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[10] Reading, with Breitenbach and Hartman, {as} instead of {os
espoudasate k.t.l.}

[11] Or, more lit. "to avert the peace" as an ill-omened thing.

[12] Without inserting {tis}, as Hartman proposes ("An. Xen." p. 387),
that, I think, is the sense. Antalcidas is the arch-diplomat--a
name to conjure with, like that of Bismarck in modern European
politics. But see Grote, "H. G." x. 213, note 2.

"Well! what is it really that has brought us here? No especial need or
difficulty in our affairs. That you may discover by a glance at our
maritime condition, or, if you prefer, at the present posture of our
affairs on land. Well, then, how does the matter stand? It is obvious
that some of our allies please us no better than they please you;[13]
and, possibly, in return for your former preservation of us, we may be
credited with a desire to point out to you the soundness of our
policy.

[13] See, for this corrupt passage, Otto Keller, op. cit. p. 219;
Hartman, op. cit. p. 387; and Breitenbach, n. ad loc. In the next
sentence I should like to adopt Hartman's emendation (ib.) {on
orthos egnote} for the MSS. {a orthos egnomen}, and translate "we
may like to prove to you the soundness of your policy at the
time." For the "preservation" referred to, see below, VI. v. 35,
and above, II. ii. 20.

"But, to revert once more to the topic of expediency and common
interests. It is admitted, I presume, that, looking at the states
collectively, half support your views, half ours; and in every single
state one party is for Sparta and another for Athens. Suppose, then,
we were to shake hands, from what quarter can we reasonably anticipate
danger and trouble? To put the case in so many words, so long as you
are our friends no one can vex us by land; no one, whilst we are your
supports, can injure you by sea. Wars like tempests gather and grow to
a head from time to time, and again they are dispelled. That we all
know. Some future day, if not to-day, we shall crave, both of us, for
peace. Why, then, need we wait for that moment, holding on until we
expire under the multitude of our ills, rather than take time by the
forelock and, before some irremediable mischief betide, make peace? I
cannot admire the man who, because he has entered the lists and has
scored many a victory and obtained to himself renown, is so eaten up
with the spirit of rivalry that he must needs go on until he is beaten
and all his training is made futile. Nor again do I praise the gambler
who, if he makes one good stroke of luck, insists on doubling the
stakes. Such conduct in the majority of cases must end in absolute
collapse. Let us lay the lesson of these to heart, and forbear to
enter into any such lists as theirs for life or death; but, while we
are yet in the heyday of our strength and fortune, shake hands in
mutual amity. So assuredly shall we through you and you through us
attain to an unprecedented pinnacle of glory throughout Hellas."

The arguments of the speakers were approved, and the Lacedaemonians
passed a resolution to accept peace on a threefold basis: the
withdrawal of the governors from the cities,[14] the disbanding of
armaments naval and military, and the guarantee of independence to the
states. "If any state transgressed these stipulations, it lay at the
option of any power whatsoever to aid the states so injured, while,
conversely, to bring such aid was not compulsory on any power against
its will." On these terms the oaths were administered and accepted by
the Lacedaemonians on behalf of themselves and their allies, and by
the Athenians and their allies separately state by state. The Thebans
had entered their individual name among the states which accepted the
oaths, but their ambassadors came the next day with instructions to
alter the name of the signatories, substituting for Thebans
Boeotians.[15] But Agesilaus answered to this demand that he would
alter nothing of what they had in the first instance sworn to and
subscribed. If they did not wish to be included in the treaty, he was
willing to erase their name at their bidding. So it came to pass that
the rest of the world made peace, the sole point of dispute being
confined to the Thebans; and the Athenians came to the conclusion that
there was a fair prospect of the Thebans being now literally
decimated.[16] As to the Thebans themselves, they retired from Sparta
in utter despondency.

[14] Grote ("H. G." x. 236) thinks that Diod. xv. 38 ({exagogeis})
belongs to this time, not to the peace between Athens and Sparta
in 374 B.C.

[15] See, for a clear explanation of the matter, Freeman, "Hist. Red.
Gov." iv. p. 175, note 3, in reference to Grote, ib. x. 231 note,
and Paus. IX. xiii. 2; Plut. "Ages." 28; Thirlwall, "H. G." v. p
69 note.

[16] Or, "as the saying is, taken and tithed." See below, VI. v. 35,
and for the origin of the saying, Herod. vii. 132.

IV

In consequence of the peace the Athenians proceeded to withdraw their
garrisons from the different sates, and sent to recall Iphicrates with
his fleet; besides which they forced him to restore eveything captured
subsequently to the late solemn undertaking at Lacedaemon. The
Lacedaemonians acted differently. Although they withdrew their
governors and garrisons from the other states, in Phocis they did not
do so. Here Cleombrotus was quartered with his army, and had sent to
ask directions from the home authorities. A speaker, Prothous,
maintained that their business was to disband the army in accordance
with their oaths, and then to send round invitations to the states to
contribute what each felt individually disposed, and lay such sum in
the temple of Apollo; after which, if any attempt to hinder the
independence of the states on any side were manifested, it would be
time enough then again to invite all who cared to protect the
principle of autonomy to march against its opponents. "In this way,"
he added, "I think the goodwill of heaven will be secured, and the
states will suffer least annoyance." But the Assembly, on hearing
these views, agreed that this man was talking nonsense. Puppets in the
hands of fate![1] An unseen power, it would seem, was already driving
them onwards; so they sent instructions to Cleombrotus not to disband
the army, but to march straight against the Thebans if they refused to
recognise the autonomy of the states. [Cleombrotus, it is understood,
had, on hearing the news of the establishment of peace, sent to the
ephorate to ask for guidance; and then they sent him the above
instructions, bidding him under the circumstances named to march upon
Thebes.[2]]

[1] See Grote, "H. G." x. 237: "The miso-Theban impulse now drove them
on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts . . . a
misguiding inspiration sent by the gods--like that of the Homeric
Ate."

[2] This passage reads like an earlier version for which the above was
substituted by the author.

The Spartan king soon perceived that, so far from leaving the Boeotian
states their autonomy, the Thebans were not even preparing to disband
their army, clearly in view of a general engagement; he therefore felt
justified in marching his troops into Boeotia. The point of ingress
which he adopted was not that which the Thebans anticipated from
Phocis, and where they were keeping guard at a defile; but, marching
through Thisbae by a mountainous and unsuspected route, he arrived
before Creusis, taking that fortress and capturing twelve Theban war-
vessels besides. After this achievement he advanced from the seaboard
and encamped in Leuctra on Thespian territory. The Thebans encamped in
a rising ground immediately opposite at no great distance, and were
supported by no allies except the Boeotians.

At this juncture the friends of Cleombrotus came to him and urged upon
him strong reasons for delivering battle. "If you let the Thebans
escape without a battle," they said, "you will run great risks of
suffering the extreme penalty at the hands of the state. People will
call to mind against you the time when you reached Cynoscephelae and
did not ravage a square foot of Theban territory; and again, a
subsequent expedition when you were driven back foiled in your attempt
to make an entry into the enemy's country--while Agesilaus on each
occasion found his entry by Mount Cithaeron. If then you have any care
for yourself, or any attachment to your fatherland, march you against
the enemy." That was what his friends urged. As to his opponents, what
they said was, "Now our fine friend will show whether he really is so
concerned on behalf of the Thebans as he is said to be."

Cleombrotus, with these words ringing in his ears, felt driven[3] to
join battle. On their side the leaders of Thebes calculated that, if
they did not fight, their provincial cities[4] would hold aloof from
them and Thebes itself would be besieged; while, if the commonalty of
Thebes failed to get supplies, there was every prospect that the city
itself would turn against them; and, seeing that many of them had
already tasted the bitterness of exile, they came to the conclusion
that it was better for them to die on the field of battle than to
renew that experience. Besides this they were somewhat encouraged by
the recital of an oracle which predicted that the Lacedaemonians would
be defeated on the spot where the monument of the maidens stood, who,
as the story goes, being violated by certain Lacedaemonians, had slain
themselves.[5] This sepulchral monument the Thebans decked with
ornaments before the battle. Furthermore, tidings were brought them
from the city that all the temples had opened of their own accord; and
the priestesses asserted that the gods revealed victory. Again, from
the Heracleion men said that the arms had disappeared, as though
Heracles himself had sallied forth to battle. It is true that another
interpretation[6] of these marvels made them out to be one and all the
artifices of the leaders of Thebes. However this may be, everything in
the battle turned out adverse to the Lacedaemonians; while fortune
herself lent aid to the Thebans and crowned their efforts with
success. Cleombrotus held his last council "whether to fight or not,"
after the morning meal. In the heat of noon a little goes a long way;
and the people said that it took a somewhat provocative effect on
their spirits.[7]

[3] Or, "was provoked."

[4] Lit. "perioecid." See Thuc. iv. 76, Arnold's note, and "Hell." V.
iv. 46, 63.

[5] See Diod. xv. 54; Paus. IX. xiii. 3; Plut. "Pelop." xx.

[6] Or, "it is true that some people made out these marvels."

[7] Or, "they were somewhat excited by it."

Both sides were now arming, and there was the unmistakeable signs of
approaching battle, when, as the first incident, there issued from the
Boeotian lines a long train bent on departure--these were the
furnishers of the market, a detachment of baggage bearers, and in
general such people as had no inclination to join in the fight. These
were met on their retreat and attacked by the mercenary troops under
Hiero, who got round them by a circular movement.[8] The mercenaries
were supported by the Phocian light infantry and some squadrons of
Heracleot and Phliasian cavalry, who fell upon the retiring train and
turned them back, pursuing them and driving them into the camp of the
Boeotians. The immediate effect was to make the Boeotian portion of
the army more numerous and closer packed than before. The next feature
of the combat was that in consequence of the flat space of plain[9]
between the opposing armies, the Lacedaemonians posted their cavalry
in front of their squares of infantry, and the Thebans followed suit.
Only there was this difference--the Theban cavalry was in a high state
of training and efficiency, owing to their war with the Orchomenians
and again their war with Thespiae, whilst the cavalry of the
Lacedaemonians was at its worst at this period.[10] The horses were
reared and kept by the wealthiest members of the state; but whenever
the ban was called out, an appointed trooper appeared who took the
horse with any sort of arms which might be presented to him, and set
off on the expedition at a moment's notice. Moreover, these troopers
were the least able-bodied of the men: raw recruits set simply astride
their horses, and devoid of soldierly ambition. Such was the cavalry
of either antagonist.

[8] Or, "surrounded them."

[9] See Rustow and Kochly, op. cit. p. 173.

[10] See "Hipparch." ix. 4; also "Cyrop." VIII. viii.

The heavy infantry of the Lacedaemonians, it is said, advanced by
sections three files abreast,[11] allowing a total depth to the whole
line of not more than twelve. The Thebans were formed in close order
of not less than fifty shields deep, calculating that victory gained
over the king's division of the army implied the easy conquest of the
rest.

[11] It would appear that the "enomoty" (section) numbered thirty-six
files. See "Pol. Lac." xi. 4; xiii. 4. For further details as to
the tactical order of the Thebans, see Diod. xv. 55; Plut.
"Pelop." xxiii.

Cleombrotus had hardly begun to lead his division against the foe
when, before in fact the troops with him were aware of his advance,
the cavalry had already come into collision, and that of the
Lacedaemonians was speedily worsted. In their flight they became
involved with their own heavy infantry; and to make matters worse, the
Theban regiments were already attacking vigorously. Still strong
evidence exists for supposing that Cleombrotus and his division were,
in the first instance, victorious in the battle, if we consider the
fact that they could never have picked him up and brought him back
alive unless his vanguard had been masters of the situation for the
moment.

When, however, Deinon the polemarch and Sphodrias, a member of the
king's council, with his son Cleonymus,[12] had fallen, then it was
that the cavalry and the polemarch's adjutants,[13] as they are
called, with the rest, under pressure of the mass against them, began
retreating; and the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, seeing the right
borne down in this way, also swerved. Still, in spite of the numbers
slain, and broken as they were, as soon as they had crossed the trench
which protected their camp in front, they grounded arms on the
spot[14] whence they had rushed to battle. This camp, it must be borne
in mind, did not lie at all on the level, but was pitched on a
somewhat steep incline. At this juncture there were some of the
Lacedaemonians who, looking upon such a disaster as intolerable,
maintained that they ought to prevent the enemy from erecting a
trophy, and try to recover the dead not under a flag of truce but by
another battle. The polemarchs, however, seeing that nearly a thousand
men of the total Lacedaemonian troops were slain; seeing also that of
the seven hundred Spartans themselves who were on the field something
like four hundred lay dead;[15] aware, further, of the despondency
which reigned among the allies, and the general disinclination on
their parts to fight longer (a frame of mind not far removed in some
instances from positive satisfaction at what had taken place)--under
the circumstances, I say, the polemarchs called a council of the
ablest representatives of the shattered army[16] and deliberated as to
what should be done. Finally the unanimous opinion was to pick up the
dead under a flag of truce, and they sent a herald to treat for terms.
The Thebans after that set up a trophy and gave back the bodies under
a truce.

[12] See above, V. iv. 33.

[13] {sumphoreis}. For the readings of this corrupt passage see Otto
Keller.

[14] Or, "in orderly way." See Curt. "H. G." iv. 400.

[15] See "Ages." ii. 24.

[16] {tous epikairiotatous}. See above, III. iii. 10; "Cyrop." VII.
iv. 4; VIII. iv. 32, vi. 2.

After these events, a messenger was despatched to Lacedaemon with news
of the calamity. He reached his destination on the last day of the
gymnopaediae,[17] just when the chorus of grown men had entered the
theatre. The ephors heard the mournful tidings not without grief and
pain, as needs they must, I take it; but for all that they did not
dismiss the chorus, but allowed the contest to run out its natural
course. What they did was to deliver the names of those who had fallen
to their friends and families, with a word of warning to the women not
to make any loud lamentations but to bear their sorrow in silence; and
the next day it was a striking spectacle to see those who had
relations among the slain moving to and fro in public with bright and
radiant looks, whilst of those whose friends were reported to be
living barely a man was to be seen, and these flitted by with lowered
heads and scowling brows, as if in humiliation.

[17] The festival was celebrated annually about midsummer. See Herod.
vi. 67; Thuc. v. 82, and Arnold's note; Pollux. iv. 105; Athen.
xiv. 30, xv. 22; Muller, "Dorians," ii. 389.

After this the ephors proceeded to call out the ban, including the
forty-years-service men of the two remaining regiments;[18] and they
proceeded further to despatch the reservces of the same age belonging
to the six regiments already on foreign service. Hitherto the Phocian
campaign had only drawn upon the thirty-five-years-service list.
Besides these they now ordered out on active service the troops
retained at the beginning of the campaign in attendance on the
magistrates at the government offices. Agesilaus being still disabled
by his infirmity, the city imposed the duty of command upon his son
Archidamus. The new general found eager co-operators in the men of
Tegea. The friends of Stasippus at this date were still living,[19]
and they were stanch in their Lacedaemonian proclivities, and wielded
considerable power in their state. Not less stoutly did the Mantineans
from their villages under their aristocratic form of government flock
to the Spartan standard. Besides Tegea and Mantinea, the Corinthians
and Sicyonians, the Phliasians and Achaeans were equally enthusiastic
to joining the campaign, whilst other states sent out soldiers. Then
came the fitting out and manning of ships of war on the part of the
Lacedaemonians themselves and of the Corinthians, whilst the
Sicyonians were requested to furnish a supply of vessels on board of
which it was proposed to transport the army across the gulf. And so,
finally, Archidamus was able to offer the sacrifices usual at the
moment of crossing the frontier. But to return to Thebes.

[18] I.e. every one up to fifty-eight years of age.

[19] See below, VI. v. 9.

Imediately after the battle the Thebans sent a messenger to Athens
wearing a chaplet. Whilst insisting on the magnitude of the victory
they at the same time called upon the Athenians to send them aid, for
now the opportunity had come to wreak vengeance on the Lacedaemonians
for all the evil they had done to Athens. As it chanced, the senate of
the Athenians was holding a session on the Acropolis. As soon as the
news was reported, the annoyance caused by its announcement was
unmistakeable. They neither invited the herald to accept of
hospitality nor sent back one word in reply to the request for
assistance. And so the herald turned his back on Athens and departed.

But there was Jason still to look to, and he was their ally. To him
then the Thebans sent, and earnestly besought his aid, their thoughts
running on the possible turn which events might take. Jason on his
side at once proceeded to man a fleet, with the apparent intention of
sending assistance by sea, besides which he got together his foreign
brigade and his own cavalry; and although the Phocians and he were
implacable enemies,[20] he marched through their territory to Boeotia.
Appearing like a vision to many of the states before his approach was
even announced--at any rate before levies could be mustered from a
dozen different points--he had stolen a march upon them and was a long
way ahead, giving proof that expedition is sometimes a better tool to
work with than sheer force.

[20] Or, "though the Phocians maintained a war 'a outrance' with him."

When he arrived in Boeotia the Thebans urged upon him that now was the
right moment to attack the Lacedaemonians: he with his foreign brigade
from the upper ground, they face to face in front; but Jason dissuaded
them from their intention. He reminded them that after a noble
achievement won it was not worth their while to play for so high a
stake, involving a still greater achievement or else the loss of
victory already gained. "Do you not see," he urged, "that your success
followed close on the heels of necessity? You ought then to reflect
that the Lacedaemonians in their distress, with a choice between life
and death, will fight it out with reckless desperation. Providence, as
it seems, ofttimes delights to make the little ones great and the
great ones small."[21]

[21] Cf. "Anab." III. ii. 10.

By such arguments he diverted the Thebans from the desperate
adventure. But for the Lacedaemonians also he had words of advice,
insisting on the difference between an army defeated and an army
flushed with victory. "If you are minded," he said, "to forget this
disaster, my advice to you is to take time to recover breath and
recruit your energies. When you have grown stronger then give battle
to these unconquered veterans.[22] At present," he continued, "you
know without my telling you that among your own allies there are some
who are already discussing terms of friendship with your foes. My
advice is this: by all means endeavour to obtain a truce. This," he
added, "is my own ambition: I want to save you, on the ground of my
father's friendship with yourselves, and as being myself your
representative."[23] Such was the tenor of his speech, but the secret
of action was perhaps to be found in a desire to make these mutual
antagonists put their dependence on himself alone. Whatever his
motive, the Lacedaemonians took his advice, and commissioned him to
procure a truce.

[22] Or, "the invincibles."

[23] Lit. "your proxenos."

As soon as the news arrived that the terms were arranged, the
polemarchs passed an order round: the troops were to take their
evening meal, get their kit together, and be ready to set off that
night, so as to scale the passes of Cithaeron by next morning. After
supper, before the hour of sleep, the order to march was given, and
with the generals at their head the troops advanced as the shades of
evening fell, along the road to Creusis, trusting rather to the chance
of their escaping notice, than to the truce itself. It was weary
marching in the dead of night, making their retreat in fear, and along
a difficult road, until they fell in with Archidamus's army of relief.
At this point, then, Archidamus waited till all the allies had
arrived, and so led the whole of the united armies back to Corinth,
from which point he dismissed the allies and led his fellow-citizens
home.

Jason took his departure from Boeotia through Phocis, where he
captured the suburbs of Hyampolis[24] and ravaged the country
districts, putting many to the sword. Content with this, he traversed
the rest of Phocis without meddling or making. Arrived at
Heraclea,[25] he knocked down the fortress of the Heracleots, showing
that he was not troubled by any apprehension lest when the pass was
thrown open somebody or other might march against his own power at
some future date. Rather was he haunted by the notion that some one or
other might one day seize Heraclea, which commanded the pass, and bar
his passage into Hellas--should Hellas ever be his goal.[26] At the
moment of his return to Thessaly he had reached the zenith of his
greatness. He was the lawfully constituted Prince[27] of Thessaly, and
he had under him a large mercenary force of infantry and cavalry, and
all in the highest perfection of training. For this twofold reason he
might claim the title great. But he was still greater as the head of a
vast alliance. Those who were prepared to fight his battles were
numerous, and he might still count upon the help of many more eager to
do so; but I call Jason greatest among his contemporaries, because not
one among them could afford to look down upon him.[28]

[24] An ancient town in Phocis (see Hom. "Il." ii. 521) on the road
leading from Orchomenus to Opus, and commanding a pass from Locris
into Phocis and Boeotia. See Herod. viii. 28; Paus. ix. 35, S. 5;
Strab. ix. 424; "Dict. of Geog." s.v.

[25] Or, "Heracleia Trachinia," a fortress city founded (as a colony)
by the Lacedaemonians in B.C. 426, to command the approach to
Thermopylae from Thessaly, and to protect the Trachinians and the
neighbouring Dorians from the Oetean mountaineers. See "Dict. of
Geog." "Trachis"; Thuc. iii. 92, 93, v. 51, 52; Diod. xii. 59.

[26] B.C. 370. The following sections 28-37 form an episode concerning
Thessalian affairs between B.C. 370 and B.C. 359.

[27] Lit. "Tagos."

[28] For a similar verbal climax see below, VI. v. 47.

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