The Riddle of the Rhine:
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Victor LeFebure >> The Riddle of the Rhine:
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The Chemical Warfare Department.--The growing importance of
chemical warfare, the vigorous chemical initiative assumed by Germany
in the summer of 1917, and various other reasons led to reorganisation
of the Chemical Warfare services in this country in October, 1917,
and the Chemical Warfare Department, under Major-General Thullier,
formerly Director of Gas Services, B.E.F., was constituted.
This reorganisation witnessed a great increase in research
and other activities of the department and a still greater
mobilisation of the chemists of the country. Although this
change witnessed further centralisation by the incorporation
of the Anti-Gas Department, thereby settling once and for all
the inherent association between offensive and defensive research,
a fact which had been apparent to many long before, yet it still ignored
the fundamental connection between offensive research and supply.
This had been recognised in French organisation as early as 1915,
yet we did not reach the ideal solution even at the end of the war.
The Anti-Gas Department.--We have mentioned the origin of the
Anti-Gas Department. Although separate in organisation from chemical
warfare research, yet the remarkable work and personality of the late
Lt.-Colonel E. F. Harrison, C.M.G., overcame the disadvantages by
energetic liaison and a great capacity for the internal organisation.
General Hartley has paid a tribute which we cannot refrain from repeating:
"Colonel Harrison was one of the great discoveries of the war.
It is often stated that he was the inventor of the box respirator,
but this he would have been the first to deny. His great merit
was as an organiser. He gathered round him an enthusiastic group
of young chemists and physicists, and the box respirator represents
the joint result of their researches, carried out under his
inspiration and controlled by his admirable practicable judgment.
He organised the manufacture of the respirator on a large scale,
and it is a great testimony to his foresight and energy that in spite
of all the difficulties of production, the supplies promised to France
never failed. Fifty million respirators were produced by the department,
and of these nineteen million were box respirators."
Anti-gas research was at first centred in the R.A.M. College, Millbank,
and from the beginning of 1917 in the Physiological Institute,
University College, London. The work done in research and production
not only protected the whole of the British Army, but formed the backbone
of American and a large part of Italian protection. Further, the sacrifices
made in connection with this work are not sufficiently known.
Numbers of young scientists sacrificed their health and sometimes life,
in carrying out the critical tests upon which the safety of millions
of Englishmen and Allies depended.
Designs Committee.--We cannot leave this branch of the subject without
referring to the Chemical Warfare Designs Committee. An important trend
in chemical warfare was its growing independence of the normal weapons of war,
and its special requirements when adapted for use with both the normal
and newer types. This tendency found expression in the above Committee
under the direction of Professor Jocelyn Field Thorpe. The development
of satisfactory chemical shell was an enormous problem, and the importance
of entirely new forms of the chemical weapon will be brought out in dealing
with the limitation of armaments.
French Organisation.--French development followed very similar lines.
From April 28th, 1915, a Commission of military representatives and
scientists was organised under General Curmer. This gave place in June
to a Chemical Warfare Research Committee under M. Weiss, Directeur des
Mines au Ministere des Traveaux Publics. In August, 1915, three special
Committees were formed; one under M. Kling for problems from the front,
whose organisation was responsible for a volume of exceedingly reliable
identifications of enemy chemicals of great use to the Allies;
another under M. Moureu for offensive research, whose brilliant organic
investigation characterised later French developments, and the other
under M. Vincent, for research on protection. But, in the meantime,
the importance of gas shell was impressed upon the French and,
on the 1st July, 1915, this organisation passed into M. Albert Thomas's
new Ministere de L'Artillerie et des Munitions. Manufacture passed into
the hands of the Directeur du Materiel Chimique de Guerre. In September,
1915, these sections were centralised under General Ozil, attached to
the same Ministry. General Ozil's service was strongly supported
by a number of eminent French scientists, and achieved unusual success
in the face of great practical difficulties.
A very close liaison was maintained with the army, and the initiative,
energy, and devotion of all concerned cannot be too highly praised.
In production alone the difficulties were enormous. There was no
highly organised dye industry available. The prewar German monopoly
had seen to that. Elaborate organisations and continuous research
work under difficult conditions were necessary to replace the smooth,
running normal activities of the great German dye combine.
The salient points in French production are dealt with more fully
in another chapter.
In research and protection French activities were no less handicapped
and just as creditable. The protection of the French armies was largely
achieved through the genius and tireless industry of Professor Paul Lebeau.
Quick to realise the need of retaliation against the new German weapon,
the French developed their chemical offensive and defensive
with characteristic elan and intuition. Contributing largely
to Allied research, they took the lead in Inter-Allied co-operation
and liaison, and their activities in this field were due to much
worthier causes than mere geographical position.
Italian Development.--The Italians were alive to the importance of
chemical warfare. World famous names such as those of Senator Paterno
and Professor Villavecchia were associated with their organisation.
Once again, however, although not lacking in invention and initiative,
they were continually hampered by production, which imposed such
grave disadvantages upon them as to endanger seriously the success
of their campaign. The success of the great German offensive against
Italy in the autumn of 1917 was largely ascribed to the German use
of gas of such types and in such amounts that the Italian protective
appliances were outmanoeuvred. Further, in spite of the offensive
qualities of the Italian gas organisation under Col. Penna,
lack of supplies prevented large scale gas retaliation, so essential
in maintaining gas morale.
Towards the end of the war, when the French and British production improved,
and with the entry of America and the promise of supplies therefrom,
it was possible to assist the Italians from Allied sources,
and arrangements were made to supply them with the British Respirator,
to assist them in the development of the Livens Projector, to supply large
quantities of mustard and other gases, and to assist them in production.
The use of the British box respirator was undoubtedly a great factor
in repelling the Austrian offensive of June, 1918. Their experimental
fields and research organisations were particularly well staffed, and,
backed by production, Italian chemical genius would have been capable
of producing very serious results.
Supply Organisations.--What a marked contrast between the organisation
required for German and Allied chemical warfare production!
Such organisation implies cadres and arrangements for co-operation
with research organisations, for semi-scale work, commercial functions,
priority, raw material supply, transport, and all their concomitants.
In Germany, the self-contained dye industry simplified all these functions.
The Government addressed itself to one producing organisation which
was responsible for most of the relevant research. Whole Government
departments were rendered unnecessary by this centralised production.
British Supply Organisation.--In England the situation was
entirely different. Even before the advent of mustard gas the Government
was compelled to apply to at least twenty contractors. The products
required were foreign to the normal activities of many of these.
They required assistance in raw materials, transport, technical methods,
either the result of the work of other factories or of research.
The latter again involved complex official organisation, cumbrous even
if efficiently carried out. This at once introduced difficulties.
The centre of gravity of supply was in government offices instead
of in the centres of production. Much depended upon the co-ordination
of the official departments. Quite apart from the Government plants
finally engaged in chemical warfare production, more than fifty plants
were used in private organisations, of which a very high percentage
were entirely new.
Allied Handicaps.--The functions of the allied Government supply
departments were or should have been much more than those of an
individual negotiating a contract. Owing to the fact that these were
new plants, and that the products were foreign to the production
of many of the firms concerned, two alternatives had to be faced.
Either the technical and service departments of each firm had
to be considerably strengthened, or else a special organisation
had to cover these functions by employing a considerable government
technical and liaison personnel. For reasons of secrecy and general
efficiency the latter procedure evolved, but neither represented
the ideal solution.
The German Solution.--This was the German arrangement in which these
functions were all embodied in the centralised producing organisation,
the I.G. The German Government took the role of a pure contractor,
the only additional function being the choice of product and method,
a question of policy. This implied the existence of a Government
experimental organisation, but purely for this purpose.
Departmental Difficulties.--The Allied task would have been
much simpler if the only war weapon had been a chemical one,
in which case an efficient organisation could have been decided
upon at first, and need have suffered no very radical changes.
As it was, however, the British supply organisation had to
administer some seventy plants, which were really in private hands,
and found its chief difficulties quite apart from the external
perplexities of the problem. They arose in its relationships
with other Government departments.
Allied Success Against Odds.--Taking a broad view of the case,
although nobody who knew the facts could regard our poison gas
production with anything but dismay, except in a few cases,
yet the main feeling was one of amazement that we succeeded
as well as we did with these entirely new substances.
The whole story of chemical warfare supply amongst the Allies is
one of devoted effort by all concerned, against overwhelming odds,
and although the level of results was poor compared with Germany,
yet we find here and there brilliant examples of Allied
adaptability and tenacity amongst which the French development
of mustard gas stands pre-eminent.
What we have already said about supply organisation may be summed up
in one sentence. The Germans were already organised to produce.
We had to create Government departments to administer a large
number of plants in private hands, and they had to cope not only
with the external difficulties of the situation but with the almost
overwhelming difficulties of internal organisation. The checquered
career of the British supply department provides a good example.
The French and Americans suffered less than ourselves from
these troubles, the latter having the benefit of the combined
experience of the other Allies.
Allied Lack of Vision in Production.--A survey of the earliest supply
organisation of this country reveals another difficulty which later events
have obscured. Few people realised the developments which chemical warfare
would produce. The early production of chemicals for gas warfare was
grouped under some such designation as trench warfare stores, and graded
in order of importance, from the point of view of supply organisation
with catapults and spring guns, flame projectors and body shields!
It is no unfair criticism to state that hard facts rather than vision forced
the importance of chemical warfare upon those responsible for munition
production in the early stages of the war. Chemical warfare production
remained under the Trench Warfare Supply Department for many months,
where it was one of ten Trench Warfare sections. The vicissitudes of trench
warfare supply are too numerous and complicated to be dealt with here,
but chemical warfare supply has suffered accordingly.
British Lag in Organisation.--Examining Allied organisations,
we find that the French and Americans approached this ideal
solution more rapidly than ourselves, and we can trace in our
own development a number of unsuccessful attempts to reach this
centralised control, although the last configuration, under the direction
of Major-General H. F. Thuillier, was the nearest approach.
French organisation for supply provides another example of their
national characteristic of logical thinking and love of symmetry.
As early as September, 1915, the French centralised their research
organisation, the Inspection des Etudes et Experience Chimiques,
and their supply organisation, the Direction du Materiel Chimique
de Guerre, in their Service Chimique de Guerre under General Ozil.
French and American Characteristics.--Their early concentration on
gas shell shows that this symmetrical organisation was due not only
to the above characteristic but also to vision in war development.
American supply organisation again provides evidence of the
national characteristic. They had no I.G. but they had plenty of money
and material, and the total of Allied experience in production.
They therefore proceeded at once to build an enormous producing
centre known as Edgewood Arsenal. We refer to this later.
The tremendous potentialities of this Arsenal will readily he seen,
although they did not become effective during the war.
It would be poor testimony to the tremendous efforts and sacrifices
made by the various firms and officials connected with chemical
warfare to leave the matter at this stage, or to make a minute
analysis of the different internal causes for lack of success.
We may say that although the efforts of all concerned were
beyond praise, yet they were so initially handicapped that it was
practically impossible even to approach the German efficiency.
In France and England we were suffering from the faults of past years,
our lack of attention to the application of science to industry.
The Americans would also have suffered, for they were in the same plight,
but they adopted the drastic solution of Edgewood Arsenal. As we
show later, however, this solution was really only a very necessary
and valuable attempt to treat the symptom rather than the disease.
We cannot regard the problem as settled for any of these countries.
If it is, then the outlook is very poor.
Inter-Allied Chemical Warfare Liaison.--Chemical warfare offered,
in theory, a splendid opportunity for co-ordination amongst
the Allies, The new methods, unhampered by tradition, seemed,
at first sight, admirably suited for exploitation against the enemy
by an allied Generalissimo and staff. Co-ordination never reached
this stage, although strong liaison organisations were developed.
Inter-allied research conferences occurred periodically in Paris,
where decisions for co-operation were taken after full discussion
of allied work. The continuity of these relationships was maintained
by an active secretariat on which each ally was represented.
The contact, so close between actual allied scientific workers
in this field, became less evident in the application of their
results to field warfare, for several reasons. In the first place,
close scientific contact in research was replaced by the actual field
relationships of the armies, and, as is well known, the central
inter-allied command did not materialise until the spring of 1918,
and even then it was only possible to apply the new principle
to the actual battlefield. The traditional differences between.
the methods of the different services of each ally still existed
to a large extent, and they found expression in type of armament,
equipment, and military standards, such as, for example, gun calibres
and shell design, to which chemical warfare had to conform.
No inter-allied gas mask materialised, although this would have been
of inestimable advantage. Probably the example of most complete
co-ordination occurred on the supply side, where absence of the above
traditional difficulties and the crying need to make the most
of available raw materials compelled a very close co-ordination.
Inter-Allied Supply.--The writer was responsible for initiating,
in 1917, an Inter-Allied Chemical Supply Committee, whose function
was to pool effectively the allied raw materials, and to arrange
their distribution in accordance with allied programmes,
the exchange of which implied a considerable step.
Later this Committee became one of a number, similarly constituted,
forming part of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council.
Thinking over the difficulties of the inter-allied supply, now that the
emergenices of the situation have passed, an important contrast emerges.
After three years of war, and although protected by the powerful arm
of the blockade, we were, still resorting, for chemical warfare supply,
to measures which, compared with the German methods, were complicated,
clumsy, and inefficient. This was, in a sense, forced upon us by
the number of the allies, and the fact that they held the outer lines.
But it is easily forgotten that Germany also had a number of allies,
and that Germany supply organisation was sufficient to feed them all.
Nature of Chemical Warfare Research.--So, much has been vaguely said,
and is vaguely known, about research in chemical warfare that a brief
analysis will be of value.
Discovery of New Substances.--Research for this purpose has
a number of very distinct functions, The most obvious is the
discovery of new substances. But there are others in connection
with which research work represents a much greater volume.
Very few new substances which found valuable application
during the war were revealed by chemical warfare research.
The bulk of the important substances were already known as such,
although their importance for war was probably not realised.
It is most important to emphasise the fact that even in
the future, should there be no direct attempts to reveal
new chemical warfare substances, they will undoubtedly arise
as a normal outcome of research, even if, without exception,
every chemist in the world became a most pronounced pacifist.
A valuable substance once discovered or decided upon, however,
whole series of research investigations become necessary.
Technical Method of Preparation;--Filling Problem;--Protection;--
Half-Scale Investigation.--The substance must be prepared in the most
efficient manner for manufacture, which may not be the mode of its discovery.
It must be used in shells, cylinders, or some other war chemical device.
Each device represents a different filling problem, different difficulties
with regard to contact of the war chemical and the envelope of the container.
If a projectile is in question the ballistics become of importance.
More important than any of these, except production, is the question
of protection. It is axiomatic that an army proposing to use a new offensive
chemical must be protected against it. It may, therefore, be necessary
to modify the existing mask or protective appliance, or to create an
entirely new one. If research reveals the necessity for the latter course
of action it may provide sufficient reason for abandoning the substance.
In addition, according to productive difficulties, it may be necessary
to undertake comprehensive and very expensive research on half-scale
methods for production. It is impossible in many cases to proceed directly
from the laboratory process to large scale manufacture without serious
risk of failure.
Two Classes of Research.--Broadly, these research functions form two classes,
those concerned with policy and approval of a substance and those
concerned with work which follows automatically upon such approval.
There must be, of course, a certain amount of overlapping and liaison
between the two classes.
Herein lay one of the great advantages enjoyed by the Germans. Their great
producing organisation, the I.G., was able to take over automatically
certain of these research functions, in particular all those with
regard to preparation and production, even of protective appliances.
The Government reserved what we have called the policy functions,
and was responsible, we assume, for the mass, of physiological and design
research which must always precede approval or a decision on policy.
Signs were not lacking, further, that the I.G. was even employed on certain
occasions for this latter type of research.
Conclusion.--From the facts at our disposal there can be no
doubt that the total material facilities at the disposal of
the Allies for chemical warfare investigation were considerably
more extensive and expensive than those of Germany with the one
notable exception of trained technical organic chemists.
It is very doubtful whether the German field experiments were
as largely provided for as those of the Allies. When we think
of the French grounds at Versailles and Entressin, the British
at Porton, the American grounds in France and in America,
and the Italian organisations, there can hardly be any doubt that
the total German facilities were much smaller. Under the actual
circumstances of the war, however, it was difficult to develop
more co-operation than was possible by a very close liaison.
The fact that all the experimental developments from these
grounds required special modification to meet the peculiar needs
of artillery and other equipment for each ally, prevented the
adoption of uniform types of projectile or other appliances.
Even uniform shell marking was found impracticable.
The "Outer and Inner Lines."--The Allied situation compelled the
multiplication of cumbersome organisations in the different countries.
Lack of a strong organic chemical industry placed each ally at a
considerable disadvantage, compared with Germany, in the development
of such organisations. Using a strategic comparison, we can say
that Germany not only possessed the "inner lines" in the chemical war,
but an exceptionally efficient system to exploit them, in the shape
of the great I.G.
CHAPTER VI
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INITIATIVE
Meaning of the Chemical Initiative.--The German invasion of Belgium
in 1914 was a direct appeal to the critical factor of surprise in war.
By disregarding their pledge, a "scrap of paper," they automatically
introduced into this attack the elements of military surprise.
We, the enemy, were unprepared, and a complete rearrangement
of dispositions became necessary.
A recent writer has admirably summarised the facts.[1]
[1] A. F. Pollard. _A Short History of the Great War_. Methuen, 1920.
"Germany began the war on the Western front before it was declared,
and on 1-2 August, German cavalry crossed the French frontier
between Luxembourg and Switzerland at three points in the direction
of Longwy, Luneville, and Belfort. But these were only feints
designed to prolong the delusion that Germany would attack
on the only front legitimately open to warfare and to delay
the reconstruction of the French defence required to meet
the real offensive. The reasons for German strategy were
conclusive to the General Staff, and they were frankly explained
by Bethmann-Hollweg to the British Ambassador. There was no
time to lose if France was to be defeated before an effective
Russian move, and time would be lost by a frontal attack.
The best railways and roads from Berlin to Paris ran through Belgium;
the Vosges protected more than half of the French frontier
south of Luxembourg, Belfort defended the narrow gap between
them and Switzerland, and even the wider thirty miles'
gap between the northern slopes of the Vosges and Luxembourg
was too narrow for the deployment of Germany's strength;
the way was also barred by the elaborate fortifications
of Verdun, Toul, and Nancy. Strategy pointed conclusively to
the Belgium route, and its advantages were clinched by the fact
that France was relying on the illusory scrap of paper."
The first German cloud gas attack was the second attempt to gain
the decisive initiative, by the unauthorised use of a surprise
of an entirely different nature.
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