The Memorabilia
X >>
Xenophon >> The Memorabilia
Pages:
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 | 14 |
15 |
16
[1] L. Dindorf suspects [SS. 1-6, {'Alla men . . . pollakis}], ed.
Lips. 1872. See also Praef. to Ox. ed. p. viii.
[2] Or, "by his conduct to all, which was not merely innocent in the
eye of law and custom but positively helpful."
[3] See above, I. i. 18; "Hell." I. vii. 14, 15; Grote, "H. G." viii.
272.
[4] See above, I. ii. 35.
[5] Leon of Salamis. See "Hell." II. iii. 39; Plat. "Apol." 32 C;
Andoc. "de Myst." 46.
[6] See above, I. i. 1; Plat. "Apol." 19 C.
[7] Kuhner cf. Quintil. VI. i. 7: "Athenis affectus movere etiam per
praeconem prohibatur orator"; "Apol." 4; Plat. "Apol." 38 D, E.
[8] See Grote, "H. G." viii. p. 663 foll.
These views he frequently maintained in conversation, now with one and
now with another, and one particular discussion with Hippias of
Elis[9] on the topic of justice and uprightness has come to my
knowledge.[10]
[9] For this famous person see Cob. "Pros. Xen." s.n.; Plat. "Hipp.
maj." 148; Quint. xii. 11, 21; Grote, "H. G." viii. 524.
[10] Or, "I can personally vouch for."
Hippias had just arrived at Athens after a long absence, and chanced
to be present when Socrates was telling some listeners how astonishing
it was that if a man wanted to get another taught to be a shoemaker or
carpenter or coppersmith or horseman, he would have no doubt where to
send him for the purpose: "People say,"[11] he added, "that if a man
wants to get his horse or his ox taught in the right way,[12] the
world is full of instructors; but if he would learn himself, or have
his son or his slave taught in the way of right, he cannot tell where
to find such instruction."
[11] L. Dindorf, after Ruhnken and Valckenar, omits this sentence
{phasi de tines . . . didaxonton}. See Kuhner ad loc. For the
sentiment see Plat. "Apol." 20 A.
[12] Cf. "Cyrop." II. ii. 26; VIII. iii. 38; also "Horsem." iii. 5;
"Hunting," vii. 4.
Hippias, catching the words, exclaimed in a bantering tone: What!
still repeating the same old talk,[13] Socrates, which I used to hear
from you long ago?
[13] This tale is repeated by Dio Chrys. "Or." III. i. 109. Cf. Plat.
"Gorg." 490 E.
Yes (answered Socrates), and what is still more strange, Hippias, it
is not only the same old talk but about the same old subjects. Now
you, I daresay, through versatility of knowledge,[14] never say the
same thing twice over on the same subject?
[14] Or, "such is the breadth of your learning," {polumathes}. Cf.
Plat. "Hipp. maj."
To be sure (he answered), my endeavour is to say something new on all
occasions.
What (he asked) about things which you know, as for instance in a case
of spelling, if any one asks you, "How many letters in Socrates, and
what is their order?"[15] I suppose you try to run off one string of
letters to-day and to-morrow another? or to a question of arithmetic,
"Does twice five make ten?" your answer to-day will differ from that
of yesterday?
[15] Cf. "Econ." viii. 14; Plat. "Alc." i. 113 A.
Hipp. No; on these topics, Socrates, I do as you do and repeat myself.
However, to revert to justice (and uprightness),[16] I flatter myself
I can at present furnish you with some remarks which neither you nor
any one else will be able to controvert.
[16] Or, "on the topic of the just I have something to say at present
which," etc.
By Hera![17] (he exclaimed), what a blessing to have discovered![18]
Now we shall have no more divisions of opinion on points of right and
wrong; judges will vote unanimously; citizens will cease wrangling;
there will be no more litigation, no more party faction, states will
reconcile their differences, and wars are ended. For my part I do not
know how I can tear myself away from you, until I have heard from your
own lips all about the grand discovery you have made.
[17] See above, I. v. 5.
[18] Or, "what a panacea are you the inventor of"; lit. "By Hera, you
have indeed discovered a mighty blessing, if juries are to cease
recording their verdicts 'aye' and 'no'; if citizens are to cease
their wranglings on points of justice, their litigations, and
their party strifes; if states are to cease differing on matters
of right and wrong and appealing to the arbitrament of war."
You shall hear all in good time (Hippias answered), but not until you
make a plain statement of your own belief. What is justice? We have
had enough of your ridiculing all the rest of the world, questioning
and cross-examining first one and then the other, but never a bit will
you render an account to any one yourself or state a plain opinion
upon a single topic.[19]
[19] See Plat. "Gorg." 465 A.
What, Hippias (Socrates retorted), have you not observed that I am in
a chronic condition of proclaiming what I regard as just and upright?
Hipp. And pray what is this theory[20] of yours on the subject? Let us
have it in words.
[20] {o logos}.
Soc. If I fail to proclaim it in words, at any rate I do so in deed
and in fact. Or do you not think that a fact is worth more as evidence
than a word?[21]
[21] Or, "is of greater evidential value," "ubi res adsunt, quid opus
est verbis?"
Worth far more, I should say (Hippias answered), for many a man with
justice and right on his lips commits injustice and wrong, but no doer
of right ever was a misdoer or could possibly be.
Soc. I ask then, have you ever heard or seen or otherwise perceived me
bearing false witness or lodging malicious information, or stirring up
strife among friends or political dissension in the city, or
committing any other unjust and wrongful act?
No, I cannot say that I have (he answered).
Soc. And do you not regard it as right and just to abstain from
wrong?[22]
[22] Or, "is not abstinence from wrongdoing synonymous with righteous
behaviour?"
Hipp. Now you are caught, Socrates, plainly trying to escape from a
plain statement. When asked what you believe justice to be, you keep
telling us not what the just man does, but what he does not do.
Why, I thought for my part (answered Socrates) that the refusal to do
wrong and injustice was a sufficient warrent in itself of
righteousness and justice, but if you do not agree, see if this
pleases you better: I assert that what is "lawful" is "just and
righteous."
Do you mean to assert (he asked) that lawful and just are synonymous
terms?
Soc. I do.
I ask (Hippias added), for I do not perceive what you mean by lawful,
nor what you mean by just.[23]
[23] Lit. "what sort of lawful or what sort of just is spoken of."
Soc. You understand what is meant by laws of a city or state?
Yes (he answered).
Soc. What do you take them to be?
Hipp. The several enactments drawn up by the citizens or members of a
state in agreement as to what things should be done or left undone.
Then I presume (Socrates continued) that a member of a state who
regulates his life in accordance with these enactments will be law-
abiding, while the transgressor of the same will be law-less?
Certainly (he answered).
Soc. And I presume the law-loving citizen will do what is just and
right, while the lawless man will do what is unjust and wrong?
Hipp. Certainly.
Soc. And I presume that he who does what is just is just, and he who
does what is unjust is unjust?
Hipp. Of course.
Soc. It would appear, then, that the law-loving man is just, and the
lawless unjust?
Then Hippias: Well, but laws, Socrates, how should any one regard as a
serious matter either the laws themselves, or obedience to them, which
laws the very people who made them are perpetually rejecting and
altering?
Which is also true of war (Socrates replied); cities are perpetually
undertaking war and then making peace again.
Most true (he answered).
Soc. If so, what is the difference between depreciating obedience to
law because laws will be repealed, and depreciating good discipline in
war because peace will one day be made? But perhaps you object to
enthusiasm displayed in defence of one's home and fatherland in war?
No, indeed I do not! I heartily approve of it (he answered).
Soc. Then have you laid to heart the lesson taught by Lycurgus to the
Lacedaemonians,[24] and do you understand that if he succeeded in
giving Sparta a distinction above other states, it was only by
instilling into her, beyond all else, a spirit of obedience to the
laws? And among magistrates and rulers in the different states, you
would scarcely refuse the palm of superiority to those who best
contribute to make their fellow-citizens obedient to the laws? And you
would admit that any particular state in which obedience to the laws
is the paramount distinction of the citizens flourishes most in peace
time, and in time of war is irresistible? But, indeed, of all the
blessings which a state may enjoy, none stands higher than the
blessing of unanimity. "Concord among citizens"--that is the constant
theme of exhortation emphasised by the councils of elders[25] and by
the choice spirits of the community;[26] at all times and everywhere
through the length and breadth of all Hellas it is an established law
that the citizens be bound together by an oath of concord;[27]
everywhere they do actually swear this oath; not of course as implying
that citizens shall all vote for the same choruses, or give their
plaudits to the same flute-players, or choose the same poets, or limit
themselves to the same pleasures, but simply that they shall pay
obedience to the laws, since in the end that state will prove most
powerful and most prosperous in which the citizens abide by these; but
without concord neither can a state be well administered nor a
household well organised.
[24] Cf. "Pol. Lac." viii. See Newman, op. cit. i. 396.
[25] Lit. "the Gerousiai." {S} or {X S} uses the Spartan phraseology.
[26] Lit. "the best men." {S} or {X S} speaks as an "aristocrat."
[27] Cf. "Hell." II. iv. 43; Lys. xxv. 21 foll.; Schneid. cf. Lycurg.
"u Leocr." 189.
And if we turn to private life, what better protection can a man have
than obedience to the laws? This shall be his safeguard against
penalties, his guarantee of honours at the hands of the community; it
shall be a clue to thread his way through the mazes of the law courts
unbewildered, secure against defeat, assured of victory.[28] It is to
him, the law-loving citizen, that men will turn in confidence when
seeking a guardian of the most sacred deposits, be it of money or be
it their sons or daughters. He, in the eyes of the state collectively,
is trustworthy--he and no other; who alone may be depended on to
render to all alike their dues--to parents and kinsmen and servants,
to friends and fellow-citizens and foreigners. This is he whom the
enemy will soonest trust to arrange an armistice, or a truce, or a
treaty of peace. They would like to become the allies of this man, and
to fight on his side. This is he to whom the allies[29] of his country
will most confidently entrust the command of their forces, or of a
garrison, or their states themselves. This, again, is he who may be
counted on to recompense kindness with gratitude, and who, therefore,
is more sure of kindly treatment than another whose sense of gratitude
is fuller.[30] The most desirable among friends, the enemy of all
others to be avoided, clearly he is not the person whom a foreign
state would choose to go to war with; encompassed by a host of friends
and exempt from foes, his very character has a charm to compel
friendship and alliance, and before him hatred and hostility melt
away.
[28] Or, "ignorant of hostile, assured of favourable verdict."
[29] Lit. "the Allies," e.g. of Sparta or of Athens, etc.
[30] Lit. "From whom may the doer of a deed of kindness more
confidently expect the recompense of gratitude than from your
lover of the law? and whom would one select as the recipient of
kindness rather than a man susceptible of gratitude?"
And now, Hippias, I have done my part; that is my proof and
demonstration that the "lawful" and "law-observant" are synonymous
with the "upright" and the "just"; do you, if you hold a contrary
view, instruct us.[31]
[31] For the style of this enconium (of the {nomimos}) cf. "Ages." i.
36; and for the "Socratic" reverence for law cf. Plat. "Crito."
Then Hippias: Nay, upon my soul, Socrates, I am not aware of holding
any contrary opinion to what you have uttered on the theme of
justice.[32]
[32] Lit. "the just and upright," {tou dikaiou}.
Soc. But now, are you aware, Hippias, of certain unwritten laws?[33]
[33] See Soph. "Antig." "Oed. T." 865, and Prof. Jebb ad loc.; Dem.
"de Cor." 317, 23; Aristot. "Rhet." I. xiii.
Yes (he answered), those held in every part of the world, and in the
same sense.
Can you then assert (asked Socrates) of these unwritten laws that men
made them?
Nay, how (he answered) should that be, for how could they all have
come together from the ends of the earth? and even if they had so
done, men are not all of one speech?[34]
[34] Or, "there would be difficulty of understanding each other, and a
babel of tongues."
Soc. Whom then do you believe to have been the makers of these laws.
Hipp. For my part, I think that the gods must have made these laws for
men, and I take it as proof that first and foremost it is a law and
custom everywhere to worship and reverence the gods.
Soc. And, I presume, to honour parents is also customary everywhere?
Yes, that too (he answered).
Soc. And, I presume, also the prohibition of intermarriage between
parents and children?
Hipp. No; at that point I stop, Socrates. That does not seem to me to
be a law of God.
Now, why? (he asked).
Because I perceive it is not infrequently transgressed (he
answered).[35]
[35] Or, "as I perceive, it is not of universal application, some
transgress it."
Soc. Well, but there are a good many other things which people do
contrary to law; only the penalty, I take it, affixed to the
transgression of the divine code is certain; there is no escape for
the offender after the manner in which a man may transgress the laws
of man with impunity, slipping through the fingers of justice by
stealth, or avoiding it by violence.
Hipp. And what is the inevitable penalty paid by those who, being
related as parents and children, intermingle in marriage?
Soc. The greatest of all penalties; for what worse calamity can human
beings suffer in the production of offspring than to misbeget?[36]
[36] Or, "in the propagation of the species than to produce
misbegotten children."
Hipp. But how or why should they breed them ill where nothing hinders
them, being of a good stock themselves and producing from stock as
good?
Soc. Because, forsooth, in order to produce good children, it is not
simply necessary that the parents should be good and of a good stock,
but that both should be equally in the prime and vigour of their
bodies.[37] Do you suppose that the seed of those who are at their
prime is like theirs who either have not yet reached their prime, or
whose prime has passed?
[37] Cf. Plat. "Laws," viii. 839 A; Herbst, etc., cf. Grotius, "de
Jure," ii. 5, xii. 4.
Hipp. No, it is reasonable to expect that the seed will differ.
Soc. And for the better--which?
Hipp. Theirs clearly who are at their prime.
Soc. It would seem that the seed of those who are not yet in their
prime or have passed their prime is not good?
Hipp. It seems most improbable it should be.
Soc. Then the right way to produce children is not that way?
Hipp. No, that is not the right way.
Soc. Then children who are so produced are produced not as they ought
to be?
Hipp. So it appears to me.
What offspring then (he asked) will be ill produced, ill begotten, and
ill born, if not these?
I subscribe to that opinion also (replied Hippias).
Soc. Well, it is a custom universally respected, is it not, to return
good for good, and kindness with kindness?
Hipp. Yes, a custom, but one which again is apt to be transgressed.
Soc. Then he that so transgresses it pays penalty in finding himself
isolated; bereft of friends who are good, and driven to seek after
those who love him not. Or is it not so that he who does me kindness
in my intercourse with him is my good friend, but if I requite not
this kindness to my benefactor, I am hated by him for my ingratitude,
and yet I must needs pursue after him and cling to him because of the
great gain to me of his society?
Hipp. Yes, Socrates. In all these cases, I admit, there is an
implication of divine authority;[38] that a law should in itself be
loaded with the penalty of its transgression does suggest to my mind a
higher than human type of legistlator.
[38] Lit. "Yes, upon my word, Socrates, all these cases look very like
(would seem to point to) the gods."
Soc. And in your opinion, Hippias, is the legislation of the gods just
and righteous, or the reverse of what is just and righteous?
Hipp. Not the reverse of what is just and righteous, Socrates, God
forbid! for scarcely could any other legislate aright, of not God
himself.
Soc. It would seem then, Hippias, the gods themselves are well pleased
that "the lawful" and "the just" should be synonymous?[39]
[39] Or, "it is well pleasing also to the gods that what is lawful is
just and what is just is lawful."
By such language and by such conduct, through example and precept
alike, he helped to make those who approached him more upright and
more just.
V
And now I propose to show in what way he made those who were with him
more vigorous in action.[1] In the first place, as befitted one whose
creed was that a basis of self-command is indispensable to any noble
performance, he manifested himself to his companions as one who had
pre-eminently disciplined himself;[2] and in the next place by
conversation and discussion he encouraged them to a like self-
restraint beyond all others.[3] Thus it was that he continued ever
mindful himself, and was continually reminding all whom he
encountered, of matters conducive to virtue; as the following
discussion with Euthydemus, which has come to my knowledge,[4] will
serve to illustrate--the topic of the discussion being self-command.
[1] Lit. "more practical," i.e. more energetic and effective.
[2] "If any one might claim to be a prince of ascetics, it was
Socrates; such was the ineffaceable impression left on the minds
of his associates."
[3] Or, "he stimulated in these same companions a spirit of self-
restraint beyond all else."
[4] Or, "which I can vouch for."
Tell me, Euthydemus (he began), do you believe freedom to be a noble
and magnificent acquisition, whether for a man or for a state?
I cannot conceive a nobler or more magnificent (he answered).
Soc. Then do you believe him to be a free man who is ruled by the
pleasures of the body, and thereby cannot perform what is best?
Certainly not (he answered).
Soc. No! for possibly to perform what is best appears to you to savour
of freedom? And, again, to have some one over you who will prevent you
doing the like seems a loss of freedom?
Most decidedly (he answered).
Soc. It would seem you are decidedly of opinion that the incontinent
are the reverse of free?[5]
[5] Or, "incontinency is illiberal."
Euth. Upon my word, I much suspect so.
Soc. And does it appear to you that the incontinent man is merely
hindered from doing what is noblest, or that further he is impelled to
do what is most shameful?
Euth. I think he is as much driven to the one as he is hindered from
the other.
Soc. And what sort of lords and masters are those, think you, who at
once put a stop to what is best and enforce what is worst?
Euth. Goodness knows, they must be the very worst of masters.
Soc. And what sort of slavery do you take to be the worst?
I should say (he answered) slavery to the worst masters.
It would seem then (pursued Socrates) that the incontinent man is
bound over to the worst sort of slavery, would it not?
So it appears to be (the other answered).
Soc. And does it not appear to you that this same beldame incontinence
shuts out wisdom, which is the best of all things,[6] from mankind,
and plunges them into the opposite? Does it not appear to you that she
hinders men from attending to things which will be of use and benefit,
and from learning to understand them; that she does so by dragging
them away to things which are pleasant; and often though they are well
aware of the good and of the evil, she amazes and confounds[7] their
wits and makes them choose the worse in place of the better?
[6] "Wisdom, the greatest good which men can possess."
[7] Schneid. cf. Plat. "Protag." 355 A; and "Symp." iv. 23.
Yes, so it comes to pass (he answered).
Soc. And[8] soundness of soul, the spirit of temperate modesty? Who
has less claim to this than the incontinent man? The works of the
temperate spirit and the works of incontinency are, I take it,
diametrically opposed?
[8] "And if this be so concerning wisdom, {sophia}, what of
{sophrasune}, soundness of soul--sobriety?"
That too, I admit (he answered).
Soc. If this then be so concerning these virtues,[9] what with regard
to carefulness and devotion to all that ought to occupy us? Can
anything more seriously militate against these than this same
incontinence?
[9] Or add, "If this be so concerning not wisdom only, but concerning
temperance and soundness of soul, what," etc.
Nothing that I can think of (he replied).
Soc. And can worse befall a man, think you? Can he be subjected to a
more baleful influence than that which induces him to choose what is
hurtful in place of what is helpful; which cajoles him to devote
himself to the evil and to neglect the good; which forces him, will he
nill he, to do what every man in his sober senses would shrink from
and avoid?
I can imagine nothing worse (he replied).
Soc. Self-control, it is reasonable to suppose, will be the cause of
opposite effects upon mankind to those of its own opposite, the want
of self-control?
Euth. It is to be supposed so.
Soc. And this, which is the source of opposite effects to the very
worst, will be the very best of things?
Euth. That is the natural inference.
Soc. It looks, does it not, Euthydemus, as if self-control were the
best thing a man could have?
It does indeed, Socrates (he answered).
Soc. But now, Euthydemus, has it ever occurred to you to note one
fact?
What fact? (he asked).
Soc. That, after all, incontinency is powerless to bring us to that
realm of sweetness which some look upon[10] as her peculiar province;
it is not incontinency but self-control alone which has the passport
to highest pleasures.
[10] Or, "which we are apt to think of as."
In what way? (he asked). How so?
Why, this way (Socrates answered): since incontinency will not suffer
us to resist hunger and thirst, or to hold out against sexual
appetite, or want of sleep (which abstinences are the only channels to
true pleasure in eating and drinking, to the joys of love, to sweet
repose and blissful slumber won by those who will patiently abide and
endure till each particular happiness is at the flood)[11]--it comes
to this: by incontinency we are cut off from the full fruition of the
more obvious and constantly recurring pleasures.[12] To self-control,
which alone enables us to endure the pains aforesaid, alone belongs
the power to give us any pleasure worth remembering in these common
cases.
[11] Or, "at its season." Lit. "is as sweet as possible."
[12] Or, "from tasting to any extent worth speaking of the most
necessary and all-pervading sources of happiness."
You speak the words of truth[13] (he answered).
[13] Lit. "What you say is absolutely and entirely true" (the "vraie
verite" of the matter).
Soc. Furthermore,[14] if there be any joy in learning aught "beautiful
and good," or in patient application to such rules as may enable a man
to manage his body aright, or to administer his household well, or to
prove himself useful to his friends and to the state, or to dominate
his enemies--which things are the sources not only of advantage but of
deepest satisifaction[15]--to the continent and self-controlled it is
given to reap the fruits of them in their performance. It is the
incontinent who have neither part nor lot in any one of them. Since we
must be right in asserting that he is least concerned with such things
who has least ability to do them, being tied down to take an interest
in the pleasure which is nearest to hand.
[14] Or, "But indeed, if there be joy in the pursuit of any noble
study or of such accomplishments as shall enable," etc.
[15] Or, "of the highest pleasures."
Euthydemus replied: Socrates, you would say, it seems to me, that a
man who is mastered by the pleasures of the body has no concern at all
with virtue.
And what is the distinction, Euthydemus (he asked), between a man
devoid of self-control and the dullest of brute beasts? A man who
foregoes all height of aim, who gives up searching for the best and
strives only to gratify his sense of pleasure,[16] is he better than
the silliest of cattle?[17] . . . But to the self-controlled alone is
it given to discover the hid treasures. These, by word and by deed,
they will pick out and make selection of them according to their
kinds, choosing deliberately the good and holding aloof from the
evil.[18] Thus (he added) it is that a man reaches the zenith, as it
were, of goodness and happiness, thus it is that he becomes most
capable of reasoning and discussion.[19] The very name discussion
({dialegesthai}) is got from people coming together and deliberating
in common by picking out and selecting things ({dialegein}) according
to their kinds.[20] A man then is bound to prepare himself as much as
possible for this business, and to pursue it beyond all else with
earnest resolution; for this is the right road to excellence, this
will make a man fittest to lead his fellows and be a master in
debate.[21]
Pages:
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 | 14 |
15 |
16