A Smaller History of Greece

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These tidings were very distasteful to the Athenians, who had
looked upon Sphacteria as their certain prey. They began to
regret having let slip the favourable opportunity for making a
peace, and to vent their displeasure upon Cleon, the director of
their conduct on that occasion. But Cleon put on a face of
brass. He abused the Strategi. His political opponent, Nicias,
was then one of those officers, a man of quiet disposition and
moderate abilities, but thoroughly honest and incorruptible. Him
Cleon now singled out for his vituperation, and, pointing at him
with his finger, exclaimed--"It would be easy enough to take the
island if our generals were MEN. If I were General, I would do
it at once!" This burst of the tanner made the assembly laugh.
He was saluted with cries of "Why don't you go, then?" and
Nicias, thinking probably to catch his opponent in his own trap,
seconded the voice of the assembly by offering to place at his
disposal whatever force he might deem necessary for the
enterprise. Cleon at first endeavoured to avoid the dangerous
honour thus thrust upon him. But the more he drew back the
louder were the assembly in calling upon him to accept the
office; and as Nicias seriously repeated his proposition, he
adopted with a good grace what there was no longer any
possibility of evading, and asserted that he would take
Sphacteria within twenty days, and either kill all the
Lacedaemonians upon it, or bring them prisoners to Athens.

Never did general set out upon an enterprise under circumstances
more singular; but, what was still more extraordinary, fortune
enabled him to make his promise good. In fact, as we have seen,
Demosthenes had already resolved on attacking the island; and
when Cleon arrived at Pylus he found everything prepared for the
assault. Accident favoured the enterprise. A fire kindled by
some Athenian sailors, who had landed for the purpose of cooking
their dinner, caught and destroyed the woods with which the
island was overgrown, and thus deprived the Lacedaemonians of one
of their principal defences. Nevertheless such was the awe
inspired by the reputation of the Spartan army that Demosthenes
considered it necessary to land about 10,000 soldiers of
different descriptions, although the Lacedaemonian force
consisted of only about 420 men. But this small force for a long
while kept their assailants at bay; till some Messenians,
stealing round by the sea-shore, over crags and cliffs which the
Lacedaemonians had deemed impracticable, suddenly appeared on the
high ground which overhung their rear. They now began to give
way, and would soon have been all slain; but Cleon and
Demosthenes, being anxious to carry them prisoners to Athens,
sent a herald to summon them to surrender. The latter, in token
of compliance, dropped their shields, and waved their hands above
their heads. They requested, however, permission to communicate
with their countrymen on the mainland; who, after two or three
communications, sent them a final message--"to take counsel for
themselves, but to do nothing disgraceful." The survivors then
surrendered. They were 292 in number, 120 of whom were native
Spartans belonging to the first families. By this surrender the
prestige of the Spartan arms was in a great degree destroyed.
The Spartans were not, indeed, deemed invincible; but their
previous feats, especially at Thermopylae, had inspired the
notion that they would rather die than yield; an opinion which
could now no longer be entertained.

Cleon had thus performed his promise. On the day after the
victory he and Demosthenes started with the prisoners for Athens,
where they arrived within 20 days from the time of Cleon's
departure. Altogether, this affair was one of the most
favourable for the Athenians that had occurred during the war.
The prisoners would serve not only for a guarantee against future
invasions, which might be averted by threatening to put them to
death, but also as a means for extorting advantageous conditions
whenever a peace should be concluded. Nay, the victory itself
was of considerable importance, since it enabled the Athenians to
place Pylus in a better posture of defence, and, by garrisoning
it with Messenians from Naupactus, to create a stronghold whence
Laconia might be overrun and ravaged at pleasure. The
Lacedaemonians themselves were so sensible of these things, that
they sent repeated messages to Athens to propose a peace, but
which the Athenians altogether disregarded.

The eighth year of the war (B.C. 424) opened with brilliant
prospects for the Athenians. Elate with their continued good
fortune, they aimed at nothing less than the recovery of all the
possessions which they had held before the Thirty Years' Truce.
for this purpose they planned an expedition against Boeotia. But
their good fortune had now reached its culminatiug point. They
were defeated by the Boeotians with great loss at the battle of
Delium, which was the greatest and most decisive engagement
fought during the first period of the war an interesting feature
of the battle is that both Socrates and his pupil Alcibiades were
engaged in it, the former among the hoplites, the latter in the
cavalry. Socrates distinguished himself by his bravery, and was
one of those who, instead of throwing down their arms, kept
together in a compact body, and repulsed the attacks of the
pursuing horse. His retreat was also protected by Alcibiades.

This disastrous battle was speedily followed by the overthrow of
the Athenian empire in Thrace. At the request of Perdiccas, King
of Macedonia, and of the Chalcidian towns, who had sued for help
against the Athenians, Brasidas was sent by the Lacedaemonian
government into Macedonia, at the head of a small body of troops.
On his arrival in Macedonia he proclaimed that he was come to
deliver the Grecian cities from the tyrannous yoke of Athens.
His bravery, his kind and conciliating demeanour, his probity,
moderation, and good faith, soon gained him the respect and love
of the allies of Athens in that quarter. Acanthus and Stagirus
hastened to open their gates to him; and early in the ensuing
winter, by means of forced marches, he suddenly and unexpectedly
appeared before the important Athenian colony of Amphipolis on
the Strymon. In that town the Athenian party sent a message for
assistance to Thucydides, the historian, who was then general in
those parts. Thucydides hastened with seven ships from Thasos,
and succeeded in securing Eion at the mouth of the Strymon; but
Amphipolis, which lay a little higher up the river, allured by
the favourable terms offered, had already surrendered to
Brasidas. For his want of vigilance on this occasion, Thucydides
was, on the motion of Cleon, sentenced to banishment, and spent
the following twenty years of his life in exile. Torone, Scione,
and other towns also revolted from Athens.

In the following year (B.C. 422) Cleon was sent to Macedonia to
recover the Athenian dependencies, and especially Amphipolis. He
encamped on a rising ground on the eastern side of the town.
Having deserted the peaceful art of dressing hides for the more
hazardous trade of war, in which he was almost totally
inexperienced, and having now no Demosthenes to direct his
movements, Cleon was thrown completely off his guard by a very
ordinary stratagem on the part of Brasidas, who contrived to give
the town quite a deserted and peaceful appearance. Cleon
suffered his troops to fall into disorder, till he was suddenly
surprised by the astounding news that Brasidas was preparing for
a sally. Cleon at once resolved to retreat. But his skill was
equal to his valour. He conducted his retreat in the most
disorderly manner. His left wing had already filed off and his
centre with straggling ranks was in the act of following, when
Brasidas ordered the gates of the town to be flung open, and,
rushing out at the head of only 150 chosen soldiers, charged the
retreating columns in flank. They were immediately routed; but
Brasidas received a mortal wound and was carried off the field.
Though his men were forming on the hill, Cleon fled as fast as he
could on the approach of the enemy, but was pursued and slain by
a Thracian peltast. In spite, however, of the disgraceful flight
of their general, the right wing maintained their ground for a
considerable time, till some cavalry and peltasts issuing from
Amphipolis attacked them in flank and rear, and compelled them to
fly. On assembling again at Eion it was found that half the
Athenian hoplites had been slain. Brasidas was carried into
Amphipolis, and lived long enough to receive the tidings of his
victory. He was interred within the walls with great military
pomp in the centre of what thenceforth became the chief agora; he
was proclaimed oecist, or founder of the town; and was worshipped
as a hero with annual games and sacrifices.

By the death of Brasidas and Cleon the two chief obstacles to a
peace were removed; for the former loved war for the sake of its
glory, the latter for the handle which it afforded for agitation
and for attacking his political opponents. The Athenian Nicias,
and the Spartan king Pleistoanax, zealously forwarded the
negotiations, and in the spring of the year B.C. 421 a peace for
50 years, commonly called the PEACE OF NICIAS, was concluded on
the basis of a mutual restitution of prisoners and places
captured during the war.

CHAPTER XII.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.--SECOND PERIOD, FROM THE PEACE OF NICIAS
TO THE DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY, B.C. 421-413.

Several of the allies of Sparta were dissatisfied with the peace
which she had concluded; and soon afterwards some of them
determined to revive the ancient pretensions of Argos, and to
make her the head of a new confederacy, which should include all
Greece, with the exception of Sparta and Athens. The movement
was begun by the Corinthians, and the league was soon joined by
the Eleans, the Mantineans, and the Chalcidians.

Between Sparta and Athens themselves matters were far from being
on a satisfactory footing. Sparta confessed her inability to
compel the Boeotians and Corinthians to accede to the peace, or
even to restore the town of Amphipolis. Athens consequently
refused to evacuate Pylus, though she removed the Helots and
Messenians from it. In the negotiations which ensued respecting
the surrender of Pylus, Alcibiades took a prominent part. This
extraordinary man had already obtained immense influence at
Athens. Young, rich, handsome, profligate, and clever,
Alcibiades was the very model of an Athenian man of fashion. In
lineage he was a striking contrast to the plebeian orators of the
day. He traced his paternal descent from Ajax, whilst on his
mother's side he claimed relationship with the Alcmaeonidae and
consequently with Pericles. On the death of his father Clinias
Pericles had become his guardian. From early youth the conduct
of Alcibiades was marked by violence, recklessness, and vanity.
He delighted in astonishing the more sober portion of the
citizens by his capricious and extravagant feats. He was utterly
destitute of morality, whether public or private. But his vices
were partly redeemed by some brilliant qualities. He possessed
both boldness of design and vigour of action; and, though
scarcely more than thirty at the time of which we are now
speaking, he had already on several occasions distinguished
himself by his bravery. His more serious studies were made
subservient to the purposes of his ambition, for which some skill
as an orator was necessary. In order to attain it he frequented
the schools of the sophists, and exercised himself in the
dialectics of Prodicus, Protagoras, and above all of Socrates.

Such was the man who now opposed the application of the
Lacedaemonian ambassadors. Their reception had been so
favourable, that Alcibiades alarmed at the prospect of their
success, resorted to a trick in order to defeat it. He called
upon the Lacedaemonian envoys, one of whom happened to be his
personal friend; and he advised them not to tell the Assembly
that they were furnished with full powers, as in that case the
people would bully them into extravagant concessions, but rather
to say that they were merely come to discuss and report. He
promised, if they did so, to speak in their favour, and induce
the Assembly to grant the restitution of Pylus, to which he
himself had hitherto been the chief obstacle. Accordingly on the
next day, when the ambassadors were introduced into the Assembly,
Alcibiades, assuming his blandest tone and most winning smile,
asked them on what footing they came and what were their powers.
In reply to these questions, the ambassadors, who only a day or
two before had told Nicias and the Senate that they were come as
plenipotentiaries, now publicly declared, in the face of the
Assembly, that they were not authorized to conclude, but only to
negotiate and discuss. At this announcement, those who had heard
their previous declaration could scarcely believe their ears. A
universal burst of indignation broke forth at this exhibition of
Spartan duplicity; whilst, to wind up the scene, Alcibiades,
affecting to be more surprised than any, distinguished himself by
being the loudest and bitterest in his invectives against the
perfidy of the Lacedaemonians.

Shortly afterwards Alcibiades procured the completion of a treaty
of alliance for 100 years with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea (B.C.
420). Thus were the Grecian states involved in a complicity of
separate and often apparently opposite alliances. It was evident
that allies so heterogeneous could not long hold together;
nevertheless, nominally at least, peace was at first observed.

In the July which followed the treaty with Argos, the Olympic
games, which recurred every fourth year, were to be celebrated.
The Athenians had been shut out by the war from the two previous
celebrations; and curiosity was excited throughout Greece to see
what figure Athens would make at this great Pan-Hellenic
festival. War, it was surmised, must have exhausted her
resources, and would thus prevent her from appearing with
becoming splendour. But from this reproach she was rescued by
the wealth and vanity, if not by the patriotism, of Alcibiades.
By his care, the Athenian deputies exhibited the richest display
of golden ewers, censers, and other plate to be used in the
public sacrifice and procession; whilst for the games he entered
in his own name no fewer than the unheard-of number of seven
four-horsed chariots, of which one gained the first, and another
the second prize. Alcibiades was consequently twice crowned with
the olive, and twice proclaimed victor by the herald.

The growing ambition and success of Alcibiades prompted him to
carry his schemes against Sparta into the very heart of
Peloponnesus, without, however, openly violating the peace.

The Lacedaemonians now found it necessary to act with more
vigour; and accordingly in B.C. 418 they assembled a very large
army, under the command of the Spartan king, Agis. A decisive
battle was fought near Mantinea, in which Agis gained a brilliant
victory over the Argives and their allies. This battle and that
of Delium were the two most important engagements that had yet
been fought in the Peloponnesian war. Although the Athenians had
fought on the side of the Argives at Mantinea, the peace between
Sparta and Athens continued to be nominally observed.

In B.C. 416 the Athenians attacked and conquered Melos, which
island and Thera were the only islands in the AEgean not subject
to the Athenian supremacy. The Melians having rejected all the
Athenian overtures for a voluntary submission, their capital was
blockaded by sea and land, and after a siege of some months
surrendered. On the proposal, as it appears, of Alcibiades, all
the adult males were put to death, the women and children sold
into slavery, and the island colonized afresh by 500 Athenians.
This horrible proceeding was the more indefensible, as the
Athenians, having attacked the Melians in full peace, could not
pretend that they were justified by the custom of war in slaying
the prisoners. It was the crowning act of insolence and cruelty
displayed during their empire, which from this period began
rapidly to decline.

The event destined to produce that catastrophe--the intervention
of the Athenians in the affairs of Sicily--was already in
progress. A quarrel had broken out between Egesta and Selinus,
both which cities were seated near the western extremity of
Sicily; and Selinus, having obtained the aid of Syracuse, was
pressing very hard upon the Egestaeans. The latter appealed to
the interests of the Athenians rather than to their sympathies.
They represented how great a blow it would be to Athens if the
Dorians became predominant in Sicily, and joined the
Peloponnesian confederacy; and they undertook, if the Athenians
would send an armament to their assistance, to provide the
necessary funds for the prosecution of the war. Their most
powerful advocate was Alcibiades, whose ambitious views are said
to have extended even to the conquest of Carthage. The quieter
and more prudent Nicias and his party threw their weight into the
opposite scale. But the Athenian assembly, dazzled by the idea
of so splendid an enterprise, decided on despatching a large
fleet under Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus, with the design of
assisting Egesta, and of establishing the influence of Athens
throughout Sicily, by whatever means might be found practicable.

For the next three months the preparations for the undertaking
were pressed on with the greatest ardour. Young and old, rich
and poor, all vied with one another to obtain a share in the
expedition. Five years of comparative peace had accumulated a
fresh supply both of men and money; and the merchants of Athens
embarked in the enterprise as in a trading expedition. It was
only a few of the wisest heads that escaped the general fever of
excitement, The expedition was on the point of sailing, when a
sudden and mysterious event converted all these exulting feelings
into gloomy foreboding.

At every door in Athens, at the corners of streets, in the market
place, before temples, gymnasia, and other public places, stood
Hermae, or statues of the god Hermes, consisting of a bust of
that deity surmounting a quadrangular pillar of marble about the
height of the human figure. When the Athenians rose one morning
towards the end of May, 415 B.C., it was found that all these
figures had been mutilated during the night, and reduced by
unknown hands to a shapeless mass. The act inspired political,
as well as religious, alarm. It seemed to indicate a widespread
conspiracy, for so sudden and general a mutilation must have been
the work of many hands. The sacrilege might only be a
preliminary attempt of some powerful citizen to seize the
despotisn, and suspicion pointed its finger at Alcibiades.
Active measures were taken and large rewards offered for the
discovery of the perpetrators. A public board was appointed to
examine witnesses, which did not, indeed, succeed in eliciting
any facts bearing on the actual subject of inquiry, but which
obtained evidence respecting similar acts of impiety committed at
previous times in drunken frolics. In these Alcibiades himself
was implicated; and though the fleet was on the very eve of
departure, a citizen rose in the assembly and accused Alcibiades
of having profaned the Eleusinian mysteries by giving a
representation of them in a private house, producing in evidence
the testimony of a slave. Alcibiades denied the accusation, and
implored the people to have it investigated at once. His
enemies, however, had sufficient influence to get the inquiry
postponed till his return; thus keeping the charge hanging over
his head, and gaining time to poison the public mind against him.

The Athenian fleet, consisting of 100 triremes, and having on
board 1500 chosen Athenian hoplites, as well as auxiliaries, at
length set sail, and proceeded to Corcyra, where it was joined by
the other allies in the month of July, 415 B.C. Upon arriving at
Rhegium the generals received the discouraging news that Egesta
was unable to contribute more than thirty talents. A council of
war was now held; and it was finally resolved to gain as many
allies as they could among the Greek cities in Sicily, and,
having thus ascertained what assistance they could rely upon, to
attack Syracuse and Selinus.

Naxos joined the Athenians, and shortly afterwards they obtained
possession by surprise of the important city of Catana, which was
now made the head-quarters of the armament. Here an unwelcome
message greeted Alcibiades. after his departure from Athens,
Thessalus, the son of Cimon, preferred an indictment against him
in consequence of his profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries.
The Salaminian, or state, trireme was despatched to Sicily,
carrying the decree of the assembly for Alcibiades to come home
and take his trial. The commander of the Salaminia was, however,
instructed not to seize his person, but to allow him to sail in
his own trireme. Alcibiades availed himself of this privilege to
effect his escape. When the ships arrived at Thurii in Italy, he
absconded, and contrived to elude the search that was made after
him, Nevertheless, though absent, he was arraigned at Athens, and
condemned to death; his property was confiscated; and the
Eumolpidae, who presided ever the celebration of the Eleusinian
mysteries, pronounced upon him the curses of the gods. On
hearing of his sentence Alcibiades is said to have exclaimed, "I
will show them that I am still alive."

Three months had now been frittered away in Sicily, during which
the Athenians had done little or nothing, if we except the
acquisition of Naxos and Catana. Nicias now resolved to make an
attempt upon Syracuse. By a false message that the Catanaeans
were ready to assist in expelling the Athenians, he induced the
Syracusans to proceed thither in great force, and he availed
himself of their absence to sail with his whole fleet into the
Great Harbour of Syracuse, where he landed near the mouth of the
Anapus. The Syracusans, when they found that they had been
deceived at Catana, marched back and offered Nicias battle in his
new position. The latter accepted it, and gained the victory;
after which he retired to Catana, and subsequently to Naxos into
winter quarters.

The Syracusans employed the winter in preparations for defence.
They also despatched envoys to Corinth and Sparta to solicit
assistance, in the latter of which towns they found an unexpected
advocate. Alcibiades, having crossed from Thurii to Cyllene in
Peloponnesus, received a special invitation to proceed to Sparta.
Here he revealed all the plans of Athens, and exhorted the
Lacedaemonians to frustrate them. For this purpose he advised
them to send an army into Sicily, under the command of a Spartan
general, and, by way of causing a diversion, to establish a
fortified post at Decelea in the Attic territory. The Spartans
fell in with these views, and resolved to send a force to the
assistance of Syracuse in the spring, under the command of
Gylippus.

Nicias, having received reinforcements from Athens, recommenced
hostilities as soon as the season allowed of it, and resolved on
besieging Syracuse. That town consisted of two parts--the inner
and the outer city. The former of these--the original settlement
was comprised in the island of Ortygia; the latter afterwards
known by the name of Achradina, covered the high ground of the
peninsula north of Ortygia, and was completely separate from the
inner city. The island of Ortygia, to which the modern city is
now confined, is of an oblong shape, about two miles in
circumference, lying between the Great Harbour on the west, and
the Little Harbour on the east, and separated from the mainland
by a narrow channel. The Great Harbour is a splendid bay, about
five miles in circumference, and the Little Harbour was spacious
enough to receive a large fleet of ships of war. The outer city
was surrounded on the north and east by the sea and by sea-walls
which rendered an assault on that side almost impracticable. On
the land side it was defended by a wall, and partly also by the
nature of the ground, which in some part was very steep. West
and north-west of the wall of the outer city stood two
unfortified suburbs, which were at a later time included within
the walls of Syracuse under the names of Tyche and Neapolis.
Between these two suburbs the ground rose in a gentle acclivity
to the summit of the ranges of hills called Epipolae.

It was from the high ground of Epipolae that Syracuse was most
exposed to attack. Nicias landed at Leon, a place upon the bay
of Thapsus, at the distance of only six or seven stadia from
Epipolae, took possession of Epipolae, and erected on the summit
a fort called Labdalum. Then coming farther down the hill
towards Syracuse, he built another fort of a circular form and of
considerable size at a place called Syke. From the latter point
he commenced his line of circumvallation, one wall extending
southwards from Syke to the Great Harbour, and the other wall
running northwards to the outer sea. The Athenians succeeded in
completing the circumvallation towards the south, but in one of
their many engagements with the Syracusans they lost the gallant
Lamachus. At the same time, the Athenian fleet entered the Great
Harbour, where it was henceforth permanently established. The
northern wall was never completed, and through the passage thus
left open the besieged continued to obtain provisions. Nicias,
who, by the death of Lamachus, had become sole commander, seemed
now on the point of succeeding. The Syracusans were so sensible
of their inferiority in the field that they no longer ventured to
show themselves outside the walls. They began to contemplate
surrender, and even sent messages to Nicias to treat of the
terms. This caused the Athenian commander to indulge in a false
confidence of success, and consequent apathy; and the army having
lost the active and energetic Lamachus, operations were no longer
carried on with the requisite activity.

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