The History Of The Conquest Of Peru

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[Footnote 11: "La gente que estaua, de la vna parte y de la otra,
todos tirauan y trabajauan al poner, y apretar de las Criznejas:
sin que el Presidente ni Obispos, ni otra persona quisiesse tener
preuilegio para dexar de trabajar." Fernandez, Hist. del Peru,
Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 87.]
The passage of the river had been effected with less loss than
might have been expected, considering the darkness of the night,
and the numbers that crowded over the aerial causeway. Some few,
indeed, fell into the water, and were drowned; and more than
sixty horses, in the attempt to swim them across the river, were
hurried down the current, and dashed against the rocks below. *12
It still required time to bring up the heavy train of ordnance
and the military wagons; and the president encamped on the strong
ground which he now occupied, to await their arrival, and to
breathe his troops after their extraordinary efforts. In these
quarters we must leave him, to acquaint the reader with the state
of things in the insurgent army, and with the cause of its
strange remissness in guarding the passes of the Apurimac. *13

[Footnote 12: "Aquel dia pasaron mas de quatrocientos Hombres,
Ilevando los Caballos a nado, encima de illos atadas sus armas, i
arcabuces, caso que se perdieron mas de sesenta Caballos, que con
la corriente grande se desataron, i luego daban en vnas penas,
donde se hacian pedacos, sin darles lugar el impetu del rio, a
que pudiesen nadar." Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 7, cap. 5. -
Gomara, Hist. de las Indias, cap. 184.]
[Footnote 13: Ibid., ubi supra. - Fernandez Hist del Peru, Parte
1, lib. 2, cap. 87. - Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 7, cap. 5. -
Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Ms. de Caravantes. - Carta
de Valdivia, Ms. - Cieza de Leon, Cronica, cap. 91. - Relacion
del Lic. Gasca, Ms.]
From the time of Pizarro's occupation of Cuzco, he had lived in
careless luxury in the midst of his followers, like a soldier of
fortune in the hour of prosperity; enjoying the present, with as
little concern for the future as if the crown of Peru were
already fixed irrevocably upon his head. It was otherwise with
Carbajal. He looked on the victory at Huarina as the
commencement, not the close, of the struggle for empire; and he
was indefatigable in placing his troops in the best condition for
maintaining their present advantage. At the first streak of
dawn, the veteran might be seen mounted on his mule, with the
garb and air of a common soldier, riding about in the different
quarters of the capital, sometimes superintending the manufacture
of arms, or providing military stores, and sometimes drilling his
men, for he was most careful always to maintain the strictest
discipline. *14 His restless spirit seemed to find no pleasure
but in incessant action; living, as he had always done, in the
turmoil of military adventure, he had no relish for any thing
unconnected with war, and in the city saw only the materials for
a well-organized camp.

[Footnote 14: "Andaua siempre en vna mula crescida de color entre
pardo y bermejo, yo no le vi en otra caualgadura en todo el
tiempo que estuuo en el Cozco antes de la batalla de Sacsahuana.
Era tan contino y diligete en solicitar lo que a su exercito
conuenia, que a todas horas del dia y de la roche le topauan sus
soldados haziendo su oficio, y los agenos." Garcilasso, Com.
Real., Parte 1, lib. 5 cap. 27.]

With these feelings, he was much dissatisfied at the course taken
by his younger leader, who now professed his intention to abide
where he was, and, when the enemy advanced, to give him battle.
Carbajal advised a very different policy. He had not that full
confidence, it would seem, in the loyalty of Pizarro's partisans,
at least, not of those who had once followed the banner of
Centeno. These men some three hundred in number, had been in a
manner compelled to take service under Pizarro. They showed no
heartiness in the cause, and the veteran strongly urged his
commander to disband them at once; since it was far better to go
to battle with a few faithful followers than with a host of the
false and faint-hearted.
But Carbajal thought, also, that his leader was not sufficiently
strong in numbers to encounter his opponent, supported as he was
by the best captains of Peru. He advised, accordingly, that he
should abandon Cuzco, carrying off all the treasure, provisions,
and stores of every kind from the city, which might, in any way,
serve the necessities of the royalists. The latter, on their
arrival, disappointed by the poverty of a place where they had
expected to find so much booty, would become disgusted with the
service. Pizzaro, meanwhile, might take refuge with his men in
the neighbouring fastnesses, where, familiar with the ground, it
would be easy to elude the enemy; and if the latter persevered in
the pursuit, with numbers diminished by desertion, it would not
be difficult in the mountain passes to find an opportunity for
assailing him at advantage. - Such was the wary counsel of the
old warrior. But it was not to the taste of his fiery commander,
who preferred to risk the chances of a battle, rather than turn
his back on a foe.

Neither did Pizarro show more favor to a proposition, said to
have been made by the Licentiate Cepeda, - that he should avail
himself of his late success to enter into negotiations with
Gasca. Such advice, from the man who had so recently resisted
all overtures of the president, could only have proceeded from a
conviction, that the late victory placed Pizarro on a
vantage-ground for demanding terms far better than would have
been before conceded to him. It may be that subsequent
experience had also led him to distrust the fidelity of Gonzalo's
followers, or, possibly, the capacity of their chief to conduct
them through the present crisis. Whatever may have been the
motives of the slippery counsellor, Pizarro gave little heed to
the suggestion, and even showed some resentment, as the matter
was pressed on him. In every contest, with Indian or European,
whatever had been the odds, he had come off victorious. He was
not now for the first time to despond; and he resolved to remain
in Cuzco, and hazard all on the chances of a battle. There was
something in the hazard itself captivating to his bold and
chivalrous temper. In this, too, he was confirmed by some of the
cavaliers who had followed him through all his fortunes; reckless
young adventurers, who, like himself, would rather risk all on a
single throw of the dice, than adopt the cautious, and, as it
seemed to them, timid, policy of graver counsellors. It was by
such advisers, then, that Pizarro's future course was to be
shaped. *15

[Footnote 15: Garcilasso, Com. Real., Parte 2, lib. 5, cap. 27. -
Gomara, Hist. de las Indias, cap. 182. - Fernandez, Hist. del
Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 88.

"Finalmente, Goncalo Pizarro dixo que queria prouar su ventura:
pues siempre auia sido vencedor, y lamas vencido." Ibid., ubi
supra.]
Such was the state of affairs in Cuzco, when Pizarro's soldiers
returned with the tidings, that a detachment of the enemy had
crossed the Apurimac, and were busy in reestablishing the bridge.
Carbajal saw at once the absolute necessity of maintaining this
pass. "It is my affair," he said; "I claim to be employed on
this service. Give me but a hundred picked men, and I will
engage to defend the pass against an army, and bring back the
chaplain - the name by which the president was known in the rebel
camp - a prisoner to Cuzco." *16 "I cannot spare you, father,"
said Gonzalo, addressing him by this affectionate epithet, which
he usually applied to his aged follower, *17 "I cannot spare you
so far from my own person"; and he gave the commission to Juan de
Acosta, a young cavalier warmly attached to his commander, and
who had given undoubted evidence of his valor on more than one
occasion, but who, as the event proved, was signally deficient in
the qualities demanded for so critical an undertaking as the
present. Acosta, accordingly, was placed at the head of two
hundred mounted musketeers, and, after much wholesome counsel
from Carbajal, set out on his expedition.

[Footnote 16: "Paresceme vuestra Senoria se vaya a la vuelta del
Collao y me deje cien hombres, los que yo escojiere, que yo me
ire a vista deste capellan, que ansi llamaba el al presidente."
Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms.]

[Footnote 17: Garcilasso, Com. Real., Parte 2, lib. 5, cap. 31]
But he soon forgot the veteran's advice, and moved at so dull a
pace over the difficult roads, that, although the distance was
not more than nine leagues, he found, on his arrival, the bridge
completed, and so large a body of the enemy already crossed, that
he was in no strength to attack them. Acosta did, indeed,
meditate an ambuscade by night; but the design was betrayed by a
deserter, and he contented himself with retreating to a safe
distance, and sending for a further reinforcement from Cuzco.
Three hundred men were promptly detached to his support; but when
they arrived, the enemy was already planted in full force on the
crest of the eminence. The golden opportunity was irrecoverably
lost; and the disconsolate cavalier rode back in all haste to
report the failure of his enterprise to his commander in Cuzco.
*18

[Footnote 18: Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Fernandez,
Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 88.

Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 7, cap. 5. - Carta de Valdivia, Ms.
Valdivia's letter to the emperor, dated at Concepcion, was
written about two years after the events above recorded. It is
chiefly taken up with his Chilian conquests, to which his
campaign under Gasca, on his visit to Peru, forms a kind of
brilliant episode. This letter, the original of which is
preserved in Simancas, covers about seventy folio pages in the
copy belonging to me. It is one of that class of historical
documents, consisting of the despatches and correspondence of the
colonial governors, which, from the minuteness of the details and
the means of information possessed by the writers, are of the
highest worth. The despatches addressed to the Court,
particularly, may compare with the celebrated Relazioni made by
the Venetian ambassadors to their republic, and now happily in
the course of publication, at Florence, under the editorial
auspices of the learned Alberi.]

Chapter III

Dismay In Gasca's Camp. - His Winter Quarters. - Resumes His
March. - Crosses The Apurimac. - Pizarro's Conduct In Cuzco. - He
Encamps Near The City. - Rout Of Xaquixa Guana.

1547-1548.

While the events recorded in the preceding chapter were passing,
President Gasca had remained at Xauxa, awaiting further tidings
from Centeno, little doubting that they would inform him of the
total discomfiture of the rebels. Great was his dismay,
therefore, on learning the issue of the fatal conflict at
Huarina, - that the royalists had been scattered far and wide
before the sword of Pizarro, while their commander had vanished
like an apparition, *1 leaving the greatest uncertainty as to his
fate.

[Footnote 1: "Y salio a la Ciudad de los Reyes, sin que Carbajal,
ni alguno de los suyos supiesse por donde fue, sino que parecio
encantamiento." Garcilasso, Com. Real. Parte 2, lib. 5, cap. 22.]
The intelligence spread general consternation among the soldiers,
proportioned to their former confidence; and they felt it was
almost hopeless to contend with a man who seemed protected by a
charm that made him invincible against the greatest odds. The
president, however sore his disappointment, was careful to
conceal it, while he endeavoured to restore the spirits of his
followers. "They had been too sanguine," he said, "and it was in
this way that Heaven rebuked their presumption. Yet it was but
in the usual course of events, that Providence, when it designed
to humble the guilty, should allow him to reach as high an
elevation as possible, that his fall might be the greater!"

But while Gasca thus strove to reassure the superstitious and the
timid, he bent his mind, with his usual energy, to repair the
injury which the cause had sustained by the defeat at Huarina.
He sent a detachment under Alvarado to Lima, to collect such of
the royalists as had fled thither from the field of battle, and
to dismantle the ships of their cannon, and bring them to the
camp. Another body was sent to Guamanga, about sixty leagues
from Cuzco, for the similar purpose of protecting the fugitives,
and also of preventing the Indian caciques from forwarding
supplies to the insurgent army in Cuzco. As his own forces now
amounted to considerably more than any his opponent could bring
against him, Gasca determined to break up his camp without
further delay, and march on the Inca capital *2

[Footnote 2: Gasca, according to Ondegardo, supported his army,
during his stay at Xauxa, from the Peruvian granaries in the
valley, as he found a quantity of maize still remaining in them
sufficient for several years' consumption. It is passing strange
that these depositaries should have been so long respected by the
hungry Conquerors. - "Cuando el Senor Presidente Gasca passo con
la gente de castigo de Gonzalo Pizarro por el Valle de Jauja,
estuvo alli siete semanas a lo que me acuerdo, se hallaron en
deposito maiz de cuatro y de tres y de dos anos mas de 15,000
hanegas junto al camino, e alli comio la gente." Ondegardo, Rel.
Seg., Ms.]
Quitting Xauxa, December 29, 1547, he passed through Guamanga,
and after a severe march, rendered particularly fatiguing by the
inclement state of the weather and the badness of the roads, he
entered the province of Andaguaylas. It was a fair and fruitful
country, and since the road beyond would take him into the depths
of a gloomy sierra, scarcely passable in the winter snows, Gasca
resolved to remain in his present quarters until the severity of
the season was mitigated. As many of the troops had already
contracted diseases from exposure to the incessant rains, he
established a camp hospital; and the good president personally
visited the quarters of the sick, ministering to their wants, and
winning their hearts by his sympathy. *3

[Footnote 3: Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 7, cap. 4. - Fernandez,
Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 82-85. - Pedro Pizarro,
Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Cieza de Leon, cap. 90]

Meanwhile, the royal camp was strengthened by the continual
arrival of reinforcements; for notwithstanding the shock that was
caused throughout the country by the first tidings of Pizarro's
victory, a little reflection convinced the people that the right
was the strongest, and must eventually prevail. There came,
also, with these levies, several of the most distinguished
captains in the country. Centeno, burning to retrieve his late
disgrace, after recovering from his illness, joined the camp with
his followers from Lima. Benalcazar, the conqueror of Quito,
who, as the reader will remember, had shared in the defeat of
Blasco Nunez in the north, came with another detachment; and was
soon after followed by Valdivia, the famous conqueror of Chili,
who, having returned to Peru to gather recruits for his
expedition, had learned the state of the country, and had thrown
himself, without hesitation, into the same scale with the
president, though it brought him into collision with his old
friend and comrade, Gonzalo Pizarro. The arrival of this last
ally was greeted with general rejoicing by the camp; for
Valdivia, schooled in the Italian wars, was esteemed the most
accomplished soldier in Peru; and Gasca complimented him by
declaring "he would rather see him than a reinforcement of eight
hundred men!" *4

[Footnote 4: At least, so says Valdivia in his letter to the
emperor. "I dixo publico que estimara mas mi persona que a los
mejores ochocientos hombres de guerra que l pudieran venir
aquella hora." Carta de Valdivia, Ms.]

Besides these warlike auxiliaries, the president was attended by
a train of ecclesiastics and civilians, such as was rarely found
in the martial fields of Peru. Among them were the bishops of
Quito, Cuzco, and Lima, the four judges of the new Audience, and
a considerable number of churchmen and monkish missionaries. *5
However little they might serve to strengthen his arm in battle,
their presence gave authority and something of a sacred character
to the cause, which had their effect on the minds of the
soldiers.

[Footnote 5: Zarate, Ms.]

The wintry season now began to give way before the mild influence
of spring, which makes itself early felt in these tropical, but
from their elevation temperate, regions; and Gasca, after nearly
three months' detention in Andaguaylas, mustered his levies for
the final march upon Cuzco. *6 Their whole number fell little
short of two thousand, - the largest European force yet assembled
in Peru. Nearly half were provided with fire-arms; and infantry
was more available than horse in the mountain countries which
they were to traverse. But his cavalry was also numerous, and he
carried with him a train of eleven heavy guns. The equipment and
discipline of the troops were good; they were well provided with
ammunition and military stores; and were led by officers whose
names were associated with the most memorable achievements in the
New World. All who had any real interest in the weal of the
country were to be found, in short, under the president's banner,
making a striking contrast to the wild and reckless adventurers
who now swelled the ranks of Pizarro.
[Footnote 6: Cieza de Leon, Cronica, cap. 90.

The old chronicler, or rather geographer, Cieza de Leon, was
present in the campaign, he tells us; so that his testimony,
always good, becomes for the remaining events of more than usual
value]

Gasca, who did not affect a greater knowledge of military affairs
than he really possessed, had given the charge of his forces to
Hinojosa, naming the Marshal Alvarado as second in command.
Valdivia, who came after these dispositions had been made,
accepted a colonel's commission, with the understanding that he
was to be consulted and employed in all matters of moment. *7 -
Having completed his arrangements, the president broke up his
camp in March, 1548, and moved upon Cuzco.

[Footnote 7: Valdivia, indeed, claims to have had the whole
command intrusted to him by Gasca "Luego me dio el autoridad toda
que traia de parte de V. M. para en los casos ocantes a la
guerra, i me encargo todo el exercito, i le puso baxo de mi mano
rogando i pidiendo por merced de su parte a todos aquellos
caballeros capitanes e gente de guerra, i de la de V. M.
mandandoles me obedesciesen en todo lo que les mandase acerca de
la guerra, i cumpliesen mis mandamientos como los suyos." (Carta
de Valdivia, Ms.) But other authorities state it, with more
probability, as given in the text. Valdivia, it must be
confessed, loses nothing from modesty. The whole of his letter to
the emperor is written in a strain of self-glorification, rarely
matched even by a Castilian hidalgo.]
The first obstacle to his progress was the river Abancay, the
bridge over which had been broken down by the enemy. But as
there was no force to annoy them on the opposite bank, the army
was not long in preparing a new bridge, and throwing it across
the stream, which in this place had nothing formidable in its
character. The road now struck into the heart of a mountain
region, where woods, precipices, and ravines were mingled
together in a sort of chaotic confusion, with here and there a
green and sheltered valley, glittering like an island of verdure
amidst the wild breakers of a troubled ocean! The bold peaks of
the Andes, rising far above the clouds, were enveloped in snow,
which descending far down their sides, gave a piercing coldness
to the winds that swept over their surface, until men and horses
were benumbed and stiffened under their influence. The roads, in
these regions, were in some places so narrow and broken, as to be
nearly impracticable for cavalry. The cavaliers were compelled
to dismount; and the president, with the rest, performed the
journey on foot, so hazardous, that, even in later times, it has
been no uncommon thing for the sure-footed mule to be
precipitated, with its cargo of silver, thousands of feet down
the sheer sides of a precipice. *8
[Footnote 8: Cieza de Leon, Cronica, cap. 91.]

By these impediments of the ground, the march was so retarded,
that the troops seldom accomplished more than two leagues a day.
*9 Fortunately, the distance was not great; and the president
looked with more apprehension to the passage of the Apurimac,
which he was now approaching. This river, one of the most
formidable tributaries of the Amazon, rolls its broad waters
through the gorges of the Cordilleras, that rise up like an
immense rampart of rock on either side, presenting a natural
barrier which it would be easy for an enemy to make good against
a force much superior to his own. The bridges over this river,
as Gasca learned before his departure from Andaguaylas, had been
all destroyed by Pizarro. The president, accordingly, had sent
to explore the banks of the stream, and determine the most
eligible spot for reestablishing communications with the opposite
side.

[Footnote 9: Ms. de Caravantes 2 L 2]

The place selected was near the Indian village of Cotapampa,
about nine leagues from Cuzco; for the river, though rapid and
turbulent from being compressed within more narrow limits, was
here less than two hundred paces in width; a distance, however,
not inconsiderable. Directions had been given to collect
materials in large quantities in the neighbourhood of this spot
as soon as possible; and at the same time, in order to perplex
the enemy and compel him to divide his forces, should he be
disposed to resist, materials in smaller quantities were
assembled on three other points of the river. The officer
stationed in the neighbourhood of Cotapampa was instructed not to
begin to lay the bridge, till the arrival of a sufficient force
should accelerate the work, and insure its success.

The structure in question, it should be remembered, was one of
those suspension bridges formerly employed by the Incas, and
still used in crossing the deep and turbulent rivers of South
America. They are made of osier withes, twisted into enormous
cables, which, when stretched across the water, are attached to
heavy blocks of masonry, or, where it will serve, to the natural
rock. Planks are laid transversely across these cables, and a
passage is thus secured, which, notwithstanding the light and
fragile appearance of the bridge, as it swings at an elevation
sometimes of several hundred feet above the abyss, affords a
tolerably safe means of conveyance for men, and even for such
heavy burdens as artillery. *10

[Footnote 10: Fernandez, Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap.
86, 87. - Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 7, cap. 5. - Pedro
Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Ms. de Caravantes. - Carta de
Valdivia, Ms. - Relacion del Lic. Gasca, Ms.]

Notwithstanding the peremptory commands of Gasca, the officer
intrusted with collecting the materials for the bridge was so
anxious to have the honor of completing the work himself, that he
commenced it at once. The president, greatly displeased at
learning this, quickened his march, in order to cover the work
with his whole force. But, while toiling through the mountain
labyrinth, tidings were brought him that a party of the enemy had
demolished the small portion of the bridge already made, by
cutting the cables on the opposite bank. Valdivia, accordingly,
hastened forward at the head of two hundred arquebusiers, while
the main body of the army followed with as much speed as
practicable.
That officer, on reaching the spot, found that the interruption
had been caused by a small party of Pizarro's followers, not
exceeding twenty in number assisted by a stronger body of
Indians. He at once caused balsas, broad and clumsy barks, or
rather rafts, of the country, to be provided, and by this means
passed his men over, without opposition to the other side of the
river. The enemy, disconcerted by the arrival of such a force,
retreated and made the best of their way to report the affair to
their commander at Cuzco. Meanwhile, Valdivia, who saw the
importance of every moment in the present crisis, pushed forward
the work with the greatest vigor. Through all that night his
weary troops continued the labor, which was already well
advanced, when the president and his battalions, emerging from
the passes of the Cordilleras, presented themselves at sunrise on
the opposite bank.

Little time was given for repose, as all felt assured that the
success of their enterprise hung on the short respite now given
them by the improvident enemy. The president, with his principal
officers, took part in the labor with the common soldiers; *11
and before ten o'clock in the evening, Gasca had the satisfaction
to see the bridge so well secured, that the leading files of the
army, unencumbered by their baggage, might venture to cross it.
A short time sufficed to place several hundred men on the other
bank. But here a new difficulty, not less formidable than that
of the river, presented itself to the troops. The ground rose up
with an abrupt, almost precipitous, swell from the river-side,
till, in the highest peaks, it reached an elevation of several
thousand feet. This steep ascent, though not to its full height,
indeed, was now to be surmounted. The difficulties of the
ground, broken up into fearful chasms and water-courses, and
tangled with thickets, were greatly increased by the darkness of
the night; and the soldiers, as they toiled slowly upward, were
filled with apprehension, akin to fear, from the uncertainty
whether each successive step might not bring them into an
ambuscade, for which the ground was so favorable. More than
once, the Spaniards were thrown into a panic by false reports
that the enemy were upon them. But Hinojosa and Valdivia were at
hand to rally their men, and cheer them on, until, at length,
before dawn broke, the bold cavaliers and their followers placed
themselves on the highest point traversed by the road, where they
waited the arrival of the president. This was not long delayed;
and in the course of the following morning, the royalists were
already in sufficient strength to bid defiance to their enemy.