1916,
under Major-General H. F. Thuillier, C.B., C.M.G., R.E. It is
interesting to note that although in their rear organisations
for research and supply the French preceded us in the adoption
of a logical symmetrical arrangement, yet in the field we were
the first to produce the centralised chemical warfare service
which was so essential.

British Home Organisations;--The Royal Society.--After the battle
of the Marne, Germany rapidly realised the need for scientific
and industrial mobilisation for the new stage into which the war
had passed. Many signs and definite statements by Falkenhayn
and others in authority have shown us how this realisation
found outlet in various schemes for research and production.
The need for scientific attention to various war problems
was also realised in England, and found expression in the
mobilisation of prominent scientists by the Royal Society,
which constituted a number of committees to deal with specific
activities and to assist various Ministries or administrative
government departments in connection with scientific matters.

Royal Society Chemical Sub-Committee.--The Chemical Sub-Committee
included such prominent names as Lord Rayleigh, Sir William Ramsay and
Sir Oliver Lodge. Retaliation, decided on early in May, 1915, was reflected
in organisation. Lord Kitchener entrusted Colonel Jackson, C.M.G., R.E.
(later Major-General Sir Louis Jackson, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., R.E.),
then in charge of a fortification section of the War Office,
with the task of examining and taking action on the possibilities
of retaliation, and a liaison with the above chemical committee
of the Royal Society was soon established. Protection became a part
of the duties of the Medical Services and was placed under the direct
control of Colonel, afterwards Sir William Horrocks, who became chairman
of the specially appointed Anti-Gas Committee. Further, a little later,
the Chemical Sub-Committee above referred to became an advisory body to
Colonel Jackson. This was the origin of the Chemical Warfare Department,
but it was destined to pass through many difficult and hampering
transformations before reaching its final, more or less efficient
and symmetrical form.

The Trench Warfare Department.--With the formation of the Ministry of
Munitions late in May, 1915, Colonel Jackson's section was transferred to it.
At this stage there was definite recognition of the absolute need of keeping
chemical warfare research, design, and supply under one head. Probably this
was the chief reason which prompted Lord Kitchener, then Secretary of State
for War, to agree to the transference of this section to another Ministry,
and consent to the birth of the Trench Warfare Department.

Scientific Advisory Committee;--Commercial Advisory Committee.--Even at
this stage activities were growing and government organisation was found
necessary to cover such functions as in Germany were rendered unnecessary
by the existence of the I.G. It became clear that the new department
would require strong permanent scientific advice, and this was found
in the formation of the Scientific Advisory Committee. This included
the most active members of the former relevant Royal Society Committee,
amongst whom were Professor A. W. Crossley, the Secretary,
and Professors H. B. Baker, J. F. Thorpe, and Sir George Beilby,
all of whom rendered great services in the later development of this
new branch of warfare. A parallel Commercial Advisory Committee
was appointed, composed of representatives of some of the leading
manufacturers of the country.

Split Between Research and Supply.--We cannot follow in detail the many
fluctuations experienced in the organisation of the department.
They represent a constant struggle between a definitely expressed
policy of centralisation and symmetry for supply and research,
and circumstances imposed upon the department by the reorganisation
and fusion of Ministries and departments. There were brief periods,
notably at the commencement and in the final stages, when the desired
centralised organisation was approached, but there were also periods
when there was a complete split between research and supply with feeble
and unsatisfactory liaison between the two. Speaking generally,
the break between research and supply occurred in December, 1915,
when the Trench Warfare Department was split up into two parts.
These were the Trench Warfare Research Department, in which was
included the Scientific Advisory Committee, and, shortly afterwards,
changed its name to that of the Chemical Advisory Committee,
and the Trench Warfare Supply Department. The relationships
between those two departments remained practically unchanged until
the formation of the Chemical Warfare Department in October, 1917.
This statement must be qualified, however, by a reference to the
services rendered by Professor, later Sir John Cadman, K.C.M.G., in
bringing about this liaison, not only with supply in England,
but also with that in France.

During the early period the Royal Society Committee of Physiology
became active and was later very closely co-ordinated with the
Chemical Warfare Department, as the Chemical Warfare Medical Committee.

Munitions Inventions Department.--Another feature which is worthy of notice
because it was common to Allied organisations other than the British,
and because it formed part of the slow realisation of the essential
unity of chemical warfare activities, was the duplication of effort
by the Munitions Inventions Department. Suggestions which could only
have value when considered as part of the definitely directed chemical
warfare policy were constantly raised with the Inventions Department,
but this difficulty was overcome later by the growing importance
of chemical warfare and the effecting of a liaison between the two
departments by Colonel Crossley.

Imperial College of Science.--During the early period the Imperial College
of Science rendered great services by assisting in research.
It continued to do so during the rest of the war, but was later
associated with a large number of British university chemical
and scientific departments in pursuing a huge programme of chemical
warfare research. We can only make passing reference to the development
of the training and experimental grounds which formed such an
important part in assisting decisions on chemical warfare policy.
The Porton ground, however, was a model of its kind, a pioneer
amongst Allied experimental grounds, and a tribute to the creative
and administrative efforts of Lt.-Colonel Crossley, C.M.G., C.B.E.,
who was its commandant from its inception to the end of the war.

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