Eryxias

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ERYXIAS

by a Platonic Imitator (see Appendix II)

Translated by Benjamin Jowett

APPENDIX II.

The two dialogues which are translated in the second appendix are not
mentioned by Aristotle, or by any early authority, and have no claim to be
ascribed to Plato. They are examples of Platonic dialogues to be assigned
probably to the second or third generation after Plato, when his writings
were well known at Athens and Alexandria. They exhibit considerable
originality, and are remarkable for containing several thoughts of the sort
which we suppose to be modern rather than ancient, and which therefore have
a peculiar interest for us. The Second Alcibiades shows that the
difficulties about prayer which have perplexed Christian theologians were
not unknown among the followers of Plato. The Eryxias was doubted by the
ancients themselves: yet it may claim the distinction of being, among all
Greek or Roman writings, the one which anticipates in the most striking
manner the modern science of political economy and gives an abstract form
to some of its principal doctrines.

For the translation of these two dialogues I am indebted to my friend and
secretary, Mr. Knight.

That the Dialogue which goes by the name of the Second Alcibiades is a
genuine writing of Plato will not be maintained by any modern critic, and
was hardly believed by the ancients themselves. The dialectic is poor and
weak. There is no power over language, or beauty of style; and there is a
certain abruptness and agroikia in the conversation, which is very un-
Platonic. The best passage is probably that about the poets:--the remark
that the poet, who is of a reserved disposition, is uncommonly difficult to
understand, and the ridiculous interpretation of Homer, are entirely in the
spirit of Plato (compare Protag; Ion; Apol.). The characters are ill-
drawn. Socrates assumes the 'superior person' and preaches too much, while
Alcibiades is stupid and heavy-in-hand. There are traces of Stoic
influence in the general tone and phraseology of the Dialogue (compare opos
melesei tis...kaka: oti pas aphron mainetai): and the writer seems to
have been acquainted with the 'Laws' of Plato (compare Laws). An incident
from the Symposium is rather clumsily introduced, and two somewhat
hackneyed quotations (Symp., Gorg.) recur. The reference to the death of
Archelaus as having occurred 'quite lately' is only a fiction, probably
suggested by the Gorgias, where the story of Archelaus is told, and a
similar phrase occurs;--ta gar echthes kai proen gegonota tauta, k.t.l.
There are several passages which are either corrupt or extremely ill-
expressed. But there is a modern interest in the subject of the dialogue;
and it is a good example of a short spurious work, which may be attributed
to the second or third century before Christ.

ERYXIAS

by

Platonic Imitator (see Appendix II above)

Translated by Benjamin Jowett

INTRODUCTION.

Much cannot be said in praise of the style or conception of the Eryxias.
It is frequently obscure; like the exercise of a student, it is full of
small imitations of Plato:--Phaeax returning from an expedition to Sicily
(compare Socrates in the Charmides from the army at Potidaea), the figure
of the game at draughts, borrowed from the Republic, etc. It has also in
many passages the ring of sophistry. On the other hand, the rather
unhandsome treatment which is exhibited towards Prodicus is quite unlike
the urbanity of Plato.

Yet there are some points in the argument which are deserving of attention.
(1) That wealth depends upon the need of it or demand for it, is the first
anticipation in an abstract form of one of the great principles of modern
political economy, and the nearest approach to it to be found in an ancient
writer. (2) The resolution of wealth into its simplest implements going on
to infinity is a subtle and refined thought. (3) That wealth is relative
to circumstances is a sound conception. (4) That the arts and sciences
which receive payment are likewise to be comprehended under the notion of
wealth, also touches a question of modern political economy. (5) The
distinction of post hoc and propter hoc, often lost sight of in modern as
well as in ancient times. These metaphysical conceptions and distinctions
show considerable power of thought in the writer, whatever we may think of
his merits as an imitator of Plato.

ERYXIAS

by

Platonic Imitator (see Appendix II above)

Translated by Benjamin Jowett

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Eryxias, Erasistratus, Critias.

SCENE: The portico of a temple of Zeus.

It happened by chance that Eryxias the Steirian was walking with me in the
Portico of Zeus the Deliverer, when there came up to us Critias and
Erasistratus, the latter the son of Phaeax, who was the nephew of
Erasistratus. Now Erasistratus had just arrived from Sicily and that part
of the world. As they approached, he said, Hail, Socrates!

SOCRATES: The same to you, I said; have you any good news from Sicily to
tell us?

ERASISTRATUS: Most excellent. But, if you please, let us first sit down;
for I am tired with my yesterday's journey from Megara.

SOCRATES: Gladly, if that is your desire.

ERASISTRATUS: What would you wish to hear first? he said. What the
Sicilians are doing, or how they are disposed towards our city? To my
mind, they are very like wasps: so long as you only cause them a little
annoyance they are quite unmanageable; you must destroy their nests if you
wish to get the better of them. And in a similar way, the Syracusans,
unless we set to work in earnest, and go against them with a great
expedition, will never submit to our rule. The petty injuries which we at
present inflict merely irritate them enough to make them utterly
intractable. And now they have sent ambassadors to Athens, and intend, I
suspect, to play us some trick.--While we were talking, the Syracusan
envoys chanced to go by, and Erasistratus, pointing to one of them, said to
me, That, Socrates, is the richest man in all Italy and Sicily. For who
has larger estates or more land at his disposal to cultivate if he please?
And they are of a quality, too, finer than any other land in Hellas.
Moreover, he has all the things which go to make up wealth, slaves and
horses innumerable, gold and silver without end.

I saw that he was inclined to expatiate on the riches of the man; so I
asked him, Well, Erasistratus, and what sort of character does he bear in
Sicily?

ERASISTRATUS: He is esteemed to be, and really is, the wickedest of all
the Sicilians and Italians, and even more wicked than he is rich; indeed,
if you were to ask any Sicilian whom he thought to be the worst and the
richest of mankind, you would never hear any one else named.

I reflected that we were speaking, not of trivial matters, but about wealth
and virtue, which are deemed to be of the greatest moment, and I asked
Erasistratus whom he considered the wealthier,--he who was the possessor of
a talent of silver or he who had a field worth two talents?

ERASISTRATUS: The owner of the field.

SOCRATES: And on the same principle he who had robes and bedding and such
things which are of greater value to him than to a stranger would be richer
than the stranger?

ERASISTRATUS: True.

SOCRATES: And if any one gave you a choice, which of these would you
prefer?

ERASISTRATUS: That which was most valuable.

SOCRATES: In which way do you think you would be the richer?

ERASISTRATUS: By choosing as I said.

SOCRATES: And he appears to you to be the richest who has goods of the
greatest value?

ERASISTRATUS: He does.

SOCRATES: And are not the healthy richer than the sick, since health is a
possession more valuable than riches to the sick? Surely there is no one
who would not prefer to be poor and well, rather than to have all the King
of Persia's wealth and to be ill. And this proves that men set health
above wealth, else they would never choose the one in preference to the
other.

ERASISTRATUS: True.

SOCRATES: And if anything appeared to be more valuable than health, he
would be the richest who possessed it?

ERASISTRATUS: He would.

SOCRATES: Suppose that some one came to us at this moment and were to ask,
Well, Socrates and Eryxias and Erasistratus, can you tell me what is of the
greatest value to men? Is it not that of which the possession will best
enable a man to advise how his own and his friend's affairs should be
administered?--What will be our reply?

ERASISTRATUS: I should say, Socrates, that happiness was the most precious
of human possessions.

SOCRATES: Not a bad answer. But do we not deem those men who are most
prosperous to be the happiest?

ERASISTRATUS: That is my opinion.

SOCRATES: And are they not most prosperous who commit the fewest errors in
respect either of themselves or of other men?

ERASISTRATUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And they who know what is evil and what is good; what should be
done and what should be left undone;--these behave the most wisely and make
the fewest mistakes?

Erasistratus agreed to this.

SOCRATES: Then the wisest and those who do best and the most fortunate and
the richest would appear to be all one and the same, if wisdom is really
the most valuable of our possessions?

Yes, said Eryxias, interposing, but what use would it be if a man had the
wisdom of Nestor and wanted the necessaries of life, food and drink and
clothes and the like? Where would be the advantage of wisdom then? Or how
could he be the richest of men who might even have to go begging, because
he had not wherewithal to live?

I thought that what Eryxias was saying had some weight, and I replied,
Would the wise man really suffer in this way, if he were so ill-provided;
whereas if he had the house of Polytion, and the house were full of gold
and silver, he would lack nothing?

ERYXIAS: Yes; for then he might dispose of his property and obtain in
exchange what he needed, or he might sell it for money with which he could
supply his wants and in a moment procure abundance of everything.

SOCRATES: True, if he could find some one who preferred such a house to
the wisdom of Nestor. But if there are persons who set great store by
wisdom like Nestor's and the advantages accruing from it, to sell these, if
he were so disposed, would be easier still. Or is a house a most useful
and necessary possession, and does it make a great difference in the
comfort of life to have a mansion like Polytion's instead of living in a
shabby little cottage, whereas wisdom is of small use and it is of no
importance whether a man is wise or ignorant about the highest matters? Or
is wisdom despised of men and can find no buyers, although cypress wood and
marble of Pentelicus are eagerly bought by numerous purchasers? Surely the
prudent pilot or the skilful physician, or the artist of any kind who is
proficient in his art, is more worth than the things which are especially
reckoned among riches; and he who can advise well and prudently for himself
and others is able also to sell the product of his art, if he so desire.

Eryxias looked askance, as if he had received some unfair treatment, and
said, I believe, Socrates, that if you were forced to speak the truth, you
would declare that you were richer than Callias the son of Hipponicus. And
yet, although you claimed to be wiser about things of real importance, you
would not any the more be richer than he.

I dare say, Eryxias, I said, that you may regard these arguments of ours as
a kind of game; you think that they have no relation to facts, but are like
the pieces in the game of draughts which the player can move in such a way
that his opponents are unable to make any countermove. (Compare Republic.)
And perhaps, too, as regards riches you are of opinion that while facts
remain the same, there are arguments, no matter whether true or false,
which enable the user of them to prove that the wisest and the richest are
one and the same, although he is in the wrong and his opponents are in the
right. There would be nothing strange in this; it would be as if two
persons were to dispute about letters, one declaring that the word Socrates
began with an S, the other that it began with an A, and the latter could
gain the victory over the former.

Eryxias glanced at the audience, laughing and blushing at once, as if he
had had nothing to do with what had just been said, and replied,--No,
indeed, Socrates, I never supposed that our arguments should be of a kind
which would never convince any one of those here present or be of advantage
to them. For what man of sense could ever be persuaded that the wisest and
the richest are the same? The truth is that we are discussing the subject
of riches, and my notion is that we should argue respecting the honest and
dishonest means of acquiring them, and, generally, whether they are a good
thing or a bad.

Very good, I said, and I am obliged to you for the hint: in future we will
be more careful. But why do not you yourself, as you introduced the
argument, and do not think that the former discussion touched the point at
issue, tell us whether you consider riches to be a good or an evil?

I am of opinion, he said, that they are a good. He was about to add
something more, when Critias interrupted him:--Do you really suppose so,
Eryxias?

Certainly, replied Eryxias; I should be mad if I did not: and I do not
fancy that you would find any one else of a contrary opinion.

And I, retorted Critias, should say that there is no one whom I could not
compel to admit that riches are bad for some men. But surely, if they were
a good, they could not appear bad for any one?

Here I interposed and said to them: If you two were having an argument
about equitation and what was the best way of riding, supposing that I knew
the art myself, I should try to bring you to an agreement. For I should be
ashamed if I were present and did not do what I could to prevent your
difference. And I should do the same if you were quarrelling about any
other art and were likely, unless you agreed on the point in dispute, to
part as enemies instead of as friends. But now, when we are contending
about a thing of which the usefulness continues during the whole of life,
and it makes an enormous difference whether we are to regard it as
beneficial or not,--a thing, too, which is esteemed of the highest
importance by the Hellenes:--(for parents, as soon as their children are,
as they think, come to years of discretion, urge them to consider how
wealth may be acquired, since by riches the value of a man is judged):--
When, I say, we are thus in earnest, and you, who agree in other respects,
fall to disputing about a matter of such moment, that is, about wealth, and
not merely whether it is black or white, light or heavy, but whether it is
a good or an evil, whereby, although you are now the dearest of friends and
kinsmen, the most bitter hatred may arise betwixt you, I must hinder your
dissension to the best of my power. If I could, I would tell you the
truth, and so put an end to the dispute; but as I cannot do this, and each
of you supposes that you can bring the other to an agreement, I am
prepared, as far as my capacity admits, to help you in solving the
question. Please, therefore, Critias, try to make us accept the doctrines
which you yourself entertain.

CRITIAS: I should like to follow up the argument, and will ask Eryxias
whether he thinks that there are just and unjust men?

ERYXIAS: Most decidedly.

CRITIAS: And does injustice seem to you an evil or a good?

ERYXIAS: An evil.

CRITIAS: Do you consider that he who bribes his neighbour's wife and
commits adultery with her, acts justly or unjustly, and this although both
the state and the laws forbid?

ERYXIAS: Unjustly.

CRITIAS: And if the wicked man has wealth and is willing to spend it, he
will carry out his evil purposes? whereas he who is short of means cannot
do what he fain would, and therefore does not sin? In such a case, surely,
it is better that a person should not be wealthy, if his poverty prevents
the accomplishment of his desires, and his desires are evil? Or, again,
should you call sickness a good or an evil?

ERYXIAS: An evil.

CRITIAS: Well, and do you think that some men are intemperate?

ERYXIAS: Yes.

CRITIAS: Then, if it is better for his health that the intemperate man
should refrain from meat and drink and other pleasant things, but he cannot
owing to his intemperance, will it not also be better that he should be too
poor to gratify his lust rather than that he should have a superabundance
of means? For thus he will not be able to sin, although he desire never so
much.

Critias appeared to be arguing so admirably that Eryxias, if he had not
been ashamed of the bystanders, would probably have got up and struck him.
For he thought that he had been robbed of a great possession when it became
obvious to him that he had been wrong in his former opinion about wealth.
I observed his vexation, and feared that they would proceed to abuse and
quarrelling: so I said,--I heard that very argument used in the Lyceum
yesterday by a wise man, Prodicus of Ceos; but the audience thought that he
was talking mere nonsense, and no one could be persuaded that he was
speaking the truth. And when at last a certain talkative young gentleman
came in, and, taking his seat, began to laugh and jeer at Prodicus,
tormenting him and demanding an explanation of his argument, he gained the
ear of the audience far more than Prodicus.

Can you repeat the discourse to us? Said Erasistratus.

SOCRATES: If I can only remember it, I will. The youth began by asking
Prodicus, In what way did he think that riches were a good and in what an
evil? Prodicus answered, as you did just now, that they were a good to
good men and to those who knew in what way they should be employed, while
to the bad and the ignorant they were an evil. The same is true, he went
on to say, of all other things; men make them to be what they are
themselves. The saying of Archilochus is true:--

'Men's thoughts correspond to the things which they meet with.'

Well, then, replied the youth, if any one makes me wise in that wisdom
whereby good men become wise, he must also make everything else good to me.
Not that he concerns himself at all with these other things, but he has
converted my ignorance into wisdom. If, for example, a person teach me
grammar or music, he will at the same time teach me all that relates to
grammar or music, and so when he makes me good, he makes things good to me.

Prodicus did not altogether agree: still he consented to what was said.

And do you think, said the youth, that doing good things is like building a
house,--the work of human agency; or do things remain what they were at
first, good or bad, for all time?

Prodicus began to suspect, I fancy, the direction which the argument was
likely to take, and did not wish to be put down by a mere stripling before
all those present:--(if they two had been alone, he would not have
minded):--so he answered, cleverly enough: I think that doing good things
is a work of human agency.

And is virtue in your opinion, Prodicus, innate or acquired by instruction?

The latter, said Prodicus.

Then you would consider him a simpleton who supposed that he could obtain
by praying to the Gods the knowledge of grammar or music or any other art,
which he must either learn from another or find out for himself?

Prodicus agreed to this also.

And when you pray to the Gods that you may do well and receive good, you
mean by your prayer nothing else than that you desire to become good and
wise:--if, at least, things are good to the good and wise and evil to the
evil. But in that case, if virtue is acquired by instruction, it would
appear that you only pray to be taught what you do not know.

Hereupon I said to Prodicus that it was no misfortune to him if he had been
proved to be in error in supposing that the Gods immediately granted to us
whatever we asked:--if, I added, whenever you go up to the Acropolis you
earnestly entreat the Gods to grant you good things, although you know not
whether they can yield your request, it is as though you went to the doors
of the grammarian and begged him, although you had never made a study of
the art, to give you a knowledge of grammar which would enable you
forthwith to do the business of a grammarian.

While I was speaking, Prodicus was preparing to retaliate upon his youthful
assailant, intending to employ the argument of which you have just made
use; for he was annoyed to have it supposed that he offered a vain prayer
to the Gods. But the master of the gymnasium came to him and begged him to
leave because he was teaching the youths doctrines which were unsuited to
them, and therefore bad for them.

I have told you this because I want you to understand how men are
circumstanced in regard to philosophy. Had Prodicus been present and said
what you have said, the audience would have thought him raving, and he
would have been ejected from the gymnasium. But you have argued so
excellently well that you have not only persuaded your hearers, but have
brought your opponent to an agreement. For just as in the law courts, if
two witnesses testify to the same fact, one of whom seems to be an honest
fellow and the other a rogue, the testimony of the rogue often has the
contrary effect on the judges' minds to what he intended, while the same
evidence if given by the honest man at once strikes them as perfectly true.
And probably the audience have something of the same feeling about yourself
and Prodicus; they think him a Sophist and a braggart, and regard you as a
gentleman of courtesy and worth. For they do not pay attention to the
argument so much as to the character of the speaker.

But truly, Socrates, said Erasistratus, though you may be joking, Critias
does seem to me to be saying something which is of weight.

SOCRATES: I am in profound earnest, I assure you. But why, as you have
begun your argument so prettily, do you not go on with the rest? There is
still something lacking, now you have agreed that (wealth) is a good to
some and an evil to others. It remains to enquire what constitutes wealth;
for unless you know this, you cannot possibly come to an understanding as
to whether it is a good or an evil. I am ready to assist you in the
enquiry to the utmost of my power: but first let him who affirms that
riches are a good, tell us what, in his opinion, is wealth.

ERASISTRATUS: Indeed, Socrates, I have no notion about wealth beyond that
which men commonly have. I suppose that wealth is a quantity of money
(compare Arist. Pol.); and this, I imagine, would also be Critias'
definition.

SOCRATES: Then now we have to consider, What is money? Or else later on
we shall be found to differ about the question. For instance, the
Carthaginians use money of this sort. Something which is about the size of
a stater is tied up in a small piece of leather: what it is, no one knows
but the makers. A seal is next set upon the leather, which then passes
into circulation, and he who has the largest number of such pieces is
esteemed the richest and best off. And yet if any one among us had a mass
of such coins he would be no wealthier than if he had so many pebbles from
the mountain. At Lacedaemon, again, they use iron by weight which has been
rendered useless: and he who has the greatest mass of such iron is thought
to be the richest, although elsewhere it has no value. In Ethiopia
engraved stones are employed, of which a Lacedaemonian could make no use.
Once more, among the Nomad Scythians a man who owned the house of Polytion
would not be thought richer than one who possessed Mount Lycabettus among
ourselves. And clearly those things cannot all be regarded as possessions;
for in some cases the possessors would appear none the richer thereby:
but, as I was saying, some one of them is thought in one place to be money,
and the possessors of it are the wealthy, whereas in some other place it is
not money, and the ownership of it does not confer wealth; just as the
standard of morals varies, and what is honourable to some men is
dishonourable to others. And if we wish to enquire why a house is valuable
to us but not to the Scythians, or why the Carthaginians value leather
which is worthless to us, or the Lacedaemonians find wealth in iron and we
do not, can we not get an answer in some such way as this: Would an
Athenian, who had a thousand talents weight of the stones which lie about
in the Agora and which we do not employ for any purpose, be thought to be
any the richer?

ERASISTRATUS: He certainly would not appear so to me.

SOCRATES: But if he possessed a thousand talents weight of some precious
stone, we should say that he was very rich?

ERASISTRATUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: The reason is that the one is useless and the other useful?

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