A Smaller History of Greece

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The affairs of Asia Minor soon began to draw the attention of
Agesilaus to that quarter. The assistance lent to Cyrus by the
Spartans was no secret at the Persian court; and Tissaphernes,
who had been rewarded for his fidelity with the satrapy of Cyrus
in addition to his own, no sooner returned to his government than
he attacked the Ionian cities, then under the protection of
Sparta. A considerable Lacedaemonian force under Thimbron was
despatched to their assistance, and which, as related in the
preceding chapter, was joined by the remnant of the Greeks who
had served under Cyrus. Thimbron, however, proved so inefficient
a commander, that he was superseded at the end of 399 or
beginning of 398 B.C., and Dercyllidas appointed in his place.
But though at first successful against Pharnabazus in AEolis,
Dercyllidas was subsequently surprised in Caria in such an
unfavourable position that he would have suffered severely but
for the timidity of Tissaphernes, who was afraid to venture upon
an action. Under these circumstances an armistice was agreed to
for the purpose of treating for a peace (397 B.C.).

Pharnabazus availed himself of this armistice to make active
preparations for a renewal of the war. He obtained large
reinforcements of Persian troops, and began to organize a fleet
in Phoenicia and Cilicia. This was intrusted to the Athenian
admiral Conon, of whom we now first hear again after a lapse of
seven years since his defeat at AEgospotami. After that
disastrous battle Conon fled with nine triremes to Cyprus, where
he was now living under the protection of Evagoras, prince of
Salamis.

It was the news of these extensive preparations that induced
Agesilaus, on the suggestion of Lysander, to volunteer his
services against the Persians. He proposed to take with him only
30 full Spartan citizens, or peers, to act as a sort of council,
together with 2000 Neodamodes, or enfranchised Helots, and 6000
hoplites of the allies. Lysander intended to be the leader of
the 30 Spartans, and expected through them to be the virtual
commander of the expedition of which Agesilaus was nominally the
head.

Since the time of Agamemnon no Grecian king had led an army into
Asia; and Agesilaus studiously availed himself of the prestige of
that precedent in order to attract recruits to his standard. The
Spartan kings claimed to inherit the sceptre of Agamemnon; and to
render the parallel more complete, Agesilaus proceeded with a
division of his fleet to Aulis, intending there to imitate the
memorable sacrifice of the Homeric hero. But as he had neglected
to ask the permission of the Thebans, and conducted the sacrifice
and solemnities by means of his own prophets and ministers, and
in a manner at variance with the usual rites of the temple, the
Thebans were offended, and expelled him by armed force:--an
insult which he never forgave.

It was in 396 B.C. that Agesilaus arrived at Ephesus and took the
command in Asia. He demanded of the Persians the complete
independence of the Greek cities in Asia; and in order that there
might be time to communicate with the Persian court, the
armistice was renewed for three months. During this interval of
repose, Lysander, by his arrogance and pretensions, offended both
Agesilaus and the Thirty Spartans. Agesilaus, determined to
uphold his dignity, subjected Lysander to so many humiliations
that he was at last fain to request his dismissal from Ephesus,
and was accordingly sent to the Hellespont, where he did good
service to the Spartan interests.

Meanwhile Tissaphernes, having received large reinforcements,
sent a message to Agesilaus before the armistice had expired,
ordering him to quit Asia. Agesilaus immediately made
preparations as if he would attack Tissaphernes in Caria; but
having thus put the enemy on a false scent, he suddenly turned
northwards into Phrygia, the satrapy of Pharnabazus, and marched
without opposition to the neighbourhood of Dascylium, the
residence of the satrap himself. Here, however, he was repulsed
by the Persian cavalry. He now proceeded into winter quarters at
Ephesus, where be employed himself in organizing a body of
cavalry to compete with the Persians. During the winter the army
was brought into excellent condition; and Agesilaus gave out
early in the spring of 395 B.C. that he should march direct upon
Sardis. Tissaphernes suspecting another feint, now dispersed his
cavalry in the plain of the Maeander. But this time Agesilaus
marched as he had announced, and in three days arrived unopposed
on the banks of the Pactolus, before the Persian cavalry could be
recalled. When they at last came up, the newly raised Grecian
horse, assisted by the peltasts, and some of the younger and more
active hoplites, soon succeeded in putting them to flight. Many
of the Persians were drowned in the Pactolus, and their camp,
containing much booty and several camels, was taken.

Agesilaus now pushed his ravages up to the very gates of Sardis,
the residence of Tissaphernes. But the career of that timid and
treacherous satrap was drawing to a close. The queen-mother,
Parysatis, who had succeeded in regaining her influence over
Artaxerxes, caused an order to be sent down from Susa for his
execution; in pursuance of which he was seized in a bath at
Colossae, and beheaded. Tithraustes, who had been intrusted with
the execution of this order, succeeded Tissaphernes in the
satrapy, and immediately reopened negotiations with Agesilaus.
An armistice of six months was concluded; and meanwhile
Tithraustes, by a subsidy of 30 talents, induced Agesilaus to
move out of his satrapy into that of Pharnabazus.

During this march into Phrygia Agesilaus received a new
commission from home, appointing him the head of the naval as
well as of the land force--two commands never before united in a
single Spartan. He named his brother-in-law, Pisander, commander
of the fleet. But in the following year (B.C. 394), whilst he
was preparing an expedition on a grand scale into the interior of
Asia Minor, he was suddenly recalled home to avert the dangers
which threatened his native country.

The jealousy and ill-will with which the newly acquired empire of
the Spartans was regarded by the other Grecian states had not
escaped the notice of the Persians; and when Tithraustes
succeeded to the satrapy of Tissaphernes he resolved to avail
himself of this feeling by exciting a war against Sparta in the
heart of Greece itself. With this view he despatched one
Timocrates, a Rhodian, to the leading Grecian cities which
appeared hostile to Sparta, carrying with him a sum of 50 talents
to be distributed among the chief men in each for the purpose of
bringing them over to the views of Persia. Timocrates was
successful in Thebes, Corinth, and Argos but he appears not to
have visited Athens.

Hostilities were at first confined to Sparta and Thebes. A
quarrel having arisen between the Opuntian Locrians and the
Phocians respecting a strip of border land, the former people
appealed to the Thebans, who invaded Phocis. The Phocians on
their side invoked the aid of the Lacedaemonians, who, elated
with the prosperous state of their affairs in Asia, and moreover
desirous of avenging the affronts they had received from the
Thebans, readily listened to the appeal. Lysander, who took an
active part in promoting the war, was directed to attack the town
of Haliartus; and it was arranged that King Pausanias should join
him on a fixed day under the walls of that town, with the main
body of the Lacedaemonians and their Peloponnesian allies.

Nothing could more strikingly denote the altered state of feeling
in Greece than the request for assistance which the Thebans, thus
menaced, made to their ancient enemies and rivals the Athenians.
Nor were the Athenians backward in responding to the appeal.
Lysander arrived at Haliartus before Pausanias. Here, in a sally
made by the citizens, opportunely supported by the unexpected
arrival of a body of Thebans, the army of Lysander was routed,
and himself slain. His troops disbanded and dispersed themselves
in the night time. Thus, when Pausanias at last came up, he
found no army to unite with; and as an imposing Athenian force
had arrived, he now, with the advice of his council took the
humiliating step--always deemed a confession of inferiority--of
requesting a truce in order to bury the dead who had fallen in
the preceding battle. Even this, however, the Thebans would not
grant except on the condition that the Lacedaemonians should
immediately quit their territory. With these terms Pausanias was
forced to comply; and after duly interring the bodies of Lysander
and his fallen comrades, the Lacedaemonians dejectedly pursued
their homeward march. Pausanias, afraid to face the public
indignation of the Spartans took refuge in the temple of Athena
Alea at Tegea; and being condemned to death in his absence, only
escaped that fate by remaining in the sanctuary. He was
succeeded by his son Agesipolis.

The enemies of Sparta took fresh courage from this disaster to
her arms. Athens, Corinth, and Argos now formed with Thebes a
solemn alliance against her. The league was soon joined by the
Euboeans, the Acarnanians, and other Grecian states. In the
spring of 394 B.C. the allies assembled at Corinth, and the war,
which had been hitherto regarded as merely Boeotian, was now
called the CORINTHIAN, by which name it is known in history.
This threatening aspect of affairs determined the Ephors to
recall Agesilaus, as already related.

The allies were soon in a condition to take the field with a
force of 24,000 hoplites, of whom one-fourth were Athenians,
together with a considerable body of light troops and cavalry.
The Lacedaemonians had also made the most active preparations.
In the neighbourhood of Corinth a battle was fought, in which the
Lacedaemonians gained the victory, though their allied troops
were put to the rout. This battle, called the battle of Corinth,
was fought in July 394 B.C.

Agesilaus, who had relinquished with a heavy heart his projected
expedition into Asia, was now on his homeward march. By the
promise of rewards he had persuaded the bravest and most
efficient soldiers in his army to accompany him, amongst whom
were many of the Ten Thousand, with Xenophon at their head. The
route of Agesilaus was much the same as the one formerly
traversed by Xerxes, and the camels which accompanied the army
gave it somewhat of an oriental aspect. At Amphipolis he
received the news of the victory at Corinth; but his heart was so
full of schemes against Persia, that the feeling which it
awakened in his bosom was rather one of regret that so many
Greeks had fallen, whose united efforts might have emancipated
Asia Minor, than of joy at the success of his countrymen. Having
forced his way through a desultory opposition offered by the
Thessalian cavalry, he crossed Mount Othrys, and marched
unopposed the rest of the way through the straits of Thermopylae
to the frontiers of Phocis and Boeotia. Here the evil tidings
reached him of the defeat and death of his brother-in-law,
Pisander, in a great sea-fight off Cnidus in Caria (August 394
B.C.) Conon, with the assistance of Pharnabazus, had succeeded in
raising a powerful fleet, partly Phoenician and partly Grecian,
with which he either destroyed or captured more than half of the
Lacedaemonian fleet. Agesilaus, fearing the impression which
such sad news might produce upon his men, gave out that the
Lacedaemonian fleet had gained a victory; and, having offered
sacrifice as if for a victory, he ordered an advance.

Agesilaus soon came up with the confederate army, which had
prepared to oppose him in the plain of Coronea. The Thebans
succeeded in driving in the Orchomenians, who formed the left
wing of the army of Agesilaus, and penetrated as far as the
baggage in the rear. But on the remainder of the line Agesilaus
was victorious, and the Thebans now saw themselves cut off from
their companions, who had retreated and taken up a position on
Mount Helicon. Facing about and forming in deep and compact
order, the Thebans sought to rejoin the main body, but they were
opposed by Agesilaus and his troops. The shock of the
conflicting masses which ensued was one of the most terrible
recorded in the annals of Grecian warfare. The shields of the
foremost ranks were shattered, and their spears broken, so that
daggers became the only available arm. Agesilaus, who was in the
front ranks, unequal by his size and strength to sustain so
furious an onset, was flung down, trodden on, and covered with
wounds; but the devoted courage of the 50 Spartans forming his
body-guard rescued him from death. The Thebans finally forced
their may through, but not without severe loss. The victory of
Agesilaus was not very decisive; but the Thebans tacitly
acknowledged their defeat by soliciting the customary truce for
the burial of their dead.

Agesilaus, on his arrival at Sparta, was received with the most
lively demonstrations of gratitude and esteem, and became hence-
forward the sole director of Spartan policy.

Thus in less than two months the Lacedaemonians had fought two
battles on land, and one at sea; namely, those of Corinth,
Coronea, and Cnidus. But, though they had been victorious in the
land engagements, they were so little decisive as to lead to no
important result; whilst their defeat at Cnidus produced the most
disastrous consequences. It was followed by the loss of nearly
all their maritime empire, even faster than they had acquired it
after the battle of AEgospotami. For as Conon and Pharnabazus
sailed with their victorious fleet from island to island, and
from port to port, their approach was everywhere the signal for
the flight or expulsion of the Spartan harmosts.

In the spring of the following year (B.C. 393) Conon and
Pharnabazus sailed to the isthmus of Corinth, then occupied as a
central post by the allies. The appearance of a Persian fleet in
the Saronic gulf was a strange sight to Grecian eyes, and one
which might have served as a severe comment on the effect of
their suicidal wars. Conon dexterously availed himself of the
hatred of Pharnabazus towards Sparta to procure a boon for his
native city. As the satrap was on the point of proceeding
homewards, Conon obtained leave to employ the seamen in
rebuilding the fortifications of Piraeus and the long walls of
Athens. Pharnabazus also granted a large sum for the same
purpose; and Conon had thus the glory of appearing, like a second
Themistocles, the deliverer and restorer of his country. Before
the end of autumn the walls were rebuilt. Having thus, as it
were, founded Athens a second time, Conon sailed to the islands
to lay again the foundations of an Athenian maritime empire.

During the remainder of this and the whole of the following year
(B.C. 392) the war was carried on in the Corinthian territory.

One of the most important events at this time was the destruction
of a whole Lacedaemonian MORA, or battalion, by the light-armed
mercenaries of the Athenian Iphicrates. For the preceding two
years Iphicrates had commanded a body of mercenaries, consisting
of peltasts, [So called from the pelta, or kind of shield which
they carried.] who had been first organised by Conon after
rebuilding the walls of Athens. For this force Iphicrates
introduced those improved arms and tactics which form an epoch in
the Grecian art of war. His object was to combine as far as
possible the peculiar advantages of the hoplites and light-armed
troops. He substituted a linen corslet for the coat of mail worn
by the hoplites, and lessened the shield, while he rendered the
light javelin and short sword of the peltasts more effective by
lengthening them both one-half These troops soon proved very
effective. After gaining several victories he ventured to make a
sally from Corinth, and attacked a Lacedaemonian mora in flank
and rear. So many fell under the darts and arrows of the
peltasts that the Lacedaemonian captain called a halt, and
ordered the youngest and most active of his hoplites to rush
forward and drive off the assailants. But their heavy arms
rendered them quite unequal to such a mode of fighting; nor did
the Lacedaemonian cavalry, which now came up, but which acted
with very little vigour and courage, produce any better effect.
At length the Lacedaemonians succeeded in reaching an eminence,
where they endeavoured to make a stand; but at this moment
Callias arrived with some Athenian hoplites from Corinth,
whereupon the already disheartened Lacedaemonians broke and fled
in confusion, pursued by the peltasts, who committed such havoc,
chasing and killing some of them even in the sea, that but very
few of the whole body succeeded in effecting their escape.

The maritime war was prosecuted with vigour. Thrasybulus, and
after his death Iphicrates, were successful upon the coast of
Asia Minor, and made the Athenians again masters of the
Hellespont. Under these circumstances the Lacedaemonians
resolved to spare no efforts to regain the good will of the
Persians. Antalcidas, the Lacedaemonian commander on the Asiatic
coast, entered into negotiations with Tiribazus, who had
succeeded Tithraustes in the satrapy of Ionia, in order to bring
about a general peace under the mediation of Persia. Conducted
by Tiribazus, Antalcidas repaired to the Persian court, and
prevailed an the Persian monarch both to adopt the peace, and to
declare war against those who should reject it. Antalcidas and
Tiribazus returned to the coasts of Asia Minor, not only armed
with these powers, but provided with an ample force to carry them
into execution. In addition to the entire fleet of Persia,
Dionysius of Syracuse had placed 20 triremes at the service of
the Lacedaemonians; and Antalcidas now sailed with a large fleet
to the Hellespont, where Iphicrates and the Athenians were still
predominant. The overwhelming force of Antalcidas, the largest
that had been seen in the Hellespont since the battle of
AEgospotami, rendered all resistance hopeless. The supplies of
corn from the Euxine no longer found their way to Athens: and
the Athenians, depressed at once both by what they felt and by
what they anticipated, began to long for peace. As without the
assistance of Athens it seemed hopeless for the other allies to
struggle against Sparta, all Greece was inclined to listen to an
accommodation.

Under these circumstances deputies from the Grecian states were
summoned to meet Tiribazus; who, after exhibiting to them the
royal seal of Persia, read to them the following terms of a
peace: "King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia
and the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus should belong to him.
He also thinks it just to leave all the other Grecian cities,
both small and great, independent--except Lemnos, Imbros, and
Scyros, which are to belong to Athens, as of old. should any
parties refuse to accept this peace, I will make war upon them,
along with those who are of the same mind, both by land and sea,
with ships and with money." All the Grecian states accepted
these terms.

This disgraceful peace, called the PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS, was
concluded in the year B.C. 387. By it Greece seemed prostrated
at the feet of the barbarians; for its very terms, engraven on
stone and set up in the sanctuaries of Greece, recognised the
Persian king as the arbiter of her destinies. Although Athens
cannot be entirely exonerated from the blame of this transaction,
the chief guilt rests upon Sparta, whose designs were far deeper
and more hypocritical than they appeared. Under the specious
pretext of securing the independence of the Grecian cities, her
only object was to break up the confederacies under Athens and
Thebes, and, with the assistance of Persia, to pave the way for
her own absolute dominion in Greece.

No sooner was the peace of Antalcidas concluded than Sparta,
directed by Agesilaus, the ever-active enemy of Thebes, exerted
all her power to weaken that city. She began by proclaiming the
independence of the various Boeotian cities, and by organizing in
each a local oligarchy, adverse to Thebes and favourable to
herself. Lacedaemonian garrisons were placed in Orchomenus and
Thespiae, and Plataea was restored in order to annoy and weaken
Thebes. Shortly afterwards the Lacedaemonians obtained
possession of Thebes itself by an act of shameful treachery.
They had declared war against Olynthus, a town situated at the
head of the Toronaic gulf, in the peninsula of the Macedonian
Chalcidice, the head of a powerful confederation which included
several of the adjacent Grecian cities. The Thebans had entered
into an alliance with Olynthus, and had forbidden any of their
citizens to join the Lacedaemonian army destined to act against
it; but they were not strong enough to prevent its marching
through their territory. Phoebidas, who was conducting a
Lacedaemonian force against Olynthus, halted on his way through
Boeotia not far from Thebes; where he was visited by Leontiades,
one of the polemarchs of the city, and two or three other leaders
of the Lacedaemonian party in Thebes. It happened that the
festival of the Thesmophoria was on the point of being
celebrated, during which the Cadmea, or Theban Acropolis, was
given up for the exclusive use of the women. The opportunity
seemed favourable for a surprise; and Leontiades and Phoebidas
concerted a plot to seize it. Whilst the festival was
celebrating, Phoebidas pretended to resume his march, but only
made a circuit round the city walls; whilst Leontiades, stealing
out of the senate, mounted his horse, and, joining the
Lacedaemonian troops, conducted them towards the Cadmea. It was
a sultry summer's afternoon, so that the very streets were
deserted; and Phoebidas, without encountering any opposition,
seized the citadel and all the women in it, to serve as hostages
for the quiet submission of the Thebans (B.C. 382). This
treacherous act during a period of profound peace awakened the
liveliest indignation throughout Greece. Sparta herself could
not venture to justify it openly, and Phoebidas was made the
scape-goat of her affected displeasure. As a sort of atonement
to the violated feeling of Greece, he was censured, fined, and
dismissed. But that this was a mere farce is evident from the
fact, of his subsequent restoration to command; and, however
indignant the Lacedaemonians affected to appear at the act of
Phoebidas, they took care to reap the fruits of it by retaining
their garrison in the Cadmea.

The once haughty Thebes was now enrolled a member of the
Lacedaemonian alliance, and furnished her contingent--the
grateful offering of the new Theban government--for the war which
Sparta was prosecuting with redoubled vigour against Olynthus.
This city was taken by the Lacedaemonians in B.C. 379; the
Olynthian confederacy was dissolved; the Grecian cities belonging
to it were compelled to join the Lacedaemonian alliance; whilst
the maritime towns of Macedonia were reduced under the dominion
of Amyntas, the king of Macedon.

The power of Sparta on land had now attained its greatest height.
Her unpopularity in Greece was commensurate with the extent of
her harshly administered dominion. She was leagued on all slides
with the enemies of Grecian freedom--with the Persians, with
Amyntas of Macedon, and with Dionysius of Syracuse. But she had
now reached the turning-point of her fortunes, and her successes,
which had been earned without scruple, were soon to be followed
by misfortunes and disgrace. The first blow came from Thebes,
where she had perpetrated her most signal injustice.

That city had been for three years in the hands of Leontiades and
the Spartan party. During this time great discontent had grown
up among the resident citizens; and there was also the party of
exasperated exiles, who had taken refuge at Athens. Among these
exiles was Pelopidas, a young man of birth and fortune, who had
already distinguished himself by his disinterested patriotism and
ardent character. He now took the lead in the plans formed the
the liberation of his country, and was the heart and soul of the
enterprise. His warm and generous heart was irresistibly
attracted by everything great and noble; and hence he was led to
form a close and intimate friendship with Epaminondas, who was
several years older than himself and of a still loftier
character. Their friendship is said to have originated in a
campaign in which they served together, when, Pelopidas having
fallen in battle apparently dead, Epaminondas protected his body
at the imminent risk of his own life. Pelopidas afterwards
endeavoured to persuade Epaminondas to share his riches with him;
and when he did not succeed, he resolved to live on the same
frugal fare as his great friend. A secret correspondence was
opened with his friends at Thebes, the chief of whom were
Phyllidas, secretary to the polemarchs, and Charon. The dominant
faction, besides the advantage of the actual possession of power,
was supported by a garrison of 1500 Lacedaemonians. The
enterprise, therefore, was one of considerable difficulty and
danger. In the execution of it Phyllidas took a leading part.
It was arranged that he should give a supper to Archias and
Philippus, the two polemarchs, and after they had partaken freely
of wine the conspirators were to be introduced, disguised as
women, and to complete their work by the assassination of the
polemarchs. On the day before the banquet, Pelopidas, with six
other exiles, arrived at Thebes from Athens, and, straggling
through the gates towards dusk in the disguise of rustics and
huntsmen, arrived safely at the house of Charon, where they
remained concealed till the appointed hour. While the polemarchs
were at table a messenger arrived from Athens with a letter for
Archias, in which the whole plot was accurately detailed. The
messenger, in accordance with his instructions, informed Archias
that the letter related to matters of serious importance. But
the polemarch, completely engrossed by the pleasures of the
table, thrust the letter under the pillow of his couch,
exclaiming, "Serious matters to-morrow."

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