The Memorabilia
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[5] {ei me ti daimonion eie}, "save under some divinely-ordained
calamity." Cf. "Cyrop." I. vi. 18; "Symp." viii. 43.
[6] See "Ages." ix; Cic. "Tusc." v. 34, 97; "de Fin." ii. 28, 90.
[7] Cf. Plut. "Mor." 128 D; Clement, "Paedag." 2. 173, 33; "Strom." 2,
492, 24; Aelian, "N. A." 8, 9.
[8] "Half in gibe and half in jest," in ref. to "Od." x. 233 foll.:
"So she let them in . . ."
[9] {upothemosune}, "inspiration." Cf. "Il." xv. 412; "Od." xvi. 233.
But as to the concerns of Aphrodite, his advice was to hold strongly
aloof from the fascination of fair forms: once lay finger on these and
it is not easy to keep a sound head and a sober mind. To take a
particular case. It was a mere kiss which, as he had heard,
Critobulus[10] had some time given to a fair youth, the son of
Alcibiades.[11] Accordingly Critobulus being present, Socrates
propounded the question.
[10] For Critobulus (the son of Crito) see "Econ." i. 1 foll.; "Symp."
i. 3 foll.
[11] See Isocr. "Or." xvi. Cobet conj. {ton tou 'Axiokhou uion}, i.e.
Clinias.
Soc. Tell me, Xenophon, have you not always believed Critobulus to be
a man of sound sense, not wild and self-willed? Should you not have
said that he was remarkable for his prudence rather than thoughtless
or foolhardy?
Xen. Certainly that is what I should have said of him.
Soc. Then you are now to regard him as quite the reverse--a hot-
blooded, reckless libertine: this is the sort of man to throw
somersaults into knives,[12] or to leap into the jaws of fire.
[12] Cf. "Symp." ii. 10, iv. 16. See Schneider ad loc.
Xen. And what have you seen him doing, that you give him so bad a
character?
Soc. Doing? Why, has not the fellow dared to steal a kiss from the son
of Alcibiades, most fair of youths and in the golden prime?
Xen. Nay, then, if that is the foolhardy adventure, it is a danger
which I could well encounter myself.
Soc. Pour soul! and what do you expect your fate to be after that
kiss? Let me tell you. On the instant you will lose your freedom, the
indenture of your bondage will be signed; it will be yours on
compulsion to spend large sums on hurtful pleasures; you will have
scarcely a moment's leisure left for any noble study; you will be
driven to concern yourself most zealously with things which no man,
not even a madman, would choose to make an object of concern.
Xen. O Heracles! how fell a power to reside in a kiss!
Soc. Does it surprise you? Do you not know that the tarantula, which
is no bigger than a threepenny bit,[13] has only to touch the mouth
and it will afflict its victim with pains and drive him out of his
senses.
[13] Lit. "a half-obol piece." For the {phalaggion} see Aristot. "H.
A." ix. 39, 1.
Xen. Yes, but then the creature injects something with its bite.
Soc. Ah, fool! and do you imagine that these lovely creatures infuse
nothing with their kiss, simply because you do not see the poison? Do
you not know that this wild beast which men call beauty in its bloom
is all the more terrible than the tarantula in that the insect must
first touch its victim, but this at a mere glance of thebeholder,
without even contact, will inject something into him--yards away--
which will make him man. And may be that is why the Loves are called
"archers," because these beauties wound so far off.[14] But my advice
to you, Xenophon, is, whenever you catch sight of one of these fair
forms, to run helter-skelter for bare life without a glance behind;
and to you, Critobulus, I would say, "Go abroad for a year: so long
time will it take to heal you of this wound."
[14] L. Dindorf, etc. regard the sentence as a gloss. Cf. "Symp." iv.
26 [{isos de kai . . . entimoteron estin}].
Such (he said), in the affairs of Aphrodite, as in meats and drinks,
should be the circumspection of all whose footing is insecure. At
least they should confine themselves to such diet as the soul would
dispense with, save for some necessity of the body; and which even so
ought to set up no disturbance.[15] But for himself, it was clear, he
was prepared at all points and invulnerable. He found less difficulty
in abstaining from beauty's fairest and fullest bloom than many others
from weeds and garbage. To sum up:[16] with regard to eating and
drinking and these other temptations of the sense, the equipment of
his soul made him independent; he could boast honestly that in his
moderate fashion[17] his pleasures were no less than theirs who take
such trouble to procure them, and his pains far fewer.
[15] Cf. "Symp." iv. 38.
[16] L. Dindorf [brackets] this passage as spurious.
[17] On the principle "enough is as good as a feast," {arkountos}.
IV
A belief is current, in accordance with views maintained concerning
Socrates in speech and writing, and in either case conjecturally,
that, however powerful he may have been in stimulating men to virtue
as a theorist, he was incapable of acting as their guide himself.[1]
It would be well for those who adopt this view to weigh carefully not
only what Socrates effected "by way of castigation" in cross-
questioning whose who conceived themselves to be possessed of all
knowledge, but also his everyday conversation with those who spent
their time in close intercourse with himself. Having done this, let
them decide whether he was incapable of making his companions better.
[1] Al. "If any one believes that Socrates, as represented in certain
dialogues (e.g. of Plato, Antisthenes, etc.) of an imaginary
character, was an adept ({protrepsasthai}) in the art of
stimulating people to virtue negatively but scarcely the man to
guide ({proagein}) his hearers on the true path himself." Cf.
(Plat.) "Clitophon," 410 B; Cic. "de Or." I. xlvii. 204; Plut.
"Mor." 798 B. See Grote, "Plato," iii. 21; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 51
foll.; Cf. below, IV. iii. 2.
I will first state what I once heard fall from his lips in a
discussion with Aristodemus,[2] "the little," as he was called, on the
topic of divinity.[3] Socrates had observed that Aristodemus neither
sacrificed nor gave heed to divination, but on the contrary was
disposed to ridicule those who did.
[2] See Plat. "Symp." 173 B: "He was a little fellow who never wore
any shoes, Aristodemus, of the deme of Cydathenaeum."--Jowett.
[3] Or, "the divine element."
So tell me, Aristodemus (he begain), are there any human beings who
have won your admiration for their wisdom?
Ar. There are.
Soc. Would you mention to us their names?
Ar. In the writings of epic poetry I have the greatest admiration for
Homer. . . . And as a dithyrambic poet for Melanippides.[4] I admire
also Sophocles as a tragedian, Polycleitus as a sculptor, and Zeuxis
as a painter.
[4] Melanippides, 430 B.C. See Cobet, "Pros. Xen." s.n.
Soc. Which would you consider the more worthy of admiration, a
fashioner of senseless images devoid of motion or one who could
fashion living creatures endowed with understanding and activity?
Ar. Decidedly the latter, provided his living creatures owed their
birth to design and were not the offspring of some chance.
Soc. But now if you had two sorts of things, the one of which presents
no clue as to what it is for, and the other is obviously for some
useful purpose--which would you judge to be the result of chance,
which of design?
Ar. Clearly that which is produced for some useful end is the work of
design.
Soc. Does it not strike you then that he who made man from the
beginning[5] did for some useful end furnish him with his several
senses--giving him eyes to behold the visible word, and ears to catch
the intonations of sound? Or again, what good would there be in odours
if nostrils had not been bestowed upon us? what perception of sweet
things and pungent, and of all the pleasures of the palate, had not a
tongue been fashioned in us as an interpreter of the same? And besides
all this, do you not think this looks like a matter of foresight, this
closing of the delicate orbs of sight with eyelids as with folding
doors, which, when there is need to use them for any purpose, can be
thrown wide open and firmly closed again in sleep? and, that even the
winds of heaven may not visit them too roughly, this planting of the
eyelashes as a protecting screen?[6] this coping of the region above
the eyes with cornice-work of eyebrow so that no drop of sweat fall
from the head and injure them? again this readiness of the ear to
catch all sounds and yet not to be surcharged? this capacity of the
front teeth of all animals to cut and of the "grinders" to receive the
food and reduce it to pulp? the position of the mouth again, close to
the eyes and nostrils as a portal of ingress for all the creature's
supplies? and lastly, seeing that matter passing out[7] of the body is
unpleasant, this hindward direction of the passages, and their removal
to a distance from the avenues of sense? I ask you, when you see all
these things constructed with such show of foresight can you doubt
whether they are products of chance or intelligence?
[5] Cf. Aristot. "de Part. Animal." 1. For the "teleological" views
see IV. iii. 2 foll.
[6] "Like a sieve" or "colander."
[7] "That which goeth out of a man."
Ar. To be sure not! Viewed in this light they would seem to be the
handiwork of some wise artificer,[8] full of love for all things
living.[9]
[8] "Demiurge."
[9] Passage referred to by Epictetus ap. Stob. "Flor." 121, 29.
Soc. What shall we say of this passion implanted in man to beget
offspring, this passion in the mother to rear her babe, and in the
creature itself, once born, this deep desire of life and fear of
death?
Ar. No doubt these do look like the contrivances of some one
deliberately planning the existence of living creatures.
Soc. Well, and doubtless you feel to have a spark of wisdom yourself?
Ar. Put your questions, and I will answer.
Soc. And yet you imagine that elsewhere no spark of wisdom is to be
found? And that, too, when you know that you have in your body a tiny
fragment only of the mighty earth, a little drop of the great waters,
and of the other elements, vast in their extent, you got, I presume, a
particle of each towards the compacting of your bodily frame? Mind
alone, it would seem, which is nowhere to be found,[10] you had the
lucky chance to snatch up and make off with, you cannot tell how. And
these things around and about us, enormous in size, infinite in
number, owe their orderly arrangement, as you suppose, to some vacuity
of wit?
[10] Cf. Plat. "Phileb." 30 B: "Soc. May our body be said to have a
soul? Pro. Clearly. Soc. And whence comes that soul, my dear
Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains
elements similar to our bodies but finer, has also a soul? Can
there be any other source?"--Jowett. Cic. "de N. D." ii. 6; iii.
11.
Ar. It may be, for my eyes fail to see the master agents of these, as
one sees the fabricators of things produced on earth.
Soc. No more do you see your own soul, which is the master agent of
your body; so that, as far as that goes, you may maintain, if you
like, that you do nothing with intelligence,[11] but everything by
chance.
[11] Or, "by your wit," {gnome}.
At this point Aristodemus: I assure you, Socrates, that I do not
disdain the Divine power. On the contrary, my belief is that the
Divinity is too grand to need any service which I could render.
Soc. But the grander that power is, which deigns to tend and wait upon
you, the more you are called upon to honour it.
Ar. Be well assured, if I could believe the gods take thought for all
men, I would not neglect them.
Soc. How can you suppose that they do not so take thought? Who, in the
first place, gave to man alone of living creatures his erect posture,
enabling him to see farther in front of him and to contemplate more
freely the height above, and to be less subject to distress than other
creatures [endowed like himself with eyes and ears and mouth].[12]
Consider next how they gave to the beast of the field[13] feet as a
means of progression only, but to man they gave in addition hands--
those hands which have achieved so much to raise us in the scale of
happiness above all animals. Did they not make the tongue also? which
belongs indeed alike to man and beast, but in man they fashioned it so
as to play on different parts of the mouth at different times, whereby
we can produce articulate speech, and have a code of signals to
express our every want to one another. Or consider the pleasures of
the sexual appetite; limited in the rest of the animal kingdom to
certain seasons, but in the case of man a series prolonged unbroken to
old age. Nor did it content the Godhead merely to watch over the
interests of man's body. What is of far higher import, he implanted in
man the noblest and most excellent type of soul. For what other
creature, to begin with, has a soul to appreciate the existence of the
gods who have arranged this grand and beauteous universe? What other
tribe of animals save man can render service to the gods? How apt is
the spirit of man to take precautions against hunger and thirst, cold
and heat, to alleviate disease and foster strength! how suited to
labour with a view to learning! how capable of garnering in the
storehouse of his memory all that he has heard or seen or understood!
Is it not most evident to you that by the side of other animals men
live and move a race of gods--by nature excellent, in beauty of body
and of soul supreme? For, mark you, had a creature of man's wit been
encased in the body of an ox,[14] he would have been powerless to
carry out his wishes, just as the possession of hands divorced from
human wit is profitless. And then you come, you who have obtained
these two most precious attributes, and give it as your opinion, that
the gods take no thought or care for you. Why, what will you have them
to do, that you may believe and be persuaded that you too are in their
thoughts?
[12] See Kuhner for an attempt to cure the text.
[13] {erpetois}, a "poetical" word. Cf. "Od." iv. 418; Herod. i. 140.
[14] See Aristot. "de Part. Animal." iv. 10.
Ar. When they treat me as you tell us they treat you, and send me
counsellors to warn me what I am to do and what abstain from
doing,[15] I will believe.
[15] See IV. iii. 12.
Soc. Send you counsellors! Come now, what when the people of Athens
make inquiry by oracle, and the gods' answer comes? Are you not an
Athenian? Think you not that to you also the answer is given? What
when they send portents to forewarn the states of Hellas? or to all
mankind? Are you not a man? a Hellene? Are not these intended for you
also? Can it be that you alone are excepted as a signal instance of
Divine neglect? Again, do you suppose that the gods could have
implanted in the heart of man the belief in their capacity to work him
weal or woe had they not the power? Would not men have discovered the
imposture in all this lapse of time? Do you not perceive that the
wisest and most perdurable of human institutions--be they cities or
tribes of men--are ever the most God-fearing; and in the individual
man the riper his age and judgment, the deeper his religousness? Ay,
my good sir (he broke forth), lay to heart and understand that even as
your own mind within you can turn and dispose of your body as it
lists, so ought we to think that the wisdom which abides within the
universal frame does so dispose of all things as it finds agreeable to
itself; for hardly may it be that your eye is able to range over many
a league, but that the eye of God is powerless to embrace all things
at a glance; or that to your soul it is given to dwell in thought on
matters here or far away in Egypt or in Sicily, but that the wisdom
and thought of God is not sufficient to include all things at one
instant under His care. If only you would copy your own behaviour[16]
where human beings are concerned. It is by acts of service and of
kindness that you discover which of your fellows are willing to
requite you in kind. It is by taking another into your counsel that
you arrive at the secret of his wisdom. If, on like principle, you
will but make trial of the gods by acts of service, whether they will
choose to give you counsel in matters obscure to mortal vision, you
shall discover the nature and the greatness of Godhead to be such that
they are able at once to see all things and to hear all things and to
be present everywhere, nor does the least thing escape their watchful
care.
[16] Or, "reason as you are wont to do."
To my mind the effect of words like these was to cause those about him
to hold aloof from unholiness, baseness, and injustice, not only
whilst they were seen of men, but even in the solitary place, since
they must believe that no part of their conduct could escape the eye
of Heaven.
V
I suppose it may be taken as admitted that self-control is a noble
acquirement for a man.[1] If so, let us turn and consider whether by
language like the following he was likely to lead his listeners
onwards[2] to the attainment of this virtue. "Sirs," he would say, "if
a war came upon us and we wished to choose a man who would best help
us to save ourselves and to subdue our enemy, I suppose we should
scarcely select one whom we knew to be a slave to his belly, to wine,
or lust, and prone to succumb to toil or sleep. Could we expect such
an one to save us or to master our foes? Or if one of us were nearing
the end of his days, and he wished to discover some one to whom he
might entrust his sons for education, his maiden daughters for
protection, and his property in general for preservation, would he
deem a libertine worthy of such offices? Why, no one would dream of
entrusting his flocks and herds, his storehouses and barns, or the
superintendence of his works to the tender mercies of an intemperate
slave. If a butler or an errand boy with such a character were offered
to us we would not take him as a free gift. And if he would not accept
an intemperate slave, what pains should the master himself take to
avoid that imputation.[3] For with the incontinent man it is not as
with the self-seeker and the covetous. These may at any rate be held
to enrich themselves in depriving others. But the intemperate man
cannot claim in like fashion to be a blessing to himself if a curse to
his neighbours; nay, the mischief which he may cause to others is
nothing by comparison with that which redounds against himself, since
it is the height of mischief to ruin--I do not say one's own house and
property--but one's own body and one's own soul. Or to take an example
from social intercourse, no one cares for a guest who evidently takes
more pleasure in the wine and the viands than in the friends beside
him--who stints his comrades of the affection due to them to dote upon
a mistress. Does it not come to this, that every honest man is bound
to look upon self-restraint as the very corner-stone of virtue:[4]
which he should seek to lay down as the basis and foundation of his
soul? Without self-restraint who can lay any good lesson to heart or
practise it when learnt in any degree worth speaking of? Or, to put it
conversely, what slave of pleasure will not suffer degeneracy of soul
and body? By Hera,[5] well may every free man pray to be saved from
the service of such a slave; and well too may he who is in bondage to
such pleasures supplicate Heaven to send him good masters, seeing that
is the one hope of salvation left him."
[1] Lit. "a beautiful and brave possesion."
[2] {proubibaze}.
[3] Or, "how should the master himself beware lest he fall into that
category."
[4] {krepida}. See Pind. "Pyth." iv. 138; ib. vii. 3; ib. fr. 93.
[5] See below, III. x. 9, xi. 5; IV. ii. 9, iv. 8; "Econ." x. 1;
"Cyrop." I. iv. 12; Plat. "Phaedr." 230 B. Cf. Shakesp. "by'r
Lakin."
Well-tempered words: yet his self-restraint shone forth even more in
his acts than in his language. Not only was he master over the
pleasures which flow from the body, but of those also which are fed by
riches, his belief being that he who receives money from this or that
chance donor sets up over himself a master, and binds himself to an
abominable slavery.
VI
In this context some discussions with Antiphon the sophist[1] deserve
record. Antiphon approaches Socrates in hope of drawing away his
associates, and in their presence thus accosts him.
[1] {o teratoskopos}, "jealous of Socrates," according to Aristotle
ap. Diog. Laert. II. v. 25. See Cobet, "Pros. Xen."
Antiphon. Why, Socrates, I always thought it was expected of students
of philosophy to grow in happiness daily; but you seem to have reaped
other fruits from your philosophy. At any rate, you exist, I do not
say live, in a style such as no slave serving under a master would put
up with. Your meat and your drink are of the cheapest sort, and as to
clothes, you cling to one wretched cloak which serves you for summer
and winter alike; and so you go the whole year round, without shoes to
your feet or a shirt to your back. Then again, you are not for taking
or making money, the mere seeking of which is a pleasure, even as the
possession of it adds to the sweetness and independence of existence.
I do not know whether you follow the common rule of teachers, who try
to fashion their pupils in imitation of themselves,[2] and propose to
mould the characters of your companions; but if you do you ought to
dub yourself professor of the art of wretchedness.[3]
[2] Or, "try to turn out their pupils as copies of themselves."
[3] See Arist. "Clouds," {on o kakodaimon Sokrates kai Khairephon}.
Thus challenged, Socrates replied: One thing to me is certain,
Antiphon; you have conceived so vivid an idea of my life of misery
that for yourself you would choose death sooner than live as I do.
Suppose now we turn and consider what it is you find so hard in my
life. Is it that he who takes payment must as a matter of contract
finish the work for which he is paid, whereas I, who do not take it,
lie under no constraint to discourse except with whom I choose? Do you
despise my dietary on the ground that the food which I eat is less
wholesome and less stengthening than yours, or that the articles of my
consumption are so scarce and so much costlier to procure than yours?
Or have the fruits of your marketing a flavour denied to mine? Do you
not know the sharper the appetite the less the need of sauces, the
keener the thirst the less the desire for out-of-the-way drinks? And
as to raiment, clothes, you know, are changed on account of cold or
else of heat. People only wear boots and shoes in order not to gall
their feet and be prevented walking. Now I ask you, have you ever
noticed that I keep more within doors than others on account of the
cold? Have you ever seen me battling with any one for shade on account
of the heat? Do you not know that even a weakling by nature may, by
dint of exercise and practice, come to outdo a giant who neglects his
body? He will beat him in the particular point of training, and bear
the strain more easily. But you apparently will not have it that I,
who am for ever training myself to endure this, that, and the other
thing which may befall the body, can brave all hardships more easily
than yourself for instance, who perhaps are not so practised. And to
escape slavery to the belly or to sleep or lechery, can you suggest
more effective means than the possession of some powerful attraction,
some counter-charm which shall gladden not only in the using, but by
the hope enkindled of its lasting usefulness? And yet this you do
know; joy is not to him who feels that he is doing well in nothing--it
belongs to one who is persuaded that things are progressing with him,
be it tillage or the working of a vessel,[4] or any of the thousand
and one things on which a man may chance to be employed. To him it is
given to rejoice as he reflects, "I am doing well." But is the
pleasured derived from all these put together half as joyous as the
consciousness of becoming better oneself, of acquiring better and
better friends? That, for my part, is the belief I continue to
cherish.
[4] "The business of a shipowner or skipper."
Again, if it be a question of helping one's friends or country, which
of the two will have the larger leisure to devote to these objects--he
who leads the life which I lead to-day, or he who lives in the style
which you deem so fortunate? Which of the two will adopt a soldier's
life more easily--the man who cannot get on without expensive living,
or he to whom whatever comes to hand suffices? Which will be the
readier to capitulate and cry "mercy" in a siege--the man of elaborate
wants, or he who can get along happily with the readiest things to
hand? You, Antiphon, would seem to suggest that happiness consists of
luxury and extravagance; I hold a different creed. To have no wants at
all is, to my mind, an attribute of Godhead;[5] to have as few wants
as possible the nearest approach to Godhead; and as that which is
divine is mightiest, so that is next mightiest which comes closest to
the divine.
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