A Smaller History of Greece

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It was in this state of affairs that the Spartan commander,
Gylippus, passed over into Italy with a little squadron of four
ships, with the view merely of preserving the Greek cities in
that country, supposing that Syracuse, and, with her, the other
Greek cities in Sicily, were irretrievably lost. At Tarentum he
learned to his great surprise and satisfaction that the Athenian
wall of circumvallation at Syracuse had not yet been completed on
the northern side. He now sailed through the straits of Messana,
which were left completely unguarded, and arrived safely at
Himera on the north coast of Sicily. Here he announced himself
as the forerunner of larger succours, and began to levy an army
which the magic of the Spartan name soon enabled him to effect;
and in a few days he was in a condition to march towards Syracuse
with about 3000 men. The Syracusans now dismissed all thoughts
of surrender, and went out boldly to meet Gylippus, who marched
into Syracuse over the heights of Epipolae, which the supineness
of Nicias had left unguarded. Upon arriving in the city,
Gylippus sent a message to the Athenians allowing them a five
days' truce to collect their effects and evacuate the island.
Nicias returned no answer to this insulting proposal; but the
operations of Gylippus soon showed that the tide of affairs was
really turned. His first exploit was to capture the Athenian
fort at Labdalum, which made him master of Epipolae. He next
commenced constructing a counter-wall to intersect the Athenian
lines on the northern side. This turn of affairs induced those
Sicilian cities which had hitherto hesitated to embrace the side
of Syracuse. Gylippus was also reinforced by the arrival of
thirty triremes from Corinth, Leucas, and Ambracia. Nicias now
felt that the attempt to blockade Syracuse with his present force
was hopeless. He therefore resolved to occupy the headland of
Plemmyrium, the southernmost point of the entrance to the Great
Harbour, which would be a convenient station for watching the
enemy, as well as for facilitating the introduction of supplies.
Here he accordingly erected three forts and formed a naval
station. Some slight affairs occurred in which the balance of
advantage was in favour of the Syracusans. By their change of
station the Athenians were now a besieged rather than a besieging
force. Their triremes were becoming leaky, and their soldiers
and sailors were constantly deserting. Nicias himself had fallen
into a bad state of health; and in this discouraging posture of
affairs he wrote to Athens requesting to he recalled, and
insisting strongly on the necessity of sending reinforcements.

The Athenians refused to recall Nicias, but they determined on
sending a large reinforcement to Sicily, under the joint command
of Demosthenes and Eurymedon. The news of these fresh and
extensive preparations incited the Lacedaemonians to more
vigorous action. The peace, if such it can be called, was now
openly broken; and in the spring of 413 B.C. the Lacedaemonians,
under King Agis, invaded Attica itself, and, following the advice
of Alcibiades, established themselves permanently at Decelia, a
place situated on the ridge of Mount Parnes about 14 miles north
of Athens, and commanding the Athenian plain. The city was thus
placed in a state of siege. Scarcity began to be felt within the
walls; the revenues were falling off, whilst on the other hand
expenses were increasing.

Meanwhile in Sicily the Syracusans had gained such confidence
that they even ventured on a naval engagement with the Athenians.
In the first battle the Athenians were victorious, but the second
battle, which lasted two days, ended in their defeat. They were
now obliged to haul up their ships in the innermost part of the
Great Harbour, under the lines of their fortified camp. A still
more serious disaster than the loss of the battle was the loss of
their naval reputation. It was evident that the Athenians had
ceased to be invincible on the sea; and the Syracusans no longer
despaired of overcoming them on their own element.

Such was the state of affairs when, to the astonishment of the
Syracusans, a fresh Athenian fleet of 75 triremes, under
Demosthenes and Eurymedon, entered the Great Harbour with all the
pomp and circumstance of war. It had on board a force of 5000
hoplites, of whom about a quarter were Athenians, and a great
number of light-armed troops. The active and enterprising
character of Demosthenes led him to adopt more vigorous measures
than those which had been hitherto pursued. He saw at once that
whilst Epipolae remained in the possession of the Syracusans
there was no hope of taking their city, and he therefore directed
all his efforts to the recapture of that position. But his
attempts were unavailing. He was defeated not only in an open
assault upon the Syracusan wall, but in a nocturnal attempt to
carry it by surprise. These reverses were aggravated by the
breaking out of sickness among the troops. Demosthenes now
proposed to return home and assist in expelling the
Lacedaemonians from Attica, instead of pursuing an enterprise
which seemed to be hopeless. But Nicias, who feared to return to
Athens with the stigma of failure, refused to give his consent to
this step. Demosthenes then urged Nicias at least to sail
immediately out of the Great Harbour, and take up their position
either at Thapsus or Catana, where they could obtain abundant
supplies of provisions, and would have an open sea for the
manoeuvres of their fleet. But even to this proposal Nicias
would not consent; and the army and navy remained in their former
position. Soon afterwards, however, Gylippus received such large
reinforcements, that Nicias found it necessary to adopt the
advice of his colleague. Preparations were secretly made for
their departure, the enemy appear to have had no suspicion of
their intention and they were on the point of quitting their ill-
fated quarters on the following morning, when on the very night
before (27 Aug. 413 B.C.) an eclipse of the moon took place. The
soothsayers who were consulted said that the army must wait
thrice nine days, a full circle of the moon, before it could quit
its present position; and the devout and superstitious Nicias
forthwith resolved to abide by this decision.

Meanwhile the intention of the Athenians became known to the
Syracusans, who determined to strike a blow before their enemy
escaped. They accordingly attacked the Athenian station both by
sea and land. On land the attack of Gylippus was repulsed; but
at sea the Athenian fleet was completely defeated, and Eurymedon,
who commanded the right division, was slain The spirits of the
Symcusans rose with their victories; and though they would
formerly have been content with the mere retreat of the
Athenians, they now resolved on effecting their utter
destruction. With this view they blocked up the entrance of the
Great Harbour with a line of vessels moored across it. All hope
seemed now to be cut off from the Athenians, unless they could
succeed in forcing this line and thus effecting their escape.
The Athenian fleet still numbered 110 triremes, which Nicias
furnished with grappling-irons, in order to bring the enemy to
close quarters, and then caused a large proportion of his land-
force to embark.

Never perhaps was a battle fought under circumstances of such
intense interest, or witnessed by so many spectators vitally
concerned in the result. The basin of the Great Harbour, about 5
miles in circumference, in which nearly 200 ships, each with
crews of more than 200 men, were about to engage, was lined with
spectators. The Syracusan fleet was the first to leave the
shore. A considerable portion was detached to guard the barrier
at the mouth of the harbour. Hither the first and most impetuous
attack of the Athenians was directed, who sought to break through
the narrow opening which had been left for the passage of
merchant vessels. Their onset was repulsed, and the battle then
became general. The shouts of the combatants, and the crash of
the iron heads of the vessels as they were driven together,
resounded over the water, and were answered on shore by the
cheers or wailings of the spectators as their friends were
victorious or vanquished. For a long time the battle was
maintained with heroic courage and dubious result. At length, as
the Athenian vessels began to yield and make back towards the
shore, a universal shriek of horror and despair arose from the
Athenian army, whilst shouts of joy and victory were raised from
the pursuing vessels, and were echoed back from the Syracusans on
land. As the Athenian vessels neared the shore their crews
leaped out, and made for the camp, whilst the boldest of the land
army rushed forward to protect the ships from being seized by the
enemy. The Athenians succeeded in saving only 60 ships, or about
half their fleet. The Syracusan fleet, however, had been reduced
to 50 ships; and on the same afternoon, Nicias and Demosthenes,
as a last hope of escape, exhorted their men to make another
attempt to break the enemy's line, and force their way out of the
harbour. But the courage of the crews was so completely damped
that they positively refused to re-embark.

The Athenian army still numbered 40,000 men; and as all chance of
escape by sea was now hopeless, it was resolved to retreat by
land to some friendly city, and there defend themselves against
the attacks of the Syracusans. As the soldiers turned to quit
that fatal encampment, the sense of their own woes was for a
moment suspended by the sight of their unburied comrades, who
seemed to reproach them with the neglect of a sacred duty; but
still more by the wailings and entreaties of the wounded, who
clung around their knees, and implored not to be abandoned to
certain destruction. Amid this scene of universal woe and
dejection, a fresh and unwonted spirit of energy and heroism
seemed to be infused into Nicias. Though suffering under an
incurable complaint, he was everywhere seen marshalling his
troops and encouraging them by his exhortations. The march was
directed towards the territory of the Sicels in the interior of
the island. The army was formed into a hollow square with the
baggage in the middle; Nicias leading the van, and Demosthenes
bringing up the rear. The road ascended by a sort of ravine over
a steep hill called the Acraean cliff on which the Syracusans had
fortified themselves. After spending two days in vain attempts
to force this position, Nicias and Demosthenes resolved during
the night to strike off to the left towards the sea. But they
were overtaken, surrounded by superior forces, and compelled to
surrender at discretion. Out of the 40,000 who started from the
camp only 10,000 at the utmost were left at the end of the sixth
day's march, the rest had either deserted or been slain. The
prisoners were sent to work in the stone-quarries of Achradina
and Epipolae. Here they were crowded together without any
shelter, and with scarcely provisions enough to sustain life.
The numerous bodies of those who died were left to putrify where
they had fallen, till at length the place became such an
intolerable centre of stench and infection that, at the end of
seventy days, the Syracusans, for their own comfort and safety,
were obliged to remove the survivors, who were sold as slaves.
Nicias and Demosthenes were condemned to death in spite of all
the efforts of Gylippus and Hermocrates to save them.

Such was the end of two of the largest and best appointed
armaments that had ever gone forth from Athens. Nicias, as we
have seen, was from the first opposed to the expedition in which
they were employed, as pregnant with the most dangerous
consequences to Athens; and, though it must be admitted that in
this respect his views were sound, it cannot at the same time be
concealed that his own want of energy, and his incompetence as a
general, were the chief causes of the failure of the undertaking.
His mistakes involved the fall of Demosthenes, an officer of far
greater resolution and ability than himself, and who, had his
counsels been followed, would in all probability have conducted
the enterprise to a safe termination, though there was no longer
room to hope for success.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.--THIRD PERIOD, FROM THE SICILIAN
EXPEDITION TO THE END OF THE WAR, B.C. 413-404.

The destruction of the Sicilian armament was a fatal blow to the
power of Athens. It is astonishing that she was able to protract
the war so long with diminished strength and resources. Her
situation inspired her enemies with new vigour; states hitherto
neutral declared against her; her subject-allies prepared to
throw off the yoke; even the Persian satraps and the court of
Susa bestirred themselves against her. The first blow to her
empire was struck by the wealthy and populous island of Chios.
This again was the work of Alcibiades, the implacable enemy of
his native land, at whose advice a Lacedaemonian fleet was sent
to the assistance of the Chians. Their example was followed by
all the other Athenian allies in Asia, with the exception of
Samos, in which the democratical party gained the upper hand. In
the midst of this general defection the Athenians did not give
way to despair. Pericles had set apart a reserve of 1000 talents
to meet the contingency of an actual invasion. This still
remained untouched, and now by an unanimous vote the penalty of
death, which forbad its appropriation to any other purpose, was
abolished, and the fund applied in fitting out a fleet against
Chios. Samos became the head-quarters of the fleet, and the base
of their operations during the remainder of the war.

After a time the tide of success began to turn in favour of the
Athenians. They recovered Lesbos and Clazomenae, defeated the
Chians, and laid waste their territory. They also gained a
victory over the Peloponnesians at Miletus; while the
Peloponnesian fleet had lost the assistance of Tissaphernes, the
Persian satrap, through the intrigues of Alcibiades. In the
course of a few months Alcibiades had completely forfeited the
confidence of the Lacedaemonians. The Spartan king Agis, whose
wife he had seduced, was his personal enemy; and after the defeat
of the Peloponnesians at Miletus, Agis denounced him as a
traitor, and persuaded the new Ephors to send out instructions to
put him to death. Of this, however, he was informed time enough
to make his escape to Tissaphernes at Magnesia. Here he
ingratiated himself into the confidence of the satrap, and
persuaded him that it was not for the interest of Persia that
either of the Grecian parties should be successful, but rather
that they should wear each other out in their mutual struggles,
when Persia would in the end succeed in expelling both. This
advice was adopted by the satrap; and in order to carry it into
execution, steps were taken to secure the inactivity of the
Peloponnesian armament, which, if vigorously employed, was
powerful enough to put a speedy end to the war. In order to
secure his return to Athens, Alcibiades now endeavoured to
persuade Tissaphernes that it was more for the Persian interest
to conclude a league with Athens than with Sparta; but the only
part of his advice which the satrap seems to have sincerely
adopted was that of playing off one party against the other.
About this, however, Alcibiades did not at all concern himself.
It was enough for his views, which had merely the selfish aim of
his own restoration to Athens, if he could make it appear that he
possessed sufficient influence with Tissaphernes to procure his
assistance for the Athenians. He therefore began to communicate
with the Athenian generals at Samos, and held out the hope of a
Persian alliance as the price of his restoration to his country.
But as he both hated and feared the Athenian democracy, he
coupled his offer with the condition that a revolution should be
effected at Athens, and an oligarchy established. The Athenian
generals greedily caught at the proposal; and though the great
mass of the soldiery were violently opposed to it, they were
silenced, if not satisfied, when told that Athens could be saved
only by means of Persia. The oligarchical conspirators formed
themselves into a confederacy, and Pisander was sent to Athens to
lay the proposal before the Athenian assembly. It met, as it
might be supposed, with the most determined opposition. The
single but unanswerable reply of Pisander was, the necessities of
the republic; and at length a reluctant vote for a change of
constitution was extorted from the people. Pisander and ten
others were despatched to treat with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes.

Upon their arrival in Ionia they informed Alcibiades that
measures had been taken for establishing an oligarchical form of
government at Athens, and required him to fulfil his part of the
engagement by procuring the aid and alliance of Persia. But
Alcibiades knew that he had undertaken what he could not perform,
and he now resolved to escape from the dilemma by one of his
habitual artifices. He received the Athenian deputation in the
presence of Tissaphernes himself, and made such extravagant
demands on behalf of the satrap that Pisander and his colleagues
indignantly broke off the conference.

Notwithstanding the conduct of Alcibiades the oligarchical
conspirators proceeded with the revolution at Athens, in which
they had gone too far to recede. Pisander, with five of the
envoys, returned to Athens to complete the work they had begun.

Pisander proposed in the assembly, and carried a resolution, that
a committee of ten should be appointed to prepare a new
constitution, which was to be submitted to the approbation of the
people. But when the day appointed for that purpose arrived, the
assembly was not convened in the Pnyx, but in the temple of
Poseidon at Colonus, a village upwards of a mile from Athens.
Here the conspirators could plant their own partisans, and were
less liable to be overawed by superior numbers. Pisander
obtained the assent of the meeting to the following revolutionary
changes:--1. The abolition of all the existing magistracies; 2.
The cessation of all payments for the discharge of civil
functions; 3. The appointment of a committee of five persons,
who were to name ninety-five more; each of the hundred thus
constituted to choose three persons; the body of Four Hundred
thus formed to be an irresponsible government, holding its
sittings in the senate house. The four hundred were to convene a
select body of five thousand citizens whenever they thought
proper. Nobody knew who these five thousand were, but they
answered two purposes, namely, to give an air of greater
popularity to the government, as well as to overawe the people by
an exaggerated notion of its strength.

Thus perished the Athenian democracy, after an existence of
nearly a century since its establishment by Clisthenes The
revolution was begun from despair of the foreign relations of
Athens, and from the hope of assistance from Persia; but it was
carried out through the machinations of the conspirators after
that delusion had ceased.

At Samos the Athenian army refused to recognise the new
government. At the instance of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus a
meeting was called in which the soldiers pledged themselves to
maintain the democracy, to continue the war against Peloponnesus,
and to put down the usurpers at Athens. The soldiers, laying
aside for a while their military character, constituted
themselves into an assembly of the people, deposed several of
their officers, and appointed others whom they could better
trust. Thrasybulus proposed the recall of Alcibiades,
notwithstanding his connection with the oligarchical conspiracy,
because it was believed that he was now able and willing to aid
the democratic cause with the gold and forces of Persia. After
considerable opposition the proposal was agreed to; Alcibiades
was brought to Samos and introduced to the assembly, where by his
magnificent promises, and extravagant boasts respecting his
influence with Tissaphernes, he once more succeeded in deceiving
the Athenians. The accomplished traitor was elected one of the
generals, and, in pursuance of his artful policy, began to pass
backwards and forwards between Samos and Magnesia, with the view
of inspiring both the satrap and the Athenians with a reciprocal
idea of his influence with either, and of instilling distrust of
Tissaphernes into the minds of the Peloponnesians.

At the first news of the re-establishment of democracy at Samos,
distrust and discord had broken out among the Four Hundred.
Antiphon and Phrynichus, at the head of the extreme section of
the oligarchical party, were for admitting a Lacedaemonian
garrison. But others, discontented with their share of power,
began to affect more popular sentiments, among whom were
Theramenes and Aristocrates. Meantime Euboea, supported by the
Lacedaemonians and Boeotians, revolted from Athens. The loss of
this island seemed a death-blow. The Lacedaemonians might now
easily blockade the ports of Athens and starve her into
surrender; whilst the partisans of the Four Hundred would
doubtless co-operate with the enemy. But from this fate they
were saved by the characteristic slowness of the Lacedaemonians,
who confined themselves to securing the conquest of Euboea. Thus
left unmolested, the Athenians convened an assembly in the Pnyx.
Votes were passed for deposing the Four Hundred, and placing the
government in the hands of the 5000, of whom every citizen who
could furnish a panoply might be a member. In short, the old
constitution was restored, except that the franchise was
restricted to 5000 citizens, and payment for the discharge of
civil functions abolished. In subsequent assemblies, the
Archons, the Senate, and other institutions were revived; and a
vote was passed to recall Alcibiades and some of his friends.
The number of the 5000 was never exactly observed, and was soon
enlarged into universal citizenship. Thus the Four Hundred were
overthrown after a reign of four months, B.C. 411.

While these things were going on at Athens, the war was
prosecuted with vigour on the coast of Asia Minor. Mindarus, who
now commanded the Peloponnesian fleet, disgusted at length by the
often-broken promises of Tissaphernes, and the scanty and
irregular pay which he furnished, set sail from Miletus and
proceeded to the Hellespont, with the intention of assisting the
satrap Pharnabazus, and of effecting, if possible, the revolt of
the Athenian dependencies in that quarter. Hither he was pursued
by the Athenian fleet under Thrasyllus. In a few days an
engagement ensued (in August, 411 B.C.), in the famous straits
between Sestos and Abydos, in which the Athenians, though with a
smaller force, gained the victory and erected a trophy on the
promontory of Cynossema, near the tomb and chapel of the Trojan
queen Hecuba. The Athenians followed up their victory by the
reduction of Cyzicus, which had revolted from them. A month or
two afterwards another obstinate engagement took place between
the Peloponnesian and Athenian fleets ness Abydos, which lasted a
whole day, and was at length decided in favour of the Athenians
by the arrival of Alcibiades with his squadron of eighteen ships
from Samos.

Shortly after the battle Tissaphernes arrived at the Hellespont
with the view of conciliating the offended Peloponnesians. He
was not only jealous of the assistance which the latter were now
rendering to Pharnabarzus, but it is also evident that his
temporizing policy had displeased the Persian court. This
appears from his conduct on the present occasion, as well as from
the subsequent appointment of Cyrus to the supreme command on the
Asiatic coast as we shall presently have to relate. When
Alcibiades, who imagined that Tissaphernes was still favourable
to the Athenian cause waited on him with the customary presents,
he was arrested by order of the satrap, and sent in custody to
Sardis. At the end of a month, however, he contrived to escape
to Clazomenae, and again joined the Athenian fleet early in the
spring of 410 B.C. Mindaras, with the assistance of Pharnabazas
on the land side, was now engaged in the siege of Cyzicus, which
the Athenian admirals determined to relieve. Here a battle
ensued, in which Mindarus was slain, the Lacedaemonians and
Persians routed, and almost the whole Peloponnesian fleet
captured. The severity of this blow was pictured in the laconic
epistle in which Hippocrates, the second in command, [Called
Epistoteus or "Secretary" in the Lacedaemonian fleet. The
commander of the fleet had the title of NAVARCHUS.] announced it
to the Ephors: "Our good luck is gone; Mindarus is slain; the
men are starving; we know not what to do."

The results of this victory were most important. Perinthus and
Selymbria, as well as Cyzicus, were recovered; and the Athenians,
once more masters of the Propontis, fortified the town of
Chrysopolis, over against Byzantium, at the entrance of the
Bosporus; re-established their toll of ten per cent, on all
vessels passing from the Euxine; and left a squadron to guard the
strait and collect the dues. So great was the discouragement of
the Lacedaemonians at the loss of their fleet that the Ephor
Endius proceeded to Athens to treat for peace on the basis of
both parties standing just as they were. The Athenian assembly
was at this time led by the demagogue Cleophon, a lamp-maker,
known to us by the later comedies of Aristophanes. Cleophon
appears to have been a man of considerable ability; but the late
victories had inspired him with too sanguine hopes and he advised
the Athenians to reject the terms proposed by Endius. Athens
thus throw away the golden opportunity of recruiting her
shattered forces of which she stood so much in need; and to this
unfortunate advice must be ascribed the calamities which
subsequently overtook her.

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