Hellenica

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[25] Leuctrum, a fortress of the district Aegytis on the confines of
Arcadia and Laconia ("in the direction of Mount Lycaeum," Thuc. v.
54). See Leake, "Morea," ii. 322; also "Peloponn." p. 248, in
which place he corrects his former view as to the situation of
Leuctrum and the Maleatid.

Oeum or Ium, the chief town of the Sciritis, probably stood in the
Klisura or series of narrow passes through the watershed of the
mountains forming the natural boundary between Laconia and Arcadia
(in the direct line north from Sparta to Tegea), "Dict. of Anc.
Geog." s.v. Leake says ("Morea," iii. 19, 30 foll.) near the
modern village of Kolina; Baedeker ("Greece," p. 269) says perhaps
at Palaeogoulas.

Caryae. This frontier town was apparently (near Arachova) on the
road from Thyrea (in the direction of the Argolid) to Sparta
(Thuc. v. 55; Paus. III. x. 7; Livy, xxxiv. 26, but see Leake,
"Morea," iii. 30; "Peloponn." p. 342).

Sellasia, probably rightly placed "half an hour above Vourlia"
(Baedeker, "Greece," p. 269). The famous battle of Sellasia, in
the spring of B.C. 221, in which the united Macedonians under
Antigonus and the Achaeans finally broke the power of Sparta, was
fought in the little valley where the stream Gorgylus joins the
river Oenus and the Khan of Krevatas now stands. For a plan, see
"Dict. of Anc. Geog." s.v.

[26] "Perioeci."

[27] Diodorus (xv. 64) gives more details; he makes the invaders
converge upon Sellasia by four separate routes. See Leake,
"Morea," iii. 29 foll.

By all accounts Ischolaus made a mistake in not advancing to meet them
on the difficult ground above Oeum. Had he done so, not a man, it is
believed, would have scaled the passes there. But for the present,
wishing to turn the help of the men of Oeum to good account, he waited
down in the village; and so the invading Arcadians scaled the heights
in a body. At this crisis Ischolaus and his men, as long as they
fought face to face with their foes, held the superiority; but,
presently, when the enemy, from rear and flank, and even from the
dwelling-houses up which they scaled, rained blows and missiles upon
them, then and there Ischolaus met his end, and every man besides,
save only one or two who, failing to be recognised, effected their
escape.

After these achievements the Arcadians marched to join the Thebans at
Caryae, and the Thebans, hearing what wonders the Arcadians had
performed, commenced their descent with far greater confidence. Their
first exploit was to burn and ravage the district of Sellasia, but
finding themselves ere long in the flat land within the sacred
enclosure of Apollo, they encamped for the night, and the next day
continued their march along the Eurotas. When they came to the bridge
they made no attempt to cross it to attack the city, for they caught
sight of the heavy infantry in the temple of Alea[28] ready to meet
them. So, keeping the Eurotas on their right, they tramped along,
burning and pillaging homesteads stocked with numerous stores. The
feelings of the citizens may well be imagined. The women who had never
set eyes upon a foe[29] could scarcely contain themselves as they
beheld the cloud of smoke. The Spartan warriors, inhabiting a city
without fortifications, posted at intervals, here one and there
another, were in truth what they appeared to be--the veriest handful.
And these kept watch and ward. The authorities passed a resolution to
announce to the helots that whosoever among them chose to take arms
and join a regiment should have his freedom guaranteed to him by
solemn pledges in return for assistance in the common war.[30] More
than six thousand helots, it is said, enrolled themselves, so that a
new terror was excited by the very incorporation of these men, whose
numbers seemed to be excessive. But when it was found that the
mercenaries from Orchomenus remained faithful, and reinforcements came
to Lacedaemon from Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, and Pellene, and some
other states, the dread of these new levies was speedily diminished.

[28] See Pausanias, III. xix. 7.

[29] See Plutarch, "Ages." xxxi. 3 (Clough, vol. iv. p. 38); Aristot.
"Pol." ii. 9-10.

[30] See below, VII. ii. 2.

The enemy in his advance came to Amyclae.[31] Here he crossed the
Eurotas. The Thebans wherever they encamped at once formed a stockade
of the fruit-trees they had felled, as thickly piled as possible, and
so kept ever on their guard. The Arcadians did nothing of the sort.
They left their camping-ground and took themselves off to attack the
homesteads and loot. On the third or fourth day after their arrival
the cavalry advanced, squadron by squadron, as far as the
racecourse,[32] within the sacred enclosure of Gaiaochos. These
consisted of the entire Theban cavalry and the Eleians, with as many
of the Phocian or Thessalian or Locrian cavalry as were present. The
cavalry of the Lacedaemonians, looking a mere handful, were drawn up
to meet them. They had posted an ambuscade chosen from their heavy
infantry, the younger men, about three hundred in number, in the house
of the Tyndarids[33]; and while the cavalry charged, out rushed the
three hundred at the same instant at full pace. The enemy did not wait
to receive the double charge, but swerved, and at sight of that many
also of the infantry took to headlong flight. But the pursuers
presently paused; the Theban army remained motionless; and both
parties returned to their camps. And now the hope, the confidence
strengthened that an attack upon the city itself would never come; nor
did it. The invading army broke up from their ground, and marched off
on the road to Helos and Gytheum.[34] The unwalled cities were
consigned to the flames, but Gytheum, where the Lacedaemonians had
their naval arsenal, was subjected to assault for three days. Certain
of the provincials[35] also joined in this attack, and shared the
campaign with the Thebans and their friends.

[31] For this ancient (Achaean) town, see Paus. III. ii. 6; Polyb. v.
19. It lay only twenty stades (a little more than two miles) from
the city of Sparta.

[32] Or, "hippodrome." See Paus. III. ii. 6.

[33] Paus. III. xvi. 2.

[34] See Baedeker's "Greece," p. 279. Was Gytheum taken? See Grote,
"H. G." x. 305; Curt. "H. G." Eng. trans. iv. 431.

[35] "Perioeci." See above, III. iii. 6; VI. v. 25; below, VII. ii. 2;
Grote, "H. G." x. 301. It is a pity that the historian should
hurry us off to Athens just at this point. The style here is
suggestive of notes ({upomnemata}) unexpanded.

The news of these proceedings set the Athenians deeply pondering what
they ought to do concerning the Lacedaemonians, and they held an
assembly in accordance with a resolution of the senate. It chanced
that the ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians and the allies still
faithful to Lacedaemon were present. The Lacedaemonian ambassadors
were Aracus, Ocyllus, Pharax, Etymocles, and Olontheus, and from the
nature of the case they all used, roughly speaking, similar arguments.
They reminded the Athenians how they had often in old days stood
happily together, shoulder to shoulder, in more than one great crisis.
They (the Lacedaemonians), on their side, had helped to expel the
tyrant from Athens, and the Athenians, when Lacedaemon was besieged by
the Messenians, had heartly leant her a helping hand.[36] Then they
fell to enumerating all the blessings that marked the season when the
two states shared a common policy, hinting how in common they had
warred against the barbarians, and more boldly recalling how the
Athenians with the full consent and advice of the Lacedaemonians were
chosen by united Hellas leaders of the common navy[37] and guardians
of all the common treasure, while they themselves were selected by all
the Hellenes as confessedly the rightful leaders on land; and this
also not without the full consent and concurrence of the Athenians.

[36] In reference (1) to the expulsion of the Peisistratidae (Herod.
v. 64); (2) the "third" Messenian war (Thuc. i. 102).

[37] See "Revenues," v. 6.

One of the speakers ventured on a remark somewhat to this strain: "If
you and we, sirs, can only agree, there is hope to-day that the old
saying may be fulfilled, and Thebes be 'taken and tithed.'"[38] The
Athenians, however, were not in the humour to listen to that style of
argument. A sort of suppressed murmur ran through the assembly which
seemed to say, "That language may be well enough now; but when they
were well off they pressed hard enough on us." But of all the pleas
put forward by the Lacedaemonians, the weightiest appeared to be this:
that when they had reduced the Athenians by war, and the Thebans
wished to wipe Athens off the face of the earth, they (the
Lacedaemonians) themselves had opposed the measure.[39] If that was
the argument of most weight, the reasoning which was the most commonly
urged was to the effect that "the solemn oaths necessitated the aid
demanded. Sparta had done no wrong to justify this invasion on the
part of the Arcadians and their allies. All she had done was to assist
the men of Tegea when[40] the Mantineans had marched against that
township contrary to their solemn oaths." Again, for the second time,
at these expressions a confused din ran through the assembly, half the
audience maintaining that the Mantineans were justified in supporting
Proxenus and his friends, who were put to death by the party with
Stasippus; the other half that they were wrong in bringing an armed
force against the men of Tegea.

[38] Or, "the Thebans be decimated"; for the phrase see above, "Hell."
VI. iii. 20.

[39] See "Hell." II. ii. 19; and "Hell." III. v. 8.

[40] Lit. "because," {oti}.

Whilst these distinctions were being drawn by the assembly itself,
Cleiteles the Corinthian got up and spoke as follows: "I daresay, men
of Athens, there is a double answer to the question, Who began the
wrongdoing? But take the case of ourselves. Since peace began, no one
can accuse us either of wantonly attacking any city, or of seizing the
wealth of any, or of ravaging a foreign territory. In spite of which
the Thebans have come into our country and cut down our fruit-treees,
burnt to the ground our houses, filched and torn to pieces our cattle
and our goods. How then, I put it to you, will you not be acting
contrary to your solemn oaths if you refuse your aid to us, who are so
manifestly the victims of wrongdoings? Yes; and when I say solemn
oaths, I speak of oaths and undertakings which you yourselves took
great pains to exact from all of us." At that point a murmur of
applause greeted Cleiteles, the Athenians feeling the truth and
justice of the speaker's language.

He sat down, and then Procles of Phlius got up and spoke as follows:
"What would happen, men of Athens, if the Lacedaemonians were well out
of the way? The answer to that question is obvious. You would be the
first object of Theban invasion. Clearly; for they must feel that you
and you alone stand in the path between them and empire over Hellas.
If this be so, I do not consider that you are more supporting
Lacedaemon by a campaign in her behalf than you are helping
yourselves. For imagine the Thebans, your own sworn foes and next-door
neighbours, masters of Hellas! You will find it a painful and onerous
exchange indeed for the distant antagonism of Sparta. As a mere matter
of self-interest, now is the time to help yourselves, while you may
still reckon upon allies, instead of waiting until they are lost, and
you are forced to fight a life-and-death battle with the Thebans
single-handed. But the fear suggests itself, that should the
Lacedaemonians escape now, they will live to cause you trouble at some
future date. Lay this maxim to heart, then, that it is not the
potential greatness of those we benefit, but of those we injure, which
causes apprehension. And this other also, that it behoves individuals
and states alike so to better their position[41] while yet in the
zenith of their strength that, in the day of weakness, when it comes,
they may find some succour and support in what their former labours
have achieved.[42] To you now, at this time, a heaven-sent opportunity
is presented. In return for assistance to the Lacedaemonians in their
need, you may win their sincere, unhesitating friendship for all time.
Yes, I say it deliberately, for the acceptance of these benefits at
your hands will not be in the presence of one or two chance witnesses.
The all-seeing gods, in whose sight to-morrow is even as to-day, will
be cognisant of these things. The knowledge of them will be jointly
attested by allies and enemies; nay, by Hellenes and barbarians alike,
since to not one of them is what we are doing a matter of unconcern.
If, then, in the presence of these witnesses, the Lacedaemonians
should prove base towards you, no one will ever again be eager in
their cause. But our hope, our expectation should rather be that they
will prove themselves good men and not base; since they beyond all
others would seem persistently to have cherished a high endeavour,
reaching forth after true praise, and holding aloof from ugly deeds.

[41] Lit. "to acquire some good."

[42] Or, "for what," etc.

"But there are further considerations which it were well you should
lay to heart. If danger were ever again to visit Hellas from the
barbarian world outside, in whom would you place your confidence if
not in the Lacedaemonians? Whom would you choose to stand at your
right hand in battle if not these, whose soldiers at Thermopylae to a
man preferred to fall at their posts rather than save their lives by
giving the barbarian free passage into Hellas? Is it not right, then,
considering for what thing's sake they dislayed that bravery in your
companionship, considering also the good hope there is that they will
prove the like again--is it not just that you and we should lend them
all countenance and goodwill? Nay, even for us their allies' sake, who
are present, it would be worth your while to manifest this goodwill.
Need you be assured that precisely those who continue faithful to them
in their misfortunes would in like manner be ashamed not to requite
you with gratitude? And if we seem to be but small states, who are
willing to share their dangers with them, lay to heart that there is a
speedy cure for this defect: with the accession of your city the
reproach that, in spite of all our assistance, we are but small
cities, will cease to be.

"For my part, men of Athens, I have hitherto on hearsay admired and
envied this great state, whither, I was told, every one who was
wronged or stood in terror of aught needed only to betake himself and
he would obtain assistance. To-day I no longer hear, I am present
myself and see these famous citizens of Lacedaemon here, and by their
side their trustiest friends, who have come to you, and ask you in
their day of need to give them help. I see Thebans also, the same who
in days bygone failed to persuade the Lacedaemonians to reduce you to
absolute slavery,[43] to-day asking you to suffer those who saved you
to be destroyed.

[43] See "Hell." II. ii. 19; III. v. 8, in reference to B.C. 405.

"That was a great deed and of fair renown, attributed in old story to
your ancestors, that they did not suffer those Argives who died on the
Cadmeia[44] to lie unburied; but a fairer wreath of glory would you
weave for your own brows if you suffer not these still living
Lacedaemonians to be trampled under the heel of insolence and
destroyed. Fair, also, was that achievement when you stayed the
insolence of Eurystheus and saved the sons of Heracles;[45] but fairer
still than that will your deed be if you rescue from destruction, not
the primal authors[46] merely, but the whole city which they founded;
fairest of all, if because yesterday the Lacedaemonians won you your
preservation by a vote which cost them nothing, you to-day shall bring
them help with arms, and at the price of peril. It is a proud day for
some of us to stand here and give what aid we can in pleading for
asistance to brave men. What, then, must you feel, who in very deed
are able to render that assistance! How generous on your parts, who
have been so often the friends and foes of Lacedaemon, to forget the
injury and remember only the good they have done! How noble of you to
repay, not for yourelves only, but for the sake of Hellas, the debt
due to those who proved themselves good men and true in her behalf!"

[44] In reference to the Seven against Thebes, see Herod. IX. xxvii.
4; Isoc. "Paneg." 55.

[45] Herod. IX. xxvii. 3; see Isoc. "Paneg." 56. "The greatness of
Sparta was founded by the succour which Athens lent to the
Heraklid invaders of the Peloponnese--a recollection which ought
to restrain Sparta from injuring or claiming to rule Athens.
Argos, Thebes, Sparta were in early times, as they are now, the
foremost cities of Hellas; but Athens was the greatest of them all
--the avenger of Argos, the chastiser of Thebes, the patron of
those who founded Sparta."--Jebb, "Att. Or." ii. 154.

[46] Plut. "Lyc." vi.

After these speeches the Athenians deliberated, and though there was
opposition, the arguments of gainsayers[47] fell upon deaf ears. The
assembly finally passed a decree to send assistance to Lacedaemon in
force, and they chose Iphicrates general. Then followed the
preliminary sacrifices, and then the general's order to his troops to
take the evening meal in the grove of the Academy.[48] But the general
himself, it is said, was in no hurry to leave the city; many were
found at their posts before him. Presently, however, he put himself at
the head of his troops, and the men followed cheerily, in firm
persuasion that he was about to lead them to some noble exploit. On
arrival at Corinth he frittered away some days, and there was a
momentary outburst of discontent at so much waste of precious time;
but as soon as he led the troops out of Corinth there was an obvious
rebound. The men responded to all orders with enthusiasm, heartily
following their general's lead, and attacking whatever fortified place
he might confront them with.

[47] As to the anti-Laconian or Boeotian party at Athens, see Curtius,
"H. G." vol. v. ch. ii. (Eng. tr.)

[48] See Baedeker, "Greece," p. 103.

And now reverting to the hostile forces on Laconian territory, we find
that the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleians had retired in large numbers.
They had every inducement so to do since their homes bordered on
Laconia; and off they went, driving or carrying whatever they had
looted. The Thebans and the rest were no less anxious to get out of
the country, though for other reasons, partly because the army was
melting away under their eyes day by day, partly because the
necessities of life were growing daily scantier, so much had been
either fairly eaten up and pillaged or else recklessly squandered and
reduced to ashes. Besides this, it was winter; so that on every ground
there was a general desire by this time to get away home.

As son as the enemy began his retreat from Laconian soil, Iphicrates
imitated his movement, and began leading back his troops out of
Arcadia into Corinthia. Iphicrates exhibited much good generalship, no
doubt, with which I have no sort of fault to find. But it is not so
with that final feature of the campaign to which we are now come. Here
I find his strategy either meaningless in intent or inadequate in
execution. He made an attempt to keep guard at Oneion, in order to
prevent the Boeotians making their way out homewards; but left
meanwhile far the best passage through Cenchreae unguarded. Again,
when he wished to discover whether or not the Thebans had passed
Oneion, he sent out on a reconnaissance the whole of the Athenian and
Corinthian cavalry; whereas, for the object in view, the eyes of a
small detachment would have been as useful as a whole regiment;[49]
and when it came to falling back, clearly the smaller number had a
better chance of hitting on a traversable road, and so effecting the
desired movement quietly. But the height of folly seems to have been
reached when he threw into the path of the enemy a large body of
troops which were still too weak to cope with him. As a matter of
fact, this body of cavalry, owing to their very numbers, could not
help covering a large space of ground; and when it became necessary to
retire, had to cling to a series of difficult positions in succession,
so that they lost not fewer than twenty horsemen.[50] It was thus the
Thebans effected their object and retired from Peloponnese.

[49] See "Hipparch." viii. 10 foll.

[50] See Diod. xv. 63; Plut. "Pelop." 24.

BOOK VII

I

B.C. 369. In the following year[1] plenipotentiary ambassadors[2] from
the Lacedaemonians and their allies arrived at Athens to consider and
take counsel in what way the alliance between Athens and Lacedaemon
might be best cemented. It was urged by many speakers, foreigners and
Athenians also, that the alliance ought to be based on the principle
of absolute equality,[3] "share and share alike," when Procles of
Phlius put forward the following argument:

[1] I.e. the official year from spring to spring. See Peter, "Chron.
Table" 95, note 215; see Grote, "H. G." x. 346, note 1.

[2] See Hicks, 89.

[3] For the phrase {epi toi isois kai omoiois}, implying "share and
share alike," see Thuc. i. 145, etc.

"Since you have already decided, men of Athens, that it is good to
secure the friendship of Lacedaemon, the point, as it appears to me,
which you ought now to consider is, by what means this friendship may
be made to last as long as possible. The probability is, that we shall
hold together best by making a treaty which shall suit the best
interests of both parties. On most points we have, I believe, a
tolerable unanimity, but there remains the question of leadership. The
preliminary decree of your senate anticipates a division of the
hegemony, crediting you with the chief maritime power, Lacedaemon with
the chief power on land; and to me, personally, I confess, that seems
a division not more established by human invention than preordained by
some divine naturalness or happy fortune. For, in the first place, you
have a geographical position pre-eminently adapted for naval
supremacy; most of the states to whom the sea is important are massed
round your own, and all of these are inferior to you in strength.
Besides, you have harbours and roadsteads, without which it is not
possible to turn a naval power to account. Again, you have many ships
of war. To extend your naval empire is a traditional policy; all the
arts and sciences connected with these matters you possess as home
products, and, what is more, in skill and experience of nautical
affairs you are far ahead of the rest of the world. The majority of
you derive your livelihood from the sea, or things connected with it;
so that in the very act of minding your own affairs you are training
yourselves to enter the lists of naval combat.[4] Again, no other
power in the world can send out a larger collective fleet, and that is
no insignificant point in reference to the question of leadership. The
nucleus of strength first gained becomes a rallying-point, round which
the rest of the world will gladly congregate. Furthermore, your good
fortune in this department must be looked upon as a definite gift of
God: for, consider among the numberless great sea-fights which you
have fought how few you have lost, how many you have won. It is only
rational, then, that your allies should much prefer to share this
particular risk with you. Indeed, to show you how natural and vital to
you is this maritime study, the following reflection may serve. For
several years the Lacedaemonians, when at war with you in old days,
dominated your territory, but they made no progress towards destroying
you. At last God granted them one day to push forward their dominion
on the sea, and then in an instant you completely succumbed to
them.[5] Is it not self-evident that your safety altogether depends
upon the sea? The sea is your natural element--your birthright; it
would be base indeed to entrust the hegemony of it to the
Lacedaemonians, and the more so, since, as they themselves admit, they
are far less acquained with this business than yourselves; and,
secondly, your risk in naval battles would not be for equal stakes--
theirs involving only the loss of the men on board their ships, but
yours, that of your children and your wives and the entire state.

[4] See "Pol. Ath." i. 19 foll.

[5] See "Hell." II. i.

"And if this is a fair statement of your position, turn, now, and
consider that of the Lacedaemonians. The first point to notice is,
that they are an inland power; as long as they are dominant on land it
does not matter how much they are cut off from the sea--they can carry
on existence happily enough. This they so fully recognise, that from
boyhood they devote themselves to training for a soldier's life. The
keystone of this training is obedience to command,[6] and in this they
hold the same pre-eminence on land which you hold on the sea. Just as
you with your fleets, so they on land can, at a moment's notice, put
the largest army in the field; and with the like consequence, that
their allies, as is only rational, attach themselves to them with
undying courage.[7] Further, God has granted them to enjoy on land a
like good fortune to that vouchsafed to you on sea. Among all the many
contests they have entered into, it is surprising in how few they have
failed, in how many they have been successful. The same unflagging
attention which you pay to maritime affairs is required from them on
land, and, as the facts of history reveal, it is no less indispensable
to them. Thus, although you were at war with them for several years
and gained many a naval victory over them, you never advanced a step
nearer to reducing them. But once worsted on land, in an instant they
were confronted with a danger affecting the very lives of child and
wife, and vital to the interests of the entire state. We may very well
understand, then, the strangeness, not to say monstrosity, in their
eyes, of surrendering to others the military leadership on land, in
matters which they have made their special study for so long and with
such eminent success. I end where I began. I agree absolutely with the
preliminary decrees of your own senate, which I consider the solution
most advantageous to both parties. My prayer[8] is that you may be
guided in your deliberations to that conclusion which is best for each
and all of us."

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