The Polity of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians
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Xenophon >> The Polity of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians
Etext prepared by John Bickers, jbickers@templar.actrix.gen.nz.
The Polity of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians
By Xenophon
Translation by H. G. Dakyns
Xenophon the Athenian was born 431 B.C. He was a
pupil of Socrates. He marched with the Spartans,
and was exiled from Athens. Sparta gave him land
and property in Scillus, where he lived for many
years before having to move once more, to settle
in Corinth. He died in 354 B.C.
The Polity of the Lacedaemonians talks about the
laws and institutions created by Lycurgus, which
train and develop Spartan citizens from birth to
old age.
PREPARER'S NOTE
This was typed from Dakyns' series, "The Works of Xenophon," a
four-volume set. The complete list of Xenophon's works (though
there is doubt about some of these) is:
Work Number of books
The Anabasis 7
The Hellenica 7
The Cyropaedia 8
The Memorabilia 4
The Symposium 1
The Economist 1
On Horsemanship 1
The Sportsman 1
The Cavalry General 1
The Apology 1
On Revenues 1
The Hiero 1
The Agesilaus 1
The Polity of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians 2
Text in brackets "{}" is my transliteration of Greek text into
English using an Oxford English Dictionary alphabet table. The
diacritical marks have been lost.
Etext prepared by John Bickers, jbickers@templar.actrix.gen.nz.
The Polity of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians
by Xenophon
Translation by H. G. Dakyns
The Polity of the Lacedaemonians talks about the
laws and institutions created by Lycurgus, which
train and develop Spartan citizens from birth to
old age.
THE POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS
I
Now, as concerning the Polity of the Athenians,[1] and the type or
manner of constitution which they have chosen,[2] I praise it not, in
so far as the very choice involves the welfare of the baser folk as
opposed to that of the better class. I repeat, I withhold my praise so
far; but, given the fact that this is the type agreed upon, I propose
to show that they set about its preservation in the right way; and
that those other transactions in connection with it, which are looked
upon as blunders by the rest of the Hellenic world, are the reverse.
[1] See Grote, "H. G." vi. p. 47 foll.; Thuc. i. 76, 77; viii. 48;
Boeckh, "P. E. A." passim; Hartman, "An. Xen. N." cap. viii.;
Roquette, "Xen. Vit." S. 26; Newman, "Pol. Arist." i. 538; and
"Xenophontis qui fertur libellus de Republica Atheniensium," ed.
A. Kirchhoff (MDCCCLXXIV), whose text I have chiefly followed.
[2] Lit. "I do not praise their choice of the (particular) type, in so
far as . . ."
In the first place, I maintain, it is only just that the poorer
classes[3] and the People of Athens should be better off than the men
of birth and wealth, seeing that it is the people who man the
fleet,[4] and put round the city her girdle of power. The
steersman,[5] the boatswain, the lieutenant,[6] the look-out-man at
the prow, the shipright--these are the people who engird the city with
power far rather than her heavy infantry[7] and men of birth of
quality. This being the case, it seems only just that offices of state
should be thrown open to every one both in the ballot[8] and the show
of hands, and that the right of speech should belong to any one who
likes, without restriction. For, observe,[9] there are many of these
offices which, according as they are in good or in bad hands, are a
source of safety or of danger to the People, and in these the People
prudently abstains from sharing; as, for instance, it does not think
it incumbent on itself to share in the functions of the general or of
the commander of cavalry.[10] The sovereign People recognises the fact
that in forgoing the personal exercise of these offices, and leaving
them to the control of the more powerful[11] citizens, it secures the
balance of advantage to itself. It is only those departments of
government which bring emolument[12] and assist the private estate
that the People cares to keep in its own hands.
[3] Cf. "Mem." I. ii. 58 foll.
[4] Lit. "ply the oar and propel the galleys."
[5] See "Econ." viii. 14; Pollux, i. 96; Arist. "Knights," 543 foll.;
Plat. "Laws," v. 707 A; Jowett, "Plat." v. 278 foll.; Boeckh, "P.
E. A." bk. ii. ch. xxi.
[6] Lit. "pentecontarch;" see Dem. "In Pol." 1212.
[7] Aristot. "Pol." vi. 7; Jowett, "The Politics of Aristotle," vol.
i. p. 109.
[8] {klerotoi}, {airetoi}.
[9] Reading with Kirchhoff, {epeo tou}, or if {epeita}, "in the next
place."
[10] Hipparch.
[11] Cf. "Hipparch." i. 9; "Econ." ii. 8.
[12] E.g. the {dikasteria}.
In the next place, in regard to what some people are puzzled to
explain--the fact that everywhere greater consideration is shown to
the base, to poor people and to common folk, than to persons of good
quality--so far from being a matter of surprise, this, as can be
shown, is the keystone of the preservation of the democracy. It is
these poor people, this common folk, this riff-raff,[13] whose
prosperity, combined with the growth of their numbers, enhances the
democracy. Whereas, a shifting of fortune to the advantage of the
wealthy and the better classes implies the establishment on the part
of the commonalty of a strong power in opposition to itself. In fact,
all the world over, the cream of society is in opposition to the
democracy. Naturally, since the smallest amount of intemperance and
injustice, together with the highest scrupulousness in the pursuit of
excellence, is to be found in the ranks of the better class, while
within the ranks of the People will be found the greatest amount of
ignorance, disorderliness, rascality--poverty acting as a stronger
incentive to base conduct, not to speak of lack of education and
ignorance, traceable to the lack of means which afflicts the average
of mankind.[14]
[13] Or, "these inferiors," "these good-for-nothings."
[14] Or, "some of these folk." The passage is corrupt.
The objection may be raised that it was a mistake to allow the
universal right of speech[15] and a seat in council. These should have
been reserved for the cleverest, the flower of the community. But
here, again, it will be found that they are acting with wise
deliberation in granting to[16] even the baser sort the right of
speech, for supposing only the better people might speak, or sit in
council, blessings would fall to the lot of those like themselves, but
to the commonalty the reverse of blessings. Whereas now, any one who
likes, any base fellow, may get up and discover something to the
advantage of himself and his equals. It may be retorted: "And what
sort of advantage either for himself or for the People can such a
fellow be expected to hit upon?" The answer to which is, that in their
judgment the ignorance and baseness of this fellow, together with his
goodwill, are worth a great deal more to them than your superior
person's virtue and wisdom, coupled with animosity. What it comes to,
therefore, is that a state founded upon such institutions will not be
the best state;[17] but, given a democracy, these are the right means
to procure its preservation. The People, it must be borne in mind,
does not demand that the city should be well governed and itself a
slave. It desires to be free and to be master.[18] As to bad
legislation it does not concern itself about that.[19] In fact, what
you believe to be bad legislation is the very source of the People's
strength and freedom. But if you seek for good legislation, in the
first place you will see the cleverest members of the community laying
down the laws for the rest. And in the next place, the better class
will curb and chastise the lower orders; the better class will
deliberate in behalf of the state, and not suffer crack-brained
fellows to sit in council, or to speak or vote in Parliament.[20] No
doubt; but under the weight of such blessings the People will in a
very short time be reduced to slavery.
[15] Lit. "everybody to speak in turn."
[16] Or, "it is a counsel of perfection on their part to grant to,"
etc.
[17] Or, "the ideal state."
[18] Or, "and to govern and hold office."
[19] Or, "it will take the risk of that."
[20] See Grote, "H. G." v. p. 510 note.
Another point is the extraordinary amount of license[21] granted to
slaves and resident aliens at Athens, where a blow is illegal, and a
slave will not step aside to let you pass him in the street. I will
explain the reason of this peculiar custom. Supposing it were legal
for a slave to be beaten by a free citizen, or for a resident alien or
freedman to be beaten by a citizen, it would frequently happen that an
Athenian might be mistaken for a slave or an alien and receive a
beating; since the Athenian People is no better clothed than the slave
or alien, nor in personal appearance is there any superiority. Or if
the fact itself that slaves in Athens are allowed to indulge in
luxury, and indeed in some cases to live magnificently, be found
astonishing, this too, it can be shown, is done of set purpose. Where
you have a naval power[22] dependent upon wealth[23] we must perforce
be slaves to our slaves, in order that we may get in our slave-
rents,[24] and let the real slave go free. Where you have wealthy
slaves it ceases to be advantageous that my slave should stand in awe
of you. In Lacedaemon my slave stands in awe of you.[25] But if your
slave is in awe of me there will be a risk of his giving away his own
moneys to avoid running a risk in his own person. It is for this
reason then that we have established an equality between our slaves
and free men; and again between our resident aliens and full
citizens,[26] because the city stands in need of her resident aliens
to meet the requirements of such a multiplicity of arts and for the
purposes of her navy. That is, I repeat, the justification for the
equality conferred upon our resident aliens.
[21] See Aristot. "Pol." v. 11 and vi. 4; Jowett, op. cit. vol. i. pp.
179, 196; Welldon, "The Politics of Aristotle," pp. 394 323; Dem.
"Phil." III. iii. 10; Plaut. "Stich." III. i. 37.
[22] See Diod. xi. 43.
[23] Reading, {apo khrematon, anagke}, or (reading, {apo khrematon
anagke}) "considerations of money force us to be slaves."
[24] See Boeckh, "P. E. A." I. xiii. (Eng. trans. p. 72). "The rights
of property with regard to slaves in no way differed from any
other chattel; they could be given or taken as pledges. They
laboured either on their master's account or their own, in
consideration of a certain sum to be paid to the master, or they
were let out on hire either for the mines or any other kind of
labour, and even for other persons' workshops, or as hired
servants for wages ({apophora}): a similar payment was also
exacted by the masters for their slaves serving in the fleet." Ib.
"Dissertation on the Silver Mines of Laurion," p. 659 (Eng.
trans.)
[25] See "Pol. Lac." vi. 3.
[26] Or, "we have given to our slaves the right to talk like equals
with free men, just as to resident aliens the right of so talking
with citizens." See Jebb, "Theophr. Char." xiv. 4, note, p. 221.
See Demosth. "against Midias," 529, where the law is cited. "If
any one commit a personal outrage upon man, woman, or child,
whether free-born or slave, or commit any illegal act against any
such person, let any Athenian that chooses" (not being under
disability) "indict him before the judges," etc; and the orator
exclaims: "You know, O Athenians, the humanity of the law, which
allows not even slaves to be insulted in their persons."--C. R.
Kennedy.
Citizens devoting their time to gymnastics and to the cultivation of
music are not to be found in Athens;[27] the sovereign People has
disestablished them,[28] not from any disbelief in the beauty and
honour of such training, but recognising the fact that these are
things the cultivation of which is beyond its power. On the same
principle, in the case of the coregia,[29] the gymnasiarchy, and the
trierarchy, the fact is recognised that it is the rich man who trains
the chorus, and the People for whom the chorus is trained; it is the
rich man who is trierarch or gymnasiarch, and the People that profits
by their labours.[30] In fact, what the People looks upon as its right
is to pocket the money.[31] To sing and run and dance and man the
vessels is well enough, but only in order that the People may be the
gainer, while the rich are made poorer. And so in the courts of
justice,[32] justice is not more an object of concern to the jurymen
than what touches personal advantage.
[27] For {mousike} and {gumnastike}, see Becker's "Charicles," Exc.
"Education."
[28] See "Revenues," iv. 52; Arist. "Frogs," 1069, {e xekenosen tas te
palaistras}, "and the places of exercise vacant and bare."--Frere.
[29] "The duties of the choregia consisted in finding maintenance and
instruction for the chorus" (in tragedy, usually of fifteen
persons) "as long as they were in training; and in providing the
dresses and equipments for the performance."--Jebb, "Theophr.
Char." xxv. 3. For those of the gymnasiarchy, see "Dict. of
Antiq." "Gymnasium." For that of the trierarchy, see Jebb, op.
cit. xxv. 9; xxix. 16; Boeckh, "P. E. A." IV. xi.
[30] See "Econ." ii. 6; Thuc. vi. 31.
[31] See Boeckh, "P. E. A." II. xvi. p. 241.
[32] For the system of judicature, the {dikasteria}, and the boards of
jurymen or judges, see Aristot. "Constitution of Athens," ch.
lxiii.; "Dict. of Antiq." s.v.
To speak next of the allies, and in reference to the point that
emissaries[33] from Athens come out, and, according to common opinion,
calumniate and vent their hatred[34] upon the better sort of people,
this is done[35] on the principle that the ruler cannot help being
hated by those whom he rules; but that if wealth and respectability
are to wield power in the subject cities the empire of the Athenian
People has but a short lease of existence. This explains why the
better people are punished with infamy,[36] robbed of their money,
driven from their homes, and put to death, while the baser sort are
promoted to honour. On the other hand, the better Athenians throw
their aegis over the better class in the allied cities.[37] And why?
Because they recognise that it is to the interest of their own class
at all times to protect the best element in the cities. It may be
urged[38] that if it comes to strength and power the real strength of
Athens lies in the capacity of her allies to contribute their money
quota. But to the democratic mind[39] it appears a higher advantage
still for the individual Athenian to get hold of the wealth of the
allies, leaving them only enough to live upon and to cultivate their
estates, but powerless to harbour treacherous designs.
[33] For {oi ekpleontes}, see Grote, "H. G." vi. p. 41.
[34] Reading {misousi}; or, if with Kirchhoff, {meiousi}, "in every
way humiliate."
[35] Or, "[they do so] as recognising the fact."
[36] {atimia} = the loss of civil rights, either total or partial. See
C. R. Kennedy, "Select Speeches of Demosthenes," Note 13,
Disenfranchisement.
[37] See Thuc. viii. 48.
[38] See Grote, "H. G." vi. 53.
[39] Or, "to a thorough democrat."
Again,[40] it is looked upon as a mistaken policy on the part of the
Athenian democracy to compel her allies to voyage to Athens in order
to have their cases tried.[41] On the other hand, it is easy to reckon
up what a number of advantages the Athenian People derive from the
practice impugned. In the first place, there is the steady receipt of
salaries throughout the year[42] derived from the court fees.[43]
Next, it enables them to manage the affairs of the allied states while
seated at home without the expense of naval expeditions. Thirdly, they
thus preserve the partisans of the democracy, and ruin her opponents
in the law courts. Whereas, supposing the several allied states tried
their cases at home, being inspired by hostility to Athens, they would
destroy those of their own citizens whose friendship to the Athenian
People was most marked. But besides all this the democracy derives the
following advantages from hearing the cases of her allies in Athens.
In the first place, the one per cent[44] levied in Piraeus is
increased to the profit of the state; again, the owner of a lodging-
house[45] does better, and so, too, the owner of a pair of beasts, or
of slaves to be let out on hire;[46] again, heralds and criers[47] are
a class of people who fare better owing to the sojourn of foreigners
at Athens. Further still, supposing the allies had not to resort to
Athens for the hearing of cases, only the official representative of
the imperial state would be held in honour, such as the general, or
trierarch, or ambassador. Whereas now every single individual among
the allies is forced to pay flattery to the People of Athens because
he knows that he must betake himself to Athens and win or lose[48] his
case at the bar, not of any stray set of judges, but of the sovereign
People itself, such being the law and custom at Athens. He is
compelled to behave as a suppliant[49] in the courts of justice, and
when some juryman comes into court, to grasp his hand. For this
reason, therefore, the allies find themselves more and more in the
position of slaves to the people of Athens.
[40] Grote, "H. G." vi. 61.
[41] See Isocr. "Panath." 245 D.
[42] See Arist. "Clouds," 1196; Demosth. "c. Timoc." 730.
[43] For the "Prytaneia," see Aristot. "Pol." ii. 12, 4. "Ephialtes
and Pericles curtailed the privileges of the Areopagus, Pericles
converted the Courts of Law into salaried bodies, and so each
succeeding demagogue outdid his predecessor in the privileges he
conferred upon the commons, until the present democracy was the
result" (Welldon). "The writer of this passage clearly intended to
class Pericles among the demagogues. He judges him in the same
deprecatory spirit as Plato in the 'Gorgias,' pp. 515, 516."--
Jowett, "Pol. of Aristot." vol. ii. p. 101. But see Aristot.
"Constitution of Athens," ch. xxv., a portion of the newly-
discovered treatise, which throws light on an obscure period in
the history of Athens; and Mr. Kenyon's note ad loc.; and Mr.
Macan's criticism, "Journal of Hellenic Studies," vol. xii. No. 1.
[44] For the {ekatoste}, see Thuc. vii. 28, in reference to the year
B.C. 416; Arist. "Wasps," 658; "Frogs," 363.
[45] See Boeckh, "P. E. A." I. xii. p. 65 (Eng. trans.); I. xxiv. p.
141.
[46] See "Revenues," iv. 20, p. 338; Jebb, "Theophr. Char." xxvi. 16.
[47] For these functionaries, see Jebb, op. cit. xvi. 10.
[48] Lit. "pay or get justice."
[49] Se Arist. "Wasps," 548 foll.; Grote, "H. G." v. 520 note; Newman,
op. cit. i. 383.
Furthermore, owing to the possession of property beyond the limits of
Attica,[50] and the exercise of magistracies which take them into
regions beyond the frontier, they and their attendants have insensibly
acquired the art of navigation.[51] A man who is perpetually voyaging
is forced to handle the oar, he and his domestics alike, and to learn
the terms familiar in seamanship. Hence a stock of skilful mariners is
produced, bred upon a wide experience of voyaging and practice. They
have learnt their business, some in piloting a small craft, others a
merchant vessel, whilst others have been drafted off from these for
service on a ship-of-war. So that the majority of them are able to row
the moment they set foot on board a vessel, having been in a state of
preliminary practice all their lives.
[50] See "Mem." II. viii. 1.
[51] See "Hell." VII. i. 4.
II
As to the heavy infantry, an arm the deficiency of which at Athens is
well recognised, this is how the matter stands. They recognise the
fact that, in reference to the hostile power, they are themselves
inferior, and must be, even if their heavy infantry were more
numerous.[1] But relatively to the allies, who bring in the tribute,
their strength even on land is enormous. And they are persuaded that
their heavy infantry is sufficient for all purposes, provided they
retain this superiority.[2] Apart from all else, to a certain extent
fortune must be held responsible for the actual condition. The
subjects of a power which is dominant by land have it open to them to
form contingents from several small states and to muster in force for
battle. But with the subjects of a naval power it is different. As far
as they are groups of islanders it is impossible for their states to
meet together for united action, for the sea lies between them, and
the dominant power is master of the sea. And even if it were possible
for them to assemble in some single island unobserved, they would only
do so to perish by famine. And as to the states subject to Athens
which are not islanders, but situated on the continent, the larger are
held in check by need[3] and the small ones absolutely by fear, since
there is no state in existence which does not depend upon imports and
exports, and these she will forfeit if she does not lend a willing ear
to those who are masters by sea. In the next place, a power dominant
by sea can do certain things which a land power is debarred from
doing; as for instance, ravage the territory of a superior, since it
is always possible to coast along to some point, where either there is
no hostile force to deal with or merely a small body; and in case of
an advance in force on the part of the enemy they can take to their
ships and sail away. Such a performance is attended with less
difficulty than that experienced by the relieving force on land.[4]
Again, it is open to a power so dominating by sea to leave its own
territory and sail off on as long a voyage as you please. Whereas the
land power cannot place more than a few days' journey between itself
and its own territory, for marches are slow affairs; and it is not
possible for an army on the march to have food supplies to last for
any great length of time. Such an army must either march through
friendly territory or it must force a way by victory in battle. The
voyager meanwhile has it in his power to disembark at any point where
he finds himself in superior force, or, at the worst, to coast by
until he reaches either a friendly district or an enemy too weak to
resist. Again, those diseases to which the fruits of the earth are
liable as visitations from heaven fall severely on a land power, but
are scarcely felt by the navel power, for such sicknesses do not visit
the whole earth everywhere at once. So that the ruler of the sea can
get in supplies from a thriving district. And if one may descend to
more trifling particulars, it is to this same lordship of the sea that
the Athenians owe the discovery, in the first place, of many of the
luxuries of life through intercourse with other countries. So that the
choice things of Sicily and Italy, of Cyprus and Egypt and Lydia, of
Pontus or Peloponnese, or wheresoever else it be, are all swept, as it
were, into one centre, and all owing, as I say, to their maritime
empire. And again, in process of listening to every form of speech,[5]
they have selected this from one place and that from another--for
themselves. So much so that while the rest of the Hellenes employ[6]
each pretty much their own peculiar mode of speech, habit of life, and
style of dress, the Athenians have adopted a composite type,[7] to
which all sections of Hellas, and the foreigner alike, have
contributed.
[1] Reading after Kirchhoff, {ettous ge . . . kan ei meizon en, ton
dia k.t.l.} See Thuc. i. 143; Isocr. "de Pace," 169 A; Plut.
"Them." 4 (Clough, i. 235).
[2] Lit. "they are superior to their allies."
[3] Reading with Kirchhoff, {dia khreian . . . dia deos}.
[4] Or, "the army marching along the seaboard to the rescue."
[5] Or, "a variety of dialects."
[6] Or, "maintain somewhat more."
[7] Or, "have contracted a mixed style, bearing traces of Hellenic and
foreign influence alike." See Mahaffy, "Hist. of Greek Lit." vol.
ii. ch. x. p. 257 (1st ed.); cf. Walt Whitman, "Preface to"
original edition of "Leaves of Grass," p. 29--"The English
language befriends the grand American expression: it is brawny
enough and limber and full enough, on the tough stock of a race,
who through all change of circumstances was never without the idea
of a political liberty, which is the animus of all liberty; it has
attracted the terms of daintier and gayer and subtler and more
elegant tongues."