The Memorabilia

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Let us take as an example that saying of his, so often on his lips: "I
am in love with so and so"; and all the while it was obvious the
going-forth of his soul was not towards excellence of body in the
bloom of beauty, but rather towards faculties of the soul unfolding in
virtue.[1] And these "good natures" he detected by certain tokens: a
readiness to learn that to which the attention was directed; a power
of retaining in the memory the lessons learnt; and a passionate
predilection for those studies in particular which serve to good
administration of a house or of a state,[2] and in general to the
proper handling of man and human affairs. Such beings, he maintained,
needed only to be educated[3] to become not only happy themselves and
happy administrators of their private households, but to be capable of
rendering other human beings as states or individuals happy also.

[1] Or, "not excellence of body in respect of beauty, but of the soul
as regards virtue; and this good natural disposition might be
detected by the readiness of its possessor to learn," etc. Cf.
Plat. "Rep." 535 B.

[2] Cf. above, I. i. 7.

[3] Or, "A person of this type would, if educated, not only prove a
fortune-favoured invididual himself and," etc. Al. Kuhner, "Eos,
qui ita instituti sunt, ut tales sint."

He had indeed a different way of dealing with different kinds of
people.[4] Those who thought they had good natural ability and
despised learning he instructed that the most highly-gifted nature
stands most in need of training and education;[5] and he would point
out how in the case of horses it is just the spirited and fiery
thoroughbred which, if properly broken in as a colt, will develop into
a serviceable and superb animal, but if left unbroken will turn out
utterly intractable and good for nothing. Or take the case of dogs: a
puppy exhibiting that zest for toil and eagerness to attack wild
creatures which are the marks of high breeding,[6] will, if well
brought up, prove excellent for the chase or for any other useful
purpose; but neglect his education and he will turn out a stupid,
crazy brute, incapable of obeying the simplest command. It is just the
same with human beings; here also the youth of best natural endowments
--that is to say, possessing the most robust qualities of spirit and a
fixed determination to carry out whatever he has laid his hand to--
will, if trained and taught what it is right to do, prove a
superlatively good and useful man. He achieves, in fact, what is best
upon the grandest scale. But leave him in boorish ignorance untrained,
and he will prove not only very bad but very mischievous,[7] and for
this reason, that lacking the knowledge to discern what is right to
do, he will frequently lay his hand to villainous practices; whilst
the very magnificence and vehemence of his character render it
impossible either to rein him in or to turn him aside from his evil
courses. Hence in his case also his achievements are on the grandest
scale but of the worst.[8]

[4] Or, "His method of attack was not indeed uniformly the same. It
varied with the individual."

[5] Or, "If any one was disposed to look down upon learning and study
in reliance upon his own natural ability, he tried to lesson him
that it is just the highly-gifted nature which stands," etc. See
Newman, op. cit. i. 397.

[6] Cf. Aristot. "H. A." ix. 1; and "Hunting," iii. 11.

[7] Or, "and the same man may easily become a master villain of the
most dangerous sort."

[8] Kuhner ad loc. after Fr. Hermann cf. Plato. "Crito," 44 E; "Hipp.
min." 375 E; "Rep." vi. 491 E; "Gorg." 526 A; "Polit." 303 A.

Or to take the type of person so eaten up with the pride of riches
that he conceives himself dispensed from any further need of education
--since it is "money makes the man," and his wealth will amply suffice
him to carry out his desires and to win honours from admiring
humanity.[9] Socrates would bring such people to their senses by
pointing out the folly of supposing that without instruction it was
possible to draw the line of demarcation[10] between what is gainful
and what is hurtful in conduct; and the further folly of supposing
that, apart from such discrimination, a man could help himself by
means of wealth alone to whatever he liked or find the path of
expediency plain before him; and was it not the veriest simplicity to
suppose that, without the power of labouring profitably, a man can
either be doing well or be in any sort of way sufficiently equipped
for the battle of life? and again, the veriest simplicity to suppose
that by mere wealth without true knowledge it was possible either to
purchase a reputation for some excellence, or without such reputation
to gain distinction and celebrity?

[9] Or, "and to be honoured by mankind."

[10] Or, "that without learning the distinction it was possible to
distinguish between," etc.

II

Or to come to a third kind--the class of people who are persuaded that
they have received the best education, and are proud of their wisdom:
his manner of dealing with these I will now describe.

Euthydemus[1] "the beautiful" had (Socrates was given to understand)
collected a large library, consisting of the most celebrated poets and
philosophers,[2] by help of which he already believed himself to be
more than a match for his fellows in wisdom, and indeed might
presently expect to out-top them all in capacity of speech and
action.[3] At first, as Socrates noted, the young man by reason of his
youth had not as yet set foot in the agora,[4] but if he had anything
to transact, his habit was to seat himself in a saddler's shop hard
by. Accordingly to this same saddler's shop Socrates betook himself
with some of those who were with him. And first the question was
started by some one: "Was it through consorting with the wise,[5] or
by his own unaided talent, that Themistocles came so to surpass his
fellow-citizens that when the services of a capable man were needed
the eyes of the whole community instinctively turned to him?"
Socrates, with a view to stirring[6] Euthydemus, answered: There was
certainly an ingenuous simplicity in the belief that superiority in
arts of comparatively little worth could only be attained by aid of
qualified teachers, but that the leadership of the state, the most
important concern of all, was destined to drop into the lap of
anybody, no matter whom, like an accidental windfall.[7]

[1] Euthydemus, the son of Diocles perhaps. See Plat. "Symp." 222 B,
and Jowet ad loc.; Cobet, "Prosop. Xen." s.n.; K. Joel, op. cit.
p. 372 foll. For {ton kalon} cf. "Phaedr." 278 E, "Isocrates the
fair." For the whole chapter cf. Plat. "Alc." i.; "Lys." 210 E.
See above, "Mem." I. ii. 29; Grote, "Plato," i. ch. x. passim.

[2] Lit. "sophists." See Grote, "H. G." viii. p. 480, note. For
private libraries see Becker, "Char." p. 272 foll. (Eng. tr.)

[3] See "Hipparch," i. 24; "Cyrop." V. v. 46.

[4] See above, III. vi. 1; Schneid. cf. Isocr. "Areop." 149 C.

[5] Cf. Soph. fr. 12, {sophoi turannoi ton sophon xunousia}.

[6] L. and S. cf. Plat. "Lys." 223 A; "Rep." 329 B: "Wishing to draw
him out."

[7] Cf. Plat. "Alc." i. 118 C: "And Pericles is said not to have got
his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with
several of the philosophers" (Jowett).

On a subsequent occasion, Euthydemus being present, though, as was
plain to see, somewhat disposed to withdraw from the friendly
concourse,[8] as if he would choose anything rather than appear to
admire Socrates on the score of wisdom, the latter made the following
remarks.

[8] {sunedrias}, "the council."

Soc. It is clear from his customary pursuits, is it not, sirs, that
when our friend Euthydemus here is of full age, and the state
propounds some question for solution, he will not abstain from
offering the benefit of his advice? One can imagine the pretty
exordium to his parliamentary speeches which, in his anxiety not to be
thought to have learnt anything from anybody, he has ready for the
occasion.[9] Clearly at the outset he will deliver himself thus: "Men
of Athens, I have never at any time learnt anything from anybody; nor,
if I have ever heard of any one as being an able statesman, well
versed in speech and capable of action, have I sought to come across
him individually. I have not so much as been at pains to provide
muself with a teacher from amongst those who have knowledge;[10] on
the contrary, I have persistently avoided, I will not say learning
from others, but the very faintest suspicion of so doing. However,
anything that occurs to me by the light of nature I shall be glad to
place at your disposal." . . . How appropriate[11] would such a
preface sound on the lips of any one seeking, say, the office of state
physician,[12] would it not? How advantageously he might begin an
address on this wise: "Men of Athens, I have never learnt the art of
healing by help of anybody, nor have I sought to provide myself with
any teacher among medical men. Indeed, to put it briefly, I have been
ever on my guard not only against learning anything from the
profession, but against the very notion of having studied medicine at
all. If, however, you will be so good as to confer on me this post, I
promise I will do my best to acquire skill by experimenting on your
persons." Every one present laughed at the exordium (and there the
matter dropped).

[9] Or, "the pretty exordium . . . now in course of conposition. He
must at all hazards avoid the suspicion of having picked up any
crumb of learning from anybody; how can he help therefore
beginning his speech thus?"

[10] Or, "scientific experts."

[11] Al. "Just as if one seeking the office of state physician were to
begin with a like exordium." {armoseie} = "it would be consistent
(with what has gone before)."

[12] Schneider cf. Plat. "Laws," iv. 720 A; "Gorg." 456 A; and for
"the parish doctor," "Polit." 259 A; Arist. "Acharn." 1030.

Presently, when it became apparent that Euthydemus had got so far that
he was disposed to pay attention to what was said, though he was still
at pains not to utter a sound himself, as if he hoped by silence to
attach to himself some reputation for sagacity, Socrates, wishing to
cure him of that defect, proceeded.

Soc. Is it not surprising that people anxious to learn to play the
harp or the flute, or to ride, or to become proficient in any like
accomplishment, are not content to work unremittingly in private by
themselves at whatever it is in which they desire to excel, but they
must sit at the feet of the best-esteemed teachers, doing all things
and enduring all things for the sake of following the judgment of
those teachers in everything, as though they themselves could not
otherwise become famous; whereas, among those who aspire to become
eminent politically as orators and statesmen,[13] there are some who
cannot see why they should not be able to do all that politics demand,
at a moment's notice, by inspiration as it were, without any
preliminary pains or preparations whatever? And yet it would appear
that the latter concerns must be more difficult of achievement than
the former, in proportion as there are more competitors in the field
but fewer who reach the goal of their ambition, which is as much as to
say that a more sustained effort of attention is needed on the part of
those who embark upon the sea of politics than is elsewhere called
for.

[13] Or, more lit. "powerful in speech and action within the sphere of
politics."

Such were the topics on which Socrates was wont in the early days of
their association to dilate in the hearing of Euthydemus; but when the
philosopher perceived that the youth not only could tolerate the turns
of the discussion more readily but was now become a somewhat eager
listener, he went to the saddler's shop alone,[14] and when Euthydemus
was seated by his side the following conversation took place.

[14] The question arises: how far is the conversation historical or
imaginary?

Soc. Pray tell me, Euthydemus, is it really true what people tell me,
that you have made a large collection of the writings of "the wise,"
as they are called?[15]

[15] Or, "have collected several works of our classical authors and
philosophers."

Euthydemus answered: Quite true, Socrates, and I mean to go on
collecting until I possess all the books I can possibly lay hold of.

Soc. By Hera! I admire you for wishing to possess treasures of wisdom
rather than of gold and silver, which shows that you do not believe
gold and silver to be the means of making men better, but that the
thoughts[16] of the wise alone enrich with virtue their possessions.

[16] Lit. "gnomes," maxims, sententiae. Cf. Aristot. "Rhet." ii. 21.

And Euthydemus was glad when he heard that saying, for, thought he to
himself, "In the eyes of Socrates I am on the high road to the
acquisition of wisdom." But the latter, perceiving him to be pleased
with the praise, continued.

Soc. And what is it in which you desire to excel, Euthydemus, that you
collect books?

And when Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer he should
make, Socrates added: Possibly you want to be a great doctor? Why, the
prescriptions[17] of the Pharmacopoeia would form a pretty large
library by themselves.

[17] {suggrammata}, "medical treatises." See Aristot. "Eth." x. 9, 21.

No, indeed, not I! (answered Euthydemus).

Soc. Then do you wish to be an architect? That too implies a man of
well-stored wit and judgment.[18]

[18] Or, "To be that implies a considerable store of well-packed
wisdom."

I have no such ambition (he replied).

Soc. Well, do you wish to be a mathematician, like Theodorus?[19]

[19] Of Cyrene (cf. Plat. "Theaet.") taught Plato. Diog. Laert. ii. 8,
19.

Euth. No, nor yet a mathematician.

Soc. Then do you wish to be an astronomer?[20] or (as the youth
signified dissent) possibly a rhapsodist?[21] (he asked), for I am
told you have the entire works of Homer in your possession.[22]

[20] Cf. below, IV. vii. 4.

[21] See "Symp." iii. 6; Plat. "Ion."

[22] See Jowett, "Plato," i. 229; Grote, "Plato," i. 455.

Nay, God forbid! not I! (ejaculated the youth). Rhapsodists have a
very exact acquaintance with epic poetry, I know, of course; but they
are empty-pated creatures enough themselves.[23]

[23] Or, "are simply perfect in the art of reciting epic poetry, but
are apt to be the veriest simpletons themselves."

At last Socrates said: Can it be, Euthydemus, that you are an aspirant
to that excellence through which men become statesmen and
administrators fit to rule and apt to benefit[24] the rest of the
world and themselves?

[24] Or, "statesmen, and economists, and rules, and benefactors of
the rest of the world and themselves."

Yes (replied he), that is the excellence I desire--beyond measure.

Upon my word (said Socrates), then you have indeed selected as the
object of your ambition the noblest of virtues and the greatest of the
arts, for this is the property of kings, and is entitled "royal"; but
(he continued) have you considered whether it is possible to excel in
these matters without being just and upright?[25]

[25] Just, {dikaios} = upright, righteous. Justice, {dikaiosune} =
social uprightness = righteousness, N.T. To quote a friend: "The
Greek {dikaios} combines the active dealing out of justice with
the self-reflective idea of preserving justice in our conduct,
which is what we mean by 'upright.'"

Euth. Certainly I have, and I say that without justice and uprightness
it is impossible to be a good citizen.

No doubt (replied Socrates) you have accomplished that initial step?

Euth. Well, Socrates, I think I could hold my own against all comers
as an upright man.

And have upright men (continued Socrates) their distinctive and
appropriate works like those of carpenters or shoe-makers?

Euth. To be sure they have.

Soc. And just as the carpenter is able to exhibit his works and
products, the righteous man should be able to expound and set forth
his, should he not?

I see (replied Euthydemus) you are afraid I cannot expound the works
of righteousness! Why, bless me! of course I can, and the works of
unrighteousness into the bargain, since there are not a few of that
sort within reach of eye and ear every day.

Shall we then (proceeded Socrates) write the letter R on this
side,[26] and on that side the letter W; and then anything that
appears to us to be the product of righteousness we will place to the
R account, and anything which appears to be the product of wrong-doing
and iniquity to the account of W?

[26] The letter R (to stand for Right, Righteous, Upright, Just). The
letter W (to stand for Wrong, Unrighteous, Unjust).

By all means do so (he answered), if you think that it assists
matters.

Accordingly Socrates drew the letters, as he had suggested, and
continued.

Soc. Lying exists among men, does it not?

Euth. Certainly.

To which side of the account then shall we place it? (he asked).

Euth. Clearly on the side of wrong and injustice.

Soc. Deceit too is not uncommon?

Euth. By no means.

Soc. To which side shall we place deceit?

Euth. Deceit clearly on the side of wrong.

Soc. Well, and chicanery[27] or mischief of any sort?

[27] Reading {to kakourgein} (= furari, Sturz); al. {kleptein}, Stob.

Euth. That too.

Soc. And the enslavement of free-born men?[28]

[28] Or, "the kidnapping of men into slavery." {to andrapodizesthai} =
the reduction of a free-born man to a state of slavery. Slavery
itself ({douleia}) being regarded as the normal condition of a
certain portion of the human race and not in itself immoral.

Euth. That too.

Soc. And we cannot allow any of these to lie on the R side of the
account, to the side of right and justice, can we, Euthydemus?

It would be monstrous (he replied).

Soc. Very good. But supposing a man to be elected general, and he
succeeds in enslaving an unjust, wicked, and hostile state, are we to
say that he is doing wrong?

Euth. By no means.

Soc. Shall we not admit that he is doing what is right?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. Again, suppose he deceives the foe while at war with them?

Euth. That would be all fair and right also.

Soc. Or steals and pillages their property? would he not be doing what
is right?

Euth. Certainly; when you began I thought you were limiting the
question to the case of friends.

Soc. So then everything which we set down on the side of Wrong will
now have to be placed to the credit of Right?

Euth. Apparently.

Soc. Very well then, let us so place them; and please, let us make a
new definition--that while it is right to do such things to a foe, it
is wrong to do them to a friend, but in dealing with the latter it
behoves us to be as straightforward as possible.[29]

[29] Or, "an absolutely straightforward course is necessary."

I quite assent (replied Euthydemus).

So far so good (remarked Socrates); but if a general, seeing his
troops demoralised, were to invent a tale to the effect that
reinforcements were coming, and by means of this false statement
should revive the courage of his men, to which of the two accounts
shall we place that act of fraud?[30]

[30] Cf. "Hell." IV. iii. 10; "Cyrop." I. vi. 31.

On the side of right, to my notion (he replied).

Soc. Or again, if a man chanced to have a son ill and in need of
medicine, which the child refused to take, and supposing the father by
an act of deceit to administer it under the guise of something nice to
eat, and by service of that lie to restore the boy to health, to which
account shall we set down this fraud?

Euth. In my judgment it too should be placed to the same account.

Soc. Well, supposing you have a friend in deplorably low spirits, and
you are afraid he will make away with himself--accordingly you rob him
of his knife or other such instrument: to which side ought we to set
the theft?

Euth. That too must surely be placed to the score of right behaviour.

Soc. I understand you to say that a straightforward course is not in
every case to be pursued even in dealing with friends?

Heaven forbid! (the youth exclaimed). If you will allow me, I rescind
my former statement.[31]

[31] See above, I. ii. 44 ({anatithemai}).

Soc. Allow you! Of course you may--anything rather than make a false
entry on our lists. . . . But there is just another point we ought not
to leave uninvestigated. Let us take the case of deceiving a friend to
his detriment: which is the more wrongful--to do so voluntarily or
unintentionally?

Euth. Really, Socrates, I have ceased to believe in my own answers,
for all my former admissions and conceptions seem to me other than I
first supposed them.[32] Still, if I may hazard one more opinion, the
intentional deceiver, I should say, is worse than the involuntary.

[32] Or, "all my original positions seem to me now other than I first
conceived them"; or, "everything I first asserted seems now to be
twisted topsy-turvy."

Soc. And is it your opinion that there is a lore and science of Right
and Justice just as there is of letters and grammar?[33]

[33] {mathesis kai episteme tou dikaiou}--a doctrine and a knowledge
of the Just.

Euth. That is my opinion.

Soc. And which should you say was more a man of letters[34]--he who
intentionally misspells or misreads, or he who does so unconsciously?

[34] Or, "more grammatical"; "the better grammarian."

Euth. He who does so intentionally, I should say, because he can spell
or read correctly whenever he chooses.

Soc. Then the voluntary misspeller may be a lettered person, but the
involuntary offender is an illiterate?[35]

[35] Or, "In fact, he who sins against the lore of grammer
intentionally may be a good grammarian and a man of letters, but
he who does so involuntarily is illiterate and a bad grammarian?"

Euth. True, he must be. I do not see how to escape from that
conclusion.

Soc. And which of the two knows what is right--he who intentionally
lies and deceives, or he who lies and deceives unconsciously?[36]

[36] Or, Soc. And does he who lies and deceives with intent know what
is right rather than he who does either or both unconsciously?

Euth. Clearly he does.

Euth. The intentional and conscious liar clearly.

Soc. Well then, your statement is this: on the one hand, the man who
has the knowledge of letters is more lettered than he who has no such
knowledge?[37]

[37] Or, Soc. It is a fair inference, is it not, that he who has the
{episteme} of grammar is more grammatical than he who has no such
{episteme}?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And he who has the {episteme} of things rightful is more
righteous than he who lacks the {episteme}? See Plat. "Hipp.
min."; Arist. "Eth. Eud." VI. v. 7.

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And, on the other, he who has the knowledge of what is right is
more righteous than he who lacks that knowledge?

Euth. I suppose it is, but for the life of me I cannot make head or
tail of my own admission.[38]

[38] Lit. "Apparently; but I appear to myself to be saying this also,
heaven knows how." See Jowett, "Plato," ii. p. 416 (ed. 2).

Soc. Well (look at it like this). Suppose a man to be anxious to speak
the truth, but he is never able to hold the same language about a
thing for two minutes together. First he says: "The road is towards
the east," and then he says, "No, it's towards the west"; or, running
up a column of figures, now he makes the product this, and again he
makes it that, now more, now less--what do you think of such a man?

Euth. Heaven help us! clearly he does not know what he thought he
knew.

Soc. And you know the appellation given to certain people--
"slavish,"[39] or, "little better than a slave?"

[39] {andropododeis}, which has the connotation of mental dulness, and
a low order of intellect, cf. "boorish,' "rustic," "loutish,"
("pariah," conceivably). "Slavish," "servile," with us connote
moral rather than intellectual deficiency, I suppose. Hence it is
impossible to preserve the humour of the Socratic argument. See
Newman, op. cit. i. 107.

Euth. I do.

Soc. Is it a term suggestive of the wisdom or the ignorance of those
to whom it is applied?

Euth. Clearly of their ignorance.

Soc. Ignorance, for instance, of smithying?

Euth. No, certainly not.

Soc. Then possibly ignorance of carpentering?

Euth. No, nor yet ignorance of carpentering.

Soc. Well, ignorance of shoemaking?

Euth. No, nor ignorance of any of these: rather the reverse, for the
majority of those who do know just these matters are "little better
than slaves."

Soc. You mean it is a title particularly to those who are ignorant of
the beautiful, the good, the just?[40]

[40] Cf. Goethe's "Im Ganzen Guten Schonen resolut zu leben."

It is, in my opinion (he replied).

Soc. Then we must in every way strain every nerve to avoid the
imputation of being slaves?

Euth. Nay, Socrates, by all that is holy, I did flatter myself that at
any rate I was a student of philosophy, and on the right road to be
taught everything essential to one who would fain make beauty and
goodness his pursuit.[41] So that now you may well imagine my despair
when, for all my pains expended, I cannot even answer the questions
put to me about what most of all a man should know; and there is no
path of progress open to me, no avenue of improvement left.

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