The Riddle of the Rhine:
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Victor LeFebure >> The Riddle of the Rhine:
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It became necessary in the spring of 1917 to provide more efficient
protection against irritating smokes which tended to penetrate
the respirator as minute particles, and the first form consisted
in the use of two layers of cotton wadding in the canister of the small
Box Respirator. The use of Blue Cross compounds by Germany in the summer
of 1917 rendered this matter more urgent, and a special filter jacket
was designed which fitted round the Small Box Respirator. A million
were made and sent to France. Developments proceeded on these lines.
Altogether, more than fifty million masks and respirators of different
kinds were manufactured by the British Anti-Gas Department for our own
and Allied armies.
We thus have some idea of the importance of protection
in chemical warfare and of the absolutely imperative need
of deciding whether or no work on protection must go on.
There can be no doubt as to the answer to this question.
It is not only in the interest of the army, whether a League of Nations
or a national army, but also in those of the civil population.
The Tense Protective Struggle.--Few people realise how the development
of Allied and enemy gas masks and protective measures was forced
upon each side in a number of critical steps. At each of these,
had research and production been unequal to the task, the armies would
have found themselves more uncovered and exposed than if the whole
trench and dug-out system had been suddenly rendered unusable in some
peculiar way, thus removing cover from high explosive and shrapnel,
rifle, and machine-gun fire. The army has an apt expression.
An officer or man parading incompletely equipped is dubbed "half naked."
To be within reach of enemy gas without a mask was true nakedness.
A modern army without a gas mask is much more helpless and beaten
than one without boots. More than this, it must be clearly
understood that a gas mask of efficient design and production
will remain of very little use unless, supported by comprehensive
research which, itself, gains enormously in efficiency if related
to enemy offensive activities.
The German Mask.--Consider the German mask for a moment.
We have seen how Germany adopted the canister drum or cartridge
form before any of the other belligerents, and in good time
to protect her own men against their own use of phosgene,
at the end of 1915. Indeed, Germany probably held up the use
of phosgene until her own protection against it was developed,
although Schwarte's book claims that the German mask issue in 1915
was mainly a protection against chlorine. The filling consisted
of some such material as powdered pumice-stone saturated with a
solution of potash, and powdered over with fine absorbent charcoal
in order to protect against organic irritants and phosgene.
These were the familiar one-layer drums. Then came the British
concentrated cloud gas offensive in the summer of 1916,
which undoubtedly found the German mask unequal to some of the higher
concentrations which were obtained under most favourable conditions.
The Gas Officer of the Sixth German Army stated in a document
issued in November, 1916: "Considerable losses were caused
by the gas attacks which have taken place latterly.
The casualties were mainly due to the men being surprised in dugouts,
to the neglect of gas discipline, masks not being at hand,
to faulty masks, and to the use of old pattern drums _*which could
not afford protection against the type of gas employed by the enemy_.
(The italics are our own.--V.L.)
Evidence is found in the introduction of the German three-layer drum
in the autumn of 1916. An army does not undertake the manufacture
of millions of new appliances without very good reason.
This new drum was specially aimed at phosgene protection.
The middle layer consisted of granulated absorbent charcoal,
which had the property of absorbing large quantities of organic
irritants and phosgene. In the three-layer drum the latter
gas was adequately guarded against for most field purposes,
although we have reason to believe that the German staff was
always apprehensive, and German soldiers suspicious of the actual
penetration of their mask obtained in the immediate locality
of projector discharges.
Dr. Pick explains in Schwarte's book what is already well known,
that the charcoal layer has a wide, "non-specific effect, and it retains
almost all materials of which the molecular weight is not too small,
even if very strongly neutral in character (as, for example, chlorpicrin)."
He goes on to say "the progressive development of gas warfare
led to the use of these very materials, whilst substances with
acid properties, such as chlorine, fell more and more into disuse.
The three-layer drum went through all sorts of changes in consequence.
When the use of chlorpicrin mixtures gained in importance in 1917,
the layer of charcoal was increased at the expense of the other two layers.
This stage of development ended in 1918, when the other layers were
done away with altogether, and the entire three sets were filled
with `A' charcoal." " `A' charcoal was a particularly efficient form.
We learn from the same source that the increased protection against
phosgene was very welcome to the Germans in view of the danger arising
from gas projector attacks. Further, the capacity for absorption of
the German charcoal was never equalled by any of foreign production."
This was certainly true for the greater part of the war.
But Dr. Pick continues, in a sentence which is full of significance:
"In consequence of the high quality of the drum's absorption, we were able to
carry on to the end of the war with a drum of relatively small proportions."
This point is so important as to demand further explanation.
Enforced German Modifications.--The most important
disadvantage of a gas mask is its resistance to breathing.
Men undertaking arduous and dangerous duties in the presence of gas
must wear a mask, but they cannot undertake these duties if their
breathing is seriously interfered with. This is particularly
so in trench engineering and in the heavy work of the artillery.
Now the resistance depends, for a given type of filling,
upon the area of the cross-section of the drum. Breathing will be
easier through a very large area than through a very small one.
The British appliance was a frank admission that, with its filling,
a large drum was necessary, so large that the weight of it could
not be borne by the mask itself, but by attachment to the chest,
the actual mask being connected with the drum or box by a flexible
rubber tube. But the Germans adopted from the beginning
a form of protective appliance in which the drum or cartridge
was attached to and supported by the mask. In other words,
their development was limited by the weight of their drum,
unless they completely changed their type on British lines.
It is quite clear that they realised this, for Doctor Pick
tells us, referring to the large size of the British box:
"For this reason the weight of the box is so great that it
is no longer possible to attach it directly to the mask.
It is, therefore, carried on the chest and joined to the mouthpiece
of the mask by a flexible tube."
The development of British cloud gas compelled the Germans so to modify
their filling that the resistance to breathing increased considerably.
They countered this, however, by introducing an exceedingly active charcoal,
realising that the weight of their drum had already reached the limit
possible with that type of apparatus, and that they could not,
therefore, get better breathing capacity by increasing its size.
When, however, the Blue Cross compounds were introduced, it was necessary
for both armies to take special precautions. These precautions involved
introducing a layer of filtering material into the canister or drum.
Dr. Pick tells us: "When the material of the Blue Cross type became
of greater importance, a supplementary apparatus had to be issued.
A thin disc filter prepared by a special method from threads of cotton
was fastened to the tube of the drum by means of a spring lid.
This arrangement provided adequate protection against materials of the
Blue Cross type used by the enemy, as, for instance, stannic chloride,
whilst the German Blue Cross gas, which was more penetrating, was only
retained to a moderate degree." This is a direct admission that,
in order to counter the Allied use of Blue Cross gas, further filtering
arrangements would have been necessary. But the resistance to
breathing of the German apparatus was already strained to the utmost.
It is exceedingly improbable that the Germans, having already reached
the limit of size of the canister or drum, and being unable to obtain
better breathing by increase in size, could have introduced any such
device without carrying their resistance beyond the possible limit.
In other words, the use of Blue Cross by the Allies would have compelled
them to adopt the British type of apparatus, that is, a bigger box supported
by the chest and connected to the mask by a flexible rubber tube.
This would have led them into an _impasse_.
Shortage of Rubber.--We know how, in the beginning of 1917, they were
compelled to substitute leather in the substance of the mask.
Dr. Pick admits that this was due to lack of raw material, rubber,
and there are many other signs that this was so. Although leather was
not altogether a bad substitute for this purpose, rubber would have been
essential for the flexible tube, and the millions required to refit
the army would have completely broken the German rubber resources.
Many facts, including their feverish development of synthetic rubber,
small quantities of which they obtained at enormous cost, go to prove
this conclusion. The submarine, _Deutschland_, returning to Germany
in 1916, from its historic trip to America, carried shipments of the most
sorely needed commodities, including large quantities of raw rubber.
Stringent measures were adopted later to collect waste rubber and prevent
its use for such purposes as billiard tables and tyres for private vehicles.
The first naval expedition to Baltic ports after the Armistice
found the hospitals in a pitiable plight for lack of rubber.
The Germans were being driven into an impossible position.
In other words, the Allies, by a proper use of Blue Cross compounds,
could have regained the gas initiative. There is no doubt that they
were within a few months of doing so. Once again we see the importance
of production. Lack of raw materials for protective purposes was
endangering the German position, but delay in offensive production
by the Allies removed that danger. Although their pressing need
was obvious, the Blue Cross arsenic compounds were not available.
The chemical war involves manoeuvring for position just as definitely
as the older forms, but in it production, formerly a routine activity,
assumes critical strategic importance.
Gas Discipline.--This constant vigilance against enemy surprise
imposed more conditions upon the troops than the permanent adoption
of a protective appliance which, in itself, was a very big thing.
Given the mask, the army had to be taught how and when to use it.
A gas sense had to be developed which ensured rapid use of the mask
at the right time with the least hampering of operations.
Gas discipline thus became one of the most important features of
general training, a feature which can never be abandoned by the armies
of civilised nations in the future without disastrous results.
This discipline, like all other protective work, was dependent
in its nature and intensity upon the struggle for the initiative.
One example out of many is found in the numerous German Army Orders
which followed our introduction of the Livens projector.
This weapon gave the possibility of much higher concentrations
at much greater ranges from the front line than were formerly
possible and for a time German gas discipline was severely shaken,
and the staffs had to react violently to meet the situation.
The introduction of this weapon, in fact, was the first clear case
of the gaining of the chemical initiative by the Allies. A telegram
from German General Headquarters stated: "The English have
achieved considerable success by firing gas mines simultaneously
from a considerable number of projectors on to one point.
Casualties occurred because the gas was fired without warning,
and because its concentration was so great that a single breath
would incapacitate a man."
This is a further example of the fact that the decisive initiative
was very difficult to obtain after two years of war, whereas by
the same means it would have been ensured at the commencement.
The general development of German protection was a partial safeguard,
but the value of the weapon could be seen from the fact that an
order was issued for all German working parties to wear gas masks
when within 1000 yards of the front line on nights not obviously
unsuitable for Allied gas discharges. It is difficult to exaggerate
the military importance of such an imposition.
Summary.--We have thus covered a period, the main features
of which were attempts at the cloud initiative by Germany
and our rapid and successful protective reaction.
The conditions surrounding the first attack were entirely peculiar.
The complete surprise attending it could only be repeated
at the commencement of another war. It failed for entirely
different reasons from those which prevented the decisive
use of phosgene by the Germans. But our reaction carried
us further, and we developed the final form of cloud gas attack,
the Livens projector, which, in its turn, taxed the German
protection to the utmost, and threatened to overcome it.
History repeated itself with a vengeance in this protective struggle.
Two attempts at the cloud initiative, the German phosgene attempt
and the Livens projector, were both partially successful.
Had either of those attempts shared the surprise of April 22nd,
1915, their success would have been many times greater.
It was contact on the battle front that developed a protective
appliance and organisation, by giving us an insight
into enemy appliances and projects. We cannot emphasise
too strongly the significance of this for the future.
Apart from remote exceptions, contact will be entirely absent.
We can have no guarantee whatever that new devices will
be revealed, either between nations or to a central body.
Suppose the Germans had been more fully aware of the possibilities
of cloud gas, and, realising the dependence of their one method
upon wind direction and caprice, had developed our method of
producing cloud at a distance. The combinations of the two methods
at Ypres could hardly have left a margin of chance for failure.
This is a feeble example of what may occur.
New German Attempts.--By this time it was not easy
to see how either side could obtain a decisive surprise
by the use of chemicals aimed at the respiratory system.
It appeared very difficult to penetrate the different forms
of respirators by conditions obtainable in the field.
Professor F. P. Kirschbaum, writing on gas warfare,
in Schwarte's book, reveals how Germany counted on obtaining
the gas initiative against the French at Verdun. He explains
how the decision to use Green Cross on a large scale coincided
with certain modifications in the design of the German gas shell,
which made its large-scale manufacture much simpler and more rapid.
"The manufacture of Green Cross," he also tells us, "was assured
in the special progress in technical chemistry, and the output
was adequate," and goes on to explain, "The first use of per
stuff[1] found the enemy unprepared with any suitable protection.
The French had equipped their troops with protection against chlorine,
but had provided no protection against phosgene,"--"the results
of Green Cross ammunition were recognised by the troops.
During the big operations before Verdun, however, the enemy
did their very utmost to substitute the gas mask M2 for
the respirator XTX. Gas mask M2 was a protection against
Green Cross. For this reason Green Cross ammunition alone could
not be expected to have an effect, as soon as the enemy carried out
defensive measures by means of gas mask M2 or some better apparatus.
This reverse spurred on the Germans to renewed efforts."
The writer proceeds to explain how in 1916 these efforts resulted
in finding two important substitutes, mustard gas or Yellow Cross
and the arsenic compounds of the Blue Cross type.
[1] Diphosgene or Green Cross constituents.
Yellow and Blue Cross.--The Germans had, somewhat hastily,
laid aside their cloud activities. But they were very keenly
pursuing another line, the development of shell gas. Thus, in July,
1917, they made two distinct attempts to regain their initiative
by the use of shell gas, and were very largely successful in one case.
We refer to the Yellow and Blue Cross shell, containing mustard
gas and diphenyl-chlorarsine respectively.
Captain Geyer, writing in Schwarte's book, relates: "Gas was used
to a much greater extent, over 100,000 shells to a bombardment
after the introduction of the Green Cross shell in the summer of 1916
at Verdun. From that time the use of gas became much more varied
as the number of types of guns firing gas projectiles was increased,
field guns having also been provided with gas projectiles.
The most tremendous advance in the use of gas by the artillery,
and indeed in the use of gas in general, came in the summer of 1917
with the introduction of the three elements, Green, Yellow, and Blue,
one after another. This introduced the most varied possibilities
of employing gas, which were utilised to the full in many places
on the front during the successful defensive operations of 1917,
above all in Flanders and at Verdun. The hardly perceptible poisoning
of an area by means of Yellow Cross shell and the surprise gas
attack became two of the new regulation methods of using gas."
Yellow Cross.--The respirator afforded complete protection
against the attacks of mustard gas on the respiratory system,
but this gas evaded protection in other ways. In the first place,
its early unfamiliarity evaded the gas discipline of the Allies,
and it was not realised in many cases that the respirator was necessary.
This was speedily corrected, but its second line of attack was not easily,
and never finally countered. We refer to its vesicant action.
Mustard gas could produce severe blistering and skin wounds
in such slight concentrations, even through clothing, that it
was a tremendous casualty producer, putting men out of action
for several weeks or months, with a very low rate of mortality.
Used in large quantities against an entirely unprotected army,
its results might well have been decisive.
This was the first example of chemical attack upon a new function.
We had too readily assumed that gas, or chemical attack,
would be restricted to the respiratory system, or to the eyes.
We had assumed that if our mask protection was ahead
of enemy respiratory attacks our situation was safe.
Mustard gas was a rude awakening. It was impossible to protect
fully against mustard gas, unless we protected the whole body,
and it was never possible to do this during the war without
too seriously influencing the movements of the soldier.
Blue Cross.--The Blue Cross Shell was a deliberate attempt
to pierce the respirator. It represented to the German mind
such an advance of aggression over protection that the effect
on the enemy would be almost as if he were entirely unprotected.
Some idea of the German estimate of its importance can be found
in the following quotation from Captain Geyer: "The search
for new irritants in the sphere of arsenic combinations
led to the discovery of a series of effective substances.
In view of the obvious importance of highly irritant compounds
capable of existing in a very finely divided, pulverised,
or particulate form, research was made in the domain of little
volatile substances with boiling points up to 400'0. This led
to the astonishing discovery that _diphenylarsenious chloride_
when scattered would penetrate all gas masks then in use,
even the German, practically unweakened, and would have serious
irritant effects on the wearers. This discovery could only be
explained by the supposition that the irritant works in the form
of particles which it is difficult to keep back by means
of a respirator, even a completely protecting respirator,
such as the German and English gas masks were at that time.
Further analysis showed that the mixture of air and gas examined
revealed a concentration of gas greatly in excess of the point
of saturation for the vapour given off by this stuff. Finally, ultra
microscopic examination showed the existence of smoke particles.
A new type of fighting material had been discovered."
He also tells us how, following this discovery, production rose
to 600 tons monthly, and used up all the arsenic obtainable
in Germany. The Allies were fully alive to the importance
of this matter, and we have already explained that, had they
been in possession of large quantities of Blue Cross compounds,
they might have forced German protection into an impossible position.
No better example could be found of the immense superiority enjoyed
by Germany owing to her flexible and efficient producing organisation.
Captain Geyer goes on to explain how the military value of these
projectiles was considerable, and, therefore, the monthly production
reached a figure of over one million shell. We have already emphasised
the question of design in chemical warfare, and its importance is
borne out by the comparative failure of these German projectiles.
Geyer explains how only minute particles less than 1/10,000
of a millimetre in diameter are of any use to penetrate a mask,
and he develops the difficulties experienced by Germany in obtaining
such fine pulverisation without decomposing the substance.
He explains the difficulties which they had in arriving at
a suitable shell, and their unsuccessful struggle to overcome
the necessity of a glass container, which, he says, demanded "a
considerable advance in the technical work of shell production."
This attempt at the chemical initiative by the use of Blue Cross
illustrates another method of attack. Geyer says, "Blue and Green Cross
ammunition were used simultaneously in the field--called coloured cross
(Buntkreuz) in order, by the use of Blue Cross, to force the enemy
to remove gas masks, whereby they exposed themselves to the poisonous
effects of Green Cross. Matters seldom reached that point, however,
for as soon as the enemy realised the effect of `coloured cross'
ammunition, they withdrew troops which were being bombarded with it
from their positions to a zone beyond the range of artillery fire.
The English in particular had tried to protect the troops against the
effects of diphenylarsenious chloride, and of diphenylarsenious cyanide
(which followed it and was even more effective) by the use of filters
made of woollen material and wadding. They were to a great extent
technically successful, but the most effective defensive apparatus,
the `jacket' to the box, was unsatisfactory from the military point
of view, as the troops could only make a limited use of it owing
to the difficulty of breathing or suffocation which it occasioned."
The reference to the withdrawal of troops is a picturesque misrepresentation.
The relative inefficiency of the German shell rendered this unnecessary.
In addition, as Captain Geyer explains, our troops were specially protected
in anticipation of the use of particulate clouds. An examination of our
protective device by the Germans obviously led them to believe that resistance
to breathing was too great for the protective appliance to be practicable.
But here the exceptional gas discipline of the British troops
became effective. There is no doubt that the new mask was worn just
as constantly and satisfactorily as the old. Captain Geyer's remarks are
also interesting from a point of view to which we have already referred:
they show how much this question of resistance to breathing was exercising
the minds of those responsible for German protection.
"Particulate" Clouds.--The principle of particulate clouds was not
entirely new, both sides having used smoke combined with lethal
gases with the object of forcing the removal of the respirator.
It was thought that the particulate form of the smoke
would penetrate a respirator designed purely to hold up
vapours and gases. The reasoning was perfectly sound.
It was only a question of using the right smoke in the right way.
There were good grounds to believe that such substances would
penetrate the respirator, and either produce a casualty or compel
the removal of the respirator by the paroxysms produced, to allow
some lethal gas to complete the work on the unprotected soldier.
Fortunately for us, these objectives were not attained, but this
was rather due to some hitch or miscalculation in the German
preparations than to any inherent impossibility.
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