The History Of The Conquest Of Peru

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Chapter VI

Movements Of The Conspirators. - Advance Of Vaca De Castro -
Proceedings Of Almagro. - Progress Of The Governor. - The Forces
Approach Each Other. - Bloody Plains Of Chupas. - Conduct Of
Vaca De Castro.

1541-1543.

The first step of the conspirators, after securing possession of
the capital, was to send to the different cities, proclaiming the
revolution which had taken place, and demanding the recognition
of the young Almagro as governor of Peru. Where the summons was
accompanied by a military force, as at Truxillo and Arequipa, it
was obeyed without much cavil. But in other cities a colder
assent was given, and in some the requisition was treated with
contempt. In Cuzco, the place of most importance next to Lima, a
considerable number of the Almagro faction secured the ascendency
of their party; and such of the magistracy as resisted were
ejected from their offices to make room for others of a more
accommodating temper. But the loyal inhabitants of the city,
dissatisfied with this proceeding, privately sent to one of
Pizarro's captains, named Alvarez de Holguin, who lay with a
considerable force in the neighbourhood; and that officer,
entering the place, soon dispossessed the new dignitaries of
their honors, and restored the ancient capital to its allegiance.

The conspirators experienced a still more determined opposition
from Alonso de Alvarado. one of the principal captains of
Pizarro, - defeated, as the reader will remember, by the elder
Almagro at the bridge of Abancay, - and now lying in the north
with a corps of about two hundred men, as good troops as any in
the land. That officer, on receiving tidings of his general's
assassination, instantly wrote to the Licentiate Vaca de Castro,
advising him of the state of affairs in Peru, and urging him to
quicken his march towards the south. *1

[Footnote 1: Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 4, cap. 13. - Herrera,
Hist. General, dec. 6, lib. 10, cap. 7. - Declaracion de
Uscategui, Ms. - Carta del Maestro, Martin de Arauco, Ms. - Carta
de Fray Vicente Valverde, desde Tumbez, Ms.]

This functionary had been sent out by the Spanish Crown, as
noticed in a preceding chapter, to cooperate with Pizarro in
restoring tranquillity to the country, with authority to assume
the government himself, in case of that commander's death. After
a long and tempestuous voyage, he had landed, in the spring of
1541, at the port of Buena Ventura, and, disgusted with the
dangers of the sea, preferred to continue his wearisome journey
by land. But so enfeebled was he by the hardships he had
undergone, that it was full three months before he reached
Popayan, where he received the astounding tidings of the death of
Pizarro. This was the contingency which had been provided for,
with such judicious forecast, in his instructions. Yet he was
sorely perplexed by the difficulties of his situation. He was a
stranger in the land, with a very imperfect knowledge of the
country, without an armed force to support him, without even the
military science which might be supposed necessary to avail
himself of it. He knew nothing of the degree of Almagro's
influence, or of the extent to which the insurrection had spread,
- nothing, in short, of the dispositions of the people among whom
he was cast.

In such an emergency, a feebler spirit might have listened to the
counsels of those who advised to return to Panama, and stay there
until he had mustered a sufficient force to enable him to take
the field against the insurgents with advantage. But the
courageous heart of Vaca de Castro shrunk from a step which would
proclaim his incompetency to the task assigned him. He had
confidence in his own resources, and in the virtue of the
commission under which he acted. He relied, too, on the habitual
loyalty of the Spaniards; and, after mature deliberation, he
determined to go forward, and trust to events for accomplishing
the objects of his mission.

He was confirmed in this purpose by the advices he now received
from Alvarado; and without longer delay, he continued his march
towards Quito. Here he was well received by Gonzalo Pizarro's
lieutenant, who had charge of the place during his commander's
absence on his expedition to the Amazon. The licentiate was also
joined by Benalcazar, the conqueror of Quito, who brought a small
reinforcement, and offered personally to assist him in the
prosecution of his enterprise. He now displayed the royal
commission, empowering him, on Pizarro's death, to assume the
government. That contingency had arrived, and Vaca de Castro
declared his purpose to exercise the authority conferred on him.
At the same time, he sent emissaries to the principal cities,
requiring their obedience to him as the lawful representative of
the Crown, - taking care to employ discreet persons on the
mission, whose character would have weight with the citizens. He
then continued his march slowly towards the south. *2
[Footnote 2: Herrera, Hist. General, dec. 6, lib. 10, cap. 4. -
Carta de Benalcazar al Emperador, desde Cali, Ms., 20 Septiembre,
1542.
Benalcazar urged Vaca de Castro to assume only the title of
Judge, and not that of Governor, which would conflict with the
pretensions of Almagro to that part of the country known as New
Toledo and bequeathed to him by his father "Porque yo le avise
muchas veces no entrase en la tierra como Governador, sino como
Juez de V. M que venia a desagraviar a los agraviados, porque
todos lo rescibirian de buena gana." Ubi supra.]
He was willing by his deliberate movements to give time for his
summons to take effect, and for the fermentation caused by the
late extraordinary events to subside. He reckoned confidently on
the loyalty which made the Spaniard unwilling, unless in cases of
the last extremity, to come into collision with the royal
authority; and, however much this popular sentiment might be
disturbed by temporary gusts of passion, he trusted to the
habitual current of their feelings for giving the people a right
direction. In this he did not miscalculate; for so deep-rooted
was the principle of loyalty in the ancient Spaniard, that ages
of oppression and misrule could alone have induced him to shake
off his allegiance. Sad it is, but not strange, that the length
of time passed under a bad government has not qualified him for
devising a good one.

While these events were passing in the north, Almagro's faction
at Lima was daily receiving new accessions of strength. For, in
addition to those who, from the first, had been avowedly of his
father's party, there were many others who, from some cause or
other, had conceived a disgust for Pizarro, and who now willingly
enlisted under the banner of the chief that had overthrown him.

The first step of the young general, or rather of Rada, who
directed his movements, was to secure the necessary supplies for
the troops, most of whom, having long been in indigent
circumstances, were wholly unprepared for service. Funds to a
considerable amount were raised, by seizing on the moneys of the
Crown in the hands of the treasurer. Pizarro's secretary, Picado,
was also drawn from his prison, and interrogated as to the place
where his master's treasures were deposited. But, although put to
the torture, he would not - or, as is probable, could not - give
information on the subject; and the conspirators, who had a long
arrear of injuries to settle with him, closed their proceedings
by publicly beheading him in the great square of Lima. *3

[Footnote 3: Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Carta de
Barrio Nuevo, Ms. - Carta de Fray Vicente Valverde, desde Tumbez,
Ms.]

Valverde, Bishop of Cuzco, as he himself assures us, vainly
interposed in his behalf. It is singular, that, the last time
this fanatical prelate appears on the stage, it should be in the
benevolent character of a supplicant for mercy. *4 Soon
afterwards, he was permitted, with the judge, Velasquez, and some
other adherents of Pizarro, to embark from the port of Lima. We
have a letter from him, dated at Tumbez, in November, 1541;
almost immediately after which he fell into the hands of the
Indians, and with his companions was massacred at Puna. A
violent death not unfrequently closed the stormy career of the
American adventurer. Valverde was a Dominican friar, and, like
Father Olmedo in the suite of Cortes, had been by his commander's
side throughout the whole of his expedition. But he did not
always, like the good Olmedo, use his influence to stay the
uplifted hand of the warrior. At least, this was not the mild
aspect in which he presented himself at the terrible massacre of
Caxamalca. Yet some contemporary accounts represent him, after
he had been installed in his episcopal office, as unwearied in
his labors to convert the natives, and to ameliorate their
condition; and his own correspondence with the government, after
that period, shows great solicitude for these praiseworthy
objects. Trained in the severest school of monastic discipline,
which too often closes the heart against the common charities of
life, he could not, like the benevolent Las Casas, rise so far
above its fanatical tenets as to regard the heathen as his
brother, while in the state of infidelity; and, in the true
spirit of that school, he doubtless conceived that the sanctity
of the end justified the means, however revolting in themselves.
Yet the same man, who thus freely shed the blood of the poor
native to secure the triumph of his faith, would doubtless have
as freely poured out his own in its defence. The character was
no uncommon one in the sixteenth century. *5
[Footnote 4: "Siendo informado que andavan ordenando la muerte a
Antonio Picado secretario del Marques que tenian preso, fui a Don
Diego e a eu Capitan General Joan de Herrada e a todos sus
capitanes, i les puse delante el servicio de Dios i de S. M. i
que bastase en lo fecho por respeto de Dios, humillandome a sus
pies porque no lo matasen: i no basto que luego dende a pocos
dias lo sacaron a la plaza desta cibdad donde le cortaron la
cabeza." Carta de Fray Vicente de Valverde, desde Tumbez, Ms]
[Footnote 5: "Quel Senor obispo Fray Vicente de Balverde como
persona que jamas ha tenido fin ni zelo al servicio de Dios ni de
S. M. ni menos en la conversion de los naturales en los poner e
dotrinar en las cosas de nuestra santa fee catholica, ni menos en
entender en la paz e sosiego destos reynos, sino a sus intereses
propios dando mal ejemplo a todos." (Carta de Almagro a la
Audiencia de Panama, Ms. , 8 de Nov. 1541.) The writer, it must
be remembered was his personal enemy.]

Almagro's followers, having supplied themselves with funds, made
as little scruple to appropriate to their own use such horses and
arms, of every description, as they could find in the city. And
this they did with the less reluctance, as the inhabitants for
the most part testified no good-will to their cause. While thus
employed, Almagro received intelligence that Holguin had left
Cuzco with a force of near three hundred men, with which he was
preparing to effect a junction with Alvarado in the north. It
was important to Almagro's success that he should defeat this
junction. If to procrastinate was the policy of Vaca de Castro,
it was clearly that of Almagro to quicken operations, and to
bring matters to as speedy an issue as possible; to march at once
against Holguin, whom he might expect easily to overcome with his
superior numbers; then to follow up the stroke by the still
easier defeat of Alvarado, when the new governor would be, in a
manner, at his mercy. It would be easy to beat these several
bodies in detail, which, once united, would present formidable
odds. Almagro and his party had already arrayed themselves
against the government by a proceeding too atrocious, and which
struck too directly at the royal authority, for its perpetrators
to flatter themselves with the hopes of pardon. Their only
chance was boldly to follow up the blow, and, by success, to
place themselves in so formidable an attitude as to excite the
apprehensions of government. The dread of its too potent vassal
might extort terms that would never be conceded to his prayers.

But Almagro and his followers shrunk from this open collision
with the Crown. They had taken up rebellion because it lay in
their path, not because they had wished it. They had meant only
to avenge their personal wrongs on Pizarro, and not to defy the
royal authority. When, therefore, some on the more resolute, who
followed things fearlessly to their consequences, proposed to
march at once against Vaca de Castro, and, by striking at the
head, settle the contest by a blow, it was almost universally
rejected; and it was not till after long debate that it was
finally determined to move against Holguin, and cut off his
communication with Alonso de Alvarado.

Scarcely had Almagro commenced his march on Xauxa, where he
proposed to give battle to his enemy, than he met with a severe
misfortune in the death of Juan de Rada. He was a man somewhat
advanced in years; and the late exciting scenes, in which he had
taken the principal part, had been too much for a frame greatly
shattered by a life of extraordinary hardship. He was thrown
into a fever, of which he soon after died. By his death, Almagro
sustained an inestimable loss; for, besides his devoted
attachment to his young leader, he was, by his large experience,
and his cautious though courageous character, better qualified
than any other cavalier in the army to conduct him safely through
the stormy sea on which he had led him to embark.

Among the cavaliers of highest consideration after Rada's death,
the two most aspiring were Christoval de Sotelo, and Garcia de
Alvarado; both possessed of considerable military talent, but the
latter marked by a bold, presumptuous manner, which might remind
one of his illustrious namesake, who achieved much higher renown
under the banner of Cortes. Unhappily, a jealousy grew up between
these two officers; that jealousy, so common among the Spaniards,
that it may seem a national characteristic; an impatience of
equality, founded on a false principle of honor, which has ever
been the fruitful source of faction among them, whether under a
monarchy or a republic.

This was peculiarly unfortunate for Almagro, whose inexperience
led him to lean for support on others, and who, in the present
distracted state of his council, knew scarcely where to turn for
it. In the delay occasioned by these dissensions, his little
army did not reach the valley of Xauxa till after the enemy had
passed it. Almagro followed close, leaving behind his baggage
and artillery that he might move the lighter. But the golden
opportunity was lost. The rivers, swollen by autumnal rains,
impeded his pursuit; and, though his light troops came up with a
few stragglers of the rear-guard, Holguin succeeded in conducting
his forces through the dangerous passes of the mountains, and in
effecting a junction with Alonso de Alvarado, near the northern
seaport of Huaura.
Disappointed in his object, Almagro prepared to march on Cuzco, -
the capital, as he regarded it, of his own jurisdiction, - to get
possession of that city, and there make preparations to meet his
adversary in the field. Sotelo was sent forward with a small
corps in advance. He experienced no opposition from the now
defenceless citizens; the government of the place was again
restored to the hands of the men of Chili, and their young leader
soon appeared at the head of his battalions, and established his
winter-quarters in the Inca capital.

Here, the jealousy of the rival captains broke out into an open
feud. It was ended by the death of Sotelo, treacherously
assassinated in his own apartment by Garcia de Alvarado.
Almagro, greatly outraged by this atrocity, was the more
indignant, as he felt himself too weak to punish the offender.
He smothered his resentment for the present, affecting to treat
the dangerous officer with more distinguished favor. But
Alvarado was not the dupe of this specious behaviour. He felt
that he had forfeited the confidence of his commander. In
revenge, he laid a plot to betray him; and Almagro, driven to the
necessity of self-defence, imitated the example of his officer,
by entering his house with a party of armed men, who, laying
violent hands on the insurgent, slew him on the spot. *6
[Footnote 6: Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Zarate, Conq.
del Peru, lib. 4, cap. 10 - 14. - Gomara, Hist. de las Ind., cap.
147.
Declaracion de Uscategui, Ms. - Carta de Barrio Nuevo, Ms. -
Herrera, Hist. General, dec. 6 lib. 10, cap. 13; dec. 7 lib. 3
cap. 1, 5.]
This irregular proceeding was followed by the best consequences.
The seditious schemes of Alvarado perished with him. The seeds
of insubordination were eradicated, and from that moment Almagro
experienced only implicit obedience and the most loyal support
from his followers. From that hour, too, his own character seemed
to be changed; he relied far less on others than on himself, and
developed resources not to have been anticipated in one of his
years; for he had hardly reached the age of twenty-two. *7 From
this time he displayed an energy and forecast, which proved him,
in despite of his youth, not unequal to the trying emergencies of
the situation in which it was his unhappy lot to be placed.
[Footnote 7: "Hico mas que su edad requeria, porque seria de edad
de veinte i dos anos." Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 4, cap. 20.]
He instantly set about providing for the wants of his men, and
strained every nerve to get them in good fighting order for the
approaching campaign. He replenished his treasury with a large
amount of silver which he drew from the mines of La Plata
Saltpetre, obtained in abundance in the neighbourhood of Cuzco,
furnished the material for gunpowder. He caused cannon, some of
large dimensions, to be cast under the superintendence of Pedro
de Candia, the Greek, who, it may be remembered, had first come
into the country with Pizarro, and who, with a number of his
countrymen, - Levantines, as they were called, - was well
acquainted with this manufacture. Under their care, fire-arms
were made, together with cuirasses and helmets, in which silver
was mingled with copper, *8 and of so excellent a quality, that
they might vie, says an old soldier of the time, with those from
the workshops of Milan. *9 Almagro received a seasonable supply,
moreover, from a source scarcely to have been expected. This was
from Manco, the wandering Inca, who, detesting the memory of
Pizarro, transferred to the young Almagro the same friendly
feelings which he had formerly borne to his father; heightened,
it may be, by the consideration that Indian blood flowed in the
veins of the young commander. From this quarter Almagro obtained
a liberal supply of swords, spears, shields, and arms and armour
of every description, chiefly taken by the Inca at the memorable
siege of Cuzco. He also received the gratifying assurance, that
the latter would support him with a detachment of native troops
when he opened the campaign.

[Footnote 8: "Y demas de esto hico armas para la Gente de su
Real, que no las tenia, de pasta de Plata, i Cobre, mezclado, de
que salen mui buenos Coseletes: haviendo corregido, demas de
esto, todas las armas de la Tierra; de manera, que el que menos
Armas tenia entre su Gente, era Cota, i Coracinas, o Coselete, i
Celadas de la mesma Pasta, que los Indios hacen diestramente, por
muestras de las Milan." Zarate, Conq. de Peru, lib. 4, cap. 14.]

[Footnote 9: "Hombres de armas con tan buenas celadas borgonesas
como se hacen en Milan." Carta de Ventura Beltran al Emperador,
Ms desde Vilcas, 8 Octubre, 1542.]

Before making a final appeal to arms, however, Almagro resolved
to try the effect of negotiation with the new governor. In the
spring, or early in the summer, of 1542, he sent an embassy to
the latter, then at Lima, in which he deprecated the necessity of
taking arms against an officer of the Crown. His only desire, he
said, was to vindicate his own rights; to secure the possession
of New Toledo, the province bequeathed to him by his father, and
from which he had been most unjustly excluded by Pizarro. He did
not dispute the governor's authority over New Castile, as the
country was designated which had been assigned to the marquess;
and he concluded by proposing that each party should remain
within his respective territory until the determination of the
Court of Castile could be made known to them. To this
application, couched in respectful terms, Almagro received no
answer.

Frustrated in his hopes of a peaceful accommodation, the young
captain now saw that nothing was left but the arbitrament of
arms. Assembling his troops, preparatory to his departure from
the capital, he made them a brief address. He protested that the
step which he and his brave companions were about to take was not
an act of rebellion against the Crown. It was forced on them by
the conduct of the governor himself. The commission of that
officer gave him no authority over the territory of New Toledo,
settled on Almagro's father, and by his father bequeathed to him.
If Vaca de Castro, by exceeding the limits of his authority,
drove him to hostilities, the blood spilt in the quarrel would
lie on the head of that commander, not on his. "In the
assassination of Pizarro," he continued, "we took that justice
into our own hands which elsewhere was denied us. It is the same
now, in our contest with the royal governor. We are as
true-hearted and loyal subjects of the Crown as he is." And he
concluded by invoking his soldiers to stand by him heart and hand
in the approaching contest, in which they were all equally
interested with himself.

The appeal was not made to an insensible audience. There were
few among them who did not feel that their fortunes were
indissolubly connected with those of their commander; and while
they had little to expect from the austere character of the
governor, they were warmly attached to the person of their young
chief, who, with all the popular qualities of his father, excited
additional sympathy from the circumstances of his age and his
forlorn condition. Laying their hands on the cross, placed on an
altar raised for the purpose, the officers and soldiers severally
swore to brave every peril with Almagro, and remain true to him
to the last.

In point of numbers, his forces had not greatly strengthened
since his departure from Lima. He mustered but little more than
five hundred in all; but among them were his father's veterans,
well seasoned by many an Indian campaign. He had about two
hundred horse, many of them clad in complete mail, a circumstance
not too common in these wars, where a stuffed doublet of cotton
was often the only panoply of the warrior. His infantry, formed
of pikemen and arquebusiers, was excellently armed. But his
strength lay in his heavy ordnance, consisting of sixteen pieces,
eight large and eight smaller guns, or falconets, as they were
called, forming, says one who saw it, a beautiful park of
artillery, that would have made a brave show on the citadel of
Burgos. *10 The little army, in short, though not imposing from
its numbers, was under as good discipline, and as well appointed,
as any that ever fought on the fields of Peru; much better than
any which Almagro's own father or Pizarro ever led into the field
and won their conquests with. Putting himself at the head of his
gallant company, the chieftain sallied forth from the walls of
Cuzco about midsummer, in 1542, and directed his march towards
the coast in expectation of meeting the enemy. *11

[Footnote 10: "El artilleria hera suficiente para hazer bateria
en el castillo de Burgos." Dicho del Capitan Francisco de
Carvajal sobre la pregunta 38 de la informacion hecha en el Cuzco
en 1543, a favor de Vaca de Castro, Ms.]

[Footnote 11: Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Declaracion
de Uscategui, Ms. - Garcilasso, Com. Real, Real., Parte 2, lib.
2, cap. 13. - Carta del Cabildo de Arequipa al Emperador, San
Joan de la Frontera, Ms., 24 de Sep. 1542 - Herrera, Hist.
General, dez lib. 3, cap. 1, 2.]
While the events detailed in the preceding pages were passing,
Vaca de Castro, whom we left at Quito in the preceding year, was
advancing slowly towards the south. His first act, after leaving
that city, showed his resolution to enter into no compromise with
the assassins of Pizarro. Benalcazar, the distinguished officer
whom I have mentioned as having early given in his adherence to
him, had protected one of the principal conspirators, his
personal friend, who had come into his power, and had facilitated
his escape. The governor, indignant at the proceeding, would
listen to no explanation, but ordered the offending officer to
return to his own district of Popayan. It was a bold step, in
the precarious state of his own fortunes.

As the governor pursued his march, he was well received by the
people on the way; and when he entered the city of San Miguel, he
was welcomed with loyal enthusiasm by the inhabitants, who
readily acknowledged his authority though they showed little
alacrity to take their chance with him in the coming struggle.