History Of The Conquest Of Peru

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When Pizarro landed in the country, he found it distracted by a contest
for the crown. It would seem to have been for his interest to play off one
party against the other, throwing his own weight into the scale that suited
him. Instead of this, he resorted to an act of audacious violence which
crushed them both at a blow. His subsequent career afforded no scope
for the profound policy displayed by Cortes, when he gathered
conflicting nations under his banner, and directed them against a
common foe. Still less did he have the opportunity of displaying the
tactics and admirable strategy of his rival. Cortes conducted his military
operations on the scientific principles of a great captain at the head of a
powerful host. Pizarro appears only as an adventurer, a fortunate knight-
errant. By one bold stroke, he broke the spell which had so long held the
land under the dominion of the Incas. The spell was broken, and the airy
fabric of their empire, built on the superstition of ages, vanished at a
touch. This was good fortune, rather than the result of policy.

Pizarro was eminently perfidious, Yet nothing is more opposed to sound
policy. One act of perfidy fully established becomes the ruin of its
author. The man who relinquishes confidence in his good faith gives up
the best basis for future operations. Who will knowingly build on a
quicksand? By his perfidious treatment of Almagro, Pizarro alienated the
minds of the Spaniards. By his perfidious treatment of Atahuallpa, and
subsequently of the Inca Manco, he disgusted the Peruvians. The name
of Pizarro became a by-word for perfidy. Almagro took his revenge in a
civil war; Manco in an insurrection which nearly cost Pizarro his
dominion. The civil war terminated in a conspiracy which cost him his
life. Such were the fruits of his policy. Pizarro may be regarded as a
cunning man; but not, as he has been often eulogized by his countrymen,
as a politic one.

When Pizarro obtained possession of Cuzco, he found a country well
advanced in the arts of civilization; institutions under which the people
lived in tranquillity and personal safety; the mountains and the uplands
whitened with flocks; the valleys teeming with the fruits of a scientific
husbandry; the granaries and warehouses filled to overflowing; the whole
land rejoicing in its abundance; and the character of the nation, softened
under the influence of the mildest and most innocent form of
superstition, well prepared for the reception of a higher and a Christian
civilization. But, far from introducing this, Pizarro delivered up the
conquered races to his brutal soldiery; the sacred cloisters were
abandoned to their lust; the towns and villages were given up to pillage;
the wretched natives were parcelled out like slaves, to toil for their
conquerors in the mines; the flocks were scattered, and wantonly
destroyed, the granaries were dissipated; the beautiful contrivances for
the more perfect culture of the soil were suffered to fall into decay; the
paradise was converted into a desert. Instead of profiting by the ancient
forms of civilization, Pizarro preferred to efface every vestige of them
from the land, and on their ruin to erect the institutions of his own
country. Yet these institutions did little for the poor Indian, held in iron
bondage. It was little to him that the shores of the Pacific were studded
with rising communities and cities, the marts of a flourishing commerce.
He had no share in the goodly heritage. He was an alien in the land of
his fathers.

The religion of the Peruvian, which directed him to the worship of that
glorious luminary which is the best representative of the might and
beneficence of the Creator, is perhaps the purest form of superstition that
has existed among men. Yet it was much, that, under the new order of
things, and through the benevolent zeal of the missionaries, some
glimmerings of a nobler faith were permitted to dawn on his darkened
soul. Pizarro, himself, cannot be charged with manifesting any
overweening solicitude for the propagation of the Faith. He was no
bigot, like Cortes. Bigotry is the perversion of the religious principle;
but the principle itself was wanting in Pizarro. The conversion of the
heathen was a predominant motive with Cortes in his expedition. It was
not a vain boast. He would have sacrificed his life for it at any time; and
more than once, by his indiscreet seal, he actually did place his life and
the success of his enterprise in jeopardy. It was his great purpose to
purify the land from the brutish abominations of the Aztecs, by
substituting the religion of Jesus. This gave to his expedition the
character of a crusade. It furnished the best apology for the Conquest,
and does more than all other considerations towards enlisting our
sympathies on the side of the conquerors.

But Pizarro's ruling motives, so far as they can be scanned by human
judgment, were avarice and ambition. The good missionaries, indeed,
followed in his train to scatter the seeds of spiritual truth, and the
Spanish government, as usual, directed its beneficent legislation to the
conversion of the natives. But the moving power with Pizarro and his
followers was the lust of gold. This was the real stimulus to their toil,
the price of perfidy, the true guerdon of their victories. This gave a base
and mercenary character to their enterprise; and when we contrast the
ferocious cupidity of the conquerors with the mild and inoffensive
manners of the conquered, our sympathies, the sympathies even of the
Spaniard, are necessarily thrown into the scale of the Indian.33

But as no picture is without its lights, we must not, in justice to Pizarro,
dwell exclusively on the darker features of his portrait. There was no
one of her sons to whom Spain was under larger obligations for extent of
empire; for his hand won for her the richest of the Indian jewels that
once sparkled in her imperial diadem. When we contemplate the perils
he braved, the sufferings he patiently endured, the incredible obstacles
he overcame, the magnificent results he effected with his single arm, as it
were, unaided by the government,--though neither a good, nor a great
man in the highest sense of that term, it is impossible not to regard him
as a very extraordinary one.

Nor can we fairly omit to notice, in extenuation of his errors, the
circumstances of his early life; for, like Almagro, he was the son of sin
and sorrow, early cast upon the world to seek his fortunes as he might.
In his young and tender age he was to take the impression of those into
whose society he was thrown. And when was it the lot of the needy
outcast to fall into that of the wise and the virtuous? His lot was cast
among the licentious inmates of a camp, the school of rapine, whose only
law was the sword, and who looked on the wretched Indian and his
heritage as their rightful spoil.

Who does not shudder at the thought of what his own fate might have
been, trained in such a school? The amount of crime does not necessarily
show the criminality of the agent. History, indeed, is concerned with the
former, that it may be recorded as a warning to mankind; but it is He
alone who knoweth the heart, the strength of the temptations and the
means of resisting it, that can determine the measure of the guilt.

Book 4

Chapter 6

Movements Of The Conspirators--Advance Of Vaca De Castro--
Proceedings Of Almagro--Progress Of The Governor-
The Forces Approach Each Other--Bloody Plains Of Chupas-
Conduct Of Vaca De Castro

1541--1543

The first step of the conspirators, after securing possession of the capital,
was to send to the different cities, proclaiming the revolution which had
taken place, and demanding the recognition of the young Almagro as
governor of Peru. Where the summons was accompanied by a military
force, as at Truxillo and Arequipa, it was obeyed without much cavil.
But in other cities a colder assent was given, and in some the requisition
was treated with contempt. In Cuzco, the place of most importance next
to Lima, a considerable number of the Almagro faction secured the
ascendency of their party; and such of the magistracy as resisted were
ejected from their offices to make room for others of a more
accommodating temper. But the loyal inhabitants of the city, dissatisfied
with this proceeding, privately sent to one of Pizarro's captains, named
Alvarez de Holguin, who lay with a considerable force in the
neighborhood; and that officer, entering the place, soon dispossessed the
new dignitaries of their honors, and restored the ancient capital to its
allegiance.

The conspirators experienced a still more determined opposition from
Alonso de Alvarado, one of the principal captains of Pizarro,-defeated,
as the reader will remember, by the elder Almagro at the bridge of
Abancay,--and now lying in the north with a corps of about two hundred
men, as good troops as any in the land. That officer, on receiving tidings
of his general's assassination, instantly wrote to the Licentiate Vaca de
Castro, advising him of the state of affairs in Peru, and urging him to
quicken his march towards the south.1

This functionary had been sent out by the Spanish Crown, as noticed in a
preceding chapter, to cooperate with Pizarro in restoring tranquillity to
the country, with authority to assume the government himself, in case of
that commander's death. After a long and tempestuous voyage, he had
landed, in the spring of 1541, at the port of Buena Ventura, and,
disgusted with the dangers of the sea, preferred to continue his
wearisome journey by land. But so enfeebled was he by the hardships he
had undergone, that it was full three months before he reached Popayan
where he received the astounding tidings of the death of Pizarro. This
was the contingency which had been provided for, with such judicious
forecast, in his instructions. Yet he was sorely perplexed by the
difficulties of his situation. He was a stranger in the land, with a very
imperfect knowledge of the country, without an armed force to support
him, without even the military science which might be supposed
necessary to avail himself of it. He knew nothing of the degree of
Almagro's influence, or of the extent to which the insurrection had
spread,--nothing, in short, of the dispositions of the people among whom
he was cast.

In such an emergency, a feebler spirit might have listened to the counsels
of those who advised to return to Panama, and stay there until he had
mustered a sufficient force to enable him to take the field against the
insurgents with advantage. But the courageous heart of Vaca de Castro
shrunk from a step which would proclaim his incompetency to the task
assigned him. He had confidence in his own resources, and in the virtue
of the commission under which he acted. He relied, too, on the habitual
loyalty of the Spaniards; and, after mature deliberation, he determined to
go forward, and trust to events for accomplishing the objects of his
mission.

He was confirmed in this purpose by the advices he now received from
Alvarado; and without longer delay, he continued his march towards
Quito. Here he was well received by Gonzalo Pizarro's lieutenant, who
had charge of the place during his commander's absence on his
expedition to the Amazon. The licentiate was also joined by Benalcazar,
the conqueror of Quito, who brought a small reinforcement, and offered
personally to assist him in the prosecution of his enterprise. He now
displayed the royal commission, empowering him, on Pizarro's death, to
assume the government. That contingency had arrived, and Vaca de
Castro declared his purpose to exercise the authority conferred on him.
At the same time, he sent emissaries to the principal cities, requiring
their obedience to him as the lawful representative of the Crown, --taking
care to employ discreet persons on the mission, whose character would
have weight with the citizens. He then continued his march slowly
towards the south.2

He was willing by his deliberate movements to give time for his
summons to take effect, and for the fermentation caused by the late
extraordinary events to subside. He reckoned confidently on the loyalty
which made the Spaniard unwilling, unless in cases of the last extremity,
to come into collision with the royal authority; and, however much this
popular sentiment might be disturbed by temporary gusts of passion, he
trusted to the habitual current of their feelings for giving the people a
right direction. In this he did not miscalculate; for so deeprooted was the
principle of loyalty in the ancient Spaniard, that ages of oppression and
misrule could alone have induced him to shake off his allegiance. Sad it
is, but not strange, that the length of time passed under a bad government
has not qualified him for devising a good one.

While these events were passing in the north, Almagro's faction at Lima
was daily receiving new accessions of strength. For, in addition to those
who, from the first, had been avowedly of his father's party, there were
many others who, from some cause or other, had conceived a disgust for
Pizarro, and who now willingly enlisted under the banner of the chief
that had overthrown him.

The first step of the young general, or rather of Rada, who directed his
movements, was to secure the necessary supplies for the troops, most of
whom, having long been in indigent circumstances, were wholly
unprepared for service. Funds to a considerable amount were raised, by
seizing on the moneys of the Crown in the hands of the treasurer.
Pizarro's secretary, Picado, was also drawn from his prison, and
interrogated as to the place where his master's treasures were deposited.
But, although put to the torture, he would not---or, as is probable, could
not --give information on the subject; and the conspirators, who had a
long arrear of injuries to settle with him, closed their proceedings by
publicly beheading him in the great square of Lima.3

Valverde, Bishop of Cuzco, as he himself assures us, vainly interposed in
his behalf. It is singular, that, the last time this fanatical prelate appears
on the stage, it should be in the benevolent character of a supplicant for
mercy.4 Soon afterwards, he was permitted, with the judge, Velasquez,
and some other adherents of Pizarro, to embark from the port of Lima.
We have a letter from him, dated at Tumbez, in November, 1541; almost
immediately after which he fell into the hands of the Indians, and with
his companions was massacred at Puna. A violent death not
unfrequently closed the stormy career of the American adventurer.
Valverde was a Dominican friar, and, like Father Olmedo in the suite of
Cortes, had been by his commander's side throughout the whole of his
expedition. But he did not always, like the good Olmedo, use his
influence to stay the uplifted hand of the warrior. At least, this was not
the mild aspect in which he presented himself at the terrible massacre of
Caxamalca. Yet some contemporary accounts represent him, after he
had been installed in his episcopal office, as unwearied in his labors to
convert the natives, and to ameliorate their condition; and his own
correspondence with the government, after that period, shows great
solicitude for these praiseworthy objects. Trained in the severest school
of monastic discipline, which too often closes the heart against the
common charities of life, he could not, like the benevolent Las Casas,
rise so far above its fanatical tenets as to regard the heathen as his
brother, while in the state of infidelity; and, in the true spirit of that
school, he doubtless conceived that the sanctity of the end justified the
means, however revolting in themselves. Yet the same man, who thus
freely shed the blood of the poor native to secure the triumph of his faith,
would doubtless have as freely poured out his own in its defence. The
character was no uncommon one in the sixteenth century.5

Almagro's followers, having supplied themselves with funds, made as
little scruple to appropriate to their own use such horses and arms, of
every description, as they could find in the city. And this they did with
the less reluctance, as the inhabitants for the most part testified no good-
will to their cause. While thus employed, Almagro received intelligence
that Holguin had left Cuzco with a force of near three hundred men, with
which he was preparing to effect a junction with Alvarado in the north.
It was important to Almagro's success that he should defeat this junction.
If to procrastinate was the policy of Vaca de Castro, it was clearly that of
Almagro to quicken operations, and to bring matters to as speedy an
issue as possible; to march at once against Holguin, whom he might
expect easily to overcome with his superior numbers; then to follow up
the stroke by the still easier defeat of Alvarado, when the new governor
would be, in a manner, at his mercy. It would be easy to beat these
several bodies in detail, which, once united, would present formidable
odds. Almagro and his party had already arrayed themselves against the
government by a proceeding too atrocious, and which struck too directly
at the royal authority, for its perpetrators to flatter themselves with the
hopes of pardon. Their only chance was boldly to follow up the blow,
and, by success, to place them, selves in so formidable an attitude as to
excite the apprehensions of government. The dread of its too potent
vassal might extort terms that would never be conceded to his prayers.

But Almagro and his followers shrunk from this open collision with the
Crown. They had taken up rebellion because it lay in their path, not
because they had wished it. They had meant only to avenge their
personal wrongs on Pizarro, and not to defy the royal authority. When,
therefore, some of the more resolute, who followed things fearlessly to
their consequences, proposed to march at once against Vaca de Castro,
and, by striking at the head, settle the contest by a blow, it was almost
universally rejected; and it was not till after long debate that it was
finally determined to move against Holguin, and cut off his
communication with Alonso de Alvarado.

Scarcely had Almagro commenced his march on Xauxa, where he
proposed to give battle to his enemy, than he met with a severe
misfortune in the death of Juan de Rada. He was a man somewhat
advanced in years; and the late exciting scenes, in which he had taken the
principal part, had been too much for a frame greatly shattered by a life
of extraordinary hardship. He was thrown into a fever, of which he soon
after died. By his death, Almagro sustained an inestimable loss; for,
besides his devoted attachment to his young leader, he was, by his large
experience, and his cautious though courageous character, better
qualified than any other cavalier in the army to conduct him safely
through the stormy sea on which he had led him to embark.

Among the cavaliers of highest consideration after Rada's death, the two
most aspiring were Christoval de Sotelo, and Garcia de Alvarado; both
possessed of considerable military talent, but the latter marked by a bold,
presumptuous manner, which might remind one of his illustrious
namesake, who achieved much higher renown under the banner of
Cortes. Unhappily, a jealousy grew up between these two officers; that
jealousy, so common among the Spaniards, that it may seem a national
characteristic; an impatience of equality, founded on a false principle of
honor, which has ever been the fruitful source of faction among them,
whether under a monarchy or a republic.

This was peculiarly unfortunate for Almagro, whose inexperience led
him to lean for support on others, and who, in the present distracted state
of his council, knew scarcely where to turn for it. In the delay
occasioned by these dissensions, his little army did not reach the valley
of Xauxa till after the enemy had passed it. Almagro followed close,
leaving behind his baggage and artillery that he might move the lighter.
But the golden opportunity was lost. The rivers, swollen by autumnal
rains, impeded his pursuit; and, though his light troops came up with a
few stragglers of the rear-guard, Holguin succeeded in conducting his
forces through the dangerous passes of the mountains, and in effecting a
junction with Alonso de Alvarado, near the northern seaport of Huaura.

Disappointed in his object, Almagro prepared to march on Cuzco,-the
capital, as he regarded it, of his own jurisdiction,--to get possession of
that city, and there make preparations to meet his adversary in the field.
Sotelo was sent forward with a small corps in advance. He experienced
no opposition from the now defenceless citizens; the government of the
place was again restored to the hands of the men of Chili, and their
young leader soon appeared at the head of his battalions, and established
his winter-quarters in the Inca capital.

Here, the jealousy of the rival captains broke out into an open feud. It
was ended by the death of Sotelo, treacherously assassinated in his own
apartment by Garcia de Alvarado. Almagro, greatly outraged by this
atrocity, was the more indignant, as he felt himself too weak to punish
the offender. He smothered his resentment for the present, affecting to
treat the dangerous officer with more distinguished favor. But Alvarado
was not the dupe of this specious behaviour. He felt that he had forfeited
the confidence of his commander. In revenge, he laid a plot to betray
him; and Almagro, driven to the necessity of self-defence, imitated the
example of his officer, by entering his house with a party of armed men,
who, laying violent hands on the insurgent, slew him on the spot.6

This irregular proceeding was followed by the best consequences. The
seditious schemes of Alvarado perished with him. The seeds of
insubordination were eradicated, and from that moment Almagro
experienced only implicit obedience and the most loyal support from his
followers. From that hour, too, his own character seemed to be changed;
he relied far less on others than on himself, and developed resources not
to have been anticipated in one of his years; for he had hardly reached
the age of twenty-two.7 From this time he displayed an energy and
forecast, which proved him, in despite of his youth, not unequal to the
trying emergencies of the situation in which it was his unhappy lot to be
placed.

He instantly set about providing for the wants of his men, and strained
every nerve to get them in good fighting order for the approaching
campaign. He replenished his treasury with a large amount of silver
which he drew from the mines of La Plata. Saltpetre, obtained in
abundance in the neighborhood of Cuzco, furnished the material for
gunpowder. He caused cannon, some of large dimensions, to be cast
under the superintendence of Pedro de Candia, the Greek, who, it may be
remembered, had first come into the country with Pizarro, and who, with
a number of his countrymen,--Levantines, as they were called,-was well
acquainted with this manufacture. Under their care, fire-arms were
made, together with cuirasses and helmets, in which silver was mingled
with copper,8 and of so excellent a quality, that they might vie, says an
old soldier of the time, with those from the workshops of Milan.9
Almagro received a seasonable supply, moreover, from a source scarcely
to have been expected. This was from Manco, the wandering Inca, who
detesting the memory of Pizarro, transferred to the young Almagro the
same friendly feelings which he had formerly borne to his father;
heightened, it may be, by the consideration that Indian blood flowed in
the veins of the young commander. From this quarter Almagro obtained
a liberal supply of swords, spears, shields, and arms and armour of every
description, chiefly taken by the Inca at the memorable siege of Cuzco.
He also received the gratifying assurance, that the latter would support
him with a detachment of native troops when he opened the campaign.

Before making a final appeal to arms, however, Almagro resolved to try
the effect of negotiation with the new governor. In the spring, or early in
the summer, of 1542, he sent an embassy to the latter, then at Lima, in
which he deprecated the necessity of taking arms against an officer of the
Crown. His only desire, he said, was to vindicate his own rights; to
secure the possession of New Toledo, the province bequeathed to him by
his father, and from which he had been most unjustly excluded by
Pizarro. He did not dispute the governor's authority over New Castile, as
the country was designated which had been assigned to the marquess;
and he concluded by proposing that each party should remain within his
respective territory until the determination of the Court of Castile could
be made known to them. To this application, couched in respectful
terms, Almagro received no answer.