The History Of The Conquest Of Peru

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Aldana, fortified with his despatches, sped swiftly on his voyage
to Panama. Through him the governor learned the actual state of
feeling in the councils of Pizarro; and he listened with regret
to the envoy's conviction, that no terms would be admitted by
that chief or his companions, that did not confirm him in the
possession of Peru. *28
[Footnote 28: With Aldana's mission to Castile Gonzalo Pizarro
closes the important letter, so often cited in these pages, and
which may be supposed to furnish the best arguments for his own
conduct. It is a curious fact, that Valdivia, the conqueror of
Chili, to whom the epistle is addressed, soon after this openly
espoused the cause of Gasca, and his troops formed part of the
forces who contended with Pizarro, not long afterwards, at
Huarina. Such was the friend on whom Gonzalo relied!]

Aldana was soon admitted to an audience by the president. It was
attended with very different results from what had followed from
the conferences with Hinojosa; for Pizarro's envoy was not armed
by nature with that stubborn panoply which had hitherto made the
other proof against all argument. He now learned with surprise
the nature of Gasca's powers, and the extent of the royal
concessions to the insurgents. He had embarked with Gonzalo
Pizarro on a desperate venture, and he found that it had proved
successful. The colony had nothing more, in reason, to demand;
and, though devoted in heart to his leader, he did not feel bound
by any principle of honor to take part with him, solely to
gratify his ambition, in a wild contest with the Crown that must
end in inevitable ruin. He consequently abandoned his mission to
Castile, probably never very palatable to him, and announced his
purpose to accept the pardon proffered by government, and support
the president in settling the affairs of Peru. He subsequently
wrote, it should be added, to his former commander in Lima,
stating the course he had taken, and earnestly recommending the
latter to follow his example.

The influence of this precedent in so important a person as
Aldana, aided, doubtless, by the conviction that no change was
now to be expected in Pizarro, while delay would be fatal to
himself, at length prevailed over Hinojosa's scruples, and he
intimated to Gasca his willingness to place the fleet under his
command. The act was performed with great pomp and ceremony.
Some of Pizarro's stanchest partisans were previously removed
from the vessels; and on the nineteenth of November, 1546,
Hinojosa and his captains resigned their commissions into the
hands of the president. They next took the oaths of allegiance
to Castile; a free pardon for all past offences was proclaimed by
the herald from a scaffold erected in the great square of the
city; and the president, greeting them as true and loyal vassals
of the Crown, restored their several commissions to the
cavaliers. The royal standard of Spain was then unfurled on
board the squadron, and proclaimed that this strong-hold of
Pizarro's power had passed away from him for ever. *29

[Footnote 29: Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Zarate, Conq.
del Peru, lib. 6, cap. 9. - Fernandez, Hist. del Peru, Parte 1,
lib. 2, cap. 38, 42. - Gomara, Hist. de las Indias, cap. 178. -
Ms. de Caravantes.
Garcilasso de la Vega, - whose partiality for Gonzalo Pizarro
forms a wholesome counterpoise to the unfavorable views taken of
his conduct by most other writers, - in his notice of this
transaction, seems disposed to allow little credit to that
loyalty which is shown by the sacrifice of a benefactor. Com.
Real., Parte 2, lib. 5, cap. 4.]

The return of their commissions to the insurgent captains was a
politic act in Gasca. It secured the services of the ablest
officers in the country, and turned against Pizarro the very arm
on which he had most leaned for support. Thus was this great
step achieved, without force or fraud, by Gasca's patience and
judicious forecast. He was content to bide his time; and he now
might rely with well-grounded confidence on the ultimate success
of his mission.

Chapter II

Gasca Assembles His Forces. - Defection Of Pizarro's Followers. -
He Musters His Levies. - Agitation In Lima. - He Abandons The
City. - Gasca Sails From Panama. - Bloody Battle Of Huarina.

1547.

No sooner was Gasca placed in possession of Panama and the fleet,
than he entered on a more decisive course of policy than he had
been hitherto allowed to pursue. He made levies of men, and drew
together supplies from all quarters. He took care to discharge
the arrears already due to the soldiers, and promised liberal pay
for the future; for, though mindful that his personal charges
should cost little to the Crown, he did not stint his expenditure
when the public good required it. As the funds in the treasury
were exhausted, he obtained loans on the credit of the government
from the wealthy citizens of Panama, who, relying on his good
faith, readily made the necessary advances. He next sent letters
to the authorities of Guatemala and Mexico, requiring their
assistance in carrying on hostilities, if necessary, against the
insurgents; and he despatched a summons, in like manner, to
Benalcazar, in the provinces north of Peru, to meet him, on his
landing in that country, with his whole available force.

The greatest enthusiasm was shown by the people of Panama in
getting the little navy in order for his intended voyage; and
prelates and commanders did not disdain to prove their loyalty by
taking part in the good work, along with the soldiers and
sailors. *1 Before his own departure, however, Gasca proposed to
send a small squadron of four ships under Aldana, to cruise off
the port of Lima, with instructions to give protection to those
well affected to the royal cause, and receive them, if need be,
on board his vessels. He was also in trusted with authenticated
copies of the president's commission, to be delivered to Gonzalo
Pizarro, that the chief might feel, there was yet time to return
before the gates of mercy were closed against him. *2

[Footnote 1: "Y ponia sus fuercas con tanta llaneza y obediencia,
que los Obispos y clerigos y los capitanes y mas principales
personas eran los que primero echauan mano, y tirauan de las
gumenas y cables de los nauios, para los sacar a la costa."
Fernandez, Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 70.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid., ubi supra. - Montesinos, Annales, Ms., ano
1546. - Gomara, Hist. de las Ind., cap. 178. - Zarate, Conq. del
Peru, lib. 6, cap. 9. - Herrera, Hist General, dec. 8, lib. 3,
cap. 3.]

While these events were going on, Gasca's proclamations and
letters were doing their work in Peru. It required but little
sagacity to perceive that the nation at large, secured in the
protection of person and property, had nothing to gain by
revolution. Interest and duty, fortunately, now lay on the same
side; and the ancient sentiment of loyalty, smothered for a time,
but not extinguished, revived in the breasts of the people.
Still this was not manifested, at once, by any overt act; for,
under a strong military rule, men dared hardly think for
themselves, much less communicate their thoughts to one another.
But changes of public opinion, like changes in the atmosphere
that come on slowly and imperceptibly, make themselves more and
more widely felt, till, by a sort of silent sympathy, they spread
to the remotest corners of the land. Some intimations of such a
change of sentiment at length found their way to Lima, although
all accounts of the president's mission had been jealously
excluded from that capital. Gonzalo Pizarro himself became
sensible of these symptoms of disaffection, though almost too
faint and feeble, as yet, for the most experienced eye to descry
in them the coming tempest.

Several of the president's proclamations had been forwarded to
Gonzalo by his faithful partisans; and Carbajal, who had been
summoned from Potosi, declared they were "more to be dreaded than
the lances of Castile." *3 Yet Pizarro did not, for a moment,
lose his confidence in his own strength; and with a navy like
that now in Panama at his command, he felt he might bid defiance
to any enemy on his coasts. He had implicit confidence in the
fidelity of Hinojosa.

[Footnote 3: "Que eran mas de temer aquellas cartas que a las
lacas del Rey de Castilla." Fernandez, Hist. del Peru Parte 1,
lib. 2, cap. 45.]
It was at this period that Paniagua arrived off the port with
Gasca's despatches to Pizarro, consisting of the emperor's letter
and his own. They were instantly submitted by that chieftain to
his trusty counsellors, Carbajal and Cepeda, and their opinions
asked as to the course to be pursued. It was the crisis of
Pizarro's fate.

Carbajal, whose sagacious eye fully comprehended the position in
which they stood, was in favor of accepting the royal grace on
the terms proposed; and he intimated his sense of their
importance by declaring, that "he would pave the way for the
bearer of them into the capital with ingots of gold and silver."
*4 Cepeda was of a different way of thinking. He was a judge of
the Royal Audience; and had been sent to Peru as the immediate
counsellor of Blasco Nunez. But he had turned against the
viceroy, had encountered him in battle, and his garments might be
said to be yet wet with his blood! What grace was there, then,
for him? Whatever respect might be shown to the letter of the
royal provisions, in point of fact, he must ever live under the
Castilian rule a ruined man. He accordingly strongly urged the
rejection of Gasca's offers. "They will cost you your
government," he said to Pizarro; "the smooth-tongued priest is
not so simple a person as you take him to be. He is deep and
politic. *5 He knows well what promises to make; and, once master
of the country, he will know, too, how to keep them."

[Footnote 4: "Y le enladrillen los caminos por do viniere con
barras de plata, y tejos de Oro." Garcilasso, Com. Real., Parte
2, lib. 5, cap. 5.]
[Footnote 5: "Que no lo embiauan por hombre sencillo y llano,
sino de grandes cautelas, astucias, falsedades y enganos." Ibid.,
loc. cit.]
Carbajal was not shaken by the arguments or the sneers of his
companions; and as the discussion waxed warm, Cepeda taxed his
opponent with giving counsel suggested by fears for his own
safety - a foolish taunt, sufficiently disproved by the whole
life of the doughty old warrior. Carbajal did not insist further
on his own views, however, as he found them unwelcome to Pizarro,
and contented himself with coolly remarking, that "he had,
indeed, no relish for rebellion; but he had as long a neck for a
halter, he believed, as any of his companions; and as he could
hardly expect to live much longer, at any rate, it was, after
all, of little moment to him." *6

[Footnote 6: "Por lo demas, quado acaezca otra cosa, ya yo he
viuido muchos anos, y tengo tan bue palmo de pescueco para la
soga, como cada uno de vuesas mercedes." Ibid., loc. cit.]

Pizarro, spurred on by a fiery ambition that overleaped every
obstacle, *7 did not condescend to count the desperate chances of
a contest with the Crown. He threw his own weight into the scale
with Cepeda. The offer of grace was rejected; and he thus cast
away the last tie which held him to his country, and, by the act,
proclaimed himself a rebel. *8
[Footnote 7: "Loca y luciferina soberuia," as Fernandez
characterizes the aspiring temper of Gonzalo. Hist. del Peru,
Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 15.]
[Footnote 8: Ms. de Caravantes.

According to Garcilasso, Paniagua was furnished with secret
instructions by the president, empowering him, in case he judged
it necessary to the preservation of the royal authority, to
confirm Pizarro in the government, "it being little matter if the
Devil ruled there, provided the country remained to the Crown!"
The fact was so reported by Paniagua, who continued in Peru after
these events. (Com. Real., Parte 2, lib. 5, cap. 5.) This is
possible. But it is more probable that a credulous gossip, like
Garcilasso, should be in error, than that Charles the Fifth
should have been prepared to make such an acknowledgment of his
imbecility, or that the man selected for Gasca's confidence
should have so indiscreetly betrayed his trust.]

It was not long after the departure of Paniagua, that Pizarro
received tidings of the defection of Aldana and Hinojosa, and of
the surrender of the fleet, on which he had expended an immense
sum, as the chief bulwark of his power. This unwelcome
intelligence was followed by accounts of the further defection of
some of the principal towns in the north, and of the
assassination of Puelles, the faithful lieutenant to whom he had
confided the government of Quito. It was not very long, also,
before he found his authority assailed in the opposite quarter at
Cuzco; for Centeno, the loyal chieftain who, as the reader may
remember, had been driven by Carbajal to take refuge in a cave
near Arequipa, had issued from his concealment after remaining
there a year, and, on learning the arrival of Gasca, had again
raised the royal standard. Then collecting a small body of
followers, and falling on Cuzco by night, he made himself master
of that capital, defeated the garrison who held it, and secured
it for the Crown. Marching soon after into the province of
Charcas, the bold chief allied himself with the officer who
commanded for Pizarro in La Plata; and their combined forces, to
the number of a thousand, took up a position on the borders of
Lake Titicaca, where the two cavaliers coolly waited an
opportunity to take the field against their ancient commander.
Gonzalo Pizarro, touched to the heart by the desertion of those
in whom he most confided, was stunned by the dismal tidings of
his losses coming so thick upon him. Yet he did not waste his
time in idle crimination or complaint; but immediately set about
making preparations to meet the storm with all his characteristic
energy. He wrote, at once, to such of his captains as he
believed still faithful, commanding them to be ready with their
troops to march to his assistance at the shortest notice. He
reminded them of their obligations to him, and that their
interests were identical with his own. The president's
commission, he added, had been made out before the news had
reached Spain of the battle of Anaquito, and could never cover a
pardon to those concerned in the death of the viceroy. *9

[Footnote 9: Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Zarate, Conq.
del Peru, lib. 6, cap. 11, 13. - Fernandez, Hist. del Peru, Parte
1, lib. 2, cap. 45, 59. - Montesinos, Annales, Ms., ano 1547.]

Pizarro was equally active in enforcing his levies in the
capital, and in putting them in the best fighting order. He soon
saw himself at the head of a thousand men, beautifully equipped,
and complete in all their appointments; "as gallant an array,"
says an old writer, "though so small in number, as ever trod the
plains of Italy," - displaying in the excellence of their arms,
their gorgeous uniforms, and the caparisons of their horses, a
magnificence that could be furnished only by the silver of Peru.
*10 Each company was provided with a new stand of colors,
emblazoned with its peculiar device. Some bore the initials and
arms of Pizarro, and one or two of these were audaciously
surmounted by a crown, as if to intimate the rank to which their
commander might aspire. *11
[Footnote 10: "Mil Hombres tan bien armados i aderecados, como se
han visto en Italia, en la maior prosperidad, porque ninguno
havia, demas de las Armas, que no llevase Calcas, i Jubon de
Seda, i muchos de Tela de Oro, i de Brocado, i otros bordados, i
recamados de Oro, i Plata, con mucha Chaperia de Oro por los
Sombreros, i especialmente por Frascos, i Caxas de Arcubuces."
Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 6, cap. 11.]
[Footnote 11: Ibid., ubi supra.

Some writers even assert that Pizarro was preparing for his
coronation at this time, and that he had actually despatched his
summons to the different towns to send their deputies to assist
at it. "Queria spresurar su coronacion, y para ello despacho
cartas a todas las ciudades del Peru." (Montesinos, Annales, Ms.,
ano 1547.) But it is hardly probable he could have placed so
blind a confidence in the colonists at this crisis, as to have
meditated so rash a step. The loyal Castilian historians are not
slow to receive reports to the discredit of the rebel.]
Among the leaders most conspicuous on this occasion was Cepeda,
"who," in the words of a writer of his time, "had exchanged the
robe of the licentiate for the plumed casque and mailed harness
of the warrior." *12 But the cavalier to whom Pizarro confided
the chief care of organizing his battalions was the veteran
Carbajal, who had studied the art of war under the best captains
of Europe, and whose life of adventure had been a practical
commentary on their early lessons. It was on his arm that
Gonzalo most leaned in the hour of danger; and well had it been
for him, if he had profited by his counsels at an earlier period.
[Footnote 12: "El qual en este tiempo, oluidado de lo que
conuenia a sus letras, y profession, y officio de Oydor; salio en
calcas jubon, y cuera, de muchos recamados: y gorra con plumas."
Fernandez Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2 cap. 62.]

It gives one some idea of the luxurious accommodations of
Pizarro's forces, that he endeavoured to provide each of his
musketeers with a horse. The expenses incurred by him were
enormous. The immediate cost of his preparations, we are told,
was not less than half a million of pesos de oro; and his pay to
the cavaliers, and, indeed, to the common soldiers, in his little
army, was on an extravagant scale, nowhere to be met with but on
the silver soil of Peru. *13
[Footnote 13: Ibid., ubi supra. - Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 6,
cap. 11. - Herrera, Hist. General, dec. 8, lib. 3, cap. 5. -
Montesinos, Annales, ano 1547.]

When his own funds were exhausted, he supplied the deficiency by
fines imposed on the rich citizens of Lima as the price of
exemption from service, by forced loans, and various other
schemes of military exaction. *14 From this time, it is said, the
chieftain's temper underwent a visible change. *15 He became more
violent in his passions, more impatient of control, and indulged
more freely in acts of cruelty and license. The desperate cause
in which he was involved made him reckless of consequences.
Though naturally frank and confiding, the frequent defection of
his followers filled him with suspicion. He knew not in whom to
confide. Every one who showed himself indifferent to his cause,
or was suspected of being so, was dealt with as an open enemy.
The greatest distrust prevailed in Lima. No man dared confide in
his neighbour. Some concealed their effects; others contrived to
elude the vigilance of the sentinels, and hid themselves in the
neighbouring woods and mountains. *16 No one was allowed to enter
or leave the city without a license. All commerce, all
intercourse, with other places was cut off. It was long since
the fifths belonging to the Crown had been remitted to Castile;
as Pizarro had appropriated them to his own use. He now took
possession of the mints, broke up the royal stamps, and issued a
debased coin, emblazoned with his own cipher. *17 It was the most
decisive act of sovereignty.

[Footnote 14: Fernandez, Parte 1, lib. 2 cap. 62. - Montesinos,
Annales Ms., ano 1547.]

[Footnote 15: Gomara, Hist. de las Ind. cap. 172.]

[Footnote 16: "Andaba la Gente tan asombrada con el temor de la
muerte, que no se podian entender, ni tenian animo para huir, i
algunos, que hallaron mejor aparejo, se escondieron por los
Canaverales, i Cuevas, enterrando sus Haciendas." Zarate, Conq.
del Peru, lib. 6, cap. 15.]
[Footnote 17: Rel. Anonima, Ms. - Montesinos Annales, Ms., ano
1547. "Assi mismo echo Gozalo Picarro a toda la plata que gastaua
y destribuya su marca, que era una G. rebuelta en una P. y
pregono que so pena de muerte, todos recibiessen por plata fina
la que tuuiesse aquella marca: sin ensayo, ni otra diligencia
alguna. Y desta suerte hizo passar mucha plata de ley baja por
fina." Fernandez, Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 62.]

At this gloomy period, the lawyer Cepeda contrived a solemn
farce, the intent of which was to give a sort of legal sanction
to the rebel cause in the eyes of the populace. He caused a
process to be prepared against Gasca, Hinojosa, and Aldana, in
which they were accused of treason against the existing
government of Peru, were convicted, and condemned to death. This
instrument he submitted to a number of jurists in the capital,
requiring their signatures. But they had no mind thus inevitably
to implicate themselves, by affixing their names to such a paper;
and they evaded it by representing, that it would only serve to
cut off all chance, should any of the accused be so disposed, of
their again embracing the cause they had deserted. Cepeda was
the only man who signed the document. Carbajal treated the whole
thing with ridicule. "What is the object of your process?" said
he to Cepeda. "Its object," replied the latter, "is to prevent
delay, that, if taken at any time, the guilty party may be at
once led to execution." "I cry you mercy," retorted Carbajal; "I
thought there must be some virtue in the instrument, that would
have killed them outright. Let but one of these same traitors
fall into my hands, and I will march him off to execution,
without waiting for the sentence of a court, I promise you!" *18

[Footnote 18: "Riose mucho entonces Caruajal y dixo; que segu
auia hecho la instancia, que auia entendido, que la justicia como
rayo, auia de yr luego a justiciarlos. Y dezia que si el los
tuuiesse presos, no se le daria vn clauo por su sentecia, ni
firmas." (Ibid., Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 55.) Among the jurists in
Lima who thus independently resisted Cepeda's requisition to sign
the paper was the Licentiate Polo Ondegardo, a man of much
discretion, and one of the best authorities for the ancient
institutions of the Incas.]

While this paper war was going on, news was brought that Aldana's
squadron was off the port of Callao. That commander had sailed
from Panama, the middle of February, 1547. On his passage down
the coast he had landed at Truxillo, where the citizens welcomed
him with enthusiasm, and eagerly proclaimed their submission to
the royal authority. He received, at the same time, messages
from several of Pizarro's officers in the interior, intimating
their return to their duty, and their readiness to support the
president. Aldana named Caxamalca as a place of rendezvous,
where they should concentrate their forces, and wait the landing
of Gasca. He then continued his voyage towards Lima.
No sooner was Pizarro informed of his approach, than, fearful
lest it might have a disastrous effect in seducing his followers
from their fidelity, he marched them about a league out of the
city, and there encamped. He was two leagues from the coast, and
he posted a guard on the shore, to intercept all communication
with the vessels. Before leaving the capital, Cepeda resorted to
an expedient for securing the inhabitants more firmly, as he
conceived, in Pizarro's interests. He caused the citizens to be
assembled, and made them a studied harangue, in which he
expatiated on the services of their governor, and the security
which the country had enjoyed under his rule. He then told them
that every man was at liberty to choose for himself; to remain
under the protection of their present ruler, or, if they
preferred, to transfer their allegiance to his enemy. He invited
them to speak their minds, but required every one who would still
continue under Pizarro to take an oath of fidelity to his cause,
with the assurance, that, if any should be so false hereafter as
to violate this pledge, he should pay for it with his life. *19
There was no one found bold enough - with his head thus in the
lion's mouth - to swerve from his obedience to Pizarro; and every
man took the oath prescribed, which was administered in the most
solemn and imposing form by the licentiate. Carbajal, as usual,
made a jest of the whole proceeding. "How long," he asked his
companion, "do you think these same oaths will stand? The first
wind that blows off the coast after we are gone will scatter them
in air!" His prediction was soon verified.

[Footnote 19: Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Fernandez,
Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 61. - Montesinos, Annales,
Ms., ano 1547. - Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 6, cap. 11, 14.]

Meantime, Aldana anchored off the port, where there was no vessel
of the insurgents to molest him. By Cepeda's advice, some four
or five had been burnt a short time before, during the absence of
Carbajal, in order to cut off all means by which the inhabitants
could leave the place. This was deeply deplored by the veteran
soldier on his return. "It was destroying," he said, "the
guardian angels of Lima." *20 And certainly, under such a
commander, they might now have stood Pizarro in good stead but
his star was on the wane.