The History Of The Conquest Of Peru

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[Footnote 11: "La gente que estaua, de la vna parte y de la otra,
todos tirauan y trabajauan al poner, y apretar de las Criznejas:
sin que el Presidente ni Obispos, ni otra persona quisiesse tener
preuilegio para dexar de trabajar." Fernandez, Hist. del Peru,
Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 87.]
The passage of the river had been effected with less loss than
might have been expected, considering the darkness of the night,
and the numbers that crowded over the aerial causeway. Some few,
indeed, fell into the water, and were drowned; and more than
sixty horses, in the attempt to swim them across the river, were
hurried down the current, and dashed against the rocks below. *12
It still required time to bring up the heavy train of ordnance
and the military wagons; and the president encamped on the strong
ground which he now occupied, to await their arrival, and to
breathe his troops after their extraordinary efforts. In these
quarters we must leave him, to acquaint the reader with the state
of things in the insurgent army, and with the cause of its
strange remissness in guarding the passes of the Apurimac. *13

[Footnote 12: "Aquel dia pasaron mas de quatrocientos Hombres,
Ilevando los Caballos a nado, encima de illos atadas sus armas, i
arcabuces, caso que se perdieron mas de sesenta Caballos, que con
la corriente grande se desataron, i luego daban en vnas penas,
donde se hacian pedacos, sin darles lugar el impetu del rio, a
que pudiesen nadar." Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 7, cap. 5. -
Gomara, Hist. de las Indias, cap. 184.]
[Footnote 13: Ibid., ubi supra. - Fernandez Hist del Peru, Parte
1, lib. 2, cap. 87. - Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 7, cap. 5. -
Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Ms. de Caravantes. - Carta
de Valdivia, Ms. - Cieza de Leon, Cronica, cap. 91. - Relacion
del Lic. Gasca, Ms.]
From the time of Pizarro's occupation of Cuzco, he had lived in
careless luxury in the midst of his followers, like a soldier of
fortune in the hour of prosperity; enjoying the present, with as
little concern for the future as if the crown of Peru were
already fixed irrevocably upon his head. It was otherwise with
Carbajal. He looked on the victory at Huarina as the
commencement, not the close, of the struggle for empire; and he
was indefatigable in placing his troops in the best condition for
maintaining their present advantage. At the first streak of
dawn, the veteran might be seen mounted on his mule, with the
garb and air of a common soldier, riding about in the different
quarters of the capital, sometimes superintending the manufacture
of arms, or providing military stores, and sometimes drilling his
men, for he was most careful always to maintain the strictest
discipline. *14 His restless spirit seemed to find no pleasure
but in incessant action; living, as he had always done, in the
turmoil of military adventure, he had no relish for any thing
unconnected with war, and in the city saw only the materials for
a well-organized camp.

[Footnote 14: "Andaua siempre en vna mula crescida de color entre
pardo y bermejo, yo no le vi en otra caualgadura en todo el
tiempo que estuuo en el Cozco antes de la batalla de Sacsahuana.
Era tan contino y diligete en solicitar lo que a su exercito
conuenia, que a todas horas del dia y de la roche le topauan sus
soldados haziendo su oficio, y los agenos." Garcilasso, Com.
Real., Parte 1, lib. 5 cap. 27.]

With these feelings, he was much dissatisfied at the course taken
by his younger leader, who now professed his intention to abide
where he was, and, when the enemy advanced, to give him battle.
Carbajal advised a very different policy. He had not that full
confidence, it would seem, in the loyalty of Pizarro's partisans,
at least, not of those who had once followed the banner of
Centeno. These men some three hundred in number, had been in a
manner compelled to take service under Pizarro. They showed no
heartiness in the cause, and the veteran strongly urged his
commander to disband them at once; since it was far better to go
to battle with a few faithful followers than with a host of the
false and faint-hearted.
But Carbajal thought, also, that his leader was not sufficiently
strong in numbers to encounter his opponent, supported as he was
by the best captains of Peru. He advised, accordingly, that he
should abandon Cuzco, carrying off all the treasure, provisions,
and stores of every kind from the city, which might, in any way,
serve the necessities of the royalists. The latter, on their
arrival, disappointed by the poverty of a place where they had
expected to find so much booty, would become disgusted with the
service. Pizzaro, meanwhile, might take refuge with his men in
the neighbouring fastnesses, where, familiar with the ground, it
would be easy to elude the enemy; and if the latter persevered in
the pursuit, with numbers diminished by desertion, it would not
be difficult in the mountain passes to find an opportunity for
assailing him at advantage. - Such was the wary counsel of the
old warrior. But it was not to the taste of his fiery commander,
who preferred to risk the chances of a battle, rather than turn
his back on a foe.

Neither did Pizarro show more favor to a proposition, said to
have been made by the Licentiate Cepeda, - that he should avail
himself of his late success to enter into negotiations with
Gasca. Such advice, from the man who had so recently resisted
all overtures of the president, could only have proceeded from a
conviction, that the late victory placed Pizarro on a
vantage-ground for demanding terms far better than would have
been before conceded to him. It may be that subsequent
experience had also led him to distrust the fidelity of Gonzalo's
followers, or, possibly, the capacity of their chief to conduct
them through the present crisis. Whatever may have been the
motives of the slippery counsellor, Pizarro gave little heed to
the suggestion, and even showed some resentment, as the matter
was pressed on him. In every contest, with Indian or European,
whatever had been the odds, he had come off victorious. He was
not now for the first time to despond; and he resolved to remain
in Cuzco, and hazard all on the chances of a battle. There was
something in the hazard itself captivating to his bold and
chivalrous temper. In this, too, he was confirmed by some of the
cavaliers who had followed him through all his fortunes; reckless
young adventurers, who, like himself, would rather risk all on a
single throw of the dice, than adopt the cautious, and, as it
seemed to them, timid, policy of graver counsellors. It was by
such advisers, then, that Pizarro's future course was to be
shaped. *15

[Footnote 15: Garcilasso, Com. Real., Parte 2, lib. 5, cap. 27. -
Gomara, Hist. de las Indias, cap. 182. - Fernandez, Hist. del
Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 88.

"Finalmente, Goncalo Pizarro dixo que queria prouar su ventura:
pues siempre auia sido vencedor, y lamas vencido." Ibid., ubi
supra.]
Such was the state of affairs in Cuzco, when Pizarro's soldiers
returned with the tidings, that a detachment of the enemy had
crossed the Apurimac, and were busy in reestablishing the bridge.
Carbajal saw at once the absolute necessity of maintaining this
pass. "It is my affair," he said; "I claim to be employed on
this service. Give me but a hundred picked men, and I will
engage to defend the pass against an army, and bring back the
chaplain - the name by which the president was known in the rebel
camp - a prisoner to Cuzco." *16 "I cannot spare you, father,"
said Gonzalo, addressing him by this affectionate epithet, which
he usually applied to his aged follower, *17 "I cannot spare you
so far from my own person"; and he gave the commission to Juan de
Acosta, a young cavalier warmly attached to his commander, and
who had given undoubted evidence of his valor on more than one
occasion, but who, as the event proved, was signally deficient in
the qualities demanded for so critical an undertaking as the
present. Acosta, accordingly, was placed at the head of two
hundred mounted musketeers, and, after much wholesome counsel
from Carbajal, set out on his expedition.

[Footnote 16: "Paresceme vuestra Senoria se vaya a la vuelta del
Collao y me deje cien hombres, los que yo escojiere, que yo me
ire a vista deste capellan, que ansi llamaba el al presidente."
Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms.]

[Footnote 17: Garcilasso, Com. Real., Parte 2, lib. 5, cap. 31]
But he soon forgot the veteran's advice, and moved at so dull a
pace over the difficult roads, that, although the distance was
not more than nine leagues, he found, on his arrival, the bridge
completed, and so large a body of the enemy already crossed, that
he was in no strength to attack them. Acosta did, indeed,
meditate an ambuscade by night; but the design was betrayed by a
deserter, and he contented himself with retreating to a safe
distance, and sending for a further reinforcement from Cuzco.
Three hundred men were promptly detached to his support; but when
they arrived, the enemy was already planted in full force on the
crest of the eminence. The golden opportunity was irrecoverably
lost; and the disconsolate cavalier rode back in all haste to
report the failure of his enterprise to his commander in Cuzco.
*18

[Footnote 18: Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. - Fernandez,
Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 88.

Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 7, cap. 5. - Carta de Valdivia, Ms.
Valdivia's letter to the emperor, dated at Concepcion, was
written about two years after the events above recorded. It is
chiefly taken up with his Chilian conquests, to which his
campaign under Gasca, on his visit to Peru, forms a kind of
brilliant episode. This letter, the original of which is
preserved in Simancas, covers about seventy folio pages in the
copy belonging to me. It is one of that class of historical
documents, consisting of the despatches and correspondence of the
colonial governors, which, from the minuteness of the details and
the means of information possessed by the writers, are of the
highest worth. The despatches addressed to the Court,
particularly, may compare with the celebrated Relazioni made by
the Venetian ambassadors to their republic, and now happily in
the course of publication, at Florence, under the editorial
auspices of the learned Alberi.]

The only question now to be decided was as to the spot where
Gonzalo Pizarro should give battle to his enemies. He determined
at once to abandon the capital, and wait for his opponents in the
neighbouring valley of Xaquixaguana. It was about five leagues
distant, and the reader may remember it as the place where
Francis Pizarro burned the Peruvian general Challcuchima, on his
first occupation of Cuzco. The valley, fenced round by the lofty
rampart of the Andes, was, for the most part, green and
luxuriant, affording many picturesque points of view; and, from
the genial temperature of the climate, had been a favorite summer
residence of the Indian nobles, many of whose pleasure-houses
still dotted the sides of the mountains. A river, or rather
stream, of no great volume, flowed through one end of this
inclosure, and the neighbouring soil was so wet and miry as to
have the character of a morass.

Here the rebel commander arrived, after a tedious march over
roads not easily traversed by his train of heavy wagons and
artillery. His forces amounted in all to about nine hundred men,
with some half-dozen pieces of ordnance. It was a well-appointed
body, and under excellent discipline, for it had been schooled by
the strictest martinet in the Peruvian service. But it was the
misfortune of Pizarro that his army was composed, in part, at
least, of men on whose attachment to his cause he could not
confidently rely. This was a deficiency which no courage nor
skill in the leader could supply.

On entering the valley, Pizarro selected the eastern quarter of
it, towards Cuzco, as the most favorable spot for his encampment.
It was crossed by the stream above mentioned, and he stationed
his army in such a manner, that, while one extremity of the camp
rested on a natural barrier formed by the mountain cliffs that
here rose up almost perpendicularly, the other was protected by
the river. While it was scarcely possible, therefore, to assail
his flanks, the approaches in front were so extremely narrowed by
these obstacles, that it would not be easy to overpower him by
numbers in that direction. In the rear, his communications
remained open with Cuzco, furnishing a ready means for obtaining
supplies. Having secured this strong position, he resolved
patiently to wait the assault of the enemy. *19

[Footnote 19: Carta de Valdivia, Ms. - Garcilasso, Com. Real.,
Parte 2, lib. 5, cap. 33, 34. - Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq.,
Ms. - Gomara, Hist. de las Indias, cap. 185. - Fernandez, Hist.
del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 88.]

Meanwhile, the royal army had been toiling up the steep sides of
the Cordilleras, until, at the close of the third day, the
president had the satisfaction to find himself surrounded by his
whole force, with their guns and military stores. Having now
sufficiently refreshed his men, he resumed his march, and all
went forward with the buoyant confidence of bringing their
quarrel with the tyrant, as Pizarro was called, to a speedy
issue.

Their advance was slow, as in the previous part of the march, for
the ground was equally embarrassing. It was not long, however,
before the president learned that his antagonist had pitched his
camp in the neighbouring valley of Xaquixaguana. Soon afterward,
two friars, sent by Gonzalo himself, appeared in the army, for
the ostensible purpose of demanding a sight of the powers with
which Gasca was intrusted. But as their conduct gave reason to
suspect they were spies, the president caused the holy men to be
seized, and refused to allow them to return to Pizarro. By an
emissary of his own, whom he despatched to the rebel chief, he
renewed the assurance of pardon already given him, in case he
would lay down his arms and submit. Such an act of generosity,
at this late hour, must be allowed to be highly creditable to
Gasca, believing, as he probably did, that the game was in his
own hands. - It is a pity that the anecdote does not rest on the
best authority. *20
[Footnote 20: The fact is not mentioned by any of the parties
present at these transactions. It is to be found, with some
little discrepancy of circumstances, in Gomara (Hist. de las
Indias, cap. 185) and Zarate (Conq. del Peru, lib. 7, cap. 6);
and their positive testimony maybe thought by most readers to
outweigh the negative afforded by the silence of other
contemporaries.]

After a march of a couple of days, the advanced guard of the
royalists came suddenly on the outposts of the insurgents, from
whom they had been concealed by a thick mist, and a slight
skirmish took place between them. At length, on the morning of
the eighth of April, the royal army, turning the crest of the
lofty range that belts round the lovely valley of Xaquixaguana,
beheld far below on the opposite side the glittering lines of the
enemy, with their white pavilions, looking like clusters of wild
fowl nestling among the cliffs of the mountains. And still
further off might be descried a host of Indian warriors, showing
gaudily in their variegated costumes; for the natives, in this
part of the country, with little perception of their true
interests, manifested great zeal in the cause of Pizarro.

Quickening their step, the royal army now hastily descended the
steep sides of the sierra; and notwithstanding every effort of
their officers, they moved in so little order, each man picking
his way as he could, that the straggling column presented many a
vulnerable point to the enemy; and the descent would not have
been accomplished without considerable loss, had Pizarro's cannon
been planted on any of the favorable positions which the ground
afforded. But that commander, far from attempting to check the
president's approach, remained doggedly in the strong position he
had occupied, with the full confidence that his adversaries would
not hesitate to assail it, strong as it was, in the same manner
as they had done at Huarina. *21

[Footnote 21: "Salio a Xaquixaguana con toda su gente y alli nos
aguardo en un llano junto a un cerro alto por donde bajabamos; y
cierto nuestro Senor le cego el entendimiento, porque si nos
aguardaran al pie de la bajada, hicieran mucho dano a nosotros.
Retiraronse a un llano junto a una cienaga, creyendo que nuestro
campo alli les acometiera y con la ventaja que nos tenian del
puesto nos vencieran." Pedro Pizarro, Descub. y Conq., Ms. -
Carta de Valdivia, Ms. - Relacion del Lic. Gasca, Ms.]
Yet he did not omit to detach a corps of arquebusiers to secure a
neighbouring eminence or spur of the Cordilleras, which in the
hands of the enemy might cause some annoyance to his own camp,
while it commanded still more effectually the ground soon to be
occupied by the assailants. But his manoeuvre was noticed by
Hinojosa; and he defeated it by sending a stronger detachment of
the royal musketeers, who repulsed the rebels, and, after a short
skirmish, got possession of the heights. Gasca's general
profited by this success to plant a small battery of cannon on
the eminence, from which, although the distance was too great for
him to do much execution, he threw some shot into the hostile
camp. One ball, indeed, struck down two men, one of them
Pizarro's page, killing a horse, at the same time, which he held
by the bridle; and the chief instantly ordered the tents to be
struck, considering that they afforded too obvious a mark for the
artillery. *22

[Footnote 22: "Porq. muchas pelotas dieron en medio de la gente,
y una dellas mato juto a Goncalo Pizarro vn criado suyo que se
estaua armando; y mato otro hombre y vn cauallo; que puso grande
alteracion en el campo, y abatieron todas las tiedas y toldos."
Fernandez, Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 89. - Carta de
Valdivia, Ms. - Relacion del Lic. Gasca. Ms]
Meanwhile, the president's forces had descended into the valley,
and as they came on the plain were formed into line by their
officers. The ground occupied by the army was somewhat lower
than that of their enemy, whose shot, as discharged, from time to
time, from his batteries, passed over their heads. Information
was now brought by a deserter, one of Centeno's old followers,
that Pizarro was getting ready for a night attack. The
president, in consequence, commanded his whole force to be drawn
up in battle array, prepared, at any instant, to repulse the
assault. But if such were meditated by the insurgent chief, he
abandoned it, - and, as it is said, from a distrust of the
fidelity of some of the troops, who, under cover of the darkness,
he feared, would go over to the opposite side. If this be true,
he must have felt the full force of Carbajal's admonition, when
too late to profit by it. The unfortunate commander was in the
situation of some bold, high-mettled cavalier, rushing to battle
on a war-horse whose tottering joints threaten to give way under
him at every step, and leave his rider to the mercy of his
enemies!

The president's troops stood to their arms the greater part of
the night, although the air from the mountains was so keen, that
it was with difficulty they could hold their lances in their
hands. *23 But before the rising sun had kindled into a glow the
highest peaks of the sierra, both camps were in motion, and
busily engaged in preparations for the combat. The royal army was
formed into two battalions of infantry, one to attack the enemy
in front, and the other, if possible, to operate on his flank.
These battalions were protected by squadrons of horse on the
wings and in the rear, while reserves both of horse and
arquebusiers were stationed to act as occasion might require.
The dispositions were made in so masterly a manner, as to draw
forth a hearty eulogium from old Carbajal, who exclaimed, "Surely
the Devil or Valdivia must be among them!" and undeniable
compliment to the latter, since the speaker was ignorant of that
commander's presence in the camp. *24

[Footnote 23: "I asi estuvo el Campo toda la Noche en Arma,
desarmadas las Tiendas, padesciendo mui gran frio que no podian
tener las Lancas en las manos." Zarate, Conq. de Peru, lib. 7,
cap. 6.]

[Footnote 24: "Y assi quando vio Francisco de Caruajal el campo
Real; pareciendole que los esquadrones venian bie ordenados dixo,
Valdiuia esta en la tierra, y rige el campo, o el diablo."
Fernandez, Hist. del Peru, Parte 1, lib. 2, cap. 89. - Relacion
del Lic. Gasca, Ms - Carta de Valdivia, Ms. - Gomara, Hist. de
las Indias, cap. 185. - Zarate, Conq. del Peru, lib. 7, cap. 6. -
Garcilasso, Com. Real., Parte 2, lib. 5, cap. 34. - Pedro Pizarro
Descub. y Conq., Ms.]

Gasca, leaving the conduct of the battle to his officers,
withdrew to the rear with his train of clergy and licentiates,
the last of whom did not share in the ambition of their rebel
brother, Cepeda, to break a lance in the field.

Gonzalo Pizarro formed his squadron in the same manner as he had
done on the plains of Huarina; except that the increased number
of his horse now enabled him to cover both flanks of his
infantry. It was still on his fire-arms, however, that he
chiefly relied. As the ranks were formed, he rode among them,
encouraging his men to do their duty like brave cavaliers, and
true soldiers of the Conquest. Pizarro was superbly armed, as
usual, and wore a complete suit of mail, of the finest
manufacture, which, as well as his helmet, was richly inlaid with
gold. *25 He rode a chestnut horse of great strength and spirit,
and as he galloped along the line, brandishing his lance, and
displaying his easy horsemanship, he might be thought to form no
bad personification of the Genius of Chivalry. To complete his
dispositions, he ordered Cepeda to lead up the infantry; for the
licentiate seems to have had a larger share in the conduct of his
affairs of late, or at least in the present military
arrangements, than Carbajal. The latter, indeed, whether from
disgust at the course taken by his leader, or from a distrust,
which, it is said, he did not affect to conceal, of the success
of the present operations, disclaimed all responsibility for
them, and chose to serve rather as a private cavalier than as a
commander. *26 Yet Cepeda, as the event showed, was no less
shrewd in detecting the coming ruin.

[Footnote 25: "Iba mui galan, i gentil hombre sobre vn poderoso
caballo castano, armado de Cota, i Coracinas ricas, con vna sobre
ropa de Raso bien golpeada, i vn Capacete de Oro en la cabeca,
con su barbote de lo mismo." Gomara, Hist. de as Indias, cap.
185.]

[Footnote 26: "Porque el Maesse de campo Francisco de Caruajal,
como hombre desdenado de que Goncalo Picarro no huuiesse querido
seguir su parecer y consejo (dandose ya por vencido), no quiso
hazer oficio de Maesse de campo, como solia, y assi fue a ponerse
en el esquadron con su compania, como vno de los capitanes de
ynfanteria." Garcilasso, Com. Real., Parte 2, lib. 5 cap. 35.]

When he had received his orders from Pizarro, he rode forward as
if to select the ground for his troops to occupy; and in doing so
disappeared for a few moments behind a projecting cliff. He soon
reappeared, however, and was seen galloping at full speed across
the plain. His men looked with astonishment, yet not distrusting
his motives, till, as he continued his course direct towards the
enemy's lines, his treachery became apparent. Several pushed for
ward to overtake him, and among them a cavalier, better mounted
than Cepeda. The latter rode a horse of no great strength or
speed, quite unfit for this critical manoeuvre of his master. The
animal, was, moreover, encumbered by the weight of the caparisons
with which his ambitious rider had loaded him, so that, on
reaching a piece of miry ground that lay between the armies, his
pace was greatly retarded. *27 Cepeda's pursuers rapidly gained
on him, and the cavalier above noticed came, at length, so near
as to throw a lance at the fugitive, which, wounding him in the
thigh, pierced his horse's flank, and they both came headlong to
the ground. It would have fared ill with the licentiate, in this
emergency, but fortunately a small party of troopers on the other
side, who had watched the chase, now galloped briskly forward to
the rescue, and, beating off his pursuers, they recovered Cepeda
from the mire, and bore him to the president's quarters.

[Footnote 27: Ibid., ubi supra.]

He was received by Gasca with the greatest satisfaction, - so
great, that, according to one chronicler, he did not disdain to
show it by saluting the licentiate on the cheek. *28 The anecdote
is scarcely reconcilable with the characters and relations of the
parties, or with the president's subsequent conduct. Gasca,
however, recognized the full value of his prize, and the effect
which his desertion at such a time must have on the spirits of
the rebels. Cepeda's movement, so unexpected by his own party,
was the result of previous deliberation, as he had secretly given
assurance, it is said, to the prior of Arequipa, then in the
royal camp, that, if Gonzalo Pizarro could not be induced to
accept the pardon offered him, he would renounce his cause. *29
The time selected by the crafty counsellor for doing so was that
most fatal to the interests of his commander.