The Cavalry General
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[13] S. 15 should perhaps stand before S. 13.
VI
But, after all, no man, however great his plastic skill, can hope to
mould and shape a work of art to suit his fancy, unless the stuff on
which he works be first prepared and made ready to obey the
craftsman's will. Nor certainly where the raw material consists of
men, will you succeed, unless, under God's blessing, these same men
have been prepared and made ready to meet their officer in a friendly
spirit. They must come to look upon him as of greater sagacity than
themselves in all that concerns encounter with the enemy. This
friendly disposition on the part of his subordinates, one must
suppose, will best be fostered by a corresponding sympathy on the part
of their commander towards the men themselves, and that not by simple
kindness but by the obvious pains he takes on their behalf, at one
time to provide them with food, and at another to secure safety of
retreat, or again by help of outposts and the like, to ensure
protection during rest and sleep.
When on active service[1] the commander must prove himself
conspicuously careful in the matter of forage, quarters, water-supply,
outposts,[2] and all other requisites; forecasting the future and
keeping ever a wakeful eye in the interest of those under him; and in
case of any advantage won, the truest gain which the head of affairs
can reap is to share with his men the profits of success.
[1] Al. "on garrison outpost duty."
[2] Reading {phulakon}, or if with Courier {thulakon}, "haversacks,"
i.e. "la farine, le contenant pour le contenu."
Indeed, to put the matter in a nutshell, there is small risk a general
will be regarded with contempt by those he leads, if, whatever he may
have to preach, he shows himself best able to perform.
Beginning with the simple art of mounting on horseback, let him so
train himself in all particulars of horsemanship that, to look at him,
the men must see their leader is a horseman who can leap a trench
unscathed or scale a parapet,[3] or gallop down a bank, and hurl a
javelin with the best. These are accomplishments which one and all
will pave the way to make contempt impossible. If, further, the men
shall see in their commander one who, with the knowledge how to act,
has force of will and cunning to make them get the better of the
enemy; and if, further, they have got the notion well into their heads
that this same leader may be trusted not to lead them recklesssly
against the foe, without the help of Heaven, or despite the auspices--
I say, you have a list of virtues which will make those under his
command the more obedient to their ruler.
[3] Or, "stone walls," "dykes."
VII
If prudence may be spoken of as the one quality distinctive of true
generalship, there are two respects in which a general of cavalry at
Athens should pre-eminently excel. Not only must he show a dutiful
submission to the gods; but he must possess great fighting qualities,
seeing that he has on his borders a rival cavalry equal to his own in
number and backed by a large force of heavy infantry.[1] So that, if
he undertake to invade the enemy's territory unsupported by the other
forces of the city[2]--in dealing with two descriptions of forces
single-handed, he and his cavalry must look for a desperate adventure;
or to take the converse case, that the enemy invades the soil of
Attica, to begin with, he will not invade at all, unless supported by
other cavalry besides his own and an infantry force sufficient to
warrant the supposition that no force on our side can cope with him.
[1] The reference is doubtless to the Thebans. Unfortunately we do not
know, on good authority, how many troops of either arm they had in
the field at Leuctra or at Mantinea.
[2] Lit. "without the rest of the city," i.e. the hoplites, etc.
Now, to deal with this vast hostile array, if only the city will
determine to sally out en masse to protect her rural districts, the
prospect is fair. Under God, our troopers, if properly cared for, are
the finer men; our infantry of the line are no less numerous, and as
regards physique, if it comes to that, not one whit inferior, while in
reference to moral qualities, they are more susceptible to the spur of
a noble ambition, if only under God's will they be correctly trained.
Or again, as touching pride of ancestry, what have Athenians to fear
as against Boeotians on that score?[3]
[3] See "Mem." III. v. 3, where it is contended that in pride of
ancestry Athenians can hold their own against Boeotians.
But suppose the city of Athens determine to betake herself to her
navy, as in the old days when the Lacedaemonians, leagued with the
rest of Hellas, brought invasion;[4] and is content once more simply
to protect her walls through thick and thin. As to protecting what
lies outside the city wall she looks to her cavalry for that; and
single-handed her troopers must do desperate encounter against the
united forces of the enemy. I say, under these circumstances, we shall
need in the first place the strong support of Heaven; and in the
second place, well will it be for us if our cavalry commander prove
himself a consummate officer.[5] Indeed, he will have need of large
wisdom to deal with a force so vastly superior in numbers, and of
enterprise to strike when the critical moment comes.
[4] See Thuc. ii. 13, 14, 22, etc., and in particular iv. 95,
Hippocrates' speech before the battle of Delium, 424 B.C.
[5] A "parfait marechal."
He must also, as it appears to me, be capable of great physical
endurance;[6] since clearly, if he has to run full tilt against an
armament present, as we picture, in such force that not even our whole
state cares to cope with it, it is plain he must accept whatever fate
is due, where might is right, himself unable to retaliate.
[6] So Jason, "Hell." VI. i. 4.
If, on the contrary, he elect to guard the territory outside the
walls[7] with a number just sufficient to keep a look-out on the
enemy, and to withdraw into safe quarters from a distance whatever
needs protection--a small number, be it observed, is just as capable
of vedette duty, as well able, say, to scan the distant horizon, as a
large; and by the same token men with no great confidence in
themselves or in their horses are not ill-qualified to guard, or
withdraw within shelter[8] the property of friends; since fear, as the
proverb has it, makes a shrewd watchman. The proposal, therefore, to
select from these a corps of observation will most likely prove true
strategy. But what then of the residue not needed for outpost duty? If
any one imagines he has got an armament, he will find it miserably
small, and lacking in every qualification necessary to risk an open
encounter.
[7] Or, "His better plan would be to."
[8] Reading {anakhorizein}. Cf. "Cyrop." II. ii. 8; "Anab." V. ii. 10;
or if {anakhorein eis}, transl. "or retire into safe quarters."
See "Hell." IV. vi. 44.
But let him make up his mind to employ it in guerilla war, and he will
find the force quite competent for that, I warrant. His business, so
at least it seems to me, will be to keep his men perpetually in
readiness to strike a blow, and without exposing himself, to play
sentinel, waiting for any false move on the part of the hostile
armament. And it is a way with soldiers, bear in mind, the more
numerous they are, the more blunders they commit. They must needs
scatter of set purpose[9] in search of provisions; or through the
disorder incidental to a march, some will advance and others lag
behind, beyond a proper limit. Blunders like these, then, our hipparch
must not let pass unpunished (unless he wishes the whole of Attica to
become a gigantic camp);[10] keeping his single point steadily in
view, that when he strikes a blow he must be expeditious and retire
before the main body has time to rally to the rescue.
[9] {epimeleia}. Cf. "Cyrop." V. iii. 47.
[10] Lit. "or else the whole of Attica will be one encampment." As at
the date of the fortification of Decelea (413 B.C.), which
permanently commanded the whole country. See Thuc. vii. 27. Al.
Courier, "autrement vous n'avez plus de camp, ou pour mieux dire,
tout le pays devient votre camp."
Again, it frequently happens on the march, that an army will get into
roads where numbers are no advantage. Again, in the passage of rivers,
defiles, and the like, it is possible for a general with a head on his
shoulders to hang on the heels of an enemy in security, and to
determine with precision[11] the exact number of the enemy he will
care to deal with. Occasionally the fine chance occurs to atack the
foe while encamping or breakfasting or supping, or as the men turn out
of bed: seasons at which the soldier is apt to be unharnessed--the
hoplite for a shorter, the cavalry trooper for a longer period.[12]
[11] See "Anab." II. v. 18; "Cyrop." III. iii. 47; IV. i. 18.
{tamieusasthai}, "with the precision of a controller."
[12] Cf. "Hell." II. iv. 6; VII. i. 16.
As to vedettes and advanced outposts, you should never cease planning
and plotting against them. For these in their turn, as a rule, are apt
to consist of small numbers, and are sometimes posted at a great
distance from their own main body. But if after all it turns out that
the enemy are well on their guard against all such attempts, then, God
helping, it would be a feat of arms to steal into the enemy's country,
first making it your business to ascertain[13] his defences, the
number of men at this, that, and the other point, and how they are
distributed throughout the country. For there is no booty so splendid
as an outpost so overmastered; and these frontier outposts are
especially prone to be deceived, with their propensity to give chase
to any small body they set eyes on, regarding that as their peculiar
function. You will have to see, however, in retiring that your line of
retreat is not right into the jaws of the enemy's reliefs hastening to
the scene of action.
[13] Or, "having first studied." Cf. "Mem." III. vi. 10.
VIII
It stands to reason, however, that in order to be able to inflict real
damage upon a greatly superior force, the weaker combatant must
possess such a moral superiority over the other as shall enable him to
appear in the position of an expert, trained in all the feats of
cavalry performance in the field, and leave his enemy to play the part
of raw recruits or amateurs.[1]
[1] Cf. "Cyrop." I. v. 11; "Mem." III. vii. 7.
And this end may be secured primarily on this wise: those who are to
form your guerilla bands[2] must be so hardened and inured to the
saddle that they are capable of undergoing all the toils of a
campaign.[3] That a squadron (and I speak of horse and man alike)
should enter these lists in careless, disorderly fashion suggests the
idea of a troop of women stepping into the arena to cope with male
antagonists.
[2] Or, add, "for buccaneers and free-lances you must be."
[3] Lit. "every toil a soldier can encounter."
But reverse the picture. Suppose men and horses to have been taught
and trained to leap trenches and scale dykes, to spring up banks, and
plunge from heights without scathe, to gallop headlong at full speed
adown a steep: they will tower over unpractised opponents as the birds
of the air tower over creatures that crawl and walk.[4] Their feet are
case-hardened by constant training, and, when it comes to tramping
over rough ground, must differ from the uninitiated as the sound man
from the lame. And so again, when it comes to charging and retiring,
the onward-dashing gallop, the well-skilled, timely retreat, expert
knowledge of the ground and scenery will assert superiority over
inexpertness like that of eyesight over blindness.
[4] See "Horse." viii. 6; cf. "Hunting," xii. 2; "Cyrop." I. vi. 28
foll.
Nor should it be forgotten, that in order to be in thorough efficiency
the horses must not only be well fed and in good condition, but at the
same time so seasoned by toil that they will go through their work
without the risk of becoming broken-winded. And lastly, as bits and
saddle-cloths (to be efficient)[5] need to be attached by straps, a
cavalry general should never be without a good supply, whereby at a
trifling expense he may convert a number of nonplussed troopers into
serviceable fighting men.[6]
[5] [{khresima}] L.D. For the {upomnema} itself cf. "Cyrop." VI. ii.
32.
[6] Or, "thus at a trifling outlay he will be able to render so many
non-efficients useful." Al. "make the articles as good as new."
But if any one is disposed to dwell on the amount of trouble it will
cost him, if he is required to devote himself to horsemanship so
assiduously, let him console himself with the reflection that the
pains and labours undergone by any man in training for a gymnastic
contest are far larger and more formidable than any which the severest
training of the horseman will involve; and for this reason, that the
greater part of gymnastic exercises are performed "in the sweat of the
brow," while equestrian exercise is performed with pleasure. Indeed,
there is no accomplishment which so nearly realises the aspiration of
a man to have the wings of a bird than this of horsemanship.[7] But
further, to a victory obtained in war attaches a far greater weight of
glory than belongs to the noblest contest of the arena.[8] Of these
the state indeed will share her meed of glory,[9] but in honour of
victory in war the very gods are wont to crown whole states with
happiness.[10] So that, for my part, I know not if there be aught else
which has a higher claim to be practised than the arts of war.
[7] Cf. "Cyrop." IV. iii. 15; Herod. iv. 132; Plat. "Rep." v. 467 D.
[8] Cf. Eur. "Autolycus," fr. 1, trans. by J. A. Symonds, "Greek
Poets," 2nd series, p. 283.
[9] Cf. Plut. "Pelop." 34 (Clough, ii. p. 235): "And yet who would
compare all the victories in the Pythian and Olympian games put
together, with one of these enterprises of Pelopidas, of which he
successfully performed so many?"
[10] "To bind about the brows of states happiness as a coronal."
And this, too, is worth noting: that the buccaneer by sea, the
privateersman, through long practice in endurance, is able to live at
the expense of far superior powers. Yes, and the life of the
freebooter is no less natural and appropriate to landsmen--I do not
say, to those who can till and gather in the fruit of their fields,
but to those who find themselves deprived of sustenance; since there
is no alternative--either men must till their fields or live on the
tillage of others, otherwise how will they find the means either of
living or of obtaining peace?[11]
[11] Cf. "Econ." v. 7.
Here, too, is a maxim to engrave upon the memory: in charging a
superior force, never to leave a difficult tract of ground in the rear
of your attack, since there is all the difference in the world between
a stumble in flight and a stumble in pursuit.
There is another precaution which I feel called upon to note. Some
generals,[12] in attacking a force which they imagine to be inferior
to their own, will advance with a ridiculously insufficient force,[13]
so that it is the merest accident if they do not experience the injury
they were minded to inflict. Conversely, in attacking any enemy whose
superiority is a well-known fact, they will bring the whole of their
force into action.
[12] Or, "one knows of generals," e.g. Iphicrates at Oneion, 369 B.C.
Cf. "Hell." VI. v. 51.
[13] Lit. "an absolutely weak force."
Now, my maxim would be precisely converse: if you attack with a
prospect of superiority, do not grudge employing all the power at your
command; excess of victory[14] never yet caused any conqueror one pang
of remorse.
[14] Or, "a great and decided victory." Cf. "Hiero," ii. 16.
But in any attempt to attack superior forces, in full certainty that,
do what you can, you must eventually retire, it is far better, say I,
under these circumstances to bring a fraction only of your whole force
into action, which fraction should be the pick and flower of the
troops at your command, both horses and men. A body of that size and
quality will be able to strike a blow and to fall back with greater
security. Whereas, if a general brings all his troops into action
against a superior force, when he wishes to retire, certain things
must happen: those of his men who are worse mounted will be captured,
others through lack of skill in horsemanship will be thrown, and a
third set be cut off owing to mere difficulties of ground; since it is
impossible to find any large tract of country exactly what you would
desire. If for no other reason, through sheer stress of numbers there
will be collisions, and much damage done by kicks through mutual
entanglement; whereas a pick of horse and men will be able to escape
offhand,[15] especially if you have invention to create a scare in the
minds of the pursuers by help of the moiety of troops who are out of
action.[16] For this purpose false ambuscades will be of use.
[15] Or, "by themselves," reading {ex auton}, as L. Dind. suggests.
Cf. Polyb. x. 40. 6, or if as vulg. {ex auton} (sub. {kheiron},
Weiske), transl. "to slip through their fingers."
[16] Zeune and other commentators cf Liv. v. 38 (Diod. xiv. 114), but
the part played by the Roman subsidiarii at the battle of the
Allia, if indeed "una salus fugientibus," was scarcely happy.
Would not "Hell." VII. v. 26 be more to the point? The detachment
of cavalry and infantry placed by Epaminondas "on certain crests,
to create an apprehension in the minds of the Athenians" in that
quarter of the field at Mantinea was a {mekhanema} of the kind
here contemplated.
Another serviceable expedient will be to discover on which side a
friendly force may suddenly appear and without risk to itself put a
drag on the wheels of the pursuer. Nay, it is self-evident, I think,
that, as far as work and speed are concerned, it is the small body
which will assert its superiority more rapidly over the larger, and
not vice versa--not of course that the mere fact of being a small body
will enable them to endure toil or give them wings; but simply it is
easier to find five men than five hundred, who will take the requisite
care and pains with their horses, and personally practise of their own
accord the art of horsemanship.
But suppose the chance should occur of entering the lists against an
equal number of the enemy's cavalry, according to my judgment it were
no bad plan to split the squadron into divisions,[17] the first of
which should be commanded by the squadron-leader, and the other by the
ablest officer to be found. This second-officer will for the time
being follow in rear of the leading division with the squadron leader;
and by and by, when the antagonist is in near proximity, and when the
word of command is passed, form squadron to the front and charge the
hostile ranks[18]--a manouvre calculated, as I conceive, to bring the
whole mass down upon the enemy with paralysing force, and to cause him
some trouble to extricate himself. Ideally speaking, both
divisions[19] will be backed by infantry kept in rear of the cavalry;
these will suddenly disclose themselves, and rushing to close
quarters, in all probability clench the nail of victory.[20] So at any
rate it strikes me, seeing as I do the effects of what is unexpected--
how, in the case of good things, the soul of man is filled to
overflowing with joy, and again, in the case of things terrible,
paralysed with amazement. In proof of what I say, let any one reflect
on the stupor into which a body of men with all the weight of
numerical advantage on their side will be betrayed by falling into an
ambuscade; or again, on the exaggerated terror mutually inspired in
belligerents during the first few days, of finding themselves posted
in face of one another.
[17] Or, "troops."
[18] Possibly on flank. See Courier, p. 35, on Spanish cavalry
tactics.
[19] Lit. "supposing both divisions to be backed by footmen," etc.
[20] Or, "achieve a much more decisive victory." Cf. "Cyrop." III.
iii. 28.
To make these dispositions is not hard; the difficulty is to discover
a body of men who will dash forward[21] and charge an enemy as above
described intelligently and loyally, with an eager spirit and
unfailing courage. That is a problem for a good cavalry general to
solve. I mean an officer who must be competent to so assert himself in
speech or action[22] that those under him will no longer hesitate.
They will recognise of themselves that it is a good thing and a right
to obey,[23] to follow their leader, to rush to close quarters with
the foe. A desire will consume them to achieve some deed of glory and
renown. A capacity will be given them patiently to abide by the
resolution of their souls.
[21] {parelontas}, in reference to S. 18 above, {parelaunoi}, "form
squadron to the front."
[22] "To be this, he must be able as an orator as well as a man of
action." Cf. "Mem." II. ii. 11.
[23] Cf. Tennyson's "The Charge of the Light Brigade":
Their's not to make reply,
Their's not to reason why,
Their's but to do and die.
To turn to another matter, take the case in which you have two armeis
facing one another in battle order, or a pair of fortresses[24]
belonging to rival powers, and in the space between all kinds of
cavalry manouvres are enacted, wheelings and charges and retreats.[25]
Under such circumstances the custom usually is for either party after
wheeling to set off at a slow pace and to gallop full speed only in
the middle of the course. But now suppose that a commander, after
making feint[26] in this style, presently on wheeling quickens for the
charge and quickens to retire--he will be able to hit the enemy far
harder, and pull through absolutely without scathe himself most
likely; through charging at full speed whilst in proximity to his own
stronghold (or main body), and quickening to a gallop as he retires
from the stronghold (or main body) of the enemy. If further, he could
secretly contrive to leave behind four or five troopers, the bravest
and best mounted of the squadron, it would give them an immense
advantage in falling upon the enemy whilst wheeling to return to the
charge.[27]
[24] Al. "fields and farmsteads between."
[25] Or, "retirements," see "Horsemanship," viii. 12; "Cyrop." V. iv.
8; "Hell." IV. ii. 6; "Ages." ii. 3.
[26] Or, "having precluded in this fashion. See Theocr. xxii. 102:
{ton men anax ataraxen etosia khersi prodeiknus Pantothen},
"feinting on every side" (A. Lang). Al. "having given due warning
of his intention." Cf. Aristot. "H. A." ix. 37.
[27] Cf. Aristoph. "Knights," 244 (Demosthenes calls to the
hipparchs[?]):
{andres eggus . all' amunou, kapanastrephou palin}.
IX
To read these observations over a few times will be sufficient, but
for giving them effect the officer will need perpetually to act as
circumstances require.[1] He must take in the situation at a glance,
and carry out unflinchingly whatever is expedient for the moment. To
set down in writing everything that he must do, is not a whit more
possible than to know the future as a whole.[2] But of all hints and
suggestions the most important to my mind is this: whatever you
determine to be right, with diligence endeavour to perform. For be it
tillage of the soil, or trading, or seafaring, or the art of ruling,
without pains applied to bring the matter to perfection, the best
theories in the world, the most correct conclusions, will be
fruitless.
[1] {pros to paratugkhanon}, lit. "to meet emergencies." Cf. Thuc. i.
122: "For war, least of all things, conforms to prescribed rules;
it strikes out a path for itself when the moment comes" (Jowett).
[2] Or, "is about as feasible as to foretell each contingency hid in
the womb of futurity."
One thing I am prepared to insist on: it is clear to myself that by
Heaven's help our total cavalry force might be much more quickly
raised to the full quota of a thousand troopers,[3] and with far less
friction to the mass of citizens, by the enrolment of two hundred
foreign cavalry. Their acquisition will be doubly helpful, as
intensifying the loyalty of the entire force and as kindling a mutual
ambition to excel in manly virtue.
[3] See Schneid. ad loc.; Boeckh, "P. E. A." pp. 263, 264; Herod. vi.
112; Thuc. vi. 31; Aristoph. "Knights," 223; Aeschin. "De F. L."
334-337. See for this reform, Martin, op. cit. 343, 368.
I can state on my own knowledge that the Lacedaemonian cavalry only
began to be famous[4] with the introduction of foreign troopers; and
in the other states of Hellas everywhere the foreign brigades stand in
high esteem, as I perceive. Need, in fact, contributes greatly to
enthusiasm. Towards the necessary cost of the horses I hold that an
ample fund will be provided,[5] partly out of the pockets of those who
are only too glad to escape cavalry service (in other words, those on
whom the service devolves prefer to pay a sum of money down and be
quit of the duty),[6] and from wealthy men who are physically
incompetent; and I do not see why orphans possessed of large estates
should not contribute.[7] Another belief I hold is that amongst our
resident aliens[8] there are some who will show a laudable ambition if
incorporated with the cavalry. I argue from the fact, apparent to
myself, that amongst this class persons are to be found most zealously
disposed to carry out the part assigned to them, in every other branch
of honourable service which the citizens may choose to share with
them. Again, it strikes me that if you seek for an energetic infantry
to support your cavalry, you will find it in a corps composed of
individuals whose hatred to the foe is naturally intense.[9] But the
success of the above suggestions will depend doubtless on the
consenting will of Heaven.[10]