History Of The Conquest Of Peru

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This letter, which was conveyed in language the most courteous and
complimentary to the subject of it, was of great length. It was
accompanied by another much more concise, to Cepeda, the intriguing
lawyer, who, as Gasca knew, had the greatest influence over Pizarro, in
the absence of Carbajal, then employed in reaping the silver harvest from
the newly discovered mines of Potosi.20 In this epistle, Gasca affected
to defer to the cunning politician as a member of the Royal Audience,
and he conferred with him on the best manner of supplying a vacancy in
that body. These several despatches were committed to a cavalier,
named Paniagua, a faithful adherent of the president, and one of those
who had accompanied him from Castile. To this same emissary he also
gave manifestos and letters, like those intrusted to the Dominican, with
orders secretly to distribute them in Lima, before he quitted that
capital.21

Weeks and months rolled away, while the president still remained at
Panama, where, indeed, as his communications were jealously cut off
with Peru, he might be said to be detained as a sort of prisoner of state.
Meanwhile, both he and Hinojosa were looking with anxiety for the
arrival of some messenger from Pizarro, who should indicate the manner
in which the president's mission was to be received by that chief. The
governor of Panama was not blind to the perilous position in which he
was himself placed, nor to the madness of provoking a contest with the
Court of Castile. But he had a reluctance--not too often shared by the
cavaliers of Peru--to abandon the fortunes of the commander who had
reposed in him so great confidence. Yet he trusted that this commander
would embrace the opportunity now offered, of placing himself and the
country in a state of permanent security.

Several of the cavaliers who had given in their adhesion to Gasca,
displeased by this obstinacy, as they termed it, of Hinojosa, proposed to
seize his person and then get possession of the armada. But the president
at once rejected this offer. His mission, he said, was one of peace, and
he would not stain it at the outset by an act of violence. He even
respected the scruples of Hinojosa; and a cavalier of so honorable a
nature, he conceived, if once he could be gained by fair means, would be
much more likely to be true to his interests, than if overcome either by
force or fraud. Gasca thought he might safely abide his time. There was
policy, as well as honesty, in this; indeed, they always go together.

Meantime, persons were occasionally arriving from Lima and the
neighboring places, who gave accounts of Pizarro, varying according to
the character and situation of the parties. Some represented him as
winning all hearts by his open temper and the politic profusion with
which, though covetous of wealth, he distributed repartimientos and
favors among his followers. Others spoke of him as carrying matters
with a high hand, while the greatest timidity and distrust prevailed
among the citizens of Lima. All agreed that his power rested on too
secure a basis to be shaken; and that, if the president should go to Lima,
he must either consent to become Pizarro's instrument and confirm him
in the government, or forfeit his own life.22

It was undoubtedly true, that Gonzalo, while he gave attention, as his
friends say, to the public business, found time for free indulgence in
those pleasures which wait on the soldier of fortune in his hour of
triumph. He was the object of flattery and homage; courted even by
those who hated him. For such as did not love the successful chieftain
had good cause to fear him; and his exploits were commemorated in
romances or ballads, as rivalling--it was not far from truth--those of the
most doughty paladins of chivalry.23

Amidst this burst of adulation, the cup of joy commended to Pizarro's
lips had one drop of bitterness in it that gave its flavor to all the rest; for,
notwithstanding his show of confidence, he looked with unceasing
anxiety to the arrival of tidings that might assure him in what light his
conduct was regarded by the government at home. This was proved by
his jealous precautions to guard the approaches to the coast, and to
detain the persons of the royal emissaries. He learned, therefore, with no
little uneasiness, from Hinojosa, the landing of President Gasca, and the
purport of his mission. But his discontent was mitigated, when he
understood that the new envoy had come without military array, without
any of the ostentatious trappings of office to impose on the minds of the
vulgar, but alone, as it were, in the plain garb of an humble
missionary.24 Pizarro could not discern, that under this modest exterior
lay a moral power, stronger than his own steel-clad battalions, which,
operating silently on public opinion,--the more sure than it was silent,--
was even now undermining his strength, like a subterraneous channel
eating away the foundations of some stately edifice, that stands secure in
its pride of place!

But, although Gonzalo Pizarro could not foresee this result, he saw
enough to satisfy him that it would be safest to exclude the president
from Peru. The tidings of his arrival, moreover, quickened his former
purpose of sending an embassy to Spain to vindicate his late
proceedings, and request the royal confirmation of his authority. The
person placed at the head of this mission was Lorenzo de Aldana, a
cavalier of discretion as well as courage, and high in the confidence of
Pizarro, as one of his most devoted partisans. He had occupied some
important posts under that chief, one secret of whose successes was the
sagacity he showed in the selection of his agents.

Besides Aldana and one or two cavaliers, the bishop of Lima was joined
in the commission, as likely, from his position, to have a favorable
influence on Gonzalo's fortunes at court. Together with the despatches
for the government, the envoys were intrusted with a letter to Gasca from
the inhabitants of Lima; in which, after civilly congratulating the
president on his arrival, they announce their regret that he had come too
late. The troubles of the country were now settled by the overthrow of
the viceroy, and the nation was reposing in quiet under the rule of
Pizarro. An embassy, they stated, was on its way to Castile, not to solicit
pardon, for they had committed no crime,25 but to petition the emperor
to confirm their leader in the government, as the man in Peru best
entitled to it by his virtues.26 They expressed the conviction that
Gasca's presence would only serve to renew the distractions of the
country, and they darkly intimated that his attempt to land would
probably cost him his life.--The language of this singular document was
more respectful than might be inferred from its import. It was dated the
14th of October, 1546, and was subscribed by seventy of the principal
cavaliers in the city. It was not improbably dictated by Cepeda, whose
hand is visible in most of the intrigues of Pizarro's little court. It is also
said, --the authority is somewhat questionable,--that Aldana received
instructions from Gonzalo secretly to offer a bribe of fifty thousand
pesos de oro to the president, to prevail on him to return to Castile; and
in case of his refusal, some darker and more effectual way was to be
devised to rid the country of his presence.27

Aldana, fortified with his despatches, sped swiftly on his voyage to
Panama. Through him the governor learned the actual state of feeling in
the councils of Pizarro; and he listened with regret to the envoy's
conviction, that no terms would be admitted by that chief or his
companions, that did not confirm him in the possession of Peru.28

Aldana was soon admitted to an audience by the president. It was
attended with very different results from what had followed from the
conferences with Hinojosa; for Pizarro's envoy was not armed by nature
with that stubborn panoply which had hitherto made the other proof
against all argument. He now learned with surprise the nature of Gasca's
powers, and the extent of the royal concessions to the insurgents. He had
embarked with Gonzalo Pizarro on a desperate venture, and he found
that it had proved successful. The colony had nothing more, in reason,
to demand; and, though devoted in heart to his leader, he did not feel
bound by any principle of honor to take part with him, solely to gratify
his ambition, in a wild contest with the Crown that must end in inevitable
ruin. He consequently abandoned his mission to Castile, probably never
very palatable to him, and announced his purpose to accept the pardon
proffered by government, and support the president in settling the affairs
of Peru. He subsequently wrote, it should be added, to his former
commander in Lima, stating the course he had taken, and earnestly
recommending the latter to follow his example.

The influence of this precedent in so important a person as Aldana,
aided, doubtless, by the conviction that no change was now to be
expected in Pizarro, while delay would be fatal to himself, at length
prevailed over Hinojosa's scruples, and he intimated to Gasca his
willingness to place the fleet under his command. The act was
performed with great pomp and ceremony. Some of Pizarro's stanchest
partisans were previously removed from the vessels; and on the
nineteenth of November, 1546, Hinojosa and his captains resigned their
commissions into the hands of the president. They next took the oaths of
allegiance to Castile; a free pardon for all past offences was proclaimed
by the herald from a scaffold erected in the great square of the city; and
the president, greeting them as true and loyal vassals of the Crown,
restored their several commissions to the cavaliers. The royal standard
of Spain was then unfurled on board the squadron, and proclaimed that
this stronghold of Pizarro's power had passed away from him for ever.29

The return of their commissions to the insurgent captains was a politic
act in Gasca. It secured the services of the ablest officers in the country,
and turned against Pizarro the very arm on which he had most leaned for
support. Thus was this great step achieved, without force or fraud, by
Gasca's patience and judicious forecast. He was content to bide his time;
and he now might rely with well-grounded confidence on the ultimate
success of his mission.

Book 5

Chapter 2

Gasca Assembles His Forces--Defection Of Pizarro's Followers--
He Musters His Levies--Agitation In Lima--He Abandons The City--
Gasca Sails From Panama--Bloody Battle Of Huarina

1547

No sooner was Gasca placed in possession of Panama and the fleet, than
he entered on a more decisive course of policy than he had been hitherto
allowed to pursue. He raised levies of men, and drew together supplies
from all quarters. He took care to discharge the arrears already due to
the soldiers, and promised liberal pay for the future; for, though mindful
that his personal charges should cost little to the Crown, he did not stint
his expenditure when the public good required it. As the funds in the
treasury were exhausted, he obtained loans on the credit of the
government from the wealthy citizens of Panama, who, relying on his
good faith, readily made the necessary advances. He next sent letters to
the authorities of Guatemala and Mexico, requiring their assistance in
carrying on hostilities, if necessary, against the insurgents; and he
despatched a summons, in like manner, to Benalcazar, in the provinces
north of Peru, to meet him, on his landing in that country, with his whole
available force.

The greatest enthusiasm was shown by the people of Panama in getting
the little navy in order for his intended voyage; and prelates and
commanders did not disdain to prove their loyalty by taking part in the
good work, along with the soldiers and sailors.1 Before his own
departure, however, Gasca proposed to send a small squadron of four
ships under Aldana, to cruise off the port of Lima, with instructions to
give protection to those well affected to the royal cause, and receive
them, if need be, on board his vessels. He was also intrusted with
authenticated copies of the president's commission, to be delivered to
Gonzalo Pizarro, that the chief might feel, there was yet time to return
before the gates of mercy were closed against him.2

While these events were going on, Gasca's proclamations and letters
were doing their work in Peru. It required but little sagacity to perceive
that the nation at large, secured in the protection of person and property,
had nothing to gain by revolution. Interest and duty, fortunately, now lay
on the same side; and the ancient sentiment of loyalty, smothered for a
time, but not extinguished, revived in the breasts of the people. Still this
was not manifested, at once, by any overt act; for, under a strong military
rule, men dared hardly think for themselves, much less communicate
their thoughts to one another. But changes of public opinion, like
changes in the atmosphere that come on slowly and imperceptibly, make
themselves more and more widely felt, till, by a sort of silent sympathy,
they spread to the remotest corners of the land. Some intimations of
such a change of sentiment at length found their way to Lima, although
all accounts of the president's mission had been jealously excluded from
that capital. Gonzalo Pizarro himself became sensible of these
symptoms of disaffection, though almost too faint and feeble, as yet, for
the most experienced eye to descry in them the coming tempest.

Several of the president's proclamations had been forwarded to Gonzalo
by his faithful partisans; and Carbajal, who had been summoned from
Potosi, declared they were "more to be dreaded than the lances of
Castile." 3 Yet Pizarro did not, for a moment, lose his confidence in his
own strength; and with a navy like that now in Panama at his command,
he felt he might bid defiance to any enemy on his coasts. He had implicit
confidence in the fidelity of Hinojosa.

It was at this period that Paniagua arrived off the port with Gasca's
despatches to Pizarro, consisting of the emperor's letter and his own.
They were instantly submitted by that chieftain to his trusty counsellors,
Carbajal and Cepeda, and their opinions asked as to the course to be
pursued. It was the crisis of Pizarro's fate.

Carbajal, whose sagacious eye fully comprehended the position in which
they stood, was in favor of accepting the royal grace on the terms
proposed; and he intimated his sense of their importance by declaring,
that "he would pave the way for the bearer of them into the capital with
ingots of gold and silver." 4 Cepeda was of a different way of thinking.
He was a judge of the Royal Audience; and had been sent to Peru as the
immediate counsellor of Blasco Nunez. But he had turned against the
viceroy, had encountered him in battle, and his garments might be said to
be yet wet with his blood! What grace was there, then, for him?
Whatever respect might be shown to the letter of the royal provisions, in
point of fact, he must ever live under the Castilian rule a ruined man. He
accordingly, strongly urged the rejection of Gasca's offers. "They will
cost you your government," he said to Pizarro; "the smooth-tongued
priest is not so simple a person as you take him to be. He is deep and
politic.5 He knows well what promises to make; and, once master of the
country, he will know, too, how to keep them."

Carbajal was not shaken by the arguments or the sneers of his
companions; and as the discussion waxed warm, Cepeda taxed his
opponent with giving counsel suggested by fears for his own safety,--a
foolish taunt, sufficiently disproved by the whole life of the doughty old
warrior, Carbajal did not insist further on his own views, however, as he
found them unwelcome to Pizarro, and contented himself with coolly
remarking, that "he had, indeed, no relish for rebellion; but he had as
long a neck for a halter, he believed, as any of his companions; and as he
could hardly expect to live much longer, at any rate, it was, after all, of
little moment to him." 6

Pizarro, spurred on by a fiery ambition that overleaped every obstacle,7
did not condescend to count the desperate chances of a contest with the
Crown. He threw his own weight into the scale with Cepeda. The offer
of grace was rejected; and he thus cast away the last tie which held him
to his country, and, by the act, proclaimed himself a rebel.8

It was not long after the departure of Paniagua, that Pizarro received
tidings of the defection of Aldana and Hinojosa, and of the surrender of
the fleet, on which he had expended an immense sum, as the chief
bulwark of his power. This unwelcome intelligence was followed by
accounts of the further defection of some of the principal towns in the
north, and of the assassination of Puelles, the faithful lieutenant to whom
he had confided the government of Quito. It was not very long, also,
before he found his authority assailed in the opposite quarter at Cuzco;
for Centeno, the loyal chieftain who, as the reader may remember, had
been driven by Carbajal to take refuge in a cave near Arequipa, had
issued from his concealment after remaining there a year, and, on
learning the arrival of Gasca, had again raised the royal standard. Then
collecting a small body of followers, and falling on Cuzco by night, he
made himself master of that capital, defeated the garrison who held it,
and secured it for the Crown. Marching soon after into the province of
Charcas, the bold chief allied himself with the officer who commanded
for Pizarro in La Plata; and their combined forces, to the number of a
thousand, took up a position on the borders of Lake Titicaca, where the
two cavaliers coolly waited an opportunity to take the field against their
ancient commander.

Gonzalo Pizarro, touched to the heart by the desertion of those in whom
he most confided, was stunned by the dismal tidings of his losses coming
so thick upon him. Yet he did not waste his time in idle crimination or
complaint; but immediately set about making preparations to meet the
storm with all his characteristic energy. He wrote, at once to such of his
captains as he believed still faithful, commanding them to be ready with
their troops to march to his assistance at the shortest notice. He
reminded them of their obligations to him, and that their interests were
identical with his own. The president's commission, he added, had been
made out before the news had reached Spain of the battle of Ariaquito,
and could never cover a pardon to those concerned in the death of the
viceroy.9

Pizarro was equally active in enforcing his levies in the capital, and in
putting them in the best fighting order. He soon saw himself at the head
of a thousand men, beautifully equipped, and complete in all their
appointments; "as gallant an array," says an old writer, "though so small
in number, as ever trod the plains of Italy,"--displaying in the excellence
of their arms, their gorgeous uniforms, and the caparisons of their horses,
a magnificence that could be furnished only by the silver of Peru.10
Each company was provided with a new stand of colors, emblazoned
with its peculiar device. Some bore the initials and arms of Pizarro, and
one or two of these were audaciously surmounted by a crown, as if to
intimate the rank to which their commander might aspire.11

Among the leaders most conspicuous on this occasion was Cepeda,
"who," in the words of a writer of his time, "had exchanged the robe of
the licentiate for the plumed casque and mailed harness of the warrior."
12 But the cavalier to whom Pizarro confided the chief care of
organizing his battalions was the veteran Carbajal, who had studied the
art of war under the best captains of Europe, and whose life of adventure
had been a practical commentary on their early lessons. It was on his
arm that Gonzalo most leaned in the hour of danger; and well had it been
for him, if he had profiled by his counsels at an earlier period.

It gives one some idea of the luxurious accommodations of Pizarro's
forces, that he endeavored to provide each of his musketeers with a
horse. The expenses incurred by him were enormous. The immediate
cost of his preparations, we are told, was not less than half a million of
pesos de oro; and his pay to the cavaliers, and, indeed, to the common
soldiers, in his little army, was on an extravagant scale, nowhere to be
met with but on the silver soil of Peru.13

When his own funds were exhausted, he supplied the deficiency by fines
imposed on the rich citizens of Lima as the price of exemption from
service, by forced loans, and various other schemes of military
exaction.14 From this time, it is said, the chieftain's temper underwent a
visible change.15 He became more violent in his passions, more
impatient of control, and indulged more freely in acts of cruelty and
license. The desperate cause in which he was involved made him
reckless of consequences. Though naturally frank and confiding, the
frequent defection of his followers filled him with suspicion. He knew
not in whom to confide. Every one who showed himself indifferent to
his cause, or was suspected of being so, was dealt with as an open
enemy. The greatest distrust prevailed in Lima. No man dared confide
in his neighbor. Some concealed their effects; others contrived to elude
the vigilance of the sentinels, and hid themselves in the neighboring
woods and mountains.16 No one was allowed to enter or leave the city
without a license. All commerce, all intercourse, with other places was
cut off. It was long since the fifth belonging to the Crown had been
remitted to Castile; as Pizarro had appropriated them for his own use.
He now took possession of the mints, broke up the royal stamps, and
issued a debased coin, emblazoned with his own cipher.17 It was the
most decisive act of sovereignty.

At this gloomy period, the lawyer Cepeda contrived a solemn farce, the
intent of which was to give a sort of legal sanction to the rebel cause in
the eyes of the populace. He caused a process to be prepared against
Gasca, Hinojosa, and Aldana, in which they were accused of treason
against the existing government of Peru, were convicted, and condemned
to death. This instrument he submitted to a number of jurists in the
capital, requiring their signatures. But they had no mind thus inevitably
to implicate themselves, by affixing their names to such a paper; and
they evaded it by representing, that it would only serve to cut off all
chance, should any of the accused be so disposed, of their again
embracing the cause they had deserted. Cepeda was the only man who
signed the document. Carbajal treated the whole thing with ridicule.
"What is the object of your process?" said he to Cepeda. "Its object,"
replied the latter, "is to prevent delay, that, if taken at any time, the guilty
party may be at once led to execution." "I cry you mercy," retorted
Carbajal; "I thought there must be some virtue in the instrument, that
would have killed them outright. Let but one of these same traitors fall
into my hands, and I will march him off to execution, without waiting for
the sentence of a court, I promise you!" 18

While this paper war was going on, news was brought that Aldana's
squadron was off the port of Callao. That commander had sailed from
Panama, the middle of February, 1547. On his passage down the coast
he had landed at Truxillo, where the citizens welcomed him with
enthusiasm, and eagerly proclaimed their submission to the royal
authority. He received, at the same time, messages from several of
Pizarro's officers in the interior, intimating their return to their duty, and
their readiness to support the president. Aldana named Caxamalca as a
place of rendezvous, where they should concentrate their forces, and wait
the landing of Gasca. He then continued his voyage towards Lima.

No sooner was Pizarro informed of his approach, than, fearful lest it
might have a disastrous effect in seducing his followers from their
fidelity, he marched them about a league out of the city, and there
encamped. He was two leagues from the coast, and he posted a guard on
the shore to intercept all communication with the vessels. Before leaving
the capital, Cepeda resorted to an expedient for securing the inhabitants
more firmly, as he conceived, in Pizarro's interests. He caused the
citizens to be assembled, and made them a studied harangue, in which he
expatiated on the services of their governor, and the security which the
country had enjoyed under his rule. He then told them that every man
was at liberty to choose for himself; to remain under the protection of
their present ruler, or, if they preferred, to transfer their allegiance to his
enemy. He invited them to speak their minds, but required every one
who would still continue under Pizarro to take an oath of fidelity to his
cause, with the assurance, that, if any should be so false hereafter as to
violate this pledge, he should pay for it with his life.19 There was no
one found bold enough--with his head thus in the lion's mouth--to swerve
from his obedience to Pizarro; and every man took the oath prescribed,
which was administered in the most solemn and imposing form by the
licentiate. Carbajal, as usual, made a jest of the whole proceeding.
"How long," he asked his companion, "do you think these same oaths
will stand? The first wind that blows off the coast after we are gone will
scatter them in air!" His prediction was soon verified.